CHINA: MILITARY OPTIONS AGAINST VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000300050006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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I"Directorate of }op~eg"W_
China:
Military Options
Against Vietnam
EA 84-10064C
March
Copy 3 4 11 7t
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China:
Military Options
Against Vietnam
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was written by
Office of East Asian Analysis.
addressed to the Chief, China Division, OEA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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EA 84-10064C
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China:
Military Options
Against Vietnam
Key Judgments Beijing has the muscle to conduct a wide variety of military actions against
Information available Vietnam but is not likely to undertake a "second lesson" unless severely
as of 15 March 1984 provoked. Our judgment is based on the following factors:
was used in this report.
? Cost. The February 1979 invasion of Vietnam was costly both in lives
and resources. Beijing lost 20,000 killed or wounded and spent at least $1
billion. Beijing today is committed to an ambitious economic moderniza-
tion program and would be reluctant to initiate a prolonged. conflict that
would drain China's coffers and have the potential to cause domestic
political dissension.
? Vietnamese strength. We believe the massive expansion and qualitative
improvements of the Vietnamese armed forces facing China are major
deterrents to Chinese action. In 1979 China dictated the beginning and
end of the conflict. In our view, because of Vietnam's new capabilities,
the Chinese military could not guarantee a quick, contained lesson.
? Soviet presence. With a major Soviet naval and air presence at Cam
Ranh Bay, China would probably avoid such actions as naval offensives
against Vietnamese-held islands in the South China Sea.
In lieu of a second lesson, Beijing uses "saber rattling" incidents-such as
small-scale skirmishes and artillery barrages-to warn Hanoi against
border provocations or assaults on Kampuchean resistance bases along the
Thai border. "Saber rattling" provides a highly visible demonstration of
Beijing's support for the Kampuchean resistance and the Thai Government
and reminds Vietnam that Chinese military power is still potent. Moreover,
it forces Vietnam to keep most of its forces deployed in the North and un-
available for duty in Kampuchea.
If Beijing believed, however, that its own or Thailand's national security
were directly threatened, or the existence of the Kampuchean resistance
was in jeopardy, we believe China would take stronger military action
against Vietnam, probably a ground offensive. Large-unit ground attacks
into Vietnam or Laos would be a measured escalation of the existing
conflict whereas naval or airstrikes would be more likely to open the door
to Vietnamese retaliation using newly acquired air-to-surface and surface-
to-surface missiles. Moreover, there are still glaring deficiencies in Chinese
air and naval forces that will take several years to overcome.
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We believe that short of a massive, and improbable, Chinese assault to take
Hanoi, there is probably no military action Beijing can take that will force
Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. The best that Beijing can hope for
is that through a combination of diplomatic and limited but persistent
military pressure it can convince Hanoi that its interests are better served
by a political settlement to the Kampuchean situation.
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Contents
Key Judgments
The Situation Today
The Military Balance, 1984
Ground Force Options
Concentrated Border Attacks 5
Ground Attacks Into Laos 5
Saber Rattling 6
Fighter Attacks 8
Ground Support 8
Bomber Strikes 8
Naval Options 9
Amphibious Assault Against Vietnamese Islands 10
The Emerging Marine Corps 10
The Paracels-Outpost in the South China Sea 11
Mining Vietnamese Harbors
12
Obstacles to Chinese Actions
12
Vietnam's New Strength
12
A Soviet Shadow
12
Second Lesson Unlikely ...
14
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On 17 February 1979, after a three-month military
buildup larger than the one that preceded China's
entrance into the Korean war, China launched a short
but bloody border war against Vietnam. Before the
war China maintained only 150,000 troops within 400
kilometers of the Sino-Vietnamese border. It rede-
ployed 10 armies, some from as far away as 1,600
kilometers drawn from six military regions for the
attack For 16 days, an estimated 500,000
Chinese troops carried out an attack along the entire
border designed to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for
invading Kampuchea, for moving closer to Moscow,
for attacking Chinese positions on the border, and for
mistreating ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam.
