PROPOSED LETTER TO DR. BRZEZINSKI REGARDING MEETING WITH CIA ANALYSTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000300730049-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: August 24, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP05S00620R000300730049-6
2 4 AUG 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Dr. Brzezinski Regarding
Meeting with CIA Analysts-
1. I have your letter to Dr. Brzezinski requesting that he
meet with some of our analysts to amplify on his criticisms of
our-political analysis. Let me suggest that it would not be
very productive to have such.a meeting. I believe Dr. Brzezinski's
problem has several aspects that really do not cast criticism on
our present analysts:
a. Policy-makers always would like to have precise
information and forecasts about political trends. These
are always the most difficult and.you will never make
policy-makers totally happy.
b. Brzezinski has expressed the view to me on a
number of occasions that it has been neglect of col-
lection efforts in the past that has caused the present
problem. Clearly, we have not concentrated on indigenous
targets in most countries of the world and we have totally
neglected areas like Africa south of the Sahara in years
past. Until we build up an infrastructure of collection
..capability in those areas, our political reporting will
necessarily suffer.
2. Beyond that, if I could just stress to your analysts the
importance of the following guidelines:
a. Avoiding consensus or a least common denomi-
nator analysis just to get agreement within the
intelligence community.
b. Clearly stating the pros and cons or the
pressures for or against, rather than coming out
with flat predictions that the "Soviets would...."
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'? ,~
In short, what the policy-makers like Brzezinski
seek is an intellectual stimulation, not a defini-
tive prediction. They want to be able to take our
product and feel that it has helped them understand
the problem in a way that they can add their own
insight to it and come to their own conclusion.
3. In sum, I personally do not take Brzezinskits criticism
r1
NER
STANSFIELD TUR
a personal affront to you, me and your analysts.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000300730049-6
2 2 ter! r 1977
The most frequent and deserved criticism of the intelligence
product today is that it is particularly good in technical and
hardware areas, but deficient in political analysis and forecasting.
In my view, this is in part a reflection of the dominance of
military influence over the intelligence system throughout the
past 30 years. It argues the case for a more objective arbiter
of the priority of intelligence effort.
E2 IMPDET
CL BY DCI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000300730049-6