BRAZIL'S CHANGING NUCLEAR GOALS: MOTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R001001270002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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se et
-Bra'zil's Changing Nuclear Goals:
Motives and Constraints
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
SNIE 93-83
December 1985
copy. 2 0 8
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Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 93-83
BRAZIL'S CHANGING NUCLEAR GOALS:
MOTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
Information available as of 5 December 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which
was approved by the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 3
Background on Nuclear Program Inherited by New Civilian
Government ........................................................................... 3
Retreat From Nuclear Power ...................................................... 3
The National Nuclear Program: New Emphasis ........................ 4
Military Nuclear Projects ............................................................. 4
Civilian Support ............................................................................ 5
Weapons Potential and Weapons-Related R&D ........................ 6
Potential Delivery Systems ........................................................... 7
The Decisionmaking Environment ............................................. 7
Implications for US Policy and Regional Stability ..................... 8
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Brazil's new civilian government, which came to power in March
1985, inherited both a major safeguarded nuclear power and fuel-cycle
program tied to an agreement with West Germany and a complex
tapestry of indigenous, largely unsafeguarded, nuclear research efforts
run by the military services and the Nuclear Energy Commission
(CNEN). Research activity and funding for the indigenous programs has
continued to increase, while activity under the West German accord
continues to be scaled down.
Despite Brazil's dissatis action wit -"t e progress of the West
German deal, we doubt that Brazil will actually cancel the accord, and
we believe that Brazil will continue its efforts to master the nuclear fuel
cycle irrespective of outside factors. This is reflective of its overall quest
for major-nation status.
Each of the Brazilian military services has its own nuclear research
and development projects that are supported by CNEN and its nuclear
research institutes.
We judge that Argentina's surprise announcement in late 1983 of
an enrichment capability has greatly spurred the Brazilians. Argentina's
nuclear program is more advanced than Brazil's, and some military
officers apparently believe that Buenos Aires has built, or can now
build, nuclear weapons and that Argentina poses a potential military
threat to Brazil.
Over the past two years there have been severe budget cuts
affecting the safeguarded power program, but economic factors have
not hampered the nuclear research efforts of the military. Although the
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civilian government cut overall military budgets, no cuts have been
noted in any military nuclear programs. We believe that in the long run
economic factors will not constrain the Brazilians if they are determined
to pursue this indigenous program
We do not believe that the Brazilian Government has decided to
produce nuclear weapons. A number of recent reports, taken together,
do suggest that segments of Brazil's nuclear establishment, particularly
the military, are now intent on acquiring facilities and expertise that
would in the future give them the capability to produce nuclear
weapons. We believe it would be at least 1990 before a nuclear
explosive device could be ready for testing if the order to produce a
weapon were given immediately
Brazil is working on a two-stage sounding rocket called the Sonda
IV, and on a larger satellite-launch vehicle. The Sonda IV could possibly
be configured to carry a nuclear warhead, but we have only fragmen-
tary evidence at this time that Brazil has any plans for its military use. F
Brazil is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
(IAEA) and all nuclear cooperation agreements signed to date are
subject to IAEA safeguards. We believe, however, that tension will
persist between Brazil's limited acceptance of safeguards and compro-
mises that may be necessary to ensure success in the indigenous
program
Illustrative of the suspicion that characterizes Brazil's view of
Argentina's nuclear aspirations has been the inability of Buenos Aires to
interest Brasilia in reaching a substantive nuclear accord that would
involve no-nuclear-weapons pledges and joint inspection of nuclear
facilities
If other countries in the region were to perceive that Brazil was in-
tent on acquiring either plutonium or highly enriched uranium, it
would have a detrimental impact on regional stability. We would
expect Brazilian-Argentine relations, which, outside of the nuclear
context, are currently quite good, to deteriorate quickly. The perception
that an Argentine-Brazilian nuclear arms race was under way would
probably exacerbate other regional rivalries.
The current direction of Brazil's national nuclear program, and the
prominent role of the military in it, presents a danger to US interests in
Brazil. Brazil would almost certainly react negatively to any overt US
moves designed to deter Brasilia from pursuing its nuclear objectives.
