KHRUSHCHEV'S COMEBACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000200016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 24, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T.I-A-L
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFF ME OF NATIONAL ESTDv1TCS
24 June 1963
STAFF H30R NDUM NO. 37-63
STJ SECT: Ithrushchev's CoanebLQ
NOTE TO ME BOARD
This memorandum was prepared on the initiative of FE Staff.,
end Is distributed for the information of the Board. Ito main
Points will be incorporated into the draft of a forthcoming
CIA assessment of current problems and pressures confronting
IChrushchev.
C-0-Iwo'-1-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24 June 1963
STAFF r toRANDuM No. 37-63
SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Comeback
A. Anticipating success for his Cuban venture, Khrushchev
during the early fall of 1962 appeared to be laying the ground-
work for a number of major political and econoniic initiatives.
It became apparent soon after the Central Committee plenum in
November, hcwever9 that his plans were being effectively stymied
both by circuwstances, in the form of a series of difficult pro-
blems which faced him in the wake of Cuba, and politics, in the
form of a dubious and probably obstinate Presidium. By February
and March, his career seemed to have reached a post-1957 lcwpoint;
either because he was convinced by a generally discouraging trend
of events or because he bad little choice but to acceed
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to a dominant, conservative, perhaps Kozlovian view then pre-
vailing in the Presidium, he gave every evidencc of being a man
in retreat.
B. Since mid-April or so, however, [{hruahchev appears to
have been very much on the move, reasserting both the style of his
personal leadership and the content of his traditional policies.
And the recently concluded plenum of the Central Committee seems
to have net the seal on his resurgence, which, at least in retro-
spect, appears to date in the main from the vime of Kozlov's
last public appearance on 10 April. In any event, his ability
to come back after a series of policy failures and a period of
probably great political tension, even if in part the result of
good luck (Kozlov's illness), is testimony both to the inherent
advantages of his position and to his skill in coping with resis-
tance. It would now appear less likely than ever that Khrushchev
will be seriously challenged by any of his colleagues in the
foreseeable future.
C, Nevertheless, a great many unresolved foreign and c1oxn stic
issues will confront the Soviet leadership. The debate with the
Chinese is approaching a cliraas; problems in and with Eastern Europe
are growing; and foreign policy as a whole seems to be in a state
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of relative immobility. At home,, the question of resource allo-
cation is still protab1y the subject of some debate,, and no doubt;
will continue to be for some time to come,. Certain doctrinal
Issues with strong political overtones still seem to be subject
to some controversy. And,, in the area of cultural policy and
the proper approach to the era of Stalin j, uncertainty and dibat _xee-
ni ent ie, no doubt widespread, But on most of these fields,,
! i ushr:hev is once again setting the dominant tone and I)rovie tig
ti'.,a party with guit eines for action which are consistent his
traditional riethods and policies. Further,, as would seem t!. be
demonstrated by the recent =mincof Bxezhnev and Podgorny to the
necretariate,he appears to be in firm control of party personnel
appointments.
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"I have a magnifieant impression of Comrade
Khrushchev . . . . He is extraorditnarily human .
He has an extraordinary mental energy, and a com-
plete, complete, complete mental lucidity . . . .
without a doubt one of the most brilliant intellects
that I have ever known .. . . a militant revolu-
tionary . . . a veritable authority on economic
problems . . . . There exists fl_n the Soviet leadershi7
a spirit of collective disciwsion; yet acidot
this . . . one is quite aware of Khrushchev's
authority and prestige in the collective manage-
ment . . . .''
--Fide?. Castro, Havana, 4 June 1963
1. A variety of recent signs, not the least of which is
cited above, suggests that Khruehchev is well on the road to P013t-
.et#i recovery. We have estimated that Ithrushchev suffered a
decline in preeminence during the winter and early spring, partly
as a result of a "conservative consensus" among his top colleagues;
but we have also estimated that his temperament is not "amenable to
collectivity" and that he lots likely to move again in order to
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reassert his dominance,, Recent, developments in domestic politics,
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the economy, and ideology tend, we think, to confirm both of these
judgments. Since perhaps mid-April or no, Khrushchev appears to
have been very much the man on the move, reasserting both the
style of his personal leadership and the content of h?1e traditional
policies. And thr.- recently concluded plenum of the ('entr' l
Committee seems to have net the seal on his resurgence.