China's ground troops destroyed Vietnamese border
fortifications, occupied three provincial capitals, and
used a scorched earth policy to create a cordon
sanitaire along the 1,200-km border. Hanoi had only
100,000 troops in the three northern military regions
and half of them were held in reserve in defensive
positions near Hanoi.
After Chinese forces seized the provincial capital of
Lang Son-a battle in which both sides had heavy
casualties-China's then PLA Chief of Staff Deng
Xiaoping declared that Vietnam had been punished
enough, and on 5 March Chinese forces began to
withdraw. Chinese troops took 10 days to pull out,
meanwhile destroying public works, blowing up
bridges, and using artillery barrages to cover their
withdrawal and to create a wasteland along the
border. The lengthy pullback highlighted China's
control of the situation and prevented Hanoi from
credibly claiming it had chased the invaders back
across the border.
Even before the last Chinese soldiers had left Viet-
nam, Hanoi began a massive buildup of its forces in
the north. Divisions were recalled from Kampuchea
and southern Vietnam, a general mobilization was
decreed, and units previously assigned to economic
China:
Military Options
Against Vietnam
construction activities were upgraded into main force
divisions. Hanoi nearly doubled the size of its army 25X1
throughout Indochina from 600,000 troops in early 25X1
1979 to about 1.2 million troops by late 1981
The Situation Today
Beijing shows no signs of willingness to compromise 25X1
with Hanoi and holds open the option of another
limited war. In January, just after the leaders of the
tripartite resistance coalition of Kampuchea visited
Beijing, a senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official
told a US diplomat that in response to an aggressive 25X1
Vietnamese dry season offensive this year, China
would be willing to increase diplomatic, economic,
and military pressure on Vietnam and has not aban-
doned the option of giving Vietnam a "second lesson."
Last April, Beijing pounded Vietnamese positions
near the Chinese border with long-range artillery and
mortar barrages in retaliation for Vietnam's 1982-83
dry season campaign in Kampuchea, which spilled
over into Thailand. Despite talks aimed at improving
relations between Moscow and Beijing, China's offi-
cial news agency in November sharply criticized
Moscow, calling Vietnam "a knife the Soviet Union
has placed at the back of China" and accusing
Moscow of forming a military alliance with the
Vietnamese in order to forge another link in the
military encirclement of China.
Hanoi takes the Chinese threat seriously and keeps
more than 60 percent of its ground forces as well as
most of its newest Soviet weapons deployed against
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Beijing's troops in Kunming
Military Region also went on an alert in reaction to
new border fighting, according to Chinese press re-
ports. China accused Hanoi of 35 border provocations
during the New Year holiday alone
The Military Balance, 1984
Beijing's 270,000 troop strength within 400 kilome-
ters of the border is approximately half that of the
opposing force in northern Vietnam. This has fostered
a belief that China has few military options it can
exercise against Vietnam. Such assessments fail to
take into account China's large reserves and its
demonstrated ability to redeploy armies rapidly to the
southern front. Hanoi's buildup in the north would
increase the cost of another border-wide, ground'force
assault such as the 1979 incursion, but Beijing could
elect to use a variety of ground, air, and naval actions
against the Vietnamese. Over the past five years,
Beijing has upgraded its military capabilities in south
China and in some ways, particularly naval opera-
tions, has actually broadened its range of military
options against Vietnam.
If Beijing believed that its own or Thailand's national
security or the existence of the Kampuchean resist-
ance forces were seriously threatened, we believe
China would take strong military action against Viet-
nam. Beijing has assured resistance and Thai leaders
that it will not allow Vietnam to reduce its forces
along the northern border in order to increase striking
power in Kampuchea. Moreover, the Chinese willing-
ness to increase border tensions-both this and last
year-even without a major threat to either the
Kampuchean resistance or Thailand, is an indication
of Beijing's deep commitment to trying to check
Vietnam from consolidating its control in Indochina.
