MOZAMBIQUE: ARE THE CUBANS COMING?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000200140002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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directorate of
intelligence
Mozambique:
Are the Cubans Coming
ALA 82-10173)
0
December 1982
ropy 1 ~ 9
g
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Directorate of Top Secret
1Vlozambique:
Are the Cubans Coming ?
This assessment was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American
Analysis, with a contribution from the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Southern Africa
Division, ALA,
The paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations
Top Secret
ALA 82-10173)
December 1982
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Mozambique:
Are the Cubans Coming?
Key Judgments We believe that during the next few months Mozambican President
Information available Machel may call for Cuban combat forces to help his government in its war25X1
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as 81
25 December 1982 against South African-backed insurgents now operating in most of the
country's 10 provinces.
quest at any time.
The meeting in mid-December between senior South African and Mozam-
bican officials to discuss mutual security concerns could delay a request by
Machel for Cuban troops. Given the failure of the two sides to resolve less
serious problems in the past, however, we doubt that they will be able to
reach a political accommodation that would lead Pretoria to rein in the
anti-Machel insurgents. As a result, we expect Machel's situation to
continue to deteriorate. It is difficult to predict exactly when the regime
will view the insurgent threat as dire enough to call for Cuban forces, but
Machel is already under sufficient pressure, in our view, to make such a re-
the United States to challenge its interests elsewhere
The USSR and Cuba, in our judgment, would probably agree to send a
limited number of Cuban troops to Mozambique if they deemed this
essential to maintaining apro-Soviet, Marxist regime in Maputo. The
Soviets would probably conclude that a failure to move decisively to keep
the Mozambican regime in power would cast doubt on the USSR's
reliability in the eyes of its other Third World allies and would encourage
problems involved.
We believe that between 3,000 and 5,000 Cuban troops would initially be
sent; more might follow later. On the basis of its experience in Angola and
Ethiopia, Havana probably would judge that a force of this size would be
adequate to handle the current situation in Mozambique. The initial
contingent would probably consist of at least one brigade--approximately
2,000 to 3,000 personnel-from Cuba's forces in Ethiopia, supplemented
by additional troops from Angola. Havana, in our view, would be unlikely
to replace these forces unless the security situations in Ethiopia or Angola
deteriorated markedly. We believe Havana would be less likely to send
troops to Mozambique directly from Cuba because of the greater logistical
Top Secret
ALA 82-10173)
ecem er 1982
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An initial troop contingent would probably be airlifted, and this could take I
place in a matter of days. Before sending troops, the Soviets might deliver
additional heavy equipment by sea.
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oscow a rea y as sent a 25X1
siza e num er o tan s, armore personnel carriers, and air defense
equipment to Mozambique, possibly in preparation for a Cuban troop
deployment.
In our view, South Africa's initial reaction to the arrival of Cuban combat
forces in Mozambique would depend to a considerable extent on where the
Cubans were deployed. Ifas we believe likely-Cuban troops were sent
to northern Mozambique rather than the Maputo area, we think Pretoria
would respond at first with stepped-up aid to the Mozambican guerrillas
and perhaps with covert operations against the Cubans and other targets.
We do not rule out direct South African military actions, however.
US interests in southern Africa would be jeopardized if Cuban combat
forces were sent to Mozambique. African leaders probably would place
some of the blame for the escalation of the conflict on Washington, arguing
that the United States, by failing to compel Pretoria to rein in the
guerrillas, was partially responsible for the situation that had led to the in-
troduction of Cuban troops. Moreover, with the arrival of Cuban combat
forces in Mozambique, we believe
that Africans would become even more inclined than they
already are to suspect the United States of favoring Pretoria-particularly
if a military confrontation developed between South Africa and Cuba.
In addition, the Western-sponsored negotiations on the Namibian problem
would be likely to collapse, because a new influx of Cubans into the region
would probably lead South Africa to pull out of the talks. Finally, ifas
seems likely-Mozambique granted the USSR access rights to naval or air
facilities in return for Cuban combat assistance, the Soviets would be able
to expand their maritime reconnaissance in the Ipdian Ocean.
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lO~Iozambidue:
Are the Cubans Coming?
