NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 24 SEPTEMBER 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000500010051-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: September 24, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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'..enrrai
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
24 September 1980
Top Secret 25X1
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Situation Reports
Iran-Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Briefs and Comments
Cuba: Refugee Flow Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-Cuba: Discord Over Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR-Pakistan: More Soviet Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Morocco - Western Sahara: Renewed Polisario Attacks . . . 9
China : Nuclear Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
International: PLO Controversy at IMF and World Bank. . . 12
Special Analysis
El Salvador: Disunity Within the Junta. . . . . . . . . . 13
25X1 Top Secret
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Iraq claimed to have made major advances into Iran yesterday
as each side escalated the fighting to include air attacks on the
other's petroleum facilities. According to press reports, Baghdad
has set conditions to end the fighting: sovereignty over the Shatt
al Arab and control of three islands near the Strait of Hormuz.
Iraq apparently invaded Iran in at least four areas
yesterday. The Iraqis claim to have seized Qasr-E Shirin
and Sumar. A local Iranian official reportedly said that
"there are only two border posts resisting the Iraqis
and if these collapse, they can surround Khorramshahr."
Abadan came under heavy shelling and possibly air attack
after Iranian aircraft struck the Iraqi petrochemical Orlin
areas.
Farther north, Iraqi ground attacks opposite Dezful
apparently met resistance from local tribesmen as well
as Iranian Government forces. The airfield near Dezful
and Iranian supply depots nearby were targets for Iraqi
raids on Monday and Tuesday. Iraq could be attempting
a drive eastward to cut the main rail and road links to
Khuzestan Province from the north, enabling it to block
Iranian reinforcements and to move south to oil-related 25X1
Iranian airstrikes yesterday inflicted damage against
Iraqi military targets. Satellite photography taken
yesterday of Al Taqaddum Airfield, some 70 kilometers
west of Baghdad, shows crater damage to two runways; a
third runway sustained damage but remained operational.
The Iraqis admit Kirkuk Airfield was damaged and announced
oil-related facilities were also hit. 25X1
Oil Conditions
Iraq's two major Persian Gulf crude oil export ter-
minals have been closed since Tuesday. An Iraqi military
communique yesterday acknowledged that Iranian aircraft
had hit oil installations at Al Faw, but we do not know 7Fyl
24 September 1980
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The Iranian Navy has disclaimed any responsibility
for vessels within its 12-mile territorial limit, now de-
clared a war zone. This covers all oil exporting facili-
ties, through which Iran was exporting 600,000 barrels
per day of, crude oil and 200.000 barrels per day of oil
products.
The extent of damage at the Abadan refinery is not
yet known although ship crews report that large storage
areas were on fire. Even a temporary shutdown of the re-
finery will cause internal oil product shortages in Iran
this winter. Alternative supplies would not be available
if Iran's Gulf ports remain closed. About 60 percent of
Abadan's output has been going to Iran's internal market.
It also supplies all of Iran's jet fuel.
Iraqi Internal Developments
Iraqi Army and public morale, in response to official
claims of battle victories, apparently remains high. The
extent of damage and casualties resulting from Iranian
attacks on Iraqi facilities are as yet unknown. At least
two American citizens were killed in an Iranian attack
on a petrochemical complex southwest of Al Basrah.
Iraq's government-controlled media continue to play
successfully on anti-Persian and anti-US themes. Shia
Muslim dissidents are having little success in rallying
Iraq's Shia majority against the Baathist regime.
Arab Reactions
Jordan remains the only Arab country to support
Iraq publicly. According to press releases from both
countries, Jordanian King Hussein telephoned the Iraqi
Tnn SarrPt
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President to assure him of Jordan's position.
US Ambassador West reported yesterday that the
Saudis are extremely concerned and are be inning to be-
lieve
ght come true.
hat four to six Iraqi aircraft
have arrived at a Saudi airfield, apparently for safe-
Status of the Hostages
The Iranian Assembly's indefinite "freeze" on its
hostage debate temporarily forestalls extremist efforts
to link the hostages' fate to developments in the con-
flict with Iraq. Assembly speaker Rafsanjani, who had
been carefully managing debate in the Assembly, said
yesterday that the conflict was part of a "large US plot"
and will have an "impact on the hostages' destiny."
