MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ASSESSING THE RADIATION AND CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION SITUATION

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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
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23 July 1974
?
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Assessing the Radiation
and Chemical Contamination Situation
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based an the SECRET USSR. Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article stresses the need to consider the effect of the radiation and
chemical situation on the combat operations of the troops and the combat
effectiveness of personnel. This need has raised essentially new demands
to establish a special system of collecting, processing and reporting
radioactive and chemical contamination data which is consistent with the
nature of modern warfare. Such a system, as envisioned by the authors, is
described and two diagrams illustrate the time periods needed for the
collection and processing of information by analytical-calculating stations
and the special radio nets which must be established. This article
appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. Ffl- nc 7...Terence, rrtc Frm this publication have been
assigned the Codeword
FIRDB-312/02488-74
1 1
Deputy Director for S,eratiOnS
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE CW
INFO. Mid-1967
Dias DOCUMIT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
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HRDB- 312/02488-74
DATE 23 July 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The System of Collecting and Processing Data on
the Radiation and Chemical Situation
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR. Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Mi1ita7
Thought". The authors of this article are General-Mayor of Technical
Troops N. Rumyantsev and Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Vaulin. This article
stresses the need to cansider the effect of the radiation and chemical
situation on the combat operations of the troops and the combat effective-
ness of personnel. This need has raised essentially new demands to
establish a special system of collecting, processing and reporting
radioactive and chemical contamination data which is consistent with the
nature of modern warfarr. Such a system, as envisioned by the authors, is
described and two diagrams illustrate the time periods needed for the
collection and processing of information by analytical-calculating stations
and the special radio nets which must be established.
Comment:
The late General-Mayor Nikolay Fedorovich Rumyantsev was also head of
an unspecified department of the Military Chemical Defense Academy, Red
Star, 16 September 1967. Lt.-Col. Yu. Vaulin co-authored an article on
commanders' estimates of radiation situation, Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6,
1967. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times
annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
End of Summary
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The System of Collecting and Processing Data an the
Radiation and Chemical Situation
by
General-Mayor of Technical Troops N. Rumyantsev and
Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Vaulin
The highly mobile nature of combat actions and the complex radiation,
chemical and bacteriological situation in modern operations have
necessitated rapid collection and processing, on a unit, large unit and
operational formation scale, of all kinds of information, and in
particular, data on the radiation, chemical and bacteriological
contamination of terrain, personnel and combat equipment.
Because of this, they are taking measures in the troops to sharply
reduce the time required to obtain these data. However, as demonstrated by
the experience of operational command-staff exercises, war games and
exercises with troops, the collection of reconnaissance data on an actual
radiation and chemical situation has been given insufficient attention,
even though decisions regarding combat actions of troops in the radioactive
and chemical contamination zones and eliminating the aftereffects of an
attack must be made on the basis of this information. At the same time,
forecasting the radioactive and chemical contamination of terrain is
essential. Sometimes decisions on the combat actions of the troops and on
carrying out all measures to eliminate the effects of nuclear-chemical
attack are made on the basis of forecast data without regard for
reconnaissance data.
Meanwhile, the results of radioactive contamination forecasting, which
is carried out in the troops and in military training institutions on the
basis of nuclear burst parameters and mean high-altitude wind velocity, do
not give a true contamination picture. There is no reliable, actual basis
for ensuring the acquisition of precise initial data. Plotting nuclear
bursts and determining their parameters, as we know, is the responsibility
of the air defense troops. However, according to the experience of several
exercises and war games, they cannot fulfil this task completely, since the
task is an additional one for them and is combined with the detection and
tracking of air targets. Sufficiently precise cooperation has not been
organized between the air defense means and the information collection
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centers, i.e., the front and army analytical-calculating stations (RAST)
forecasting the radial-15n situation.
A unified net for collecting and processing meteorological infor-
mation, also basic to forecasting the radiation and chemical situation, is
not, as a rule, established. The front and armies have many meteorological
stations, but they still have not been consolidatedunder unified control.
These stations operate according to different programs, considering only
the narrow requirements of their respective branches of the armed forces
and troop arms, although all of them, as a matter of fact, obtain the same
kind of information which also could be used for purposes of protecting the
troops against weapons of mass destruction.
In our view, it is very difficult to make a reliable forecast of the
radiation situation under existing conditions for obtaining initial data.
The very complex processes of plotting coordinates, determining the
parameters of nuclear bursts, and transmitting them to the collection
centers, are reduced to simple transmission of data by intermediaries,
Aich, in point of fact, distorts the procedure by which this information
is obtained. While discussing the shortcomings of the forecasting method,
we are a long way from thinking of abandoning it. Commanders and staffs of
all echelons undoubtedly require forecast data when making decisions.
However, this information must be based on precise radiation and chemical
reconnaissance data.
