SOVIET MILITARY FORCES OPPOSITE IRAN AND IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505390001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

III I I I. I II I ______ _
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Soviet Military Forces. Opposite Iran',
and In Afghanistan
Summary
Soviet military forces would have to undertake extensive
preparations before they could conduct a general invasion of Iran
or Pakistan. We believe that Soviet motives for invading either
country are presently small. Even if Moscow's incentives
increased, concern over possible.US reactions and apprehensions
about becoming bogged down in far larger guerrilla wars than the
Afghan one would be likely to deter Moscow from attacking Iran or
The USSR's long-term objective in Iran is the establishment
of a pro-Soviet government. With little likelihood of achieving
this any time soon, Soviet efforts will be aimed at keeping the
US from regaining its pre-Khomeini position in Iran.
For the time being, Moscow appears unwilling to court Tehran
until the Khomeini regime takes genuine steps to reverse its
anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, end its support for the Afghan
resistance, enter negotiations with Iraq, and ease repression of
the Tudeh (Communist) Party.
We judge it unlikely that the Soviets would undertake
military action against Iran in the foreseeable future.
If the USSR were to decide to invade, however, it has
sufficient ground and tactical air forces stationed in its
Southern Theater of Military Operations (TMO) north of Iran to
conduct a general offensive into Iran intended to reach the
Persian Gulf and occupy.the country. Soviet forces stationed in
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet
Analysis, in response to a request from the Justice Department.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Regional Issues Group
SOV M 86-20111
Central Intelligence Agency
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Afghanistan.
the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus and Turkestan Military
Districts and in Afghanistan are part of the Southern TMO. The
USSR also has some 117,000 troops on the eastern flank of Iran in
effort to deter it from supporting the mujahideen.
However, the forces in the Southern TMO would have to make
extensive preparations before undertaking a general invasion of
Iran, which would far surpass any Soviet military action since
World War II. The forces in Afghanistan, while already at full
combat strength, are too heavily engaged there, too strained
logistically, and too lacking in roads and other communications
to be able to nificant contribution to any action
against Iran.
The Soviet army also lacks both the strength and the
logistical base in Afghanistan to undertake major military
actions against Pakistan. For some years to come, the continued
Afghan resistance will probably keep the Soviets so tied down
that they will not pose a threat from Afghanistan against
Pakistan, although Moscow may intensify the present border
incidents and even launch limited strikes into Pakistan in an
regimes.
We believe the Soviet' leadership misjudged the extent of
resistance that would be encountered in Afghanistan. Their
experience of getting bogged down there in a larger, longer war
than they had expected is likely to make them extremely chary of
sending troops into either Iran or Pakistan and thus multiplying
their problems with guerrilla resistance--even if they could
claim some legitimacy by responding to appeals for support by new
. The Soviets are also likely to be deterred from invasion of
either country by uncertainty over possible US counteractions.
Although Washington does not have any legal commitment to the
Khomeini regime, it has in the past indicated an intention to
respond to any threat to Gulf oil supplies. Moscow probably
would be particularly wary of invading countries that have
seacoasts across which aid could reach resistance m more
readily than it now reaches the Afghan mujahideen. 7"7
The Soviet Threat to Iran
Circumstances which could lead the Soviets to consider an
invasion of Iran include:
-- The introduction of US military forces into Iran or the
perception by Moscow that the US was about to do so.
-- The rise to power in Iran of a pro-Soviet faction which
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"requested" Soviet assistance to solidify or sustain its
rule.
-- The eruption of civil war in Iran following the death or
fall from power of Ayatollah Khomeini which plunged the
country into prolonged political chaos.
The initiation of a Warsaw Pact-NATO or Soviet-Chinese war
and the subsequent expansion of military operations to
include Iranian territory.
Even under these conditions, however, the Soviets would still be
reluctant to commit their forces, and they would do so only if
convinced that non-military measurQs had proven fruitless or were
assessed as unlikely to succeed.
Soviet Ground and Air Forces
The Soviets currently have 24 motorized rifle divisions, one
tank division, one airborne division, and other ground combat and
combat support units in the Southern TMO.
