NIGERIA: SIX-MONTH OUTLOOK FOR THE BUHARI REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200140007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
for the Buhari Regime
Nigeria: Six-Month Outlook
ALA 84-10015
February 1984
Copy 3 12
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F 1) Intelligence
Nigeria: Six-Month Outlook
for the Buhari Regime
This paper was prepared by
of the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 84-10015
February 1984
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Nigeria: Six-Month Outlook
for. the Buhari RegimeF-
Key Judgments Nigeria's military seized power last December, promising to tackle corrup-
Information available tion and government inefficiency, to revitalize the economy, and to punish
as of 10 February 1984
was used in this report. officials. But Head of State General Buhari still appears unsure of
.
how to begin tackling Nigeria's economic and'political problems. His
government of senior military officers already has encountered some
criticism from the junior military and the press that it is ill equipped to
handle the country's woes and that it is little more than a continuation of
the northern-dominated civilian regime of _ former President Shagari.
Preoccupation with domestic matters is likely to preclude Buhari from
radically changing Nigeria's generally moderate foreign policies. To draw
a distinction between itself and the pro-Western Shagari regime, however,
the military government is likely to be more genuinely nonaligned,
stridently nationalistic, and critical of US policy in southern Africa. Lagos
will, nonetheless, continue to look to Washington for economic help,
assistance in meeting food needs, and intercession with the IMF, which is
urging such tough austerity measures as devaluation.
Prospects for an economic turnaround are poor, mainly because of the soft
world oil market. Despite the regime's promises to honor Nigeria's
international financial obligations and take necessary steps to revive the
country's economy-perhaps including devaluation-we have serious
doubts that the military will prove more effective than its civilian
predecessors in stemming the economic decline. At best, we believe the
military will be forced to preside over the implementation of austerity
measures drawn up during the Shagari administration, which will worsen
living conditions in the short run. At worst, the government could embark
on a more populist course, refuse to undertake IMF-required austerity
programs, allow arrearages to accumulate, and blame the West for
Nigeria's economic woes. As a last resort, the military government could
even break ranks with OPEC by unilaterally cutting oil prices-a move
that would work to Nigeria's disadvantage by provoking retaliatory price
cuts by other OPEC members.
Whatever approach the government pursues, we expect increased grum-
bling and plotting within the military that will make a countercoup a
growing possibility during the near term. Every successful coup in Nigeria
has been followed within six months by an attempted countercoup, and we
believe Buhari may have even less grace time. In our judgment, the
Secret
ALA 84-10015
February 1984
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greatest threat comes from middle- and junior-grade officers who favor
harsher steps against former civilian politicians and more "radical"
measures to revive Nigeria's economy. We believe that a coup by these
officers would probably be violent and would usher in a prolonged period of
political and economic instability whether successful or not.
A government headed by such a group would be apt to seek public support
by making difficult-to-fulfill populist promises, executing former top
civilian and military officials, scrapping austerity measures and restrictions
on oil production, and blaming foreign scapegoats-mainly the United
States and the United Kingdom-for Nigeria's woes. In addition to
bringing further instability, the regime would prove more difficult for the
West to deal with and possibly offer Tripoli and Moscow opportunities to
interfere and to develop closer relations.
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Key Judgments
Introduction
1
Foreign Policy
Future Coup Scenarios
5
Countercoup by Middle- and Junior-Grade Officers
5
Palace Coup by Senior Officers
5
Outlook and Implications for the United States.
5
2. Nigeria: Selected Economic Indicators
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Figure 1
Federal States and Tribal Groups
The "Holy North"-75-100% Muslim
Former Northern Region boundary
State boundary
Kilometers
Gabon Congo
1
tr
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Nigeria: Six-Month Outlook
for the Buhari Regime F_
Introduction
This paper assesses the outlook for Nigeria's new
military government over its first six months in power.