Ayatollah Khomeini has not specifically tied the hostages'
fate to the developing conflict. 25X1
Moscow is resisting Iranian and Iraqi pressure to
take sides, while seeking ways to promote an early end
to the fighting. This theme was highlighted in an
article in Izvestiya yesterday.
Yesterday Iranian President Bani-Sadr met with the
Soviet Ambassador to Iran and Iranian Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Mokri met with Soviet officials in Moscow.
Although Mokri subsequently told a press conference that
the Soviets were "neutral" in the conflict, he added
that they, refused to promise an end to arms deliveries
24 September 1980
25X1
2bAl
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Poland evidently intends to seek wide-scale debt rescheduling
with its Western creditors, but not on a formal, multilateral
Vice Foreign Minister Dobrosielski, who recently
told the US Ambassador that Poland probably would have
to reschedule, has indicated that Poland "preferred"
bilateral to formal multilateral rescheduling, hinting
that Poland would insist on it. He requested that the
US review its refusal to accept rescheduling on a bi-
Soviet objections.
High-level Polish officials meeting last week in
Warsaw decided to make bilateral requests of Poland's
creditors for assistance, including debt deferral. The
-Poles also will ask for new Western bank credits and new
means of financing raw materials purchases. They re-
portedly rejected applying for International Monetary
Fund and World Bank membership, apparently fearing strong
uling, generally a complex and time-consuming process.
Poland's agreement to formal multilateral resched-
uling would amount to a humiliating public confession of
economic and financial mismanagement. It also might
incur Soviet displeasure, complicate efforts by other
Communist countries to borrow in the West, and make it
even more difficult for Poland to obtain new credits.
Western creditors also may prefer to avoid formal resched-
The Warsaw District Court's rejection of a Katowice
factory union's application for legal status is not likely
to lead to a confrontation with workers. Representatives
of Walesa's organization have ridiculed the 12 unions
that have submitted applications, including the one in
Katowice, as revamped official unions. 25X1
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A better test of the regime's intentions toward free
trade unions will come in its handling of the Walesa or-
ganization's application, which will be submitted today.
The denial of the Katowice unit's registration because
of its plans to operate nationwide, to include members
from unrelated professions, and to raise donations prob-
ably signaled to prospective unions and to Moscow that
the regime will carefully screen the applications.
Student Activity
According to a source of the US Embassy, the leader-
ship of the official student organization developed a
"consensus" at a recent meeting that a new organization
is necessary, although apparently no concrete action was
Military
Adverse weather conditions continue to deny us over- 25X1
head photography.
24 September
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-ILLEGIB
Cuban Refugee Arrivals in the US, 3 Aug-13 September
24-30 Aug 31 Aug- 7-13 Sept
6 Sep*
ILLEGIB
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CUBA: Refugee Flow Continues
Cuba continues to send 150 to 200 refugees per day to the US,
while taking other actions designed to relieve tensions with the 25X1
Some 1,400 Cubans arrived in the US last week. At
this rate, over 125,000 refugees from Cuba would have
made their way to the US by the end of the month. Satel-
lite photography of Mariel harbor on Saturday showed at
least 110 pleasure craft--enough to transport an addi-
5X1
2
An additional group of former political prisoners
and their families who had been in the US Interests
Section in Havana since May arrived in the US on a
charter flight on 18 September. Cuban immigration offi-
cials told the departing group that 2 million Cubans
have applied for exit permits and that the government 25X1
continues to distribute the applications.
On the other hand, Cuban officials in Washington and
Havana last week told a US-Cuban humanitarian organiza-
tion that Havana has decided to end the boatlift from
Mariel so that it will not become an issue in the US
election. Although other Cuban officials reportedly made
similar statements earlier this month, we have not de-
tected any signs that Cuba is preparing to shut down the 25X1
refugee operation.
While the refugee flow continues, Cuba's return on
.18 September of two Cubans who hijacked a US airliner
suggests an effort to minimize provocative actions. The
announcement of stiff penalties for aerial hijacking was
directed only at the refugees in the US, however, and
Havana repeated its tough position that once "anti-
socials" leave the country they cannot return. This pre-
sumably includes criminals and others the US might want 25X1
24 September 1980
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USSR-CUBA: Discord Over Afghanistan
Afghanistan.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's talks with President Castro
in Havana last week annarently failed to resolve differences on
Havana characterized the talks as "frank"--a sure
sign of disagreement--and, in contrast to previous high-
level visits, a joint communique was not issued. Although
Gromyko's.visit was the first by a top Soviet leader in
several years, it received only limited coverage in the
Soviet and Cuban media. His departure just before the
joint Cuban-Soviet manned space launch was televised, 25X1
Nonaligned critics.