Ground Force Options
defense, that will take several years to overcome.
of the existing conflict whereas naval or air strikes
would be more likely to open the door to Vietnamese
retaliation using its airpower and air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface missiles. Finally, there are still
glaring deficiencies in Chinese air and naval forces,
particularly in the areas of ground- and sea-based air
In our judgment, if Beijing exercised the option of a
second lesson it would probably be in the form of a
limited ground offensive. The PLA is still a conserva-
tive, ground-oriented military force that has little
experience or confidence in projecting power using its
naval or air components. A border incursion into
Vietnam or Laos would be only a measured escalation
Beijing has the muscle to mount another massive
ground assault comparable to 1979. There are 27
ground combat divisions and an estimated 600,000
ground, air, and naval troops in Kunming and
Guangzhou Military Regions. Hanoi currently has 38
ground combat divisions and upwards of 700,000
ground, air, and naval troops in all of northern
Vietnam but has few reserves available to augment
this force (figure 2). Beijing, on the other hand, has an
additional 1 million ground troops not committed to
the Soviet front which it can dispatch to fight Viet-
nam. Moreover, if Beijing were again to deploy to the
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Figure 2
Combat Forces Along the Sino-Vietnamese Border, March 1984
Chengdu
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Guiyang
aiyuan4`
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China Vietnam
I Q Combat division
4 4 Occupied military airfield
- Military region boundary
- International boundary
Province-level boundary
Railroad
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Lao
.Lai Chou
Boundary representatron ts\aot
necessarily authontatire. Names
in Vietnam are shorn withou
t
d acntical marks.
Dao Bach Long Vi
(Nightingale Island)
[Vietnam]
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hanjiang
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Duncan Island
?a (Daogian Dao)
Paracellsland~.,
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Matau
(Port.)
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(U.K.)
Pratas Island 1
Air forces
Combat aircraft 1,000 300
Ground forces
Combat divisions 27 38
Troops (within combat division) 420,000 480,000
Armor 800 1,000
Note: These numbers include forces within China's Guangzhou
and Kunming Military Regions, and all Vietnam's forces in
northern Vietnam.
South China
Sea
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south, maneuver divisions from the Wuhan strategic
reserve, the Sichuan basin, and Kunming and
Guangzhou Military Regions, as it did in the 1979
conflict, it could attain an overall advantage of almost
2 to 1 in main force combat troops and a similar edge
assaults into Vietnam. Terrain, however, dictates use
of only a few major corridors in the event of large-
scale operations.
Beijing also has at least one highly specialized recon-
naissance unit on the Vietnamese front trained for
long-range patrols behind enemy lines which could
provide additional intelligence during a border as-
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in armor.
Concentrated Border Attacks
China is aware of the Vietnamese buildup and, in our
view, recognizes the heavy costs of launching another
border-wide offensive similar to the 1979 incursion.
An option for Beijing would be to mass an invasion
force at a single point on the border and thereby gain
a decisive tactical advantage along a narrow front
rather than the entire border. To maintain the ele-
ment of surprise, smaller forces could be active along
much of the border to mask the chosen objective from
Vietnamese forces until the actual attack. Chinese
forces could take a particular objective, for example
the provincial capital of Lai Chau, protect their
flanks, and then withdraw within a short period after
once again proving Vietnam's vulnerability and ad-
ministering another, albeit smaller, lesson.
Improvements to the Chinese military infrastructure
within the border area since 1979 enhance Beijing's
ability to exercise this option. Five years ago, there
were few major military installations along the fron-
tier, and invading troops were housed in villages and
could serve as staging areas for sizable reserve forces
arriving from the north. In addition, vastly expanded
logistic storage facilities and new military hospitals
close to the front provide greatly enhanced resupply
and casualty care-two glaring weaknesses of the
1979 campaign.
roads into the border region.
the Chinese have constructed a series of
unpaved roads that parallel 440 kilometers of the
Vietnam-Guangxi Province border and have greatly
improved roads on the Yunnan front as well. These
new road nets provide better lines of communication
between Chinese installations and the border, give
Beijing's troops greater lateral movement, and in-
crease the number of possible entry points for land
sault.