Nigeria's fourth successful coup since 1966 was engi-
neered by senior officers (brigadiers and major gener-
als) who had been appointed to command positions
because of their supposed loyalty to former President
Shagari's civilian government. In our judgment, the
coup leaders acted in part to preempt a takeover by
more impatient and less conservative middle- and
junior-grade officers, as evidenced by the regime's
preoccupation with justifying the coup to lower rank-
ing military personnel. We also believe that although
the coup was well executed, senior officers seized
power without fully understanding the seriousness of
Nigeria's economic problems. In our view they lacked
a clear plan of action beyond a desire to end corrup-
tion and administrative chaos, revive the economy,
and restore Nigeria's international prestige.
Nigeria's new leaders have drawn heavily on their
experiences in the last military government (1975-79)
in structuring and staffing the government. Early
appointments indicate the military will rely heavily on
senior civil servants to provide continuity and admin-
istrative expertise for the ruling 19-member Supreme
Military Council. In addition, the Federal Executive
Council-a cabinet of 11 civilian and seven military
members-is responsible for the day-to-day running
of the government
Military Uncertainties
In our judgment, the stability and cohesion of the
military government over the next few months de-
pends on the ability of Head of State Buhari to
solidify support among lower ranking military person-
nel as well as among fellow senior officers. Military
discipline and authority appear to have withstood the
immediate aftermath of the coup, but we believe that
Nigeria's Army of 120,000 is likely to become in-
creasingly politicized and factionalized as a conse-
quence of its renewed involvement in running the
country. The extensive shuffling of command assign-
ments, the retirement of many senior officers, and the
promotion of more junior officers to key line and staff
positions, in our judgment, will give rise to personal
grievances and rivalries, heighten ethnic tensions
within the officer corps, and increase coup plotting.
Unless the Buhari government is able quickly to make 25X1
a better showing than the Shagari regime, we expect
that it will soon be threatened by middle- and junior-
helped prompt the senior officers' coup of 3125X1
December. Undeterred by the coup, these "young
hawks" apparently are still seeking power:
? The US Consulate in northern Nigeria has heard
from a number of sources of complaints within the
Army's middle ranks over government slowness in
getting the administration going, rooting out corrup-
tion, and controlling prices.
? Defense attache reporting from Lagos indicates that
some field grade officers are grumbling over their
failure to receive government posts.
these feelings may be
more acute among southern officers, who apparently
resent the regime for being northern dominated as
was Shagari's.
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We believe that some of these officers may now be in
better positions to carry out a coup. With the eleva-
tion of senior officers to the ruling council and the
retirement of others, middle-grade officers have
moved up to key brigade commands and headquarters
staff positions. The US defense attache believes these
positions could give middle-grade officers command
of the military resources needed to control events.F_
We believe lower ranking officers will see Buhari's
handling of corrupt former civilian leaders and allega-
tions of past corruption under Shagari against some of
the new regime's senior military members as a litmus
test of the government's resolve in carrying out re-
forms. Failure of the government to take harsh puni-
tive action, in our view, will contribute to the impres-
sion that senior officers moved to prevent, rather than
implement, political changes and that they are more
concerned with preserving the status quo and covering
up their own corruption under civilian rule. Only 10
days after the coup, Buhari was forced to replace one
of his appointed state military governors following
press revelations of his corrupt past
Buhari,
who has a reputation as a strong and well-respected
officer, was the unanimous choice among coup leaders
to become head of state. We believe, however, that
Buhari eventually could be challenged by senior offi-
cers-such as Chief of Army Staff Babangida-who
may harbor their own political ambitions and seek to
appeal to the lower ranks: In particular, we believe
Buhari will need to pay close attention to those
officers who remain within the Army chain of com-
mand and who may come to believe that officers
exercising administrative responsibility have lost
touch with the aims of the architects of the coup
Economic Bind
Popular and military support for the Buhari govern-
ment is likely to be further undermined by continuing
economic hard times. The government can expect to
win little domestic popularity by imposing tough
austerity measures to secure IMF assistance and to
ensure access to large syndicated bank loans-moves
that will worsen living standards in the short runF-
Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, Head of State,
Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, and
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Although Buhari increasingly recognizes that contin-
ued delay in facing economic reality will only worsen
conditions and make inevitable adjustment all the
more painful, the government still has not clearly
signaled policy directions or announced specific recov-
ery plans. The US Embassy reports Buhari is particu-
larly hedging his bets over the key issue of IMF-
mandated devaluation, which he fears would heighten
inflation and increase-the shortage of essential
imports.