Havana apparently hoped that progress would be
achieved. The Cubans presumably wanted some sign of
Soviet flexibility that they could use to placate their 25X1
Afghanistan problem continues.
early next year--realizes that its international ambi-
tions are likely to remain frustrated as long as the
Afghanistan probably was a focal point of disagree-
ment. Moscow's intervention there has proved a major
embarrassment for Cuba, and has reduced Cuba's effective-
ness as chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. The Castro
regime--with an eye toward the UN, a possible seat on the
Security Council, and the Nonaligned meeting in New Delhi
Despite the apparent setback, the Cubans will con-
tinue to support Moscow publicly on the issue. Cuban
discomfort over Afghanistan is not sufficient to precip-
itate any fundamental change in the relationship between
Havana and Moscow. 25X1
Afghan Foreign Minister Dost.
Gromyko, however, apparently rejected Cuban calls
for a new Soviet tack on Afghanistan. Last Friday in
New York.he reiterated the standard Soviet formula to 25X1
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Top Secret
The Soviets are keeping up their diplomatic pressure on 25X1
the Pakistani Army is training Afghan insurgents.
bases and refugee camps in Pakistan. The Ambassador
alleged that there are some 70 camps in Pakistan w her
Last week the new Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad
gave a still unpublished interview to a Pakistani jour-
nalist in which he threatened that the "time was growing
near" when the USSR would have to attack Afghan insurgent
Earlier this month in Kabul, the Soviet Ambassador
warned that "drastic action" would be taken to destroy
bases where insurgents have antiaircraft missiles, regard- 25X1
The Soviet pressure probably is the result of Paki-
stan's continued efforts to promote international con-
demnation of the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan.
The Soviets also may hope to prevent President Zia from
moving closer to the US during his visit here next week.
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PoZisario Front guerrillas are stepping up their attacks on
Moroccan positions in Western Sahara and southern Morocco ollowi 25X1
an attempt at mediation by the OAU earlier this month.
Morocco and the Polisario met for the first time
with the OAU mediation committee, although Rabat continued
to reject Polisario attempts to make direct contact.
Rabat believes that it made some progress when the com-
mittee accorded equal treatment to the pro-Moroccan
Saharans and to the Algerian-backed Polisario delegates.
It also is pleased that the committee's new plan for a
cease-fire would permit Moroccan troops to remain in
place in the Sahara. Morocco remains concerned, however,
that its political position will erode further this fall,
if the UN acts on the OAU committee's recommendation to
involve the UN in policing the cease-fire and in organiz-
ing a referendum, which Morocco still rejects.
Although Algeria reportedly avoided all Moroccan
efforts to engage it in substantive bilateral discussions
at the OAU meeting, it remains interested in seeing an 25X1
earl end of the conflict.
The guerrillas recently initiated their first major
actions in three months. Last week, they ambushed a
Moroccan task force conducting sweep operations in south-
ern Morocco. Rabat announced that 70 of its soldiers
were killed--one of the highest casualty tolls it has
admitted for a single engagement.
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China's second nuclear-powered submarine has begun sea trials,
indicating that the Chinese have resolved propulsion problems that
caused the,submarine to spend over two-and-a-half years fitting
the first has been operational since 1973--comprise only
a small fraction of Beijing's submarine force, which in-
cludes some 100 diesel units and is the third largest in
The two Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines--
believe may be nearing completion.
The Han is one of only two domestically designed
Chinese submarines, the other being the diesel-electric
Ming-class, which is a Chinese variation of a Soviet
submarine. The Han submarines will provide a valuable
source of crew training as well as experience for the
designers and builders of future Chinese nuclear-powered
units, including the ballistic missile submarine that we
10 Top Secret
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INTERNATIONAL: PLO Controversy at IMF and World Bank
Last minute passage of US-backed resolutions block-
ing PLO observer status for the annual meetings next week
of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank was
achieved in the face of unprecedented pressure by Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. Arab efforts to influence voting re-
portedly included threats to stop oil deliveries to some
of the developing countries in the two organizations.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also indicated they might with-
hold funds from the two institutions. Although the Arab
actions will have no immediate impact on financial opera-
tions, they could limit future increases in IMF and World
Bank financing of member country balance-of-payments 25X1
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EL SALVADOR: Disunity Within the Junta
of violence for the remainder of 1980.