-- Most divisions have their full complement of equipment,
although it consist's almost exclusively of older models
such as the T-54/55 tank and towed artillery.
-- Soviet ground forces in the Southern TMO, excepting those
in Afghanistan, are maintained in peacetime at low
readiness. Most divisions are manned at one-quarter or
less of war authorized strength.
-- Force preparations would entail some postmobilization
training once mobilized reservists were available.
-- We judge that the amount of time required by the ground
forces to complete personnel mobilization, equipment
preparation, and post-mobilization refresher training
would be at least four to six weeks. In preparation for
the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets spent some three
months in mobilization, rehearsals and pre-invasion
training to prepare invading troops for a much smaller
operation.
The Soviet ground force posture opposite Iran has remained
largely unchanged since the invasion of Afghanistan. Equipment
modernization has proceeded slowly, and Soviet forces in this
region are only now receiving the T-62 tank (a model now largely
phased out of Soviet forces in Central Europe) and small amounts
of self-propelled artillery. There has been some growth in total
equipment holdings as understrength Soviet units have received
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have been added to the force since 1979.
additional equipment through "trickle-down" from better-equipped
units opposite NATO. Two low-strength motorized rifle divisions
Soviet air force units that would be used in operations
against Iran are kept at a higher state of combat readiness than
the ground forces in the Southern TMO; thus, they would require
less mobilization and preparation before engaging in offensive
operations.
Tactical air regiments in the theater have a total of
nearly 1,300 combat aircraft.
-- In addition, there are nearly 500 helicopters available in
the Southern TMO to carry out combat and logistics
operations.
-- Tactical air regiments typically are equipped with older
aircraft such as the MIG-23 Flogger and SU-17 Fitter, but
one regiment in the Transcaucasus Military District
received the newest fighter, the MIG-29 Fulcrum.
Since 1980, the Soviets have been increasing the number of
ground attack aircraft in'the Southern TMO by activating new
ground attack regiments and converting some fighter regiments to
the ground attack role. Consequently, the theater now has more
ground attack aircraft han any other except that opposite NATO's
Central Region.
Soviet Military Planning
The Soviets could conduct a variety of military campaigns
against Iran. The objectives of the campaign and the risks the
Soviets were willing to take would largely determine the forces
to be allocated, the manner in which the campaign was conducted,
and the preparations that would precede it. Because the Soviets
tend to leave little to risk, they are conservative in assessing
force requirements and thorough in planning and preparing for
military operations. We do not foresee circumstances in which
they would see an opportunity for a quick military action to
significantly enhance their position with little risk. We
believe that any military move would more likely be preceded by
extensive and perhaps drawn-out deliberations within the Soviet
political and military leadership. We judge, therefore, that the
Soviets assume that Iranian resistance would be sufficient to
prevent an easy victory, and they also ticipate and
prepare for US military intervention. 7 "
Before undertaking a campaign against Iran, the Soviets
would have to make extensive preparations to ready their forces
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and combat support infrastructure for operations. We estimate
that:
-- The Soviets would require 20 to 25 divisions to undertake
a general invasion of Iran.
-- The forces would be brought up to wartime strength through
a large-scale mobilization involving the callup of several
hundred thousand reservists.
-- The process of preparing ground forces for offensive
operations against Iran and moving them to the Soviet-
Iranian border would take more than a month.
-- The logistics structure of the Southern TMO would have to
be expanded considerably from its peacetime configuration
including the requisition of thousands of trucks from the
civilian economy for military use.
-- Even with such preparations, a general invasion would
still be an extremely difficult operation for the Soviets
to execute because of Iran's highly constricted terrain
and the difficulties in providing logistics sup~for,
Soviet forces far beyond the border region.
Assessment of a Soviet Campaign
The amount of time the Soviets would require to carry out a
campaign to overcome Iranian resistance and-occupy Iran once
combat commenced could range from several weeks to several
months.
-- The Soviets could seize the border regions of Iran
relatively quickly, and after securing this area, might
attempt to advance on one or two narrow axes towards the
Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.