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DISCUSSION
Background on Nuclear Program
Inherited by New Civilian Government
1. Brazil's new civilian government, which came to
power in March 1985, inherited both a major nuclear
power and fuel-cycle program and a complex tapestry
of indigenous, largely unsafeguarded, nuclear research
efforts run by the military services and the Nuclear
Energy Commission (CNEN). In 1975, Brazil entered
into an agreement with West Germany to develop a
nuclear power program to supply its growing demand
for electrical energy and to reduce its dependence on
imported oil. As originally envisioned, the agreement
with West Germany called for the construction of up
to eight power reactors, plus uranium enrichment and
spent-fuel reprocessing facilities. The terms of the
agreement also provided for a large measure of tech-
nology transfer from West Germany to Brazil. By the
early 1980s, however, soaring development costs, re-
duced government revenues, technical problems, and
lowered projections of future electrical energy needs
have resulted in a general scaling down of the safe-
guarded nuclear power program, which was run by
the government corporation NUCLEBRAS.
2. By 1981, Brazil was also actively working on
indigenous, and unsafeguarded, nuclear research and
development programs, and the military services were
involved in projects that included research on uranium
enrichment, reprocessing, and reactor design.
3. We believe Brazil's determination to master the
fuel cycle is reflective of its overall quest for major-
nation status and is consistent with earlier drives to
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develop auto, aviation, steel, petroleum, and computer
industries. We also judge that Brazil wishes to develop
the capabilities that would enable it to build nuclear
weapons at some time in the future. We further
believe the change from a military to a civilian
government has not altered these goals.
4.I Isome
influential figures within the Brazilian military see the
development of nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles,
and nuclear weapons as important concomitants of
Brazil's emergence as a great power. To the military,
one of the lessons of the Falklands war was that
Brazil's geopolitical position does not make it immune
from conflict. While Argentina remains the most
likely potential rival with whom hostilities may erupt,
Brazilian military officials speak more generally about
the need to have defensive forces able to meet threats
from outside of the area. Although nuclear weapons
are not specifically mentioned as having a role to play
in Brazil's defensive posture, the ministers of the
services have all noted that, they feel Brazil should
master the nuclear fuel cycle and that, then, only "a
political decision" would be necesary to determine
whether to develop nuclear weapons.
Retreat From Nuclear Power
5. Despite the initial enthusiasm, Brasilia began
publicly acknowledging as early as 1979 that the
nuclear power program would be reduced:
- Recent estimates place the cost of completing the
original agreement at close to $40 billion, over six
times original estimates, while Brazil's ability to
generate funds is restrained by economic auster-
ity and its limited ability to borrow in overseas
markets.
- According to Brazil's electric utility company
ELECTROBRAS, growth rates for electricity
demand have dropped sharply since the 1970s-
and are likely to remain low through the 1990s-
while supplies of cheap power from conventional
sources are now coming on line.
- Brazil has encountered difficulty assimilating the
complex West German nuclear technology, and
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some nuclear officials have severely criticized
the uranium enrichment facility's unproven
technology (the Becker nozzle), which is substan-
tially more expensive than planned.
6. Since taking office in March, the new civilian
government has indicated both publicly and privately
that the nuclear power program would be reexamined.
The Minister of Mines and Energy has decided to limit
future funding to the completion of the two power
reactors currently under construction-in effect can-
celing six of the eight reactors. The fuel-cycle projects
are also being cut back. The reprocessing headquarters
of NUCLEBRAS has apparently been closed. The
uranium enrichment plant, which would cost an esti-
mated $3 billion to complete, will probably be sub-
stantially reduced in scaled
7. Last summer, President Sarney indicated pri-
vately that he intends to reduce the size and scope of
NUCLEBRAS,
Moreover, Sarney has appointed a blue-ribbon
panel to evaluate Brazil's nuclear programs, and it is
now touring the country. According to Sarney, the
panel is primarily intended to justify the further
downgrading of NUCLEBRAS to those few remaining
proponents of a large nuclear power program. Sarney
also indicated that he realized West Germany would
mount a campaign to maintain the entire accord and
that the negotiations to revise it would be difficult. He
stated that the accord was a failure from Brazil's
Argentina's nuclear program is more advanced than
military officers believe that Buenos Aires has, or can
now build, nuclear weapons, and that Argentina poses
Military Nuclear Projects
10. Each of the Brazilian military services has its
own nuclear research and development projects that
are supported by CNEN and its nuclear research
institutes. These projects encompass a wide range of
nuclear technology and facilities that, if completed
and operated successfully, conceivably could give Bra-
zil the capability to develop a nuclear device by 1990.
perspective.