The established radiation and chemical reconnaissance system ensures
conducting it on all levels of all troop arms, starting from company-type
(battery-type) subunits. Furthermore, for this purpose there must be
specialized radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits and units in the
regiment, division, army and front. The current tendency toward trans-
ferring radiation and chemical gEonmssance activities directly to
subunits and units, provided with the appropriate equipment, most fully
meets the requirements of protecting troops against radioactive and toxic
materials and the nature of modern combat operations.
Analytical-calculating groups (RAG) and analytical-calculating
stations were established in division and army staffs during exercises and
war games. However, in the majority of cases they worked only on
forecasting radioactive and chemical contamination. Since they were not
provided with communications means, they were unable to collect information
an radioactive and chemical contamination and inform the troops about it.
Besides, the personnel of these groups were lacking in teamwork and the
necessary experience (certain persons were assigned in one exercise and
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other persons in the second), which sometimes raised doubt about the
advisability in general of establishing such groups.
In our view, the lack of organic analytical-calculating stations in
armies and analytical-calculating groups in divisions in peacetime is a
serious obstacle to fundamental improvement of the entire system of
collecting and processing data on the radiation and chemical situation.
Without a firmly established sequence and procedure for issuing radioactive
and chemical contamination reports, needless duplication and confusion
occur in the collection of this information and, as a result, the troops
are not warned of radioactive and chemical contamination in time.
The need to constantly consider the effect of the radiation and
chemical situation on the combat operations of the troops and the combat
effectiveness of personnel has raised essentially new demands to establish
a special system of collecting, processing and issuing radioactive and
chemical contamination data which is responsive to the nature of the modern
operation and battle, and to find ways of improving this system, primarily
through the existing means of troop control. By such a tem we mean the
various systems of technical means
and providing the staffs with al
radia
emical situation.
4.11
working in firmly established sequence
to estimate_the
This system, in our view, must include radar posts (special plotting
posts) capable of issuing coordinates of nuclear bursts and determining
their parameters; radiometeorological stations providing the periodic
measurement and issuing of data on wind velocity and direction at high
altitudes; meteorological pots of subunits and units of the chemical
troops for determining the weather in the surface air layer; sources
(ground and aerial reconnaissance subunits and radiation and chemical
observation posts of the subunits of all troop arms of information on the
actual radiation and chemical sitlation; and, centers for collecting and
processing data on the radiation and chemical situation (analytical-
calculating groups in the divisions and analytical-calculating stations in
the armies and in the front).
It is desirable, in our opinion, to organize the operation of the main
elements of the system for collection and processing of data on the
radiation and chemical situation in the following way.
Until the question of adapting special technical means is finally
resolved, coordinates and parameters of nuclear bursts may be determined by
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establishing a plottin system based on the use of existing radar stations.
According to the experience of exercises, to monitor all zones of an army
requires two or three special posts equipped with radar sets which do not
have to fulfil any other tasks except the plotting of nuclear bursts.
The problem of the cooperation of these special posts with the
analytical-calculating stations must be resolved. The problem is that each
burst may be plotted simultaneously by two or three army radar posts and
approximately the same number of front radar posts. If all of these posts
report the data directly to the analytical-calculating station, filtering
out the duplicate information will considerably hamper and slaw dawn the
pace of its operation. The filtering out principles already verified by
the air defense troops should be adopted here. Further, a special post for
the collection of information on the coordinates and parameters of nuclear
bursts should be established; this post will receive information from
plotting posts, analyze it and report simply to the analytical-calculating
station about each burst.
Establishing a system for plotting nuclear bursts based on the use of
existing radar stations even in just one of the military districts will
permit already determining now the most desirable organic organizational
structure of the system and the procedure for maintaining communications
between the posts and information collection centers, accumulating
experience in using the system, and preparing a base for rapidly equipping
the posts and centers with new technical means.
In our opinion, the procedure for providing the troops of a front with
mean wind data must be the following. Staffs of combined-arms armies will
use data from the meteorological battery of the chief of rocket troops and
artillery of the army, which has three sounding posts. One of these is
deployed in the center of the operational disposition of the troops of the
army, the second in the rear area of the army, and the third in reserve,
which will permit covering the entire offensive zone of the army to a depth
of 120 to 150 kilometers. The results of the sounding of these stations
must be transmitted to the rocket troops and artillery staff, and from
there to the operations department of the staff of the army and to the
analytical-calculating station. At the same time the analytical-
calculating station will receive on its own receiver the circular "mean _
weather" bulletin, transmitted by each of two automatic radiometeorological
stations (ARMS).
It is desirable to deploy an automatic radiometeorological station
from the separate hydrometeorological company of the front in the zone of a
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tank army which does not have an organic meteorological battery. This
station must transmit high-altitude wind data to the operations department
and analytical-calculating station of the tank army.
