ANGOLA: A DIVIDED LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200120007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Angola:
A Divided Leadership
-Set-
ALA 84-10005
January 1984
Copy 2 9 4
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P. em. r. P. t
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Angola:
A Divided Leadership
This paper was prepared byCentral
Africa Branch, Africa Division, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with
Secret
ALA 84-10005
January 1984
the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
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Angola:
A Divided Leadership
Key Judgments The political balance within Angola's ruling, Marxist-oriented party is
Information available delicate and tense. Worsening ideological and ethnic factionalism is a
as of 31 December 1983 major source of friction within the regime and has led to polarization at the
was used in this report.
top that has immobilized most decisionmaking. The leadership recently
appears to be collectively committed to an increased military effort-aided
by expanded Soviet and Cuban assistance-to roll back Jonas Savimbi's
UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola) insurgents.
Otherwise, however, the deep divisions within the regime have rendered it
unable to deal with deteriorating economic, social, and military conditions
or to respond to negotiating opportunities in the international arena that
could offer ways of altering these adverse domestic trends.
President dos Santos, a black who was a compromise choice after Angola's
first President died in 1979, has been attempting to strengthen his position
by replacing many rivals in the government and the ruling party with his
own men. He still faces, however, strong opposition from a Soviet- and
Cuban-backed, mulatto-led hardline faction that dominates the decision-
making process. This faction has successfully held the line against both the
acceptance of a Cuban troop reduction as part of a Namibian settlement
package and the exploration- of a political accommodation with Jonas
Savimbi.
The other major group, a black nationalist faction, in the past has
demonstrated some flexibility on the issues of Cuban withdrawal and
UNITA and has been otherwise seemingly in agreement with dos Santos's
relatively moderate policy preferences. The black nationalists, however,
have been alienated from dos Santos, in part because he has been unable to
fulfill their expectations for economic and social development and a greater
role in decisionmaking. 25X1
Although both factions appear to have lost some power and influence to the
President, we do not believe that dos Santos has been able to amass
sufficient authority or support to turn policy on key security issues in
directions favorable to the United States, as we believe he would prefer to
do. Rather, we believe that in trying to attain a centrist consensus divorced
from the ideological and racial fray, dos Santos may have created a three-
way standoff in which he, while supported by some individual MPLA
leaders, is not solidly backed by either major faction.
Secret
ALA 84-10005
January 1984
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We do not expect an early resolution to the crisis of leadership in Luanda.
Factional infighting is likely to continue and may intensify, but we expect
the hardliners to retain the upper hand for at least the near term. They
hold the upper hand in political experience and sophistication, and, with
the help of their Soviet and Cuban backers, are likely to fight bitterly-and
successfully-to block policies that would cut against their interests.
Nonetheless, the black majority Angolan populace is more on the side of
the black nationalists, and we expect this group to make a comeback in the
longer term, provided they start to work more effectively to enhance their
support at the grass-roots level in the party, the military, and the populace
at large.
We believe that as long as dos Santos continues to move cautiously he
probably can survive. His hardline opponents in the regime probably will
allow him to continue talks with the. United States and with South Africa
because they believe these efforts at least buy time for the government.
They also may believe that the United States might offer diplomatic
recognition or economic aid, or that international pressure might eventual-
ly force Washington to drop its insistence on linking independence for
Namibia to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Nonetheless, we do not
believe that the President can decisively change policy directions in the
near term.
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Dos Santos: Struggling for Authority
2
The Hardliners: Still the Principal Arbiters
6
The Military in Politics
8
Outlook and Implications for the United States
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BRAZZAVILLE
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Kilometers
Boundary representation is
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Control
Influence
Expansion
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Angola:
A Divided Leadership
the political balance with-
in the ruling, Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is delicate and
tense. President dos Santos has undertaken some
restructuring and shifting of power over the past two
years in an effort to consolidate his power, but we
believe that ideological and ethnic factionalism, along
with the personal enmity between dos Santos and
other key leaders, has worsened and has immobilized
the decisionmaking*process.'