2,, There follows a more or Less chronological review of some
of the principal signs of Kbrushchev's political malaise of last
winter and manifestations of his recovery during the spring. A
number of perhaps relevant developments in the military area, in-
cluding some personnel changes, the Fenkovsky case, and disputes
over doctrine, and the general air of uncertainty in foreign affairs,
are not specifically examined here. But they have been taken into
account, and do not appear to contradict the general trend of
domestic events. The focus of this paper is thus concentrated
mainly on those factors -- including Kozlov, chemistry, culture,
Castro, and the consumer -- which seem most clearly -co have played
at least a symptomatic Kole in Khrushchevfs recent faU and rise.
This criterion -- clarity -- precludes another area of examination,
viz, certain possible indications of high-level political infighting,
such as the listings of Presidium member Kirilenko out of alpha-
betical order by some Soviet newspapers. Ibfightiog almost cer-
tainly exists r,nd may be reflected in this esot ric way, but such
evidence is usually more intriguing than it is conclusive.
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The Nadir
3. Anticipating success for his C'tban venture, Khruahchev
in the early fall seemed to be laying the groundvork for a number
of major l,olit&eal and economic iritf atives o The alleged dis-
covery of a Lenin statement which stressed the nrimncy of economics
over politics was intended in part to establish the doctrinrl frame-
work for structural changes in party and state management of the
economy. And the burgeoning anti-Stalin (and anti-Stalinist)
campaign, high-lighted by Khrushchev's decision to publish
Solzhenitsyn's novel, One Day aid Yevtushenko t e poem, "Stalin Hetrs",
may have been intended to net the stage "or a number of political
changes, includir , perhaps, a shakeup of the top leadership.
L. Despite the failure in Cuba, Khrushchev appears in the
main to have gotten his way at the plenum of the Central Committee
held in November. His plans for a reorganization of the party along
funetioal (industrial and agricultural) lines and his proposals
concerning changes in top state economic organs were for the most
pr.,rt adopted by the plenum. His economic plans, particularly his
emphasis on the need to give greater priority to agriculture and
to the chemical '.ndustry (and less to the steel industry), both
areas of prime interest to the consumer, were also endorsed, though
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probably not in full. And big political plans, while still obscure,
have been reflected in part by the plenum's docision to
expx,ud the party Secretariat, establish a number of new top party
bureaus as overseers of specific economic areas, and create a new
control commission (headed by Khrushchev's protege, Shelepin) to
ride herd on both party and state bureaucracies. A]. of these
moves could have facilitated an attempt by Kbrushchev to increase
hie power at the expense of that still exercised by his senior
colleagues on the Presidium.
5. It became apparent soon after the November plenum, however,
that Khrushchev's plaits were being effectively stymied by a com-
bination of: concern stTrnu:ta ted by the Cuban crisis; confusion
occasioned by the various reorganizations; turmoil provoked by the
destalinize,tion campaign; end political resistance evoked by the
ftnctional split in the party, the new doctrinal emphasis on
economics, and Khrushchev's apparent efforts at aggrandizement,
His prestige already l- .fir damaged by a numlbor of policy failures,
and his own self-carl'idence no doubt )ndly shaken,, Khrushchev did
not react positively. The cotlbination of clroumsimnce, in trc fora
of a series of problems which confronted him in the wake of Cuba,
and politics, In the form of a dubious and probably obstinate
Presidium, seated to be too much for him.
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6. Thereafter, in December and Jttnu&y, Khrushchev's pro-
grarin seemed to be subject to a process of unsystematic undoing.
The anti.-Stalin campaign was abandoned; the party and state re-
organization appeared to be floundering; the new party'bur?aus re-
mained relatively inactive; the party state control commission was
given fewer powere over party organs than it was apparently Initially
intended to receive; and plans for greater emphasis on agriculture
and the chemical industry were placed in cbeyrnce. By February
and March., Khrushchev'n career seemed to reach a post-1957 lowpoint.