8. Despite Brazil's dissatisfaction with the progress
of the West German deal, we doubt that Brazil will
actually cancel the accord. Both countries have too
much at stake to completely sever nuclear relations.
West German assistance will be needed to complete
the work, albeit on a reduced scale, on the uranium
enrichment facility. Brazilian nuclear technicians and
scientists continue to receive training in West Germa-
ny, and reporting indicates that Brazilian authorities
want this training to continue. West Germany could
also serve as a convenient source of equipment and
materials for the indigenous nuclear program.
The National Nuclear Program: New Emphasis
9. We believe Brazil will continue its efforts to
master the nuclear fuel cycle irrespective of outside
factors. But we also judge that Argentina's late 1983
announcement of its enrichment capability has greatly
spurred the Brazilians.
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Civilian Support
16. CNEN. The Nuclear Energy Commission
(CNEN) is Brazil's organization for administering in-
digenous nuclear research and development. CNEN's
president, Rex Nazare, is a staunch advocate of indige-
nous nuclear research, and he supports the military's
research efforts both technically and bureaucratically.
The various nuclear capabilities of CNEN's civilian
institutes provide much needed technical support,
training, and basic materials for the military's nuclear
projects.
17. IPEN. The Institute for Energy and Nuclear
Research (IPEN) is Brazil's oldest nuclear research
institute and its most capable in terms of trained
manpower and operating facilities. IPEN's staff con-
sists of primarily US-trained nuclear engineers and
scientists. IPEN has developed on its own the technol-
ogy and facilities for the production of uranium
dioxide pellets, uranium hexafluoride, and uranium
metal. IPEN fabricates research reactor fuel plates and
operates its US-supplied 10-megawatt research reactor.
19. IEN. The Institute of Nuclear Engineering
(IEN), located in Rio de Janeiro, also assists the
military. Although its nuclear capabilities are not of
the scale of those at IPEN, IEN provides technical
assistance, materials, and equipment not provided by
IPEN. IEN operates a 10-kilowatt research reactor
supplied by the United States and is in the initial stages
of constructing a 5-MW research reactor. IEN pro-
duces beryllium and has recently completed a new
electronics laboratory to provide nuclear instruments
and reactor components. IEN carries out the Brazil/
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Italy Fast Breeder Reactor cooperation agreement and
is building a sodium loop with Italian assistance. IEN
hopes to construct a fast breeder reactor sometime
after 1988, but these plans are not sufficiently concrete
to justify Brazilian production of plutonium.
20. Sarney's Intentions. President Sarney plans to
further increase the funding of the indigenous nuclear
research programs, although it is not yet clear how
much more money he is willing to provide. We believe
the Brazilians fully intend to cutback NUCLEBRAS
even more, thus making its personnel and technical
support potentially available to expand the base of the
indigenous program. This potential influx of person-
nel, many of whom have received extensive training
from West Germany in reactor design and engineer-
ing, reprocessing, and uranium enrichment technol-
ogies, would strengthen Brazil's ability to pursue indig-
enous military and civilian nuclear programs. Sarney
specifically indicated that one of his objectives in
increasing the budgets of the national research efforts
was to create jobs for former NUCLEBRAS personnel.
Most NUCLEBRAS employees, some of whom have
expressed their personal dislike for Rex Nazare, will
have little choice but to go to work for him (or some
future CNEN head) out of economic necessity.
Weapons Potential and Weapons-Related R&D
21. On balance, we do not believe that the Brazilian
Government has decided to produce nuclear weapons.
A number of recent reports, however, taken together,
do suggest that segments of Brazil's nuclear establish-
ment, particularly the military, are now intent on
acquiring facilities and expertise that would give them
the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Indications
include:
22. The indigenous national nuclear program could,
as structured, provide the technical base for a nuclear
weapons program. Although each military service is
developing different nuclear technologies, each can
24. We have no hard evidence that Brazilian re-
searchers are doing actual design work on a nuclear
explosive device. We have some evidence, however,
that theoretical work on plutonium and highly en-
riched uranium spherical configurations has taken
plac but that work
does not constitute nucle weapons ciesrW.