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is an elite, highly trained special forces unit in which
all soldiers are proficient in Vietnamese, close-quarter
combat, and parachuting. The unit reportedly cap-
tured more prisoners than any other Chinese unit
during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. It has practiced 25X1
paradrops in the border area frequently in the past
five years. This elite unit can be expected to serve
again as a major collector of tactical intelligence in 25X1
any future foray into Vietnam. 25X1
Ground Attacks Into Laos
An alternative to ground assaults along Vietnam's
heavily fortified northern border is a Chinese incur-
sion into Laos. Vietnam only has one division de-
ployed in the three Lao provinces opposite China and
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only one additional combat division-a total of about
20,000 men-in the two military regions of northern
Laos. We estimate that the Vietnamese could get
support from about 20,000 Lao troops, but the Chi-
nese could overwhelm the defenders by massing two
main force armies (100,000 men) for an attack.
Beijing could also count on Chinese-trained resistance
forces in northern Laos to harass Vietnamese and Lao
positions, to disrupt lines of communications, and to
provide detailed intelligence on the defenders' troop
strengths and dispositions. Since 1979, China has
trained Lao resistance fighters at military installa-
tions in southern Yunnan and sent them back to bases
Vietnam is concerned about the possibility of a Chi-
nese offensive through Laos and frequently conducts
exercises simulating combat against such an attack.
These exercises also test an increasingly complicated
command structure in Laos that involves incorpora-
tion of new equipment into the Lao Army inventory:
Assaults into Laos offer both advantages and disad-
vantages to Beijing. An offensive through Laos would
allow for an easier withdrawal when the lesson ended
because Vietnam lacks the reinforcements there to
press a counterattack, and it would also offer Beijing
the chance to focus world attention on the existence of
an armed resistance movement in Laos. There are also
some major drawbacks:
? An assault into Laos might be seen by the interna-
tional community as an attack on a third country
and a widening of the regional conflict.
? Because of the mountainous terrain and sparse road
networks, large Chinese units would be channeled
into valleys where they would be vulnerable.
Province.
? A Chinese attack could punish Vietnamese forces
stationed in Laos but would offer no opportunity to
hurt the Vietnamese economy unless Beijing's
troops pressed eastward into Vietnam's Lai Chau
the north and unavailable for duty in Kampuchea.
Saber Rattling
The most likely Chinese ground force option is to
initiate small-scale clashes and ground probes into
northern Vietnam in response to Vietnamese provoca-
tions along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier or a large
Vietnamese offensive in Kampuchea that threatened
Thailand. This alternative increases the tension along
the border and is a highly visible demonstration of
Chinese displeasure but limits the danger of escala-
tion of the conflict. It also has the advantage of
forcing Vietnam to keep most of its forces deployed in
This is the option that Beijing exercised in a limited
way in 1983 in response to a Vietnamese drive against
resistance forces along the Thai border. In late March
and early April, the Vietnamese overran two resist-
ance bases on the border, crossed into Thailand, and
in a brief firefight killed several Thai soldiers.' China,
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Figure 3. Chinese long-range
artillery pound Vietnamese po-
responding to a Thai request, pounded Vietnamese
positions from Lao Cai in the west to Lang Son in the
east with long-range artillery. Chinese troops also
mounted hit-and-run raids on Vietnamese border
outposts. Beijing was able to accomplish this show of
force with surprise, few casualties, and without rein-
forcements largely because the PLA had built a series
of field artillery positions on high ground along the
border capable of lobbing shells as far as 25 kilome-
ters into Vietnam.
By attacking Vietnam, Beijing provided tangible evi-
dence of its support for the Kampuchean resistance
and the Thai Government and reminded Vietnam that
Chinese military power was still potent. Moreover, the
attacks forced Hanoi to bring its troops to a high alert
status on the northern front:
in mid-April unusually
large truck convoys-with some vehicles towing
field artillery-were moving northeast out of Hanoi
while a field-deployed surface-to-air missile position
was activated near the border town of Lao Cai.
penetration bombing attacks.