Either, becausi he was convinced by the arguments of his colleagues
and by the generally discouraging trend of events, or because he
had little choice but to accede to the dominant view than pre-
vailing in the Presiaiuvn, he gave every evidence during these two
months of being a man in retreat.
7. Khrushchev's speech to bin Moscow constituents on
27 February, in which he spoke of the need to spend "enormous" sums
on "military might", seemed to reflect his general discouragement.
It offered the Soviet people little in the way -,f praise for past
performances aid virtually not ing in the way of future; promises.
In contrast, Kozlov, speaking in Leningrad only the day before,
hailed both the USSR's glorious succesea and remarkable prospects
and described Soviet society as the "brightest and most joyous
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on earth." ICozlov (at one time a metallurgist) seemed to give only
grudging and qualified approval to Khrushchev's plans for the
chemical industry and called for large new investments in the
machine building industry, (a pitch which wan to be specifically
disallowed by Khrushchev in April, of which more later). Through-
out this period, Kozlov was very much in evidence and Taxis state-
ments and travels were well publicized in the Soviet press.
8. Next, on 8 March, Khrushchev addressed the writers. It
could not have been an iasy task, for in the process of insisting
on artistic conformity, he was forced to recant in two very sensi-
tive areas of policy. In affect, he repudiated hie own cultural
policy of some years standing, i.e. minimal party interference in
the ants and at least tacit permission for the appearance of
literary works more realist than socialist. And he drastically
revised his previous assessments of Stalin and his era, paid tribute
to Stalin's merits and Eervices, and, in effect, reversed the anti-
Stalin campaign inaugurated by him only a few months bei'ore.
9. The next blow to Yhrushchev's prestige, and perhaps his
power, apparently came on 13 March. A joint meeting of the party
presidium and the Council of Minictera decided on that day to
establish a Supreme National Economic Council provided with all the
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"necessary rights and powers for the solution of the questions
connected with the work of industry and construction, and for
insuring the successful fulfillment of state flans." The new
organ, zubordinate to the Council of Ministers, "given orders
and instvictions which must be carried out by all state bodies
irrespective of their subordination."
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10. This act was somewhat unusual in several respects. It
was made without any prior public warning whatsoe,rer; indeed, a
speech made. by the top Soviet planning official only ten days
beforehand clearly indicated that even this official had not been
forewarned. Further, it is highly unusual to convene the Presidium
and the Council of Ministers for such purposes; normally, a
decision of this magnitude px blic1y involves the Central Committee
as a whole. Finally, there has been remarkably little public
comment on the new Council; neither the Soviet press nor the
leaders have devoted much space or time to an examination of its
functions or, as would seem to be in order, an extollment of its
virtues. Khrushchev himself avoided comment until late April, and
then his remrks were notably unenthusiastic. Indeed, they included
some direct criticism of the performance of the Council's new
chief, Ustinov, in his previous Job (running the nation's defense
industries).
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U. The establishment of the new Council also appeared to
contradict both the spirit and the letter of the decisions made
at Khrushchev's behest by the Central Committee plenum the previous
November. First of all, it seemed to shift emphasis away from
greater party control and mnrngement of the economy; inter aalia,
the head of the new Council was not a high-level party figure, nor
was he a protege of Khrushchev's (though he may have been one of
Kozlov's), Secondly, it concentrated in this man's hands all the
powers previously assigned by the November plenum to the heads of
the three top state economic organs (the planning council, the
construction council, and the national economic council). Finally,
and in complete contradiction of the injunction of Khrushchev, it
gave to these three organs authority over comparable bodies in
the* union republics. The whole episode reminded a number of
observers (probably including some in the USSR) of a previous period
in Soviet history when Khrushchev's plans for decentralization were
temporarily thwarted by the anti-party group. At a low point in
Khrushchev, addressing the plenum on 19 November, declared that
in order to carry to its logical conclusion the responsibility
of the republics for the management of national economy and its
planning, it is necessary to make planninC, and the irplementation
of plans fully the tasks of the ropnibli.cn, their Goo-plans and
sovnarkhozes. (underscoring ours)
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Khrucahchev's career in December 1956, this group succeeded in
pushing through a plan to create a central economic organ very
similar to the Supreme Council, a move subsequently rescinded
by Khrushchev.