25. There is no evidence of high-explosives (HE)
work relevant to nuclear weapons development. Brazil
operates several large high-explosives production
plants that may have the potential for development of
high-explosives technology applicable to nuclear
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26. Given the current absence of fissile material
facilities, we believe it would be at least 1990 before a
Brazilian nuclear device could be ready for testing if
the order to produce a weapon were given immediate-
ly. Unless an enrichment facility or a plutonium
production reactor and complementary reprocessing
facility are built, Brazil will continue to face this four-
to five-year gap.
Potential Delivery Systems
27. Missile Program. Brazil has two potential fu-
ture nuclear-capable missile systems. The first of these
is the Sonda IV, which is a two-stage sounding rocket.
This system, which has been flight-tested twice, is
capable of launching a 500-kilogram payload to a
range of about 600 kilometers. The other system will
be a satellite launch vehicle (SLV) that will be made
up of several Sonda IV first stages. This vehicle is in
the planning stage, and the Brazilians have stated that
they expect it to be ready for its first flight in the early
1990s. In order to convert these two systems into
ballistic missiles, the Brazilians would have to improve
their capabilities in at least three areas: guidance
technology, reentry vehicle technology, and produc-
tion capability. Guidance technology would be the
most demanding of these areas. Brazil probably would
try to acquire the necessary technology from foreign
sources
28. We believe the Sonda IV as configured could be
used to carry a nuclear warhead.
29. Aircraft. Brazil currently has over a dozen
Mirage III-Es in its inventory. The French Air Force
uses this plane to carry tactical nuclear weapons. The
other planes in Brazil's current inventory are too small
or lack ranges that would make them suitable plat-
forms from which to drop nuclear weapons. Brazil will
be adding the AMX attack plane, produced jointly
with Italy, to its inventory in the late 1980s. Although
not specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons,
this plane could perform this role if the weapon is
designed to weigh no more than 1,000 kilograms.
The Decisionmaking Environment
30. In our view, the preeminence of the indigenous
nuclear research and development program is no
longer a debated issue within the Brazilian establish-
ment. The analysis of a number of trends leads us to
this conclusion. NUCLEBRAS' decline has been an
ongoing development since the late 1970s, along with
the steadily growing realization that heavy depen-
dence on foreign technology was unacceptable. In late
1982 the central government began the federalization
of IPEN-formerly a Sao Paulo state entity. Though
this has been contested on legal grounds, Brasilia has
prevailed, and IPEN's formal subordination to CNEN
is recognized. Over that period, IPEN and CNEN
have steadily implemented more rigid security proce-
dures in various projects, and the military's role in
31. Brazil's armed forces have a long history of
inter-service rivalries that could be a negative factor in
their pursuit of their nuclear goals. There are some
signs, however, that the military services are beginning
to cooperate, albeit tentatively.
32. Economic Factors. Over the past two years,
economic factors have not hampered the nuclear
research efforts of the military, and this continues to
be the case. Although the civilian government cut the
overall budgets of the military, no cuts have been
noted in any of their nuclear programs. On the
contrary, sources have reported that the administrators
of these programs believe that funding is currently not
a problem for the level of research and development
that has been authorized to date
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34. We believe that, in the long run, economic
factors will not constrain the Brazilians, if they are
determined to pursue this indigenous program. Brazil's
economy is the ninth largest in the world, and we do
not believe that Brasilia will have difficulty finding
the $2-5 billion over the five to 10 years that probably
would be required to bring the program to fruition.
Only in the event of a radical shift to a highly populist
regime-which we do not expect-would we forsee an
effort to shift resources in ways that would seriously
impede nuclear funding.
35. As indicated above, Brazil's civilian leaders
have increased support for the indigenous nuclear
program. We believe this provides a mantle of legiti-
macy to the programs started under the military
government. Moreover, we believe that political sup-
port for the indigenous program will continue under
gram.
the Sarney administration, reflecting a national con-
sensus for mastering the nuclear fuel cycle as part of
Brazil's drive to reach great-power status. There is no
evidence of public opposition to the indigenous pro-
Implications for US Policy and Regional Stability
36. International Posture. As the Brazilian indige-
nous nuclear programs progress, the proliferation im-
plications of the military's new facilities will probably
become the subject of international speculation and
criticism. To fend off this criticism, Brazilian foreign
policy will increasingly have to focus on defending
and justifying these programs in a world in which
there is considerable antiproliferation sentiment. Ad-
ditionally, Brazil would not welcome the prospect of
being lumped with other suspected nuclear prolifer-
ants, such as South Africa and Israel. We judge,
however, that Brazil will be willing to bear these
political costs if indeed it ultimately decides to move
toward nuclear weapons.
