MOZAMBIQUE: RENAMO TODAY--PROFILE AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707220001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 15, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central In igence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 May 1986
Mozambique: RENAMO Today--Profile and Prospects
Summary
The Mozambican insurgent group, known as the Mozambican National
Resistance (RENAMO), has grown markedly as a military threat since its
inception approximately 10 years ago and has been able to capitalize on a
variety of popular grievances against Maputo's Soviet-supported Marxist
Government. Aided first by the former white-ruled Rhodesian Government
and subsequently by South Africa, the guerrillas now operate throughout
much of rural Mozambique and launch occasional raids in urban areas, where
the government is the strongest. While the insurgents are militarily
ideology, as well as a seasoned political leader capable of rivaling
Mozambican President Samora Machel.
We believe that over the next six months the insurgents will fall
short of achieving a military victor
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our examination of a wide range of US Embassy I 25X1
reporting suggests to us that any negotiations would be protracted and, to
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This memorandum was requested by Phillip Rin dahl Director of African
Affairs- National Security Council
The paper was written by -luffice of ican an
Latin American Analysis. A contribution was provided by
the Office of Central Reference. This paper was coordinated with e
Directorate of Operations. Questions and Comments are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
ALA M 86-20023C
CO/Y d of 'f9
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be started at all, would r-nuire both sides to dro conditions currently
unacceptable to the other.
South Africa and the USSR are not likely to become
substantially more involved on behalf of their clients in Mozambique in
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Who's Running the Show--RENAMO's Organization and Leadership
The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) has serious
organizational and leadership shortcomings that we believe would almost
certainly become even more pronounced were the group to gain a voice in
the Maputo Government or assume power. RENAMO is divided into military
and political wings, a legacy of its origins (see Appendix I for a
discussion of RENAMO's origins). Our analysis of US Embassy reporting
suggests that divisions within the political wing, coupled with irregular
communication and a lack of cohesion between the two wings, are key areas
of organizational weakness for the insurgents. Other major problems for
RENAMO are its narrow ethnic base and its dearth of well-educated and
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experienced Personnel in the senior ranks.
An Effective Military Wing
RENAMO's estimated 15,000 men under arms appear cohesive and highly
motivated . South African military
assistance in the early 1980s was a key factor in enabling the guerrillas
to weather a variety of challenges, including pressure from both
Mozambican and Zimbabwean* forces, and the death of several key military
leaders.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the insurgents operate in varying
strength in all of Mozambique's 10 provinces in groups ranging from a
handful to several hundred. They attack a wide range of economic targets,
and have kidnapped and killed some foreign economic technicians in an
effort to disrupt the economy, according to press and Embassy reporting.
RENAMO forces generally employ guerrilla-style tactics but have
occasionally carried out direct attacks on Army basecamps, according to
Dress and US Embassy reporting.
In addition to
insurgent attacks against economic targets, s activity includes
some banditry. The guerrillas have looted stores and civilian homes, and
they have killed dozens of civilians described by our Embassy in Maputo as
innocent bystanders.
We have more informatio the military wing runs than on who is
involved in making it work.
e deduce that while individual military figures are
important to the success of RENAMO's operations, nobody--possibly aside
* Zimbabwean soldiers became involved in Mozambique in 1982, when Prime
Minister Mugabe decided to protect from RENAMO attacks the rail line and
oil pipeline that run between the Mozambican port of Beira and the
Zimbabwean city of Mutare. Zimbabwe imports over 90 percent of its oil
products through the pipeline. In mid-1985, Zimbabwe expanded its troops
inside Mozambique from approximately 3,000 to at least 9,000 and extended
their largely defensive military role to include counterinsurgency
operations against RENAMO. More recently, the Zimbabweans recaptured for
the second time in the last six months RENAMO's headquarters located in
the Gorongosa Mountain range.
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Political Wing
RENAMO LEADERSHIP
President/Commander-in-Chief
(Afonso Jacama)
Military Wing
Government in Exile *
Includes:
--Secretary General.
--Secretaries for various functions, such as
external affairs, finances, etc.
--Additional members with no specific
functions
Military Council **
Includes:
--Senior defense personnel such as
Minister of Defense and
Chief of General Staff.
--Regional and Provincial Commanders
with rank of General.