Vietnam's well-developed air defenses restrict Beij-
ing's air options. During the 1979 war, although
nearly 600 fighter and bomber aircraft shifted from
airfields throughout China to the south-raising Beij-
ing's air strength along the border to over 850 combat
aircraft-China limited its air involvement to defen-
sive patrols and reconnaissance along the border.
Today, the Chinese have three choices for mounting
air operations against Vietnam: tactical bombing 25X1
raids against military or civilian targets near the
border, air support for ground offensives, and deep
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Fighter Attacks
Beijing's best aircraft for tactical bombing strikes and
ground attack operations is the A-5 fighter-bomber.
Even though it is a short-range aircraft with a limited
bomb load, it could be used effectively in bombing
raids against targets near the Chinese border. The
A-5s could take off from airfields near the border,
attack, and return to Chinese airfields before Viet-
namese fighter aircraft could intercept them.
Beijing recognizes the utility of these aircraft and
formed a regiment of 25 A-5 fighter-bombers in
Guangzhou Military Region in March 1980. It is the
first new ground attack regiment created since 1976
and the only one in south China.
Ground Support
Training involving the A-5s in Guangzhou shows that
the Chinese intend to use the fighter-bombers in two
wartime missions: to strike preselected targets in
tandem with bombers, and to support ground forces.
In at least two large-scale exercises in Guangzhou
since late 1981, A-5s working in conjunction with B-5
(IL-28) light bombers flew multiple ground attack
Bomber Strikes
In May 1980, Beijing added B-6 (TU-16) medium
bombers to the air division at Leiyang in Guangzhou
Military Region, giving the Chinese the option to
mount bombing runs deeper into Vietnam. These
bombers can strike targets deep in Vietnamese territo-
ry with larger bomb loads than either the A-5s or
B-5s. However, the B-6's relatively slow speed, limited
maneuverability, and ineffective electronic counter-
measures would make it easy prey for supersonic
fighter-interceptors and surface-to-air missiles.
China would run the risk of high bomber losses if it
attacked installations other than those close to the
Chinese frontier. The Hanoi-Haiphong corridor pre-
sents especially great dangers for B-6 bombers, as the
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area is protected by a sophisticated network of over-
lapping SA-2 medium-to-high and SA-3 low-to-medi-
um altitude missile sites. Moreover, Vietnam has
received over 150 late-model MIG-21 fighter-inter-
ceptors from the Soviet Union since the war, and
nearly all are based near Hanoi. Vietnamese econom-
ic and military targets along the border are, however,
vulnerable to B-6 attacks. They are defended by only
a few surface-to-air missile sites, and A-5s could
attack the ground-based air defenses before the B-6s
arrived. Although B-6s would be easy targets for
Vietnamese supersonic interceptors, if the B-6s struck
targets close to the Chinese frontier, they could be
adequately defended by Chinese interceptor aircraft.
Beijing is well aware of the improvement to Vietnam-
ese airpower and has taken steps to bolster its own air
defenses.
In addition, fighter regiments from other
military regions continue a policy begun in 1979 of
rotating to airfields along the Sino-Vietnamese border
for six months. These rotational assignments not only
augment air strength in the region, but also give pilots
experience in a combat environment and acquaint
regiments with flying conditions in south China.
We believe that the Chinese are more likely to
consider the use of naval power in a "second lesson"
than they were in the 1979 conflict. Two key factors
underlie this judgment: first, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in the capability of the South Sea Fleet
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to undertake offensive naval action; and second, Viet-
namese naval weaknesses have not been fully re-
dressed. We judge that the two types of naval actions
that China would seriously consider are an amphibi-
ous assault against Vietnamese-held islands in the
South China Sea and the mining of Haiphong harbor.