Providing an army of the second echelon of the front and large
units and units in the rear area with mean wind data must be made the
responsibility of the separate hydrometeorological company of the front,
which must deploy three sounding posts for this purpose. The information
from these stations will be transmitted to the operations directorate and
analytical-calculating station of the front, and also to the operations
department of the staff of an army of the secondechelon.
Transmission times for mean wind data should be made the same for all
front automatic radiometeorological stations--six times in each 24-hour
period, every four hours.
Protecting troops from weapons of mass destruction gives rise to the
need for wider use of data on the actual developing radiation and chemical
situation side by side with the results of radioactive and chemical
Contamination forecasting. Therefore, the system of obtaining data and
estimating the radiation and chemical situation must be based on both of
these means. Forecast results should be revised constantly on the basis of
factual radiation and chemical reconnaissance data.
The staffs of the armies and the front can receive forecast data
earlier than reconnaissance information. Thereforethe forecast must be
used first for an approximate estimate of the radiation situation. This
estimate is essentially a determination of the effect of the radioactive
contamination on the combat effectiveness of large units and units. A map
or overlay showing zones subjected to radioactive contamination is used to
determine in which zone GA, B or C1 a unit or large unit might be located
and the possible duration of its operations there.
It is known that the collection of data on the actual radiation and
chemical situation now goes through the channel from company to battalion
to regiment to division to analytical-calculating station of an army to the
analytical-calculating station of the front. It is desirable, in our view,
to allocate the responsibilities for collection and processing of these
data on the company commander in the company, on the chief of staff in the
battalion, on the chief of the chemical service in the regiment, on the
deputy chief of the chemical service for reconnaissance in the division,
and on the analytical-calculating station in the army and the front.
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Research shows that information on the radiation and chemical
situation at the levels from battalion to front now may be collected and
processed in the time frames indicated in Diagram I. It goes without
saying that these time frames do not permit considering the effect of the
radiation and chemical situation in advance when making decisions,
especially at the operational level.
This process can be accelerated considerably by using the promising
method of network planning and control in organizing the operation of the
entire system of collection of data on the radiation and chemical
situation. For example, the collecting of data on the coordinates and
parameters of nuclear bursts and on areas where chemical weapons were used,
the plotting of these data on a map, the forecasting of radioactive
contamination, the calculating of radiation doses and the collecting of
reconnaissance information on the actual developing radiation and chemical
situation, fall within the critical processes determining the minim=
possible duration of work. Consequently, we have to find ways of reducing
the duration of these processes, monitor especially carefully the
observance of established time periods for carrying them out, and take
operational measures to prevent a breakdown in this work.
If the chief of the chemical service in a regiment is given in
addition, one assistant, data on the actual radiation situation will be
collected and reported to the commander in only 15 minutes. The division
staff also will receive this information correspondingly sooner.
A considerable amount of information on the radiation and chemical
situation will be received in the staff of a division by various duty
personnel through various communications channels. Processing these data
requires collecting and decoding all reports, recording them in the log,
reducing them to a common sidereal time, plotting on the map, drawing
isolines of zones, calculating possible radiation doses, reporting to the
division commander, informing the staff of the division and preparing
reports to the staff of the army. One man, who, with sufficient effort,
now fulfils this work, can finish it in one hour and 40 minutes as the
experience of exercises shows. If the division has an organic minutes,
group, these data will be completely processed in 40 minutes.
The analytical-calculating group in a divisio4 besides collating data
on the actual radiation and chemical situation, will collect information on
nuclear bursts and areas where chemical weapons were used, forecast
radioactive and chemical contamination, receive meteorological data, and
inform division units and separate subunits of the forecast and the actual
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developing radiation and chemical situation. According to the experience
of research, the optimum composition of the group may be four to six men
(two officers and two to four NCO and enlisted men). It must have direct
radio communications with chiefs of the chemical services of the regiments
and the analytical-calculating station of the army.
The time spent on the collection of information on the radiation and
chemical situation in the staffs of the army and the front can be reduced
considerably by the establishment of direct communications between the
analytical-calculating groups of the divisions and the analytical-
calculating stations of the army and front, and also by using other
communications channels. In the latter case, in order to earmark
information of interest to us out of the general flow of reports of an
operational-tactical nature, a distinctive group of signals (for example
"111") should be transmitted at the beginning of each radiogram or telegram
on the radiation and chemical situation. All messages with such a group
received at the communications center or in other directorates and
departments of a staff must, in accordance with communications
instructions, be simultaneously routed to the analytical-calculating
'station, regardless of the addressee. This procedure, in our view, ensures
wore complete and timely receipt of information at the
analytical-calculating station of the army and the front.