Nevertheless, in the absence of an. unlikely surge in
world demand for Nigerian oil, Buhari will have little
choice but to continue some of Shagari's tough eco-
nomic policies, at least initially. As a consequence, we
expect that Buhari will at least attempt to reach
agreement with the IMF, reschedule short-term ar-
rearages, continue import restrictions,' and perhaps
negotiatea new payments schedule for medium- and
long-term debt obligations.. The Nigerian press specu-
lates that, to increase revenues, Lagos will ask
OPEC's approval for increased production. We expect
that the organization will not go along with such a
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Figure 2
Nigeria: Selected Economic Indicators, 1975-83
Real GDP Growth
Percent
Consumer Price Inflation
Percent
-12 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82a83b
Foreign Exchange Reserves,
Yearend'
Composition of Real GDP, 1982
Percent
Manufacturing
8.0
Construction
13.0
Agriculture
21.0
Petroleum
it, n
Services
32.0
a Estimated.
b Projected.
c Data include gold.
Oil Production
Million b/d
Composition of Exports, 1983
Percent
96.0
Coma ~~
1.0
Other
3.0
request, believing that such a move would prompt
others-such as Venezuela and Iran-to follow suit
and put renewed downward pressure on oil prices. In
the absence of official approval, we believe Lagos
probably will attempt to circumvent its OPEC quota
of 1.3 million barrels per day by quietly allowing
production to creep up to about 1.6 million barrels per
day and see how other OPEC members and the
international market react. 25X1
We believe negotiations with the IMF will prove
difficult and protracted. Even if an agreement is
reached, we believe the government will find it diffi-
cult to resist short-term political benefits that could
accrue from watering down or scrapping certain
austerity measures. Furthermore, we believe that this
military government, like its historical predecessors,
will be unable to make rapid.and significant improve-
ments in government efficiency and responsiveness or
stem endemic corruption-major causes of the coun-
try's chronic economic morass. 25X1
Foreign Policy
On balance, we expect the Buhari government's pre-
occupation with domestic matters will deter it from
embarking on new foreign policy initiatives or dra-
matically altering Nigeria's generally moderate poli-
cies. Nevertheless, we expect the tone of the military's
foreign policy-particularly on important issues such
as southern Africa, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), and Chad-to be more assertive, stridently
nationalistic, and more visibly nonaligned than that of
the conservative, cautious, and inward-looking
Shagari government:
? Nigeria's new UN representative, retired General
Garba-who served as foreign minister under the
activist Obasanjo military regime-is favorably dis-
posed toward the West but is also an outspoken
hardliner on southern African issues, according to
the US Embassy.
? The Embassy reports that the country's new foreign
minister, Dr. Ibrahim Gambari, has spoken wistful-
ly of the regime's need for a foreign policy "tri-
umph"-analogous to Nigeria's recognition in 1975
of Angola's MPLA government-to enhance its
domestic standing.
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These two views on foreign policy suggest to us that
there may be some potential on Lagos's part for
unpredictable behavior detrimental to US interestsr
We believe Buhari will continue to ask the United
States for economic assistance, help in meeting food
needs, and intercession with the IMF. A rapid wors-
ening of economic conditions, coupled with an inabil-
ity to reach agreement with the IMF and internation-
al banks, could tempt Buhari to lash out at the "lack"
of US help and at Washington's policy on southern
Africa. We believe, however, that Buhari will stop
short of an open economic rupture with the United
States or the West. In any case, foreign policy
posturing would deflect domestic criticism for only a
short time and is unlikely by itself to deter coup
plotting within the military.