12. Khrushchev left Moscow on 14 March, the day after he
chaired the meeting wh,,ch established the Supreme Council. He
apparently needed a change of ec:-.: a and an opportunity to publicize
some of his own convictions. Accordingly, heading south, he toured
a 'umber of chemical plants and advertised the notion he had no
strongly expressed it: November that the development of the ehemical
industry should be accelerated. "This question," Khrushchev had
said then, "deserves to be discussed again at the next plenum of
the Central Committee of the CPSU." But while Khrushchev vas
vacationing on the Black Sea, it vas announced in Moscow on 9 April
that the next plenum of the Central Committee would concern itself
with ideology.
13. On the previous day, Pravda had published the party slogans
for May Day; the one concerning Ytagoslavia failed to reflect
Khrushchev's view of this country's status as a socialist country
and,in effect, contradicted the statement made on this point in
the CPSU letter of 30 March to the Communist Party of China, a
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letter which bore the signs of Ih ushchev's authorship. Only a
week before, all of the top members of the Presidtum except Khrushchev
had assembled in Moscow, ostensibly to entertain a delegation from
the Communist Party of France. Given the timing and the fact
that there in no precedent for such an assembly in Kh ushchev's
absence, together with past signs that Kozlov bad been, at best,
lukewarm about the USSR's rapprochement with Yugoslavia, it is
at least tempting to conclude that these leaders had reviewed the
May lay slogans and that, in the process, Khrushcheu had either
been outvoted or ignored.
14. It waw apparent durirg this entire period.. February and
March, that a series of interrelated problems were agitating the
Soviet leadership, It became so obvious, in fact, that rumors
were rife of Khrushchev's imminent political demise and both
Italian and Yugoslav Communistv alluded publicly to controversy
within the leadership. The Italian statements were apparently
prompted in part by the then impending general elections and the
desire of the CPI to disassociate itself from the increasingly harsh
cultural line emerging in ::1oscow. But no such motive impelled the
Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow, F. Barbieri, who wrote on 10 April
that the Soviets were engaged in "debates on foreign policies" and
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"controversies and struggles" ovar the allocation of resources, and
who implied, in general, that the Soviet leadership was in a
state of disagreement and disarray.
15. Barbieri, who can be fairly characterized as a knowledgeable
observer, claimed that "external factors" (which he blamed on US)
had led to an increase in Soviet military ir:restments and this, in
turn, had produced a 'whole complex of internal problems. Thus, he
wrote, large investments in agriculture planned for 1962 and 1963
were reduced; difficulties were encountered in the effort to e.pand
the chemical industry, which was supposed to become the basis for
industrial modernization and a faster rate of growth in living
standards; and "conflicts" between the "old and tJe new ways of
Soviet development;", as exemplified by the competition for resources
between the chemical and metai'Lurigical industries, were inten-
sified. Barbieri did not identify Khrushchev as the leader who
bad favored agriculture and the chemical industry and who had
been highly critical of the "metal eaters", but did note that the
formation of the Supreme National Economic Council ran counter to
the decisions of the November plenum.
The Ascent
16. if Khrushchev left Moscow under a cloud in mid-Nzrch,
the sun had broken through by the time of his official return on
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or about 20 Aprils. In this connection,, it would seem to be more
than mere coincidence that Kozlov, who may have been the leader of
conservative forces in the Presidium., made his last public
appearance on 10 April at the first session of a meeting of
artists in Moscow; he failed to attend the second session convened
two days later. He thus was probably stricken on the 10th or 11th.
In any events it was announced on the 11th that the May tiny slogan
concerning Yugoslavia had been revised and it now repeated
Khrushchev's formaila used in the letter to the Chinese.
17. On 17 April., Pravda seemingly prepared for Khrushchev's
impending arrival with a panegyric reviewing a collection of his
speeches entitled "A Major Contribution to the Theory and Practice
of Communist Construction." Referring to Khrushchev as "that true
Leninist" who heads the Communist Party and its Central Committee,,
the editorial claimed that the publication of Khrushchev's works
constituted a "significant event in the life of our party and the
country." It hailed the 22nd Party '';ongress., quite clearly identified
as Khrushchev's cwn., as comparable to Lenin's 2nd and 8th Congresses
and as "the most outstanding event, in the history of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and of the whole world Communist and workers
movement." Throughout the article., emphasis was placed on the
wisdom and success of such traditional Khrushchev policies as
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priority for agriculture, the need for material Incentives, and
the "welfare of man."*
18. This apparent revival of concern for the consumer was
echoed three days later in a small, front-page item in Izvestia
which announced a decision of the Supreme National Economic Council
to increase by one billion rubles the planned production of con-
sumers goods in 1963. This, as far as we know, was the first
time that a decision of the Supreme Council had been announced.