The availability of only one radio net, on which the collection of
data and information on the radiation and chemical situation is
accomplished, is not satisfactory for the staffs and troops. It has been
established that 40 minutes is spent on obtaining data from one army and
another 45 minutes on reciprocal information. To accomplish a mutual
exchange of information of the analytical-calculating station of the front
with all of the analytical-calculating stations of the armies on one FaMO"
net requires at least seven hours. In one 24-hour period, the division
communications link with the analytical-calculating station of the army
will be loaded for 10 hours and 30 minutes just with transmissions of
radiation and chemical situation data, and, correspondingly, the link of
the analytical-calculating station of the army with the analytical-
calculating station of the front, 14 hours and 20 minutes. The remaining
time is totally insufficient TEE obtaining reciprocal information. The
analytical-calculating station of the front needs at least one more radio
set, and the army analytical-calculating station of the army, one
additional receiver.
The experience of exercises shows that timely receipt of information
is achieved only when, in addition to using command and staff
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communications lines, special radio nets are established for collecting
data and information on the radiation and chemical situation (Diagram 2).
The communications lines which are not now provided by organic radio means
are represented in the diagram by a dotted line. The lack of direct
communications by the analytical-calculating group of the division and the
analytical calculating station of the army with the sources of information
is a serious obstacle to the establishment and improvement of the entire
system of data and information collection an the radiation and chemical
situation.
One way to reduce the time spent an the collection and processing of
information and its receipt by the analytical-calculating stations and
staffs is to simplify the system of encoding data on nuclear bursts and
radiation levels measured on the ground. In our view, only the burst
coordinates and radiation level measuring points need be encoded; the burst
parameters (yield, type, time), as well as the magnitude of the radiation
level, may be transmitted in plain text. The enemy, you know, knows his
awn bursts and their timing.
Analysis of analytical-calculating station work shows that under the
existing system of forecasting and collecting data on the actual radiation
and chemical situation, and under conditions when the commander of the
troops of the front or the commander of the army is located at the forward
command post, the informationhe needs to make or amplify a decision may be
received from the analytical-calculating station of the front or army only
in five to seven hours. Obviously, the collection_of_dia7E-the-radiation
and chemical situation must be done at the same_time at the forward command
pOst, However, neither the forces nor the means linre_heen provided for
this at present. A number of military districts are proposing to assign a
calculating group, made up of front and army analytical-calculating station
personnel, to the forward commaTiost to -:orecast the radiation situation
primarily in support of the main grouping. It seems to us more desirable
for the front and army forward command posts to have an organic analytical-
calculating section, a component of the analytical-calculating station,
with communications means necessary for receiving data on nuclear burst
parameters and the radiation and chemical situation.
The high degree of training of the personnel of analytical-calculating
groups and analytical-calculating stations, attained by appropriate
training in peacetime, plays a substantial role in the speed of issuing of
data an the radiation and chemical situation. Therefore, because of the
possibility of the delivery of a surprise nuclear strike by the enemy, in
order to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops, in our view, it
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is necessary in peacetime to have the foundation of an organic structure of
a system of collection and processing, of data on the radiation and
chemical situation, i.e., organic analytical-calculating groups in
divisions and organic analytical-calculating stations in armies.
Improving the system of collecting and processing data on the
radiation and chemical situation will ensure the successful conduct of
combat operations by the troops under the conditions of widespread use of
weapons of mass destruction.
(see Diagrams 1 and 2 an following pages)
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Diagram 1 5 his 40 min
Under existing
conditions
With the presence of an assistant to the
division chemical services chief and an
analytical-calculating group in the division
4 his 40 min
With the collection of situation
data on two communications channels
With a report of forecast data on
contamination zones
7 min
3 hrs 40 min
3 hrs
1 hr 40 min
30-40 min
Battalion
Regiment
min
Division
Army
Front
hrs 30 min
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I 313 I
Rad:o _net for
data (an.ayweana
tPs)
ifirm?&?eheirirgal
division anailyaglal-
net)
radio Li
CRP radio
chemical de
Division
analyticq
calculatin
group
cn Diagram 2. Diagram of radio
*ft communications used for
collection of radiation and
i?-r; chemical situation data
0
Ae ial radiatix reconnaissance
r--7 r ulio net
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1
Aerial radiation
o not for radiation & chemical situation data
111Lanalpadal-calculating station radio net)
?ation chamical situatior,
icai-ealculating siaticri iet)
/1\ Army radar
a
n
_ z__ ypsst
NueleWriexplosion plottingystem radio net
-A
I- n / \
\ Army weather
L311 j / __.1 station
-qteorological data radio net
Commander, separate
chemical re ?n co.
separate
se co.
0
Ground radiati
chemical ream
radio net
Army.
?
calcUlating-
station
0
a)
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2 8
CRP radio net
CRP radio net
(front
rrLcsji -11
311:11-1
r?.connaissance radio net
Front radar
post
Front weather
station
Coimiander, separate
chemical econ co.
Front ground radiation
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