Introduction
The wfdening South African-backed insurgency in
Mozambique and occasional South African military
operations inside that country have created a sense of
desperation among officials in Maputo and led them
to consider asking Cuba to send combat forces.
arge y as a resu o t e insurgency,
Mozambique's leftist government has expanded its
military ties with the Soviets and Cubans in recent
years. Moscow has provided an array of ground
weapons and other heavy equipment along with some
500 to 800 advisers. Havana's 800 to 1,000 military
advisers play a key role in the Mozambican military's
counterinsurgency operations.
This paper examines the present security situation in
Mozambique, Soviet and Cuban perspectives on a
possible deployment of Cuban troops, the mechanics
of introducing such forces, and South Africa's likely
reaction. Finally, it explores the impact of a Cuban
troop influx on US interests in the region
Deteriorating Security Conditions
The South African-supported Mozambique National
Resistance Movement (NRM) has had considerable
success in expanding its forces and operations during
the past two years. Numbering only in the hundreds
when they began operating in the late 1970s, the
Beira, the second-largest city, is frequently without
water or electricity because of attacks on facilities just
outside the city.
South African military operations in Mozambique
have added to the Machel regime's unease. In early
1981, South African commandos entered a suburb of
Maputo and destroyed buildings belonging to the
African National Congress (ANC), the principal
South African dissident group. There have been at
least three sophisticated sabotage operations since
then in the Beira area, and considering the NRM's
limited technical capabilities, we believe the South
Africans almost certainly played a key role in these
incidents. The most recent such attack caused exten-
sive damage to fuel storage facilities in Beira in early
December. Finally, South African troops initiated a
number of shooting incidents along the border in
November and December
The Mozambican military-weakened by shortages
of food and other supplies, low morale, inexperienced
leadership, and rising defections-is clearly unable to
guerrillas are now around 10,000 strong,
about half of them are
armed. Last spring, insurgent forces moved out from
their strongholds in the central Mozambican prov-
inces of Manica and Sofala and began operating in
force in the southern provinces of Gaza and Inham-
bane. More recently, guerrillas-numbering in the
thousands-moved northward into populous and eco-
nomically important Zambezia Province as well as
parts of Tete Province.
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As a result, President Machel's regime fully controls
only the key cities of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala,
parts of Maputo Province, and most of the northeast-
ern provinces of Nampula and Cabo Delgado. Even
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'Lake
Nyasa
mY'quQr
Mozambique Channel
~ Cabo Delgado
`~~
Area of recent insurgent
operations
Area of traditional insurgent
operations
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Soviet and Cuban Perspectives
A Mozambican call for Cuban troops in the near term
would be the first significant test of Andropov's policy
in the Third World. At least initially, he would be
inclined to temporize, in part because a sizable Cuban
troop deployment would undercut Moscow's current
campaign to assuage the United States and the
West-and even China-about Moscow's intentions.
He would be particularly concerned about the impact
of such a move on the USSR's relations with Western
Europe, especially countries like West Germany and
France, which have been diplomatically active in
trying to settle the Namibian problem. For this
reason, Andropov and his Politburo colleagues might
initially look to alternatives, such as more military aid
to Mozambique or even a limited accommodation
between Maputo and Pretoria.
We believe, however, that the USSR and Cuba
eventually would probably agree to send a limited
contingent of Cuban troops to Mozambique if such
forces seemed essential to preserve apro-Soviet,
Marxist regime in Maputo. The USSR, in our judg-
ment, would not send its own combat units to Mozam-
bique, although it probably would augment its mili-
tary advisory team and continue to increase its arms
shipments.
Inhibiting Factors. We believe that neither the
Soviets nor the Cubans are eager to send Cuban
combat forces to Mozambique. Both Moscow and
Havana recognize the risks and costs that such a move
would entail.
One of their key concerns almost certainly is the
possibility of a South African military response that
could result in heavy Cuban casualties and perhaps
force a choice between the introduction of more
Cubans or an embarrassing withdrawal. Even in the
absence of direct South African retaliation, insurgent
attacks could cause substantial Cuban casualties.
Havana would have difficulty concealing a heavy
casualty rate, and over time this would help undercut
the popularity of the regime. Since 1980, the regime
in Havana has been particularly sensitive to any issues
that might further undercut popular attitudes toward
Soviet and Cuban officials presumably also realize
that Cuban forces could become bogged down in a
frustrating struggle against the guerrillas. Neither
Moscow nor Havana wishes to be caught up in a
protracted conflict such as in Angola.