This paper analyzes the divisions within the leader-
ship of Angola by examining the two principal fac-
tions-the mulatto-led, pro-Soviet, ideological hard-
liners and the more moderate, pragmatic black
nationalists. It describes the key personalities involved
and the stands each faction has taken on.issues
important to the United States. The paper also as-
sesses dos Santos's performance, discusses the pros-
pects for his continuation in power, and speculates on
possible outcomes to the factional strife in Luanda.
Neto's Legacy
President Agostinho Neto, who died in September
1979, had begun to move Angolan policy in a more
moderate direction after the early years of postrevolu-
tionary enthusiasm.' Although Neto frequently de-
clared his allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, he acted
more like a pragmatic socialist, and
he had plans for far-
reaching, albeit gradual, moderating changes in for-
eign and domestic policy. He appeared to us to want
to develop a closer relationship with the West and was
purging the party and government of those who
disagreed openly with him. His goals,
included reorganizing the government
at the national and provincial levels in order to meet 25X1
black demands for more power relative to the mulatto
elite, securing the country's northern and southern
frontiers by making accommodations with Angola's 25X1
neighbors, and taking a more earnest look at the
possibility of a peaceful resolution to the UNITA
(National Union for Total Independence of Angola)
insurgency, then largely confined to the southern part
of the country. In retrospect, Neto also appeared to
have been attempting to create a more genuine policy
of nonalignment that eventually may have included
the withdrawal of Cuban troops.
Some MPLA leaders, according to reporting from 25X1
several open sources, became concerned that Neto's
desire to deradicalize the regime and seek an accom-
modation with the West was a betrayal of the Ango-
lan revolution. Nonetheless, because of Neto's stature
in Angola these leaders posed little overt opposition to
his actions within the ruling group-an uneasy coali-
tion divided then, as now, along racial lines between
mulattoes and blacks and along closely corresponding
ideological lines between pro-Soviet ideologues and
pragmatic nationalists.
An added complication to assessing where the two major fac-
tions-and key individuals within them-stand on issues important
to the United States is that policy views in Luanda frequently do 25X1
not break down neatly along factional lines. The factions them-
selves sometimes appear to be divided over important questions,
particularly economic planning and military strategy. Nevertheless, 25X1
we believe that the information available to us provides a reason-
ably accurate picture of the broad outlines of the political pulling
and hauling and the effects it has had on policy decisions as well as
on political fortunes of key individuals in the leadership
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The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
was founded in 1956 out of a coalition of several anti-
Portuguese groups. It assumed power in 1975 after
emerging victorious from the civil war that attended
the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola, and it has
remained an'elite "vanguard"party. Blacks make up
the bulk of the party's 30,000 members. The coun-
try'sfrst President, Agostinho Neto, was a black-
as is dos Santos. But mulattoes, who make up less
than 2 percent of Angola's population, have dominat-
ed the party's hierarchy since its founding. As a
result of the privileged status they enjoyed under
Portuguese rule, the mulattoes tend to be better
educated and more skilled than black Angolans, and
they occupy a greatly disproportionate share of the
key positions in the society.
The party's 64-member central committee is un-
wieldy, and real power, at least within the party,
appears to be centered in the 14-man political bureau.
Major personnel changes and the direction of party
policy generally are rubberstamped by periodic party
congresses.
Popular support for the MPLA has been governed
largely by ethnic and geographic factors. The party's
strongest following is in and around the capital and in
other urban areas. Its rural influence is greatest in
the region north of the Benguela Railroad and in the
southwest. Its base of tribal support is primarily from
the 1.7 million Kimbundu and the smaller tribes they
dominate, together constituting approximately 30
percent of the population. The 150,000 to 200,000
mulattoes and the 10,000 to 30,000 whites still in
Angola also generally support the MPLA, in large
measure because the MPLA is an avowedly multira-
cial party.