Amphibious Assault Against Vietnamese Islands
Improvements to the South Sea Fleet's amphibious
lift capabilities make the Chinese Navy better pre-
pared than ever for taking Vietnamese-held islands by
With these capabilities, Beijing would have a com-
manding edge over Vietnamese troops defending the
two most likely targets, the Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea or Bach Long Vi (Nightingale)
Island in the Gulf of Tonkin. Assuming that Hanoi's
garrisons-a total of 500 troops-on the nine islands
they occupy in the Spratlys are not reinforced, China
ing troops and equipment.
could assemble an assault force with a decisive nu-
merical advantage. Moreover, if the assault force
included half of the fleet's complement of destroyers,
frigates, and subchasers, China would have a com-
manding edge in firepower over the Vietnamese de-
fenders. Beijing could gain a similar edge over the
estimated 1,000 Vietnamese soldiers on Bach Long Vi
Island as it is much closer to the Chinese mainland
and landing craft could make. multiple journeys carry-
The Emerging Marine Corps. Beijing has also created
a dedicated amphibious force of Marines, with the
South Sea Fleet leading the way, which greatly
increases the likelihood of success in any amphibious
assault operation. On 12 May 1982, Liberation Army
Daily announced that tanks and armored vehicles of
the Navy's "new force," the Marines, had taken part
in an amphibious landing exercise in south China.
Since then, we have noted
that China is training a small force of
marines in amphibious operations, probably on Hai-
nan Island:
? PLA Pictorial, Beijing's monthly military maga-
zine, in April 1983 carried a series of photos
highlighting the creation of a Marine Corps. Com-
bat troops wearing navy uniforms were pictured
landing with tanks and amphibious armored per-
sonnnel carriers. The landing craft were Yuliang
LSMs which only the South Sea Fleet operates. The
armored vehicles were marked with a letter "H"
suggesting that they are dedicated Haijunluzhandui
or "Marine" assets.
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Although we know little about the structure and size
of China's new Marine Corps, we expect that each of
China's three fleets will eventually form its own unit.
(We believe these units will eventually be as large as a
Chinese infantry division (14,000 men) and be
equipped with a regiment of amphibious tanks and
? In May 1983, Beijing, for the first time, dispatched
two naval ships on a training mission to the Srat-
lys.
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armored personnel carriers.
The Paracels-Outpost in the South China Sea.
China seized control over all of the Paracel Islands in
January 1974 after a short naval battle with South
Vietnamese gunboats and minor skirmishes with
South Vietnamese ground forces on the islands. Bei-
jing did little to bolster facilities on the Paracel
Islands before the 1979 war but since then has
improved its military presence there, which would
enable the islands to be used in support of military
operations in the South China Sea:
y early 1982 the Chinese
had built a new nava ase and port on Duncan
Island. The harbor is routinely used by submarine
chasers, and it may be able to accommodate larger
warships.
? In October 1983, two B-6 bombers overflew Malay-
sian-occupied Swallow Reef in the Spratlys, this
time with a frigate and replenishment oiler deploy-
ing south of the Paracels to provide navigational
assistance and air surveillance.
Deficiencies of the South Sea Fleet. The South Sea
Fleet's most serious weakness in projecting power is
its lack of modern shipborne air defense systems. Any
Chinese naval task force operating in the Spratlys, for
example, would be out of range of China's land-based
fighters and within striking distance of Vietnam's
airpower. Although Hanoi's SU-22s and MIG-21s
would be operating near the limits of their effective
combat radius, they would pose a credible threat,
using bombs and Soviet AS-7 tactical air-to-surface
missiles against China's naval ships. At. present, South
Sea Fleet warships have no surface-to-air missiles or
other modern weapon systems for defense against
fighter-bombers and air-to-surface missiles. Ground
forces have shoulder-fired SA-7s but no mobile, tacti-
cal, low-to-medium altitude SAMs to deploy after
establishing shore positions.~
Similar problems would be encountered in an assault
on Vietnamese-held Bach Long Vi Island in the Gulf
of Tonkin. Although Chinese fighterswould be avail-
able to provide fleet air defense
the Vietnamese have Sepal naval surface-,
Beijing appears to be testing its newly improved naval
capabilities in the South China Sea. Since late 1980,
Beijing has paid more attention to the Spratly Islands,
over which it claims sovereignty:
? On 8 November 1980, two naval B-6 bombers from
Hainan Island overflew Northeast Cay, the north-
ernmost island of the Spratlys. In anticipation of
Vietnamese reaction, Chinese fighter aircraft con-
ducted defensive patrols near the Paracels while the
bombers flew south.