'- Composed largely of blacks from central Mozambique but includes a
small number of Portu_au~MQ- uak1ng whites and mulattoes...
'Supposed to meet every six months but actually meets infrequently...
Details unknown on total number of members or how they were selected...
Little real authority as all major decisions are made by Jacama.
* * Almost entirely blacks...Met regularly at RENAMO headquarters in Gorongosa Mountains
-until last August when Zimbabwean troops overran base... Responsible for overall military
strategy... Keeps tabs on political leadership and vets all major political decisions...
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Military Chain of Command
Commander in Chief
Military Council
(Defense Department)
Northern Command
Zambezia. Niassa. Nampula
Cabo Delgado Provinces
I ------------1 -------------- L ------------1 ,------------
Central Command
Manica. Tate
Sofala Provinces
Southern Command
Gaza, Maputo,
Inhambane Provinces
Various Regions
(Possibly defined
along provincial lines)
------------------------- -' t----------- -----
L , --------- ------- -------- - ------- --------- ------ --------
---------- -
Various Sectors
(L/sually 4 or
5 per region)__ ?------- -------i ?------- -------$ ?------- ------- ?------- -------
'Various Various Zones ; I
ivuXera vary)
-------------- I-------------- --------------- I--------------
*Boundaries conform largely to these Provinces
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from its President and Commander-in-Chief Afonso Jacama--appears to be
irreplaceable. Jacama is widely credited with wise management of the
military wing, and is highly respected by his men as a, brave and
Jacama. however.is said to have several limitations.
Some other RENAMO-watchers likewise describe Jacama as an
unsophisticated, largely apolitical individual who lacks charisma and is
not well known among Mozambique's population.
the top decisionmaking body of the military wing is the Military Council,
which includes Jacama, senior defense officials such as Minister of
Defense and Chief of General Staff, and a small number of military leaders
of the rank of general. The Council is responsible for the command and
control of military activities and the formulation of training policies.
decisions made by the Council are passed
through the ranks down to local-level commanders through a variety of
means, ranging from a relatively sophisticated radio communications
network that was provided by the South Africans to the use of young,
unarmed sympathizers called mujibahs who act as runners.
RENAMO military forces are generally well-organized and fall into
several different categoric
-- Most RENAMO troops are guerrillas, who usually operate in groups
of 50 or less.
-- Some RENAMO soldiers operate mortars and heavy machine guns in
support of their less heavily armed colleagues.
-- Others have received training as
communications and demolition specialists.
A handful of others serve as handlers of RENAMO's few river
boats.
Poor Political Performance
RENAMO's small, externally based political wing--probably numbering
100 or less--has been disorganized and largely ineffectual since its
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inception. Political exiles are scattered in Portugal, West Germany,
Kenya, South Africa, and the United States. The so called policymaking
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body of RENA ' litical wing, known as the "Government-in-Exile , meets
infreauently
RENAMO's external political wine
is riven by personal frictions.
Evo Fernandes, Secretary General of RENAMO and technically its
number-two official, leads the political wing. Of Indian descent, he
became Secretary General in 1983 after the death of Orlando Cristina--a
white Mozambican who handled RENAMO's political affairs and worked closely
with the South Africans.
IRENAMO's military leaders, who live a dang
and'spartan existence in the countryside, probably resent the politicians
for living well abroad. In addition, there are ethnic and racial tensions
between the largely black military forces the whites and mulattoes who
dominate the top political positions.
Political Program
Racad on our interpretation of US Embassy reporting
to fight as RENAMO guerrillas. Many of RENAMO's military leaders are
staunchly anti-Communist and anti-Machel and are committed to his
overthrow. Still others are defectors from the Mozambican military who
want to be on what they perceive to be the winning side. In addition,
Mozambicans from ethnic groups in the central part of the country are
convinced that they failed to receive their fair share of the government's
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goods and services under Machel. Finally, those RENAMO guerrillas who
were forcibly recruited may fear reprisals if they were to desert.
By all accounts, however, RENAMO purports to support pro-Western,
democratic ideals. Our reading of RENAMO documents indicates that its
political ideology is simplistic, undeveloped, and once carried bed the
"ouster of Machel and his Communist government," fairly vague.
According to a RENAMO document released in September 1985, RENAMO
stands for:
-- The "eradication of Communism".