Dos Santos: Struggling for Authority
Reporting from a variety of open sources indicates
that President dos Santos, formerly one of Neto's
prime ministers and close associate, came to power in
1979 as a compromise candidate of the two major
political groupings. Although dos Santos, a Soviet-
educated engineer, was chosen for the Presidency by
constitutional means, mulatto-led hardliners in the
regime-along with the Soviets and Cubans-backed
him because they believed he would be weak, mallea-
ble, and controllable. The other major faction, the
black nationalists, accepted dos Santos because of his
close identification with the relatively moderate policy
course that Neto had begun to pursue before his
death.
Although he has ruled with the caution and indeci-
siveness of a compromise leader, dos Santos has
gradually sought to establish himself as a power in his
own right. Both in his consensus-building style of
leadership and in his preference for relatively moder-
ate policies, dos Santos appears to us to have tried to
cast himself in the mold of Neto. He lacks the
personal stature and authority that Neto had as the
founder of the MPLA and the father of independent
Angola.
For approximately the past year and a half, dos
Santos has tried to strengthen his position vis-a-vis the
major party factions by undercutting the competing
groups. Although we lack precise reporting on how
dos Santos operates, he apparently has been able on
occasion to use his dual position as head of the party
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Dos Santos, according to reporting from various open
and diplomatic sources, discusses important policy
matters with a small group of close advisers to whom
he looks for counsel and support. In our view, the
President's inner circle seems to be composed largely
of technocrats who are not closely aligned with either
major faction. These confidants probably include
Minister of Interior Manuel "Kilo " Rodrigues, Sec-
retary of State for Cooperation and former foreign
affairs adviser Carlos Fernandes, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Venancio de Moura.
Kilo, a key moderate and a leading member of the
political bureau, has for many years been one of
Angola's principal negotiators on Namibia in con-
tacts with the United States and South Africa. Kilo is
believed by many diplomatic observers to be particu-
larly close to the President. Other members of the
inner circle may include from time to time Vice
Minister of Defense Antonio dos Santos Franca and
political bureau member Robert de Almeida, an
influential, moderate black.
Dos Santos, in our view, however, cannot make major
policy decisions without the approval of a larger and
more diverse "ruling group" of perhaps 10 or 12 key
party leaders drawn from both the party's central
committee and political bureau as well as from the
Cabinet. This larger collection of key personalities is,
we believe, Angola's top policymaking body. It in-
cludes some members of dos Santos's inner circle,
other moderates and pragmatists-such as Defense
Minister Pedro Maria Tonha and Minister gf'Plan-
ning Lopo do Nascimento, both black-as well as 25X1
some of dos Santos's ideological and ethnic oppo-
nents.
party Secretary Lucio Lara and former Defense Min-
ister Iko Carreira are the most important hardline
members of the decisionmaking group.
Although we do not have direct evidence of the
relationship between Moscow and Lara,
Lara plays a key
role in blocking dos Santos from implementing policy
changes on issues of importance to the United States.
Consequently, we believe that Soviet and Cuban
desires probably are filtered into the ruling group
through the hardliners led by Lara-as well as
through Moscow's and Havana's direct dealings with
dos Santos. Although the hardliners have suffered
some setbacks over the past year or so, the recent
hardening of the regime's position on fighting the
insurgents and in its talks with the United States
suggests that the hardliners still hold sway in the
decisionmaking ruling group.
and government to outmaneuver the factions bureau-
cratically. His powers of appointment have been
particularly important in this regard. In some in-
stances, he has also played off one faction against the
other-for example, relying on hardliner support to
expel some black nationalist leaders from the Cabinet.
On other occasions, he has been able to act against
factional opponents on the grounds of personal incom-
petence and corruption.
At the same time that he has removed some members
of the opposing factions, dos Santos appears to have
placed his own men on the MPLA's control commis-
sion, a small group that among other functions moni-
tors party discipline. We also see a decision of the
MPLA's central committee in December 1982 to
grant dos Santos "special powers" to deal with the
"national emergency" as part of his design to increase
his influence at the expense of the factions.