Pravda, commenting on 16 March on the decision to establish the
Council, had stressed the value of the new body in terms of such
matters as construction activity, the introduction of new machines,
and the strengthening of state discipline; it did not refer to
the production of consumers goods at a11, Thus, in his first
public move, the armaments expert Ustinov, who had been named to
head an agency responsible mainly for the direction of heavy
Both the tone and the contents of a Pravda article which
appeared on 13 Febr,iry and which dealt with the publication
of earlier volumes in the Khrushchev series were of an entirely
different nature. Praise was extraordinarily reserved and
substance was surrounded by qualifiers. Ever; the title; com-
pared to that of the April article, was non-committal: "On the
Crash Front of Communist Construction."
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industry and construction, found himself identified with jar tops
and soda siphons (two of the items named in Izvestia). This looked
very much like the work of Khrushchev.
19. Khrushchev's speech of 24 April to construction and
industrial workers, in which he alluded to his eventual retirement,
was notable in several other respects. Much of it wan bitter,
as was in a sense his election speech in February, but in this
instance his bitterness was demanding rather than defensive. In
a sense, he seemed to be roasting those who had ruled during his
"absence"; he lamented the sorry state of affairs in economic
management, insisted that something be done about it, and
criticized the heads of the top economic organs by name (including
Ustinov). He reiterated his belief in the virtues of the chemical
indua-try and announced, cryptically, that the Central Committee
had decided to convene a plenum at some unspecified date to deal
with this subject. Finally, he rebutted an opinion concerning the
machine building industry expressed by Kozlov in February.* The
Kozlov, speaking in Leningrad on 26 February, had called for
the investment of "huge Rands" in the construction of new
machine building enterprises. Khrushchev said that such new
enterpriseu should, of course, continue to be built but that it
is "considerably more profitable" t iinvest in new evuipment so
as to facilitate a transfer to two-shift work in existii,g
enterprises. He claimed that the latter procedure would bring
twice the return per ruble of investment.
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speech as a whole, while not of the character which could be
fairly described as typical of Khrushchev in all its substance,
nevertheless appeared in the main to be another sign of resurgence.
20. This at least partial return to Khrushehevi.an economics
was confirmed on 4 June when Pravda announced that the Premier
had made a number of proposals concerning "basic principles and
approaches for drafting the economic plan for 1964-65 and following
years." Khrushchev stressed tb' need for a "fundamental revision"
in planning and said that the chemical industry should be the
chief beneficiary of such a revision. Consumers' goods, agricul-
ture, and industry (in that order) would benefit in turn. Pravda
noted that the Council of Ministers meeting which heard these
proposals was also attended by a variety of representatives from
the party, the union republics, and top central economic organs,
but made no reference to anyone present from the Supreme National
Economic Council.
2].. The announcement in late April that Castro had accepted
the Soviet Premier's personal inv.tation to visit the USSR seemed
to be yet another sign of Khrushchev'a political comeback and, in
this context, Castro's subsequent Soviet tour almost certainly
proved to be a great boon. Castro's implicit endorsement of the
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Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, his specific sanction
of the USShOs Cuban policy, and his high praise of Khrushchov
personally all s?rued to buttress Ihrushchev's prestige. If
nothing else, Castro provided Khrushchev v-ith an opportunity to
demonstrate his status as N'ttmber One and to appear before the
public in a favorable light. Moreover, it must have occurred to
Soviet party members that Castro would scarely have returned
to Havana and responded to Khrushchev with such notable enthusiasm
if he had had ary serious doubts about Khrushchev's political
future.