-- The establishment in Maputo of a government of national unity,
"to introduce and stabilize a democratic order."
-- Free elections.
-- A mixed economy with government responsibility for health and
educational services.
-- Full cooperation with its neighbors, especially those like
Zimbabwe that rely on Mozambican ports.
In addition, RENAMO officials have stated firmly that they will not
negotiate with Machel until the following terms have been met:
The departure of all foreign troops from Mozambique
-- The establishment of a cease-fire.
-- Recognition by the Machel Government of RENAMO as a legitimate
political organization.
-- Agreement on plans for popular elections.
RENAMO's failure to develop a more thorough-going political program
and to implement it in practice is a major shortcoming in the eyes of most
observers. In particular, the slow pace of the insurgents' movement
toward establishing a shadow government in areas under their control in
central Mozambique contrasts sharply with Savimbi's accomplishments in
Angola and of Machel's Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).
Prior to independence from Portugal, FRELIMO had established a rudimentary
government structure, including a limited number of schools and medical
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clinics, in the northern part of the country. RENAMO, according to US
Embassy reporting, provides only a limited number of civil or social
services.
The historical record suggests that several factors contribute to the
insurgents' political shortcomings. The longstanding split between the
military.and political wing, squabbling within the political wing, and
President Jacama's reportedly limited interest in politics have no doubt
contributed to the organization's slow political development. Moreover,
our appraisal of the limited information available on RENAMO in its early
days suggests to us that the insurgents' earlier dependence on and
direction by the Rhodesians and South Africans has probably inhibited its
political growth.
In the event RENAMO were to assume power in Maputo, our review of
Mozambique's deeply ingrained problems leads us to conclude that it would
be confronted with many of the same challenges the Machel regime currently
faces as well as some new ones:
It would face significant security problems, including
resistance from hostile ethnic groups and FRELIMO remnants.
Machel loyalists later would probably retreat to the bush and
mount insurgent operations with the support of the Frontline
states and the Soviets.
It would have limited expertise and room for maneuver in
improving Mozambique's dismal economic performance, although a
RENAMO government almost certainly would dismantle the trappings
of Marxist-Leninist socialism.
It would face considerable foreign policy challenges, including
finding replacements for Communist bloc technicians it would be
likely to expel as well as obtaining diplomatic and other
support from black African states, many of which would probably
regard a RENAMO government as a South African client.
It would be unlikely to move toward a more democratic-style
government given likely continued resistance among some ethnic
groups to RENAMO's rule as well as Mozambique's authoritarian
tradition.
Popular Support
US Embassy reporting suggests that RENAMO enjoys widespread
popularity among a number of ethnic groups in central Mozambique, but
lacks significant appeal among rural ethnic groups outside this area and
among urban dwellers. Its prospects for significantly expanding its base
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of support seem limited, in view of continued squabbling between its
military and political wings and the guerrillas' often brutal tactics.
The record of RENAMO's military performance suggests that RENAMO's
popular support depends heavily on its tribal dimension, especially in the
central provinces of Mozambique, where the insurgent group first began
operating in the mid-1970s and from where most of its key military leaders
hail, including Commander-in-Chief Jacama. Both before and after
independence, the various Shona-speaking ethnic groups in the central area
experienced frictions with FRELIMO, which includes a large number of
Zulu-speakers from southern Mozambique.
Another factor that has won RENAMO some following in central
Mozambique is its reinvigoration of
existing traditional systems to administer the civilian population. Many
tribal chiefs, whom FRELIMO dismissed shortly after independence in its
efforts to consolidate power, have willingly aligned themselves with
RENAMO to regain prestige and control over their constituents. RENAMO,
civil and crimina matters their regions. In addition, the insurgents
have gained support by returning to traditional practices outlawed by the
Maputo government, such as dowries for marriages, private ownership of
F_ I
farms, and freedom of movement from village to village.
lso benefitted from Mozambiqu
ENAMO h
' economic woes which
as a
R
manV nts attribute to FRELIMO's misrule.
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Outside of central Mozambique, however, we believe most Mozambican
rural aweiiers are p olitically apathetic and preoccupied with eking out a
subsistence living in a harsh environment.