As the result of these moves by dos Santos, both
factions appear to have lost some power and influence
to the President. And yet, the government's continued
inability to mount an effective counterinsurgency
effort, to stem the economic decline, or to move
decisively in its bilateral negotiations with the United
States strongly suggests that dos Santos has not
acquired the mass of authority necessary to make
decisions that will stick on controversial issues.
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The Factions' Stance on Key Issues
Leaders of both major factions-and the leadership
in Luanda as a whole probably are aware that the
UNITA insurgency must be ended and some sort of
settlement on Namibia must be reached before the
government can turn its attention to the country's
massive economic and social problems. The combina-
tion of the war with UNITA and South African
military incursions into southern Angola has de-
stroyed much of the economic infrastructure, disrupt-
ed agricultural production, and cut output from
Angola's diamond mines. The government is saddled
with hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced
persons in the southern and central part of the
country and is increasingly unable to pay its debts
and support the rising defense burden-which in-
cludes cash payments for the Cuban combat force.aP
There are stark differences, however, in the lengths
we believe each faction is prepared to go to solve the
key security problems:
? Reporting from a variety of diplomatic and open
sources indicates that the black nationalists, until
recently at least, were prepared to accept a substan-
tial reduction in the Cuban presence as the price for
a Namibia settlement. The nationalists have been
willing to force the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) to be more flexible in nego-
tiations over Namibia and have favored using the
threat of a reduction in Angolan support to accom-
plish this. Many members of the black nationalist
faction also have expressed a willingness to seek a
political accommodation with Savimbi. In our
judgment, however, the military momentum
UNITA has generated in recent months probably
has triggered concern among the black nationalists,
who may now believe that a withdrawal of Cuban
forces at this juncture would give Savimbi's forces
a sudden boost on the battlefield. For this reason
and because the nationalists probably do not wish
Luanda to appear to be knuckling under to the
United States and South Africa, we believe they
would favor a very gradual drawdown of Cuban
troops but only when they conclude that Savimbi
can be contained militarily and dealt with politi-
cally.
? The hardliners, who probably believe that a depar-
ture of Cuban troops would mean the end to
mulatto domination of the MPLA, categorically
reject a Cuban withdrawal as the price for a
Namibia settlement and favor a military solution to
the UNITA insurgency. Prominent hardliners have
told Western diplomats that, if a Namibia settle-
ment is reached, South Africa's departure from
Namibia would end Pretoria's support to UNITA,
which could then be defeated by government forces.
Similarly, we believe that the mulatto-led hard-
liners oppose reconciliation with Savimbi because
they are afraid that, if Savimbi were brought into
the government, he would enter into an alliance
with the black nationalists in the MPLA or-with
his charisma and political skills-gain a dominant
position in his own right. In either case this would
spell the end of mulatto primacy in Luanda. F_
price to pay for US recognition.
With regard to other issues, both factions in Luanda
probably are dissatisfied with Soviet Bloc economic
aid. Reporting from various diplomatic sources also
suggests that both the pro-Soviet hardliners and the
black nationalists agree on the desirability of gaining
US diplomatic recognition for Angola; both recognize
that greater Western economic and technical assist-
ance and investment are needed if Angola is to reverse
its steep economic decline. The hardliners insist,
however, that despite the worsening economic situa-
tion the withdrawal of Cuban troops is too heavy a
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Rather, dos Santos, in trying to attain a centrist
consensus divorced from the ideological and racial
fray, probably has succeeded, in our judgment, in
creating a three-way standoff in which he, while
supported by some individual MPLA leaders, is not
solidly backed by either major faction. Indeed, the
factionalism in the leadership that has paralyzed
decisionmaking in Luanda over the past year or so
appears to us to flow as much from the alienation of
both factions from dos Santos as it does from the
increase in tensions between the factions themselves.
Reporting from various diplomatic sources indicates
that policy debates have grown increasingly bitter and
rancorous over the past year and that there have been
instances when senior officials from both opposing
camps have criticized dos Santos openly at party
meetings.