37. Nuclear Safeguards and International Obli-
gations. We note that Brazil, as a member of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, has pledged to
require IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear exports. The
Minister of Mines and Energy publicly reiterated in
October 1985 that all nuclear cooperation agreements
signed to date-with West Germany and China,
among others-are subject to IAEA safeguards.0
the chairman of
CNEN said in September that Brazil favors universal,
nondiscriminatory safeguards that do not inhibit de-
velopment of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that
Brazil respects its joint commitments to the IAEA.
Despite such pledges, it is our view that an inevitable
and difficult tension is likely to persist between
Brazil's limited acceptance of safeguards and the
practical compromises that may be necessary to ensure
ss in the national program.
38.I (suggests a
growing willingness by Brazil to sidestep some nuclear
safeguards obligations and an incipient convergence
between its safeguarded and unsafeguarded programs.
39. We believe the activities reported thus far
would not in themselves dramatically advance Brazil's
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efforts to master sensitive technologies such as repro-
cessing and enrichment. We also doubt that Brazil is
now prepared to run the risks to its nuclear and other
interests inherent in embarking on a series of unac-
knowledged violations for the sake of expediency.
Nonetheless, we believe that when and if important
aspects of the unsafeguarded program are perceived to
be at stake, there will be pressures to violate safeguards
on a selective basis.
40. Brazil and the Nonproliferation Regime.
Brazil is not a party to the NPT and continues to
firmly resist exhortations to accede to the agreement.
Brazil historically has complained that the NPT is
discriminatory in that it recognizes two unequal orders
of nations, the nuclear weapon states and the nonnu-
clear weapon states. In our view, there is virtually no
room for movement in this position, and determined
resistance to the NPT, and to the nuclear suppliers
mechanisms which it spawned, will continue in Brasi-
li~
41. While eschewing the NPT and the adoption of
full-scope international safeguards on all its nuclear
activities, Brazil has signed and ratified the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Brasilia has said that it will not waive that
accord into force until all Latin America states have
done so. Chile, Argentina, and Cuba are the holdouts
at this time. (u)
42. Regional Stability. Illustrative of the suspicion
that characterizes Brazil's view of Argentina's nuclear
aspirations has been the inability of Buenos Aires to
interest Brasilia in reaching a substantive nuclear
accord that would involve joint inspection of nuclear
facilities, no-nuclear-weapons pledges, increased re-
search and development efforts in the nuclear energy
field, and cooperation in joint ventures to market
nuclear equipment. During a visit to Argentina by
Brazil's Foreign Minister in May 1985, Buenos Aires
formally proposed this arrangement,
In response, Brazil indicated only
that it would study the initiative. By September,
the
Argentine military had stifled enthusiasm for the idea
at home, and in Brazil no work was in progress on the
45. If other countries in the region were to perceive
that Brazil was intent on acquiring either plutonium or
highly enriched uranium it would have a detrimental
impact on regional stability. We would expect Brazil-
ian-Argentine relations, which, outside of the nuclear
context, are currently quite good, to quickly deterio-
rate. The perception that an Argentine-Brazilian nu-
clear arms race was under way would probably exac-
erbate other regional rivalries.
46. US Interests. The failure of the international
community in gaining Brazilian and Argentine adher-
ence to the NPT does not bode well for future efforts
directed at curtailing any efforts by these two rivals to
build sensitive nuclear facilities and engage in nuclear
weapons research. We believe that West Germany is
likely to be accused of directly assisting both Brazil
and Argentina in acquiring sensitive nuclear facilities
or the technical expertise required to build and oper-
ate them. The source of this alleged responsibility is
likely to be past West German assistance associated
with Argentine and Brazilian nuclear power programs,
which in both cases included some reprocessing capa-
bility and, in the Brazilian case, uranium enrichment.
47. The current direction of Brazil's national nucle-
ar research and development efforts; the prominent
role of the military in funding and administering these
efforts; and the reputation of the CNEN President of
favoring, at a minimum, the nuclear option present a
danger to US interests in Brazil. Brazil will almost
certainly react negatively to any overt US moves
designed to deter Brasilia from pursuing its nuclear
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