Early Tests for Buhari
In our judgment, Buhari will have to try to take more
decisive steps to counter a growing impression of
governmental drift. Otherwise, the public perception
will grow that Nigeria's economic and political prob-
lems have reached such magnitude as to defy the
regime's ability to solve them. Moreover, popular
support will be short lived if signs mount that Buhari
and his fellow officers do not represent a clean break
with the past.
In our judgment, the delay in naming a Cabinet and
outlining policies reflects the government's difficulty
in finding capable civilians willing to serve in the new
government, as well as likely differences of opinion
and jockeying for position among key senior officers.
Furthermore, the US Embassy reports that most
civilian members of the new Cabinet appear ill suited
by background and experience to their assignment. F
We expect the government to be faced with growing
criticism that it-like its predecessor-is too dominat-
ed by northerners. While the new regime has tried to
ensure a relatively representative balance among ma-
jor ethnic groups, regions, and military services in
making high-level appointments, senior officers of
northern, Muslim Hausa-Fulani origin appear to
dominate the Supreme Military Council and top
Army positions. So far, we are not aware of any
incipient polarization of Nigerian attitudes toward
political and economic issues along strictly regional
lines, a condition prevalent throughout the early
1960s that led to secession and civil war (1967-70). If
this recurred, however, it could fuel an antinorthern
coup attempt by southerners and minority tribal
officers. If the government hopes to keep regional
tensions from bubbling over, we believe it must
shuffle some of its appointees-on the ruling council
as well as Cabinet ministers and state military gover-
nors-in an attempt to find a more "acceptable"
ethnic and regional mix.
Public disenchantment with the regime is unlikely to
spark widespread, violent protests in the short run, but
we believe unrest is likely to increase if it becomes
more evident that the government is unable to meet
the expectations generated by the coup. The US
Consulate in Kaduna reports that the regime already
has been faced with a protest by northern textile
workers demanding that the government honor its
postcoup pledge to expedite the payment of salary
arrears.
We expect that the new government will find especial-
ly troublesome the issue of how severely to deal with
former civilian officials-including former President
Shagari. Although the government has arrested hun-
dreds of civilian officials and promised to hold them
accountable for malfeasance and economic sabotage,
we believe senior officers would prefer to avoid foster-
ing a political climate of vengeance and retribution in
which they themselves could become entangled. Pub-
lic trials-and any subsequent executions-almost
certainly would heighten ethnic tensions, produce
charges that certain groups were being singled out, do
little to improve administrative effectiveness, and
deflect resources from more pressing economic mat-
ters. Nevertheless, Buhari in the end may feel no
choice but to bow to public pressures and junior
military demands for harsher retribution, especially
as the economy continues to slide.
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Future Coup Scenarios
In our judgment, the possibility of an attempted
countercoup will remain high for the near term. Every
successful coup in Nigeria has been followed within
six months by an attempted countercoup, and we
think Buhari may have even less grace time. Nigeria's
economic crisis will compound Buhari's political vul-
nerability. We see little likelihood that the govern-
ment's new economic team will quickly devise a
comprehensive plan of action. We expect that negotia-
tions with Nigeria's creditors and the IMF will be
drawn out until the regime's economic advisers gain a
clearer understanding of the depth of the economic
crisis, and as Buhari attempts to strike a better deal
than Shagari could. As a consequence, we believe
Buhari soon will find his government subject to
criticism for drift and indecision that will enhance the
potential for a coup.
Countercoup by Middle- and Junior-Grade Officers.
In our judgment, a countercoup is most likely to come
from the level of middle- and junior-grade officers-
lieutenant colonels and lower-groups about which
we know little. We believe that Buhari, despite his
leadership strengths, will have difficulty balancing the
more conservative and cautious instincts of his fellow
senior officers with demands from frustrated middle-
and junior-grade officers for more far-reaching retri-
bution and reform. A coup by such younger and less
conservative officers, whether led by radical northern-
ers or by southerners and minority tribesmen frustrat-
ed with northern domination, probably would be
bloody and would target senior officers for assassina-
tion.