Dos Santos's inability to gain a consensus on the
major issues facing the regime has reinforced his.
image as a weak and indecisive leader. The imposition
of martial law in parts of the country and other
emergency measures have underscored the weakness
of the MPLA regime rather than help undergird the
President's position. His failure to follow through on
an anticorruption campaign that threatened to impli-
cate a number of senior officials in diamond-smug-
gling activities is another indication of dos Santos's
relative weakness.
Virtually all of Angola's top leadership, including dos
Santos, pay homage to the Neto legacy and describe
current policies as the fulfillment of what Neto had in
mind for Angola. Various press and diplomatic
sources have described the black nationalist faction as
composed of "revolutionary nationalists" who, al-
though committed to Marxism, prefer political non-
alignment and economic relations with the West.
According to black nationalist leaders, the party and
ideology should be made to serve the country and not
the reverse, a situation they allege the hardliners have
imposed on Angola. Moreover, they argue that the
government's primary emphasis should be on econom-
ic and social development and that the militant
foreign policy that Angola has been pursuing over the
past several years has not been in the country's best
interests. By contrast, mulattoes in the MPLA have
demonstrated themselves to be more radical than
black party members. The narrowly based, mulatto
led group, in our judgment, has taken positions on
most key issues that have been dogmatically Marxist,
pro-Soviet, and protective of the group's factional
interests.
The Black Nationalists: In Eclipse
The Catete Group-the faction's core cluster of
strident black nationalists, so named because some of
its members hail from the town of that name near
Luanda-appeared to us to be in the ascendancy
about two years ago, but have suffered several re-
verses over the past year. Members of the Catete
Group and the loose collection of like-minded blacks 25X1
that we believe are affiliated with them are still
represented on the MPLA's central committee and its
smaller and more influential political bureau. But
reporting from various open and diplomatic sources
suggests that their numbers have been reduced, and
hardliners may have tightened their hold over these
two governing bodies.' 25X1
Some of the black nationalists' reverses have clearly
come at the hands of the hardliners-who may have
been aided in their intrigues by the application of
pressure on dos Santos by Moscow and Havana-but
we believe the President has moved against the na-
tionalists as well, partially because he probably finds
it easier to act against the nationalists than the more
powerful hardliners. Nevertheless, despite the tensions
that have resulted from the nationalists' losses of
government and party positions and their disappoint-
ment with what they view as dos Santos's failure to
fulfill their policy expectations, we believe the mak-
ings of a political alliance between the President and
this faction still exist. In our view, dos Santos's policy
' Reporting on political developments in Angola is not sufficiently
detailed to allow us to assign even rough numbers to the member-
ship of either of the two main factions. In relative terms, however,
the black nationalist faction probably is significantly larger than
the hardline faction-in line with national population divisions-
although its influence on decisionmaking is the lesser.
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preferences generally accord with those of the nation-
alists,.and he probably recognizes that the black
nationalists are potentially supported by the majority
of the numerically superior blacks within the MPLA,
as well as by the urban and rural blacks and the black
rank and file in the armed forces and in the People's
Militia. So far, however, black leaders have been
unable to mobilize this latent support.
The black nationalists have been particularly weak-
ened by dos Santos's ouster from the government in
late. 1982 of then Agriculture Minister Manuel Paca-
vira and, more recently, Minister of Health Mendes
de Carvalho. Reporting from diplomatic sources re-
vealed that de Carvalho had been outspokenly critical
of dos Santos's indecisiveness and had been a strong
advocate of rapprochement with UNITA. Like most
black nationalists, both former officials also have been
critical of the MPLA's dependence on mulattoes,
whites, and foreigners. These same sources indicate
that Pacavira and de Carvalho have some popular
support among young blacks in Luanda's ghettos.F_
We have not been able to identify the current leaders
of the Catete Group and, in view of current trends in
Luanda, the radical black nationalists may have to lay
low temporarily and regroup. Some of the faction's
former adherents, such as political bureau member
Evaristo Domingos Kimba, apparently have been co-
opted by the President. Others, like Vice Minister of
Defense Joao Luis Neto, have been sent abroad by dos
Santos for "training" or assigned to provincial posts in
the interior.