Financial considerations, too, could be a restraining
factor. Mozambique, unlike Angola, is not a major
exporter of oil and lacks foreign exchange to pay for
Cuban forces. Indeed, it is unable to pay for the
Soviet military aid it already receives. The Soviets
almost certainly recognize, therefore, that they would
have to underwrite the costs of de loving Cuban
forces.'
Situations elsewhere in the world might work against
a deployment of Cuban forces to Mozambique.
Havana's first priority in providing support to foreign
governments is its stake in ensuring the survival of the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. A sharp deteriora-
tion in the situation there probably would forestall a
Cuban deployment of troops to Mozambique. A major
new South African invasion of southern Angola or a
Somali incursion into the Ogaden might similarly
constrain Havana from sendin forces to Mozam-
bique.
Factors for Involvement. The Soviets, in our judg-
ment, would probably calculate that a failure to move
decisively to save the Mozambican regime would cast
doubt on the USSR's reliability in the eyes of its other
Third World allies. The new Soviet leadership, which
has already restated the USSR's commitment to
sustaining revolutionary regimes in the Third World,
would probably reason that failure to rescue apro-
Soviet regime, even one that is of only peripheral
importance to Soviet interests, could strengthen US
resolve to challenge Soviet interests elsewhere in the
Third World. The prospect of acquiring access rights
to Mozambican naval and air facilities in return for
saving the Mozambican regime might be a further
' Moscow would not be incurring totally new expenditures, however,
if some of the Cubans came from Ethiopia, where we assume the
its leadership.
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incentive for Moscow to favor a positive response to a
request by Maputo for Cuban troops. The Soviets
might also hope to use their enhanced influence to
strengthen the position of pro-Soviet officials in the
Mozambican leadership
The Cubans, for their part, might see increased
Cuban military involvement in Mozambique as an
excellent opportunity to extract a significant increase
in aid from Moscow at a time when Cuba is faced
with severe economic problems. Cuban President
Castro may also look upon Cuban military support for
Machel as a means of enhancing his and Cuba's
international prestige at the time of the seventh
Nonaligned Summit in India next March, when he is
expected to relinquish the chairmanship of the Non-
aligned Movement. In addition, Castro could decide
that the safety of the estimated 1,800 to 2,000 Cubans
(civilian and military advisers) already in Mozam-
bique hinged on the insertion of a major Cuban
combat force; such a judgment apparently played a
key role in his decision to send forces to Angola in
November 1975. In the final analysis, however, we
believe Soviet wishes will be the main factor in
determining Castro's course of action
On balance, then, we believe the Soviets and Cubans
would deploy Cuban combat troops to Mozambique if
the regime there asked for them and if they deemed it
essential to remaining in power. Even if Cuban Presi-
dent Castro proved reluctant to comply with such a
Mozambican request, we believe Cuba's dependence
on the USSR would compel Castro to go along with a
Soviet decision in favor of sending troops, provided
that Moscow used its substantial leverage.
Recent Signs of Concern. In the meantime, there are
increasing signs that officials in Havana and Moscow
are worried about the situation in Mozambique and
expect a request for Cuban forces to be made soon.
Last summer, according to US Embassy reporting,
the Cuban Ambassador to Maputo stated privately
that he thought Mozambique would call for Cuban
troops.
Bureau member Jorge Risquet, who had previously
been in charge of Cuban military and civilian person-
nel in Angola, led delegations to Mozambique in
January and in September and October. Senior Cu-
ban military officers were with him on both occasions.
Probably partly in response to issues raised at these
visits, Machel visited Havana in May.
The Soviets sent Ye Samoteikin, one of President
Brezhnev's personal aides, to Maputo in January, and
chief political commissar of the armed forces Yepi-
shev visited Mozambique in May. In turn, Mozambi-
can Defense Minister Chipande visited the USSR last
spring. In November, Machel met with top Soviet
military officials-Defense Minister Ustinov; Chief of
the General Staff Ogarkov; General Sokolov, the first
deputy defense minister who oversees Soviet opera-
tions in Afghanistan; and Colonel General Sergey-
chik, the first deputy chief of the organization respon-
sible for Soviet military aid-when he was in Moscow
for Brezhnev's funeral. In addition, ahigh-level Soviet
military delegation,
late December. The delegation apparently was sent to
assess the situation and make recommendations to
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that the USSR has made at least three
deliveries of military hardware to Mozambique since
last spring. In addition to tanks, artillery, and air
defense equipment, the shipments have included the
Soviets' first delivery to southern Africa of an ad-
vanced armored personnel carrier, the BMP. The only
other BMPs in Sub-Saharan Africa are in Ethiopia,
where they are operated by Cubans.