22. A Khrushchevi,,'. comeback could also be seen in events
associated with the then forthcoming Central Committee Plenum on
ideology. Initially scheduled for late May, it was announced on
14 May that this meeting had been postponed to mid-June. (For
reasons which remain obscure, the decision was alleged to have been
made on 3 May, one day after the official announcement of Kozlov's
illness.) More importaniv, this decision was accompanied by signs
that the party's at.?ident campaign against recalcitrant writers
had been considerably toned down and that the subject matter to be
considered by the plenum had been greatly broadened. Publicity
preceding the meeting addressed itself to such topics as the
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 education of the "new Communist man", the moral and political
decline of the capitalist West, and the need for ideology to spur
Increases in labor, productivity.
23. In any event, the great cultural crackdown feared by the
writers in March now seems le-a likely. Kozlov's illness may have
been partly responsible for this; the liberal writers believe that
he had been the champion of "Stalinist" authors and was largely
responsible for the harsh campaign against non-conformity. What-
ever the reasons, Ilichev, in his speech to the plenum (which,
among other things, was highly laudatory of Khrushchev) assured
hia listeners that there world be no return to Stalinist methods
in the struggle against literary "rubbish." Despite continuing
emphasis on the impermissability of "ideological coexistence" with
the West and the probability that some further measures will be
taken to strengthen the party's influence and control over the
writers, cultural policy now seems to be returning partially to
the more traditional Khrushchev approach; hands off the intellectu-
als insofar as possible, partly because the liberals at times serve
Khrushchev's political purposes, partly because Khrushchev would
ordinarily prefer to avoid the storms created both at home and
abroad by direct moves against the liberals.
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24. A great many urxesolved foreign and domestic issues
still confront the Soviet leadership. The debate with the Chinese
is approaching a climax; problems in and with Eastern Europe are
growing; and foreign policy as a whole seems to be in a state of
relative immobility. At home, the question of resource allocation
is still probably the subject of some debate, and no doubt will
continue to be for some time to come. Certain doctrinal issues
with strong political overtones still seem to be subject to some
controversy. The question of "economics vs. politics", for
example, has been revived along Khrushchevian lines, but in a
somewhat confused and contentious manner. And, in the area of
cultural policy and the proper approach to the era of Stalin,
uncertainty and disagreement is no doubt widespread. But in most
of these fields, Khrushchev is once again setting the dominant
tone and providing the party with guidelines for action which are
consistent with his traditional methods and policies. Eurther,
as would seem to be demonstrated by the recent naming of Brezhnev
and Podgorny to the secretariat, he appears to :ie in firm control
of party personnel appointments.
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25. Throturh precisely what means Khrushchev was able to
reassert his r'ominance after a period of great difficulty may
never be known to us. It appears on the surface, however, that
the disappearance of Kozlov from the political scene was of
crucial importance; in retrospect at least, Khrushchev's resurgence
seems to date in the main from the time of Kozlov's last public
appearance. And this must be taken together with a variety of
signs (some of which, not specifically alluded to in this paper,
go back a numberof years) indicating that Kozlov disagreed with
his boss on a number of important issues.
26. During February and March, Khrushchev was, at a minimum,
fighting a rearguard action to save his political and economic
programs. Whether he was also involved in a struggle for his
political life is not at all clear. His colleagues, with the
possible exception of Kozlov, would probably be quite reluctant to
extend policy disputes into the area of Khrushchev's personal
position in the party and government. Khrushchev, after all, has
had years in which to extend his reins of authority and to establish
his image as the indispensible leader. In any evrent, however,
Khrushchev's ability to come back after a series of policy failures
and after a period of probably great political tension, even if in
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part the result of good luck (Kozlov's illn?as), is certainly
testimony to the man's skill in coping with resistance.
27. It would now appear to be less likely than ever that
Khruahchev will be &ej?loualy challenged by any of his colleagues
in the foreseeable future; even the Chinese, who for some time
have entertained hopes of Khrushchev'a removal, now seem to have
given up on the idea and to be addressing themselves to the errors
of the Soviet party as a whole. Thus the next crisis in the Sova.et
leadership may come only after Khrushchev's death. But the
implications of this most recent crisis strongly suggest that
the struggle for power among his heirs will be a fierce one which
will not necessarily be won by the advocates of Khrushchevian
policies.
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