One potential bright spot for this faction has been the
dramatic rise to a position of major influence over the
past 18 months of Minister of Planning Lopo do
Nascimento, now virtually an economic czar. We do
not count Nascimento-a former prime minister and
once widely viewed as being close to Havana-as a
member of the Catete Group. He has been strength-
ening his black nationalist credentials, however, by
elevating blacks to senior positions under him and
may be building a power base. Last year, according to
diplomatic sources, he removed Cuban advisers from
several key ministries. Nascimento has become a close
adviser to dos Santos, and, as some foreign diplomatic
observers in Luanda view him as a potential rival to
the President, he could provide the black nationalists
with the effective leadership they have lacked.F_
Lopo do Nascimento, Minister
of Planning
The Hardliners: Still the Principal Arbiters
Although dos Santos has reduced somewhat the power
of the Soviet- and Cuban-backed, mulatto-led hard-
liners in the MPLA over the past two years, we still
believe that no major substantive decision can be
made without their agreement.' Moreover, we believe
that dos Santos cannot overly antagonize the hard-
liners even on nonsubstantive matters without running
the risk of a move against him by this faction,
particularly since we believe the hardliners retain
control of the military and intelligence services. For
example, black nationalists attempted to undermine
the hardliners in mid-1983 by ramming through the
central committee a new nationality law that would
adversely affect the mulattoes-and, by extension, the
hardliners. Dos Santos, however, has not enacted the
measure into law, probably fearing the hardliners'
reaction.
' Moscow has some 1,500 civilian advisers and economic techni-
cians in Angola, many of whom are attached to various government
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The hardliners have a number of crucial advantages.
The faction is more cohesive and better disciplined
and organized than its black nationalist rivals. It also
has superior leadership; the key hardline leaders are
seasoned political manipulators and infighters. Final-
ly, and most important in our view, Moscow and
Havana are ready, willing, and able to use on behalf
of the hardline faction the leverage they have as the
military underwriters of the re ime.
Lucio Lara, a doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist, a mulat-
to, and MPLA party secretary, probably is the most
powerful of the pro-Soviet hardliners. He is also the
party's chief theoretician and probably Angola's most
skillful politician. Although diplomatic sources report
that he has undefined health problems and his influ-
ence appears to have waned somewhat over the past
year-for example, he is no longer appointed acting
head of the party when dos Santos leaves the coun-
try-we believe Lara remains, along with dos Santos
and Nascimento, one of Angola's top three leaders.F_
Former Defense Minister Iko Carreira is also a
leading hardliner. Reporting from various diplomatic
sources indicates that he may be less doctrinaire than
Lara and has sometimes been described as an oppor-
tunist. Although a mulatto, Carreira is said to retain
substantial support among black officers in the Ango-
lan military. Since his return in 1982 from nearly
three years' extended training in the Soviet Union,
Carreira has been serving as an adviser to the Presi-
dent on defense matters and recently was appointed
Chief of the Air Force. The former Defense Minis-
ter's reputation has been tarnished by widespread
allegations that he is personally corrupt, and he
appears to have lost his former prestige and authority.
Nevertheless, his status as an associate of the late
President Neto gives him considerable influence with-
in the hardline faction.
Paulo Jorge has not figured prominently in the fac-
tional infighting, but the mulatto Foreign Minister is
a member of the hardline group, according to several
diplomatic sources. Black nationalists, the sources
report, resent having a mulatto as Foreign Minister,
and, over the past two years, there has been wide-
spread speculation in Luanda's diplomatic community
that the Foreign Minister's removal was imminent.