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Since the beginning of 1982, there has been an
unprecedented number of visits involving high-level
Mozambican officials concerned with military mat-
ters and Cuban and Soviet officials. Cuban Political
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In our view, a variety of considerations have prevent-
ed Machel from calling for Cuban forces. Despite his
Marxist orientation, we believe he would prefer to
minimize foreign.involvement, particularly that of the
Soviets and their allies, in the counterinsurgency
effort. Machel hasOvoiced disapproval of
Angola's dependence on Cuban troops. Machel proba-
bly also realizes that the governments of most neigh-
boring states would be disturbed by an ir~lux of
Cuban troops, and that calling in the Cubans would
undermine Mozambique's efforts over the past few
years to expand economic and other links with the
West. Finally, Machel almost certainly is aware that
an irtllux of Cuban troops into Mozambique would
raise the prospect of a full-scale South f(frican
the lines of the attack they conducted in a suburb ,
of Maputo in 1981. In December 1982 they mount-
ed asimilar operation in Maseru, Lesotho. STAT
the attack STAT
in Maseru was intended in part as a warning to
Mozambique, which-they alleged-has been in-
creasingits military and political support to the
ANC. Pretoria might also choose to mount further
covert operations against key economic facilities in
Mozambique and attribute responsibility for such
attacks to the NRM. 25X1
? A sharp new upsurge in Mozambican military
We believe, however, that the security situation is so
precarious that the Mozambican regime could ask
for Cuban troops at any time and that such a decision
could come without concrete new indicators. None-
theless, one or more of the following developments
might well precede-and prompt-a request for Cu-
banforces:
STAT
? Insurgent activities even closer to Maputo. The
guerrillas already operate in force some 130 kilo-
meters north of the city and have carried out
operations in the vicinity of Xai-Xai, the capital of
Maputo Province.
? Sabotage operations inside Maputo.
? New South African military operations. The South
,~fricans might carry out further raids in Mozam-
bique against facilities belonging to the ANC along
Machel and other senior Mozambican officials last
fall told Western diplomats that Maputo may feel
compelled to accept Communist troops to protect
Soviet Bloc economic technicians from insurgent at-
tacks. Machel and Foreign Minister Chissano have
asserted that the USSR, Cuba, Bulgaria, and Hunga-
ry have pressed them to accept troops. While we do
not necessarily take these Mozambican statements at
face value, we are reluctant to dismiss them solely as
ploys designed to alarm the West.
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The Mechanics of Deployment
Finding the Troops. We believe the Cubans would
initially send between 3,000 and 5,000 troops to
Mozambique. On the basis of its experiences in
Angola and Ethiopia, Havana probably would judge
that a force of this size would be adequate to handle
the current situation in Mozambique. We would
expect the first elements of a Cuban expeditionary
force to come from Ethio is and An ola rather than
from Cuba.
We estimate that at least one brigade-approximately
2,000 to 3,000 troops-would come from Ethiopia. It
would probably be supplemented by up to 2,500
Cuban troops from Angola. Another possibility, albeit
remote, is that the Cubans might send troops from the
Congo to Mozambique.
~up to 2,000 Cuban troops may be present at
Pointe Noire (Congo) as part of the force defending
Angola's Cabinda enclave.
We doubt that Cuba would replace any of these
troops unless the military situation in the Ogaden or
southern Angola deteriorated dramatically:
? In Ethiopia, the Cuban expeditionary force-esti-
mated at approximately 11,000 men, of whom about
8,000 are formed into four combat brigades-has
been relatively inactive. It could probably be re-
duced by 2,000 to 3,000 personnel without signifi-
cantly affecting the situation in Ethiopia.