to-surface cruise missiles at installations near Hai-
phong. The Sepal has a range that covers the entire
Gulf and half of Hainan Island and it could be used
effectively against the Chinese fleet. Even if the
Vietnamese Sepals were destroyed by Chinese air-
strikes, a confrontation in the Gulf would almost
certainly lead to a costly air war in which China's
numerically superior airpower probably would wear
down and eventually defeat the Vietnamese, but not
before taking heavy losses.
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A second deficiency for the Chinese during any
amphibious assault is the lack of adequate antisubma-
rine warfare capabilities. Although the Chinese have
made some minor improvements in the ASW equip-
ment they acquired from the Soviets in the late 1950s,
it remains of limited utility. Chinese sonars, in partic-
ular, can detect targets only within short ranges. The
Vietnamese Navy does not yet have any submarines,
but four to six Soviet submarines usually are present
in the South China Sea, including several diesel-
powered torpedo-attack submarines and one or two
nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. They
could conceivably support Hanoi in a Sino-Vietnam-
ese naval conflict.
Mining Vietnamese Harbors
We believe that the mining of Vietnamese harbors
would be a low-risk, high-impact military operation
that is within the capabilities of the Chinese Navy.
Haiphong harbor is the most attractive target, as over
50 percent of Vietnam's merchant shipping and most
arms imports come through the port. Even a tempo-
rary closure would cause considerable economic dislo-
cation and complicate the delivery of arms from the
Soviet Union. Traffic could be rerouted to southern
ports, but the delays could prove critical if there was
fighting along the northern border.
Mindful of Vietnam's well-developed air and coastal
defenses around Haiphong, the Chinese would proba-
bly use submarine-launched naval mines. China has
over 100 R-class diesel attack submarines-22 in the
South Sea Fleet-each of which can lay up to 36
mines. China's submarine force could easily lay
enough mines in one operation to close Haiphong to
shipping. The United States, using a mine roughly
equivalent to China's current mines, initially closed
Haiphong in 1972 using only 50 mines. China pro-
duces five varieties of naval mines ranging in weight
from 200 to 1,100 kilograms. We believe the Chinese
Navy has a large stock of naval mines.
The Vietnamese Navy's ASW and minesweeping
capabilities, though improving, are probably insuffi-
cient to prevent China from mining Haiphong, and
the Navy would be hard pressed to clear independent-
ly the harbor once mines were laid. Hanoi's ASW
force consists of four Petya-class light frigates and
eight subchasers based at Da Nang, and 30 KA-25
Hormone helicopters based at Haiphong. The Chinese
would be most likely to mine the harbor at night since
Hormone ASW helicopters are unable to operate
effectively in submarine detection at night. All six of
Vietnam's minesweepers would have to be used to
reopen Haiphong, but Chinese submarines could
probably keep the harbor closed by returning at night
to lay more mines.
Obstacles to Chinese Actions
Vietnam's New Strength
The expansion and qualitative improvements to the
Vietnamese armed forces facing China are certainly
major obstacles to a Chinese attack. In 1979 the
Chinese were able to dictate the beginning and ending
of the conflict. Today, Vietnam has-acquired new
offensive weapons such as SU-22 fighter-bombers and
AS-7 tactical air-to-surface missiles. They have also
acquired Scud-B tactical surface-to-surface missiles
that can strike Chinese airfields and cities from
Kaiyuan in the west, to Nanning in Guangxi, to the
west coast of Hainan Island. The Scud-B is an older
Soviet system, and, while inaccurate, it can deliver a
1,000-kilogram high-explosive or chemical warhead
on targets as far as 300 kilometers from the launch
position. In view of Vietnam's new strength, the
Chinese military could not guarantee a quick, con-
tained lesson.