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Moreover, as RENAMO has expanded military operations to the north and
south, it has found it more difficult to gain new tribal support, leading
to some forced recruiting, according to US Embassy reporting. In the
south, groups like the Zulu-speaking Shangaan, heavily represented at
senior levels in FRELIMO and the central government, appear hostile to
RENAMO. Other groups in the north, such as the independent-minded
'
s overtures.
Makonde, seem similarly unreceptive to RENAMO
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In addition, recent US Embassy reporting notes that RENAMO's
heavy-handed tactics often undercut its efforts to gain popular support,
and cites a large number of well-documented incidents where RENAMO
guerrillas, in addition to attacking economic targets, have killed,
kidnapped, or maimed civilians. Several Christian church groups in
Mozambique have publicly criticized the guerrillas for excesses. Most
brutality, probably occurs in areas where RENAMO has the least popular
support. We have no evidence to suggest that mistreatment of the
population is deliberate RENAMO policy.
Urban areas remain largely FRELIMO strongholds, according to US
Embassy reporting. Some sympathy for RENAMO almost certainly exists,
however, given the harsh living con ' ions under the FRELIMO government
described in US Embassy reporting.
External Backing
In our view, RENAMO presently gets little outside help, and probably
has scored most of its recent military successes largely on its own.
Pretoria, however, has been RENAMO's principal backer since 1980 and its
assistance to RENAMO up to 1984 included organizational and tactical
direction, training, communications equipment, medical and other nonlethal
March 1984 led to a reduction in South African aid to the RENAMO
guerrillas (as well as to Pretoria's public denial of any relations with
them) in exchange for Maputo's expulsion of the anti-Pretoria African
National Congress (ANC). The Mozambicans' subsequent capture of RENAMU
records--which detailed allegations of post-Nkomati South African
assistance, albeit at considerably lower levels--served to undercut
Pretoria's claims that it severed its relations with the insurgents.
Our reading of the current military situation in Mozambique, together
with US Embassy reporting on persistent, credible allegations of continued
South African aid to RENAMO, leads us to believe that South African
military officers continue to extend limited quantities of assistance to
RENAMO despite public protestations to the contrary.
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- US Embassy reports that RENAMO was forewarned of Zimbabwe's
attack in April on its headquarters in the Gorongosa Mountains
suggest to us that South Africa may continue to provide
intelligence support.
-- Pretoria probably continues to deliver occasional shipments of
F_ I
arms and ammunition to RENAMO by sea or air.
Nonetheless, our assessment of IUS Embassy
reporting leads us to deduce that Pretoria has cut off or sharply reduced
many of its ties with RENAMO. As far as we can tell:
-- South Africa no longer supports RENAMO's clandestine radio
station, "Voice of Free Africa," which broadcast throughout
Mozambique until the Nkomati Accord was signed.
-- Based on our reading of the current military situation, we
suspect that Pretoria no longer makes regular deliveries of arms
and supplies to RENAMO.
-- We have no information to indicate that South Africa provides
extensive training for RENAMO insurgents at South African
military facilities.
In addition to South Africa, RENAMO is rumored to have received
assistance from a wide range of other official and non-official sources,
including conservative individuals and private organizations in Malawi,
Kenya, Zimbabwe, West Germany, France. Portugal, several moderate Arab
states. Brazil and the Comoros.
we
suspect, based on suggestions in US Embassy reporting a of
private businessmen have granted assistance to RENAMO
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Outlook
Our evaluation of the current military situation leads us to conclude
that Maputo has been largely ineffective in responding to RENAMO. The
Mozambican Army continues to mount sporadic offensives in the countryside,
but generally remains in the cities and along a few key transportation
routes. Most troops are conscripts and morale is poor. Moreover, because
it lacks equipment and supplies, the Army often avoids combat, according
to US Embassy reporting.
Were it not for Zimbabwe's timely military assistance, Maputo's 25X1
military position today would be even weaker. Our interpretation of
recent US Embassy reports from Harare leads us to believe that Zimbabwe
will maintain a force in Mozambique to guard its oil pipeline and several
transport links. Our analysis of the record of Zimbabwe's involvement
suggests that a reduction in the frequency of its counterinsurgency
operations appears likely, damaging Maputo's military capabilities and the
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The charismatic, wily President Samora Machel remains the most
powerful political figure in Maputo. Nonetheless, he has had to weather a
number of challenges within his own government and military during the
past year. Frictions within the regime over RENAMO have surfaced, with
pragmatists like Minister of Cooperation Veloso promoting talks with
RENAMO and Minister of Security Vieira strongly opposing them.