We believe that a coup by middle- and junior-grade
officers-depending on how radical and narrowly
ethnic its coloration may be-has the potential to
increase ethnic and economic turmoil. In our view,
middle- and junior-grade officers would take power
with no precise policies beyond a strong feeling that
change requires a sweeping and violent "cleansing" of
the armed forces and public life. The aim would be to
improve the quality of political and economic life for
Nigeria's less privileged groups by trying to reduce
corruption, impose government accountability, and
lower prices, and by severely punishing former civilian
and military officials. Such a government would also
be apt to seek public support by scrapping austerity
measures and restrictions on oil production and by
blaming foreign scapegoats-mainly the United
States and the United Kingdom-for Nigeria's woes.
Palace Coup by Senior Ofcers. Buhari could be
ousted by fellow senior officers on the ruling military
council if a power struggle develops or if it appears
that he cannot garner wider support among middle-
and junior-grade military officers and the population
at large. The danger of a palace coup will increase if
top military leaders believe that plotting by middle-
and junior-grade officers has reached a serious stage.
In our judgment, a new senior-level coup would be led
by a key officer, such as Chief of Army Staff 25X1
Babangida, who probably would espouse more re-
formist-populist policies than Buhari in a last-ditch
effort to appeal to lower ranking military personnel.
Such a palace coup would represent a holding action,
however, and we doubt that its leaders could stay in
power for long, because Nigeria's underlying econom-
ic and political problems would remain unresolved.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
At present, we are not aware that any major group in
Nigeria-military, ethnic, political, or religious-is
advocating the sort of revolutionary change that
would undermine the country's legacy of federalism, a
free market economy, and nonalignment. Nor in our
view, do the Libyans or Soviets have many new
opportunities for meddling so long as the Buhari 25X1
government continues in power. US Embassy report-
ing indicates that Tripoli has scarcely acknowledged
the latest change of government in Lagos. To date,
government vigilance and Nigeria's size and diversity
have prevented Tripoli from gaining much influence,
despite some funding for local Islamic organizations
and recruitment of Nigerians for subversive training 25X1
in Libya
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The US Embassy in Moscow notes that while the
Soviet media are giving increasingly favorable cover-
age to Buhari's takeover, this probably is intended
mainly to avoid jeopardizing Soviet-Nigerian econom-
ic relations. US Embassy reporting indicates that the
Soviets in recent years, while continuing undercover
ties with some leftist Nigerian labor and student
groups, have emphasized outwardly correct relations
with whatever Nigerian Government is in charge in
the interest of developing trade for hard currency
earnings. We believe that the Soviets recognize that
the litmus test of Nigerian-Soviet relations will con-
tinue for the foreseeable future to depend on success-
ful completion of the long-overdue $2 billion Ajaokuta
steel plant in which 6,000 Soviet technicians are
involved.
In our judgment, however, another coup may bring
Nigeria closer to a Ghana-like collapse into tribalism,
radicalization, and further instability. We believe
such a development would make the country more
difficult for the West to work with and create oppor-
tunities for Tripoli and Moscow. Nigeria's regional
and tribal rivalries are potentially exploitable, but we
expect no central Nigerian Government will tolerate
blatant Libyan or Soviet meddling. Moreover, in our
view, neither Tripoli not Moscow is willing or has the
wherewithal to assist Nigeria in solving its economic
problems, and Nigeria has little need for arms aid
from Libya or the USSR
Nevertheless, we believe the Libyans and Soviets can
offer moral support, radical doctrine to emulate, and
an alternative source of advice to an impressionable
government of younger officers. In our judgment,
both Libya and the USSR would like to see a radical
regime come to power in Nigeria that could be
encouraged to side with Africa's progressive states in
the OAU on such issues as Chad and in other
international forums. We also believe that northern
Nigeria's large Muslim population is an attractive
target for the Libyans, who doubtless hope that
domestic chaos would reduce Nigerian effectiveness
in playing a moderate and constructive role on the
African scene and afford Tripoli a freer hand in the
region.
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