A Soviet Shadow
With a major Soviet naval and air presence at Cam
Ranh Bay, China would also have to weigh heavily
the possibility of Soviet intervention in any future
Sino-Vietnamese hostilities. We believe it is unlikely
that the Soviets would intervene in a purely Sino-
Vietnamese conflict, but the Soviets have sought to
deter the Chinese before by dispatching warships to
the South China Sea. During the 1979 war, a Kresta-
II cruiser led a task force into the South China Sea
and a Sverdlov cruiser moved into the East China
Sea. the Soviets
routinely maintain a complement of six surface com-
batants in the South China Sea and last November
expanded their air operations at Cam Ranh Bay by
transferring nine Badger (TU-16) bomber aircraft
from a base near Vladivostok.
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We do not believe, however, that Soviet troop deploy-
ments along the Sino-Soviet border are a major
military deterrent to Chinese action against Vietnam.
China in 1979 prepared for the possibility of Soviet
retaliation along the northern frontier and placed
troops on a high state of alert but was not deterred
from attacking Vietnam. Today, China has strength-
ened its northern defenses and is less vulnerable than
in 1979 to Soviet pressure along their long land
border.'
Second Lesson Unlikely ...
Although Beijing has the muscle to implement a wide
variety of military options, we do not believe that
China will undertake a major second lesson against
Vietnam unless severely provoked. The 1979 invasion
was costly both in terms of lives and resources as
China lost 20,000 killed or wounded and had to raise
its 1979 military budget by over 2 billion yuan to
cover the cost of the war. Beijing today is committed
to an ambitious program of economic modernization
and would be reluctant to get involved in another
prolonged conflict which would drain China's coffers
and potentially cause domestic unrest.
... But the Tensions Remain
Even without a new border war, Beijing exacts a high
price from Vietnam for its domination of Indochina
and its collusion with the Soviet Union, and has few
incentives to defuse the tension:
? The harassment along the land border compels
Hanoi to maintain a large standing army at a
relatively high state of readiness along the Chinese
frontier.
? Beijing's assistance to Kampuchean resistance
groups has helped to mire Hanoi in a long and
inconclusive antiguerrilla campaign in Kampuchea.
? China's increasing levels of material support and
training for antigovernment insurgents in Laos of-
fers the prospects of increasing the cost to the
Vietnamese of their efforts to control Indochina.
? Mutual condemnation of Vietnam's takeover of
Kampuchea has created new reasons to support
Thailand and opened doors to improving relations
with other Southeast Asian nations. Opposition to
Vietnamese domination of Indochina as well as the
growing Soviet naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay
allows Beijing to point to a congruence of interest
with US foreign policy in this part of East Asia.
Nonetheless, the price Beijing exacts today through
limited military activity is not sufficient to force
Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. Short of a
massive, and improbable, Chinese assault to take
Hanoi, there is probably no military action Beijing
can take that will break Vietnam's resolve. The best
that Beijing can hope for is that through a combina-
tion of diplomatic and limited but persistent military
pressure it can convince Hanoi that its interests are
better served by a political settlement to the Kampu-
chean situation.
The hostility and diametrically opposed positions on
Indochina point to a prolonged hostility between
China and Vietnam. Beijing, over the last five years,
has shown no willingness to accept Hanoi's many
overtures for a reduction in tensions and continues to
make a total Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampu-
chea the precondition for any settlement. Vietnam, on
the other hand, is unwilling to compromise its basic
aim of controlling Indochina. We see no wavering on
Moscow's part of its backing for the Vietnamese
position, and thus we believe the impasse will contin-
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