After more than eight months in power, the Salvadoran junta
has begun to display some political skill and has achieved some
success in containing the revolutionaries, but it continues to be
plagued by internal divisions. Military hardliners have emerged
strengthened from the recent showdown, but the three civilians on
the five-man junta can claim greater legal authority. This sets
the stage for another civilian-military confrontation, probably
before the end of the year. Leftist forces have suffered recent
political and tactical setbacks but are encouraged by infighting
within the government and will maintain
F__ I their present high level 25X1
resorting to excessive violence.
The government showed sophistication in its handling
of the leftist general strike and power blackout last
month. The junta made effective use of the media and,
despite frequent guerrilla attacks, heavy military and
security force patrols controlled the capital without
Business cooperation with the government, the armed
forces' bloodless seizure of power plants, and the arrest
of the striking electrical workers demonstrated that the
government is more firmly in command. The Christian
Democrats, who hold two seats on the junta, are drawing
confidence from the government's improved performance,
and now believe they can persuade some leftist factions 25X1
to quit their alliance with the guerrillas.
guerrilla terrorism
The government also has registered gains against
the guerrillas. In addition to meeting the insurgents'
challenge in the capital, the military occupied the na-
tional university this summer, depriving the guerrillas
of an important base. Government forces--with help from
neighboring countries--have interdicted some leftist arms
supplies, and peasants have reacted to indiscriminate
Urban and rural support for
leftist goals has weakened generally.
24 September 1980
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Vulnerabilities of the Junta
The recent clash between rival military factions
stemmed from political and personal differences. Con-
servative armed forces leaders and centrist junta member
Colonel Gutierrez undercut the progressive military
member of the junta, Colonel Majano, by assigning his
military followers to unimportant posts. Majano acceded
Majano's departure would further damage the junta's
already shaky international position and, if enough of
his supporters left with him, the government could unravel.
Anticipating such a possibility, government leaders have
considered reorganizing the junta, with Christian Demo-
cratic member Duarte as president. 25X1
in the junta and remains on the verge of resigning.
to the order and received some token concessions. How-
ever, he has been unable to work effectively with others
The decline of the Majano group has set up an
eventual confrontation between conservative military..
officers who have been aligned frequently with Gutierrez
and the liberal Christian Democrats. The Christian Demo-
crats maneuvered astutely during the showdown, consenting
to the officer transfers in exchange for an agreement by
the military to give formal control of the armed forces
to the junta. 25X1
To make civilian control a reality, however, the
Christian Democrats would have to wring from the military
a commitment to end rightist violence, continue socio-
economic reforms, and transfer certain hardline officers.
The civilians have warned they will withdraw from the
junta if their authority is subverted. This threat gives
them considerable leverage, because their departure would
bring down the government. 25X1
divided over how to proceed.
Insurgent Strategy
Guerrilla forces--numbering as many as 3,000 to
4,000--face a possible fall off in new recruitments,
partly because they can no longer pay some of their cadre.
Kidnaping ransoms have fallen sharply this year and
organizational expenses have been heavy. Because of
these reverses, the largest guerrilla groups are again 25X1
24 September 1980
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The revolutionaries are reevaluating their strategy
and putting more emphasis on larger military actions--
attacking transport and power facilities. Assaults by
insurgent platoons have become almost commonplace, and
the guerrillas have begun using antitank rocket launchers--
as in last week's attack on the US Embassy.
Military and civilian leaders in the government are
now more optimistic, but--even with its new political
skills--the junta is only an even bet to last the next
six months.
Substantially greater support from Cuoa or Nicaragua
to the guerrillas would seriously imperil the junta.
Salvadoran military capabilities are already being taxed
by the present level of fighting, and a spread of insur-
gency would aggravate divisions within the government, 25X1
especially over questions of strategy.
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Top -,Secret
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