? In Angola as well, the Cubans probably would not
have to replace troops sent to Mozambique. We
estimate that there are now well over 20,000 Cuban
troops in Angola, and many of them have been
largely inactive. Troops taken from Angola would
most likely be drawn from the Luanda or Cabinda
areas and not from southern and central Angola,
where Cuban and Angolan forces are fighting
against insurgents of the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
Havana could, of course, send troops directly to
Mozambique from Cuba, but we believe this is less
likely in view of Cuban concern over the Nicaraguan
situation. The elite Special Troops of the Ministry of
Interior-the first Cuban combat units sent to Angola
in November 1975--can be sent overseas on short
notice. Several reserve units in the Cuban Army could
also be mobilized quickly for overseas service.
Moving Troops and Equipment. The initial contingent
of troops would probably be airlifted to Mozambique
by the Cubans. Cubana Airlines aircraft-some capa-
ble of transporting 120 to 180 troops each-and
Cuban military transports could airlift 1,000 to 1,500
personnel from Ethiopia, Angola, or Cuba to Mozam-
bique in one or two days. The entire contingent
probably could be flown to Mozambique within a
week. Ethiopian, Angolan, and Mozambican civil
airliners could also be used to shuttle troops. Judging
from past Cuban troop deployments to Africa, the
Soviets could also provide aircraft for the airlift
Before sending troops, the Cubans, we believe, would
prefer that sufficient heavy equipment be on hand in
Mozambique for an armored or mechanized infantry
brigade. The movement of this equipment might take
place only days or weeks before the arrival of a troop
contingent, but it could also be pre-positioned several
months in advance. Heavy equipment for an armored
brigade began to arrive in Ethiopia in,1977, shortly
before the Cuban expeditionary force.
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Possible Cuban Troop Routes to Mozambique
Ivory
Coast
Upper
Volta,
La bya
Central African
Republic
Buru
SoutPt
4t9rica
PRETORIA'
Swaziland
`Malta C`v`~ t v Cy
1i~ia Mediterranean Sea
aspran
b. 1r-- Sea
Red `
~ Saa
ahrai
Qatar
Air route
Sea route
Distance in nautical miles
o soo
Nautical Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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cargo and passenger ships, and Ethiopia and Angola
possess several amphibious landing ships that are
capable of moving equipment and troops to Mozam-
bique. The movement of an armored brigade and its
equipment from Ethiopia would require at least three
Soviet or Cuban cargo ships. The brigade's troops
could be moved to Mozambique by two Soviet passen-
ger ships or a combination of converted Cuban cargo
ships and amphibious landing ships. The movement of
troops and equipment from Ethiopia and Angola by
sea would require at least two to three weeks to
complete.
The Cubans, wary of possible South African military
retaliation, would probably send the bulk of their
forces to northern Mozambique. Several battalion-
size camps are located near Beira, for instance, and
together they are capable of accommodating a Cuban
brigade. Should the Cubans nonetheless deploy forces
to southern Mozambique, they could make use of the
recently expanded facility at Matola, which is only 60
kilometers from the South African border.
Wherever Cuban troops arrived, we believe they
would avoid playing a direct role in the counterinsur-
gency at first, although this could change over time.
They probably would guard ports and other economic
installations and man garrisons in the main cities,
thus freeing more Mozambican troops for combat.
South African Reaction
South African officials have stated publicly that they
would find a Cuban troop presence in Mozambique
intolerable, and they have told the US Government
privately that the arrival of Cuban forces would
trigger a South African military attack. The recent
South African attack against ANC facilities in Leso-
tho, as well as South Africa's almost certain involve-
ment in the December raid on oil depots in Beira,
underscores Pretoria's toughening attitude toward its
neighbors and its willingness to employ military force.
We believe, however, that the South Africans might
well react cautiously at first. Pretoria almost certainly
harbors doubts about the extent of Western support it
could count upon in any direct military confrontation
with Cuban forces in Mozambique. Most officials in
Pretoria would, in our estimation, be concerned that
direct attacks by their forces could lead to a situation
in which South Africa would be at war, without active
Western support, against Soviet-backed Cuban forces
in Mozambique and along the Namibian-Angolan
border. Senior South African officials have often
alluded to their "betrayal" at the hands of the United
States when, in their view, Washington reneged on
commitments to back Pretoria after large numbers of
Cuban troops arrived in Luanda during the Angolan
In our view, the probability of direct South African
military retaliation would vary with the regions and
circumstances in which the Cubans might be de-
ployed, although we cannot categorically rule out
such a response in any event:
? The arrival of Cuban troops in Maputo would be
more likely to trigger direct South African military
retaliation than a Cuban troop deployment to the
Beira and Nacala areas in northern Mozambique.