-- If the Soviets encountered only Iranian resistance, we
believe they would be able to reach the Gulf in as little
as three weeks from the start of combat.
-- A complete occupation of Iran would take up to several
months. Difficulties encountered in achieving this
objective would be the rugged and inhospitable terrain,
the lack of adequate north-south and east-west axes of
traverse, and the need to secure lengthy and vulnerable
supply lines to support stationed Soviet forces.
Soviet success would depend on the intensity, durability,
and effectiveness of Iranian resistance and whether the Iranians
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received outside assistance. Even after conventional combat
operations had ended, however, the Soviets would face the
prospect of a long and costly occupation of the territory. In
consolidating their control over the country, the Soviets would
have to contend with guerrilla resistance that would be much
stronger and probably more effective than the one they currently
face in Afghanistan. The Iranians probably could resist the
Soviets for years, especially if they o arms from abroad
and could distribute them internally.
Soviet Forces in Afghanistan
Pre-Invasion. Before the December 1979 invasion the Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan consisted of a large contingent
of approximately 3,000 military advisors. In the latter half of
1979 some small airborne units were introduced to the major
airfield at Bagram to provide security.
helicopter--MI-8s, MI-24s, and MI-6s.
1979-1980. The invasion force during the first year
consisted of approximately 80,000 men. It included the main
elements of three motorized-rifle divisions and two airborne
divisions, as well as additional independent units to garrison
cities in different parts of Afghanistan. Soviet fixed-wing
aircraft were deployed at 'four main airfields--Shindand,
Qandahar, Kabul, and Bagram--and helicopters were deployed there
and at numerous secondary airfields. The aircraft included
MIG-21s and SU-17s, along with several,dif_fer_nt types of
1986. By the middle of 1986 the Soviet military presence
had grown to some 117,000 troops. The sham withdrawal in October
1986 did not include all six regiments specified by General
Secretary Gorbachev, but did reduce Soviet forces by some 1,500-
2,000 men belonging to the three air defense and one
understrength tank regiments actually withdrawn. The largest
concentration is in the east near Kabul, but garrisons have been
established near most major cities and along the main roads
throughout the country. There are approximately 125 fixed-wing
combat aircraft and over 350 helicopters. The most important
changes have included:
-- Continual. improvement of armor and artillery, including
the introduction of advanced infantry-fighting vehicles
and self-propelled artillery.
-- The upgrade of MIG-21 fighter aircraft to MIG-23s, and the
introduction of three squadrons--some 45 planes--of SU-25
ground attack aircraft.
-- The initial introduction of Special Purpose Forces
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fighting has continued.
(Spetsnaz) battalions in 1983, and their rowth by 1986 to
a total of eight (some 4500 men).
Soviet Strategy. The main goals of Soviet strategy have
been: 1) to secure the main cities and roads 2) to prevent the
insurgents from concentrating forces and holding territory, and
3) to build up the Afghan army and security forces. Early in the
war the Soviets were forced to concentrate on breaking up large
insurgent groups. As the insurgents began to fight in smaller,
less vulnerable bands, the Soviets experimented with various
tactics, such as large combined-arms sweep operations, small-unit
ambushes, and heliborne assaults. Much effort has been expended
on securing the major cities, especially Kabul, and preventing
attacks on supply, and Afghan forces have conducted regular
sweeps in and around Herat to dislodge the mujahideen from their
strong position in the city. In 1986 they erected numerous new
security posts and began t parts of the old city, but
Soviet and Afghan forces frequently conduct sweeps and raids
near the Iranian border, trying to cut off the flow of arms.
These have resulted in regular air violations and cross-border
artillery shelling. On at, least one occasion Iranian and Soviet
aircraft engaged each other, with no known losses on either
side. Iran has regularly protested such incursions to the Afghan
government. In the last year the number of incidents appears to
have dropped, possibly because Ira lowed fewer supplies to
be brought in for the insurgents.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Military Forces Opposite Iran and In
Afghanistan
External Distribution
Ms. Ann E. Rondeau
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Room 5132
Dept. of Justice/Main Justice
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