Nevertheless, we believe that in recent months Jorge
has been playing a more central role in Angolan
foreign policy. His inflammatory rhetoric has often
appeared at odds with the aims of the negotiations in
which dos Santos has been involved. Although some
Western diplomats argue that in private discussions
Jorge is more reasonable and pragmatic on issues
related to the Namibia negotiations, his public state-
ments have been full of diatribe and highly critical of
the United States.
Although we are able to identify from fragmentary
reporting a few black hardliners in the regime, such as
Ambrosio Lukoki and the secretary general of the
Angolan workers union, Pascoal Luvualu, we do not
know what roles they play in the factional strife. In an
effort to weaken the hardliners, dos Santos dismissed
Lukoki, who was believed to be close to Cuban
President Castro, from the political bureau.
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The Military in Politics
We believe that the Angolan military has the poten-
tial to play a greater political role than apparently is
the case. Although we do not know the extent of
involvement of Angola's military leaders in politics or
their attitudes on major issues facing the regime, the
military's influence in decisionmaking appears to have
grown over the past two years. For example, the
armed forces' representation on the political bureau
and central committee has increased somewhat in
recent years. A reliable diplomatic source has report-
ed that dos Santos has become more dependent on the
military since last year. The creation of military
councils for the administration of central and south-
ern Angola will further enhance the political influence
of the armed forces.
ideologi-
cal and racial divisions in the armed forces may
roughly parallel those in the political sphere. A few of
the country's military leaders appear to be fairly close
to dos Santos, according to diplomatic sources, but
others may be under Iko Carreira's sway. The mili-
tary's frustration over its own inability to effectively
prosecute the war against UNITA may lead it to lose
confidence in the regime and may lead some in the
military to plan for a possible military takeover. In the
past, Minister of Defense Pedro Maria Tonha has
been mentioned by some diplomatic observers as a
possible replacement for President dos Santos. Never-
theless, the military's dependence on Soviet and
Cuban support makes it unlikely, in our view, that the
military could act independently at this juncture.
Moreover, we believe that the hardliners' control over
the military probably has increased in recent months
as the Soviets and Cubans have increased their mili-
tary assistance in reaction to growing insurgent
successes.
We do not expect an early resolution to the crisis of
leadership in Luanda and doubt that the regime over
the near term will undertake new policy departures
that would be favorable to the United States and the
West. We doubt that dos Santos will be able to bridge
the ideological and racial cleavages within the party
to the degree necessary to develop a consensus in favor
of the policies he-and the nationalists-favor. Nor
do we expect that he will be able to amass sufficient
authority to move unilaterally in pursuit of these
policies. His attempts to date to exclude hardliners
from his regime's dealings with the United States and
South Africa and his increased reliance on his own
team of negotiators have raised suspicions of him to a
high degree among the hardliners as well as in
Moscow and Havana. Likewise, dos Santos's effort to
increase his authority through bureaucratic maneu-
verings could backfire. According to diplomatic
sources, dos Santos's acquisition of special powers,
first granted by the MPLA Central Committee in late
1982 and recently renewed, has already caused minis-
ters to look to him for decisions, but he is unable or
unwilling to make them lest he antagonize one faction
or another. As a result, his indecisiveness and funda-
mental weakness have become more conspicuous. Dos
Santos's failure to gain either aid or concessions-
such as diplomatic recognition-during negotiations
with the United States may have also worked against
Decisionmaking on key issues is likely, in our view, to
remain a collective process, and the final say will
continue to come from the deeply divided ruling group
of key leaders. The mood of the group will be
determined by the state of play in the three-way
pulling and hauling between the two factions and dos
Santos, as well as by unfolding events. The ebb and
flow of the government's struggle with UNITA will
be an important factor. Recent UNITA gains proba-
bly figure importantly in the tougher line Luanda
recently has taken on Namibia-related issues. Most
notably, dos Santos and other top officials have
insisted publicly that no withdrawal of Cubans can
occur until a settlement in Namibia is achieved and
have linked such a settlement to South Africa's
agreement to withdraw its forces from Angola and
halt aid to UNITA..This hardening of Luanda's
position, in our view, reflects mounting concern
among all factions over the growing insurgent threat
and their prospects if UNITA were to seize control.