We believe that over the next six months Mozambique most likely will
experience a continued gradual deterioration of its security situation,
with little progress toward a negotiated settlement. Barring dramatic
changes in the battlefield situation, shifts in the magnitude of each
side's external support, or a coup, we believe that the short-term
military dynamics will probably look much the same as during 1985--with
RENAMO strong in the rural areas while launching occasional spectacular
attacks in urban areas, and Machel's government clinging onto major cities
and larger towns.
However, were a RENAMO government to emerge in Maputo, it would oe
challenged by many of the same problems that Machel currently faces. It
would encounter opposition from key ethnic groups, likely insurgent
operations by Machel loyalists in the bush, and dismal economic
prospects. In addition, most neighboring black states would hostile,
i
th Af
r
ca.
seeing a RENAMO government as a creation of Sou
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On the negotiating front, US Embassy reports indicate that both sides
are talking about talking, but we believe neither shows signs of engaging
in serious negotiations anytime soon. RENAMO's leaders probably believe
that time is on their side and that continued military pressure will force
Maputo to the bargaining table on their terms. Machel, for his part,
requested additional military aid from the Soviets during a visit last
April to .Moscow, according to our Embassy there. Our reading of several
US Embassy reports on this trip leads us to conclude that Machel seems
unwilling to give up the fight even though Soviet leader Gorbachev's
statements during Machel's visit implied that Moscow will not increase aid
substantially. Our review of Maputo's attitudes toward negotiations leads
us to suspect that Machel's recent feelers to RENAMO are probably intended
to pave the way for a last-resort option of reaching a sett~t, but
only much later on and only if there is no alternative.
Key external players--Pretoria and Moscow--could ultimately decide
Mozambique's fate. Our evaluation of both the South Africans' and the
Soviets' interests in the region lead us to estimate that they are not
likely to become substantially more involved in the near term. Fighting
at present levels serves Pretoria's longstanding goal of keeping Machel
off balance--unable openly to support the anti-South Africa guerrillas of
the African National Congress (ANC) or to make full use of Mozambican
transport routes to Zimbabwe--but without the costs for Pretoria of
maintaining RENAMO should it come to power. Continued fighting also
serves Moscow's interests in reinforcing Machel's military dependence on
the USSR, retaining a lever to pressure Maputo against overly close
dealings with South Africa and the West, and maintaining the Soviets'
low-cost military access to Mozambican ports.
Though less likely in the near term, both South Africa and the Soviet
Union retain the option of upping the ante in Mozambique. South Africa,
in pursuing its often stated objective to US officials of fostering
negotiations leading to a government of national unity in Maputo, could
decide to increase its aid to RENAMO. More direct South African aid would
enable the guerrillas to step up their urban sabotage campaign, which we
believe must begin to hurt before Machel decides to negotiate. Based on
past experience, we estimate that direct South African military pressure
in the form of dramatic commando attacks--say, in retaliation for alleged
Mozambican back-sliding on promises not to aid the ANC--would probably
serve the same purpose.
Another less likely scenario would be the introduction of enough
Soviet and Cuban military aid to prop up Machel indefinitely. At this
point, however, Moscow does not appear to be overly concerned that
Machel's tenure is threatened or ready to make the massive investment that
could quickly improve his military fortunes. Moreover, both Havana and
d
t
warn
e
Moscow almost certainly must take into account recent repea
from the South Africans to keep Communist troops out of Maputo.
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Appendix I
History of RENAMO
After Portugual granted Mozambique independence in 1975 and turned
power over to Samora Machel's Marxist FRELIMO guerrilla movement, several
anti-FRELIMO groups and individuals banded together to form what later
emerged as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO).*
RENAMO united a wide variety of anti-FRELIMO groups with disparate
outlooks and included:
-- Small political parties like the pro-Chinese Revolutionary
Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) and the Lisbon-based United
Democratic Front of Mozambique (FUMO) that refused to merge with
the larger, more powerful FRELIMO.
-- Both black and white former Mozambican colonial army officers
and secret police who had aided the Portuguese against FRELIMO.