? Pretoria would be less likely to attack Cuban troops
if they arrived in small groups and dispersed quick-
ly
In any event, we expect that Pretoria would take a
number of steps in response to the arrival of Cuban
forces, in part to mollify South African public opin-
ion. At a minimum, we believe the South Africans
would increase their support to the NRM. They
probably would also carry out covert operations
against key targets within Mozambique-including,
perhaps, attacks on Cuban and other Communist
personnel that they would try to pass off as NRM
operations. If these measures failed to prevent Cuban-
Mozambican advances against the NRM, direct
South African military action would become more
likely.
Still, we suspect that there is more ambivalence in
Pretoria on the question of Cuban combat forces than
official statements indicate. Some officials might well
see certain advantages in a limited influx of Cuban
combat forces into Mozambique. These officials prob-
ably believe that the deployment of Cuban forces in
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Mozambique would lead to stronger ties between
South Africa and the West, particularly the United
States. At a minimum, Pretoria probably calculates
that the Cubans' arrival would halt a growing West-
ern dialogue with Mozambique that has recently been
accompanied by Western pressure on Pretoria to rein
in the NRM.
Prospects
The meeting in mid-December between South Afri-
can Foreign Minister Botha and Mozambican Securi-
ty Minister Veloso could help delay a request by
Machel for Cuban troops. The Mozambicans had
been trying to arrange such talks for several months
in obvious hopes of reaching some private under-
standing with the South Africans over ANC activities
in Mozambique that would lead to a reduction in
Pretoria's support for the NRM. During the talks,
which both sides described as cordial, the officials
exchanged views on the ANC and the NRM and
agreed to discuss these issues later in greater depth.
While it is possible that this meeting could mark the
beginning of a process of accommodation between
Pretoria and Maputo that would obviate Machel's
need for Cuban combat support, we do not believe this
is probable:
? Earlier discussions between senior Mozambican and
South African officials accomplished little. Pretoria
has continued to increase its support to the NRM,
and the ANC has continued to launch attacks from
Mozambique.
? Machel would have difficulty reining in the ANC.
Several influential officials in his regime would
oppose such a move, and his border guard would
probably be unable to prevent ANC teams from
crossing into South Africa.
? South Africa, in any event, would be unlikely to
reduce its aid to the NRM. Pretoria's support for
the guerrillas is an inexpensive, efficient means of
helping to maintain its economic hegemony in the
region.
Nonetheless, we expect a series of follow-on meetings
at lower levels between the Mozambicans and the
South Africans. From the Mozambican perspective,
however, these probably will be overshadowed by the
likely continued deterioration in the security situation
at home. As a result, we believe that Machel almost
certainly will continue to consider obtaining combat 25X1
support from Havana. 25X1
Implications for the United States. US interests in
southern Africa could be damaged in a number of
ways if Cuban combat forces were sent to
Mozambique.
? Black southern African leaders probably would
place some of the blame on Washington for the
escalation of the conflict. They could be expected to
argue that the United States, by failing to compel
Pretoria to rein in the insurgents, was partially
responsible for the situation that had led to the
introduction of Cuban troops. With the arrival of
Cuban combat forces in Mozambique, moreover, 25X1
Africans would become even more inclined than
they already are to suspect the United States of
favoring Pretoria-particularly if a military con-
frontation developed between South Africa and the
Cubans.
? The Western-sponsored negotiations on the Namib-
ian problem would be likely to collapse, since an
influx of Cubans into southern Africa would proba-
bly cause South Africa to pull out of the talks.
? Maputo would be likely to halt a number of West-
ern-sponsored economic projects in Mozambique
that are designed in part to ease economic troubles
facing the Western-oriented regimes in landlocked
Zimbabwe and Malawi.
? Mozambicans would probably grant Moscow access
rights to naval or air facilities in return for Cuban
combat forces. Soviet access to airfields in Mozam-
bique would permit expanded maritime surveillance
in the Indian Ocean.
25X1
25X1
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Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/21 :CIA-RDP83S00855R000200140002-7