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As long as dos Santos continues to move cautiously,
he probably can survive. Dos Santos's hardline oppo-
nents in the regime probably will allow him to
continue negotiations with the United States and with
South Africa because they believe these efforts at
least buy time for the government. They also may
believe that the United States might offer diplomatic
recognition or economic aid, or that international
pressure might eventually force Washington to drop
its insistence on linking a Cuban withdrawal to
independence for Namibia. Nonetheless, it is unlikely,
in our judgment, that the President can move deci-
sively away from current policy directions in the near
term because of the paralyzing divisions within the
figure in it. His influence over the Angolan military
probably would be crucial in keeping the armed forces
ruling party.
Possible Outcomes
Despite the probability, in our view, that the three-
way standoff between dos Santos and the factions will
persist over the near term and will continue to work
against any significant alteration of existing policies,
the power equation in Luanda could change dramati-
cally and with little warning. In the order of likelihood
that we see, such a change could come about through
three eventualities: a palace coup against dos Santos
engineered by the hardliners with the assistance of
Moscow and Havana; a voluntary decision by dos
Santos to step down; or the takeover of the govern-
ment by the black nationalists, possibly through ex-
ploitation of a popular uprising.
We believe that dos Santos probably is afraid to move
against top mulattoes such as Lucio Lara precisely
because he feels such a move would spark a coup by
the hardliners. We also believe that the hardliners
might try to seize power if they believed that dos
Santos was preparing to accept a Cuban troop with-
drawal or enter reconciliation talks with Savimbi-
policy initiatives that would threaten the mulattoes'
position in Luanda.
We assume the hardliners already have plans for a
palace coup that they could quickly implement in an
"emergency." We also expect that Cuban forces in
the Luanda area would be involved in such a coup and
that former Defense Minister Iko Carreira would
on the sidelines or aligned with the hardliners.
The ouster of dos Santos by the hardliners and his
replacement by one of their own would add a new
degree of inflexibility into decisionmaking in key
areas of concern to the United States. Soviet and
Cuban influence in Luanda would be strengthened,
and Angola's interest in reaching an accommodation
with either Savimbi or the South Africans would be
sharply reduced.
Although we currently have no hard evidence to
suggest that dos Santos is considering stepping down
voluntarily, there has been periodic reporting from
diplomatic sources to indicate that the President has
not been entirely comfortable in his position. Conse-
quently, if he remains unable to get his way on key
policy questions and conditions throughout the coun-
try continue to deteriorate, his personal frustrations
could grow to the point where he might be willing to
leave office with minimal pressure. A relatively peace-
ful and quiet departure by dos Santos could result in a
constitutional succession in which another compro-
mise candidate would be chosen by the MPLA's
Central Committee. Another dos Santos-like presi-
dent, however, would not end the factional paralysis in
Luanda, and we would expect that Angola would
continue to be unable to reverse deteriorating econom-
ic and security conditions.
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The black nationalists could gain control in Luanda
by exploiting a revolt by military units in the capital
area or a large-scale popular uprising by disgruntled
black ghetto dwellers in Luanda. We have no evidence
that such explosions are imminent, but there is plenty
of loose tinder around that could fuel them. Popular
resentment toward the Soviet and Cuban presence
and to mulatto control is longstanding and wide-
spread. Food shortages, deteriorating living condi-
tions, and spreading official corruption have nour-
ished disillusionment with the regime. Black
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nationalist leaders would have little difficulty in chan-
neling public anger toward the mulattoes and their
Soviet and Cuban backers, and, while the struggle
might be bloody and drawn out, the nationalists could,
with luck, end up on top. There are policy divisions
within the nationalist faction itself-as there are
among the hardliners-and the emergence of a new
leadership in this manner might not result in any
immediate moderation of policies in Luanda. Over
time, however, we would expect some policy depar-
tures in directions more favorable to the West, partic-
ularly on the UNITA question.
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