-- White landowners and businessmen of Portuguese descent who had
lived for generations in Mozambique and were being forced to
abandon their properties.
-- Various tribal leaders from northern and central Mozambique who
had experienced frictions before independence with the
southern-led FRELIMO.
By 1977, RENAMO guerrillas--based at an abandoned tobacco farm in
eastern Rhodesia and receiving Rhodesian equipment and other support--had
begun reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the central Mozambican
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provinces of Sofala and Manica against ZANU. In addition, RENAMO claimed
responsibility for attacks by Rhodesian security forces on a wide variety
of high-visibility targets--such as the oil depot at Beira. Meanwhile,
the largely white and mulatto members of RENAMO's political wing were
canvassing for aid in Portugal, other parts of Western Europe, and South
Africa, where a sizable community of recently resettled Portuguese were
sympathetic to RENAMO's cause.
In 1978, RENAMO began conducting occasional small-scale hit-and-run
attacks against Mozambican economic targets. The guerrillas soon began
attacking a broader range of transportation and communications
targets--the same ones that FRELIMO chose during its war against the
Portuguese--and was also responsible for freeing hundreds of political
prisoners held in government "reeducation" camps. Not surprisingly, many
detainees joined RENAMO forces.
South African officials 1 disclaimed any
connection with RENAMO through 1980, but had held discussions with RENAMO
political leaders as early as 1979 about the possibility of South African
covert material and financial aid to the group. Shortly after plans for
Zimbabwe's independence under black rule were completed at the
UK-sponsored Lancaster House Conference in December 1979, Pretoria
airlifted RENAMO's leadership, as well as a small number of Rhodesian
military and intelligence officers, to South Africa. Many of the
Rhodesians were subsequently incorporated into counterpart organizations
in South Africa, and some continued to serve as advisors to RENAMO. Other
RENAMO forces traveled to South Africa by foot.
South Africa assumed sponsorship of RENAMO, which in 1980 claimed to
have at least 2,000 men under arms, for several reasons. Pretoria was
eager to maintain pressure on hostile Mozambique, which allowed
guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) to launch cross-border
attacks against South Africa. In addition, South Africa wanted to disrupt
independent Zimbabwe's use of transportation routes and ports in
Mozambique that once accommodated 90 percent of Rhodesia's overseas trade
and provided Maputo with a sizable amount of hard currency in transport
fees. Pretoria hoped to force Zimbabwe to continue using transportation
routes through South Africa that would provide leverage over Harare.
RENAMO members were resettled on South African military bases and
South African military advisers subsequently established a headquarters
and training base for RENAMO in the northern Transvaal. In addition,
Pretoria quickly set up a communications network between Mozambique and
South Africa as well as a logistics. infrastructure for resupply and troop
rotation. Shortly after Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980, RENAMO's
clandestine radio station "The Voice of Free Africa" resumed broadcast~in
into Mozambique--this time from South Africa instead of Rhodesia.
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S E C R E T
SUBJECT: RENAMO Today--Profile and Prospects
Original--Phillip Ringdahl, Director of African Affairs, NSC
1--Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1--Stephen Sestanovich, Director, Political-Military
Affairs, National Security Council
1--Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
1--Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1--Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
1--Jeffrey S. Davidow, Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, Department of State
1--Raymond F. Smith, Deputy Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, Department of State
1--Allen Harris, Deputy Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, Department of State
1--Douglas Holladay, Working Group on South Africa
and Southern Africa, Department of State.
1--Anthony S. Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis
for Africa, INR, Department of State
1--Leo Cecchini, Desk Officer for Mozambique,
Department of State
1--James Wood, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Africa, International Security Affairs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
1--William Thom, Acting Defense Intelligence
Officer for Africa, Defense Intelligence Agency.
1--Walter Barrows, Assistant to the Director, International
Security Agency.
1--DCI
1--DDI
1--NIO for Africa
1--NIO for USSR
1--NIC
1--DDO/Africa
1--DDO/AF 0
1--PDB Staff
1--ILS
1--C/DDI/PES
1--D/ALA
1--ALA Research Director
2--ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean)
4--OCPAS/IMD/CB
4--ALA/AF
4--ALA/C
4--ALA/C (File)
ALA/AF~
(15 May 1986)
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