THE REAL STAKES IN SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 2, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #03888-85
2 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: The Real Stakes in South Africa
1. As we go about the business of reviewing our policy toward South
Africa, it will be vital to perceive that country not merely as an
isolated hot-spot or even as the lynchpin of our diplomatic efforts in
that region of the world, but rather as part of a larger, globe-girdling
phenomenon: as one bead in the necklace of countries whose governments
are non-communist but authoritarian, each in its own way embarked on a
course of internal reform leading toward democracy. In addition to South
Africa, beads in this necklace include the Philippines, South Korea,
Chile, and Pakistan. Some would add Taiwan and Mexico.
2. The struggle over this necklace is a major element of the
US-Soviet competition. Our goal in each country is true democracy; our
strategy is to offer each government our full support--moral even more
than material--while simultaneously using the influence this support
brings us to pressure each government to continue along its power-sharing
course. In contrast, the Soviet goal is to destabilize each country in
hopes of bringing to power Marxist governments; the Soviet strategy is to
force each government toward political repression--for example in
response to domestic violence--in hopes that when the road closes toward
evolution the road will open toward revolution. The key to this strategy
is to drive a wedge between the US and the target government, and by
doing so to remove US influence on the theory that when left to its
natural instincts, an authoritarian government will revert to
repression. It's a bit like cutting off a reformed alcoholic from his AA
meetings, in hopes the poor devil will weaken and take just one little
nip.
3. Without in any way getting tangled in the question of whether the
whole thing has been masterminded by some genius in Moscow, it is an
observable and irrefutable fact that in South Africa the Soviet strategy
.Cl By Signer
Derl OADR
All portions Secret
1 Derived from Multiple
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
has now succeeded. The government in Pretoria has declared a State of.
Emergency in response to domestic violence,'and thrown more than a
thousand people into jail. (Prediction: Before long some American
journalist will discover that the concentration camp is a South African
invention, dating to the Boer War, and use this fact to launch a damaging
report on prison conditions for the current detainees.) At the same
time, there now exists a political wedge between the US and South
Africa. And the wedge is being driven in more deeply each day. Even
more appalling, the Soviet strategy has succeeded in less than six months.
4. While it is too soon to report implications, it is easy to make
some projections. Within the other countries that comprise the necklace
I've described, leaders will take note of events in South Africa. If
they have not already focused on the old political adage--that
revolutions tend to happen not when oppression is at its worst, but
rather when conditions begin to improve--they will focus on this adage
now. We should anticipate that in at least some of these countries,
evolution toward democracy will be slowed or even aborted. Moreover,
leaders in all these countries will note the breathtaking ease with which
the wedge between the US and South Africa was driven in. This latter
fact will also be noted in Moscow, and within the leadership of all those
Western-based "public interest" groups that did so much to bring about
the present debacle. Having won such a big victory so quickly and so
easily, our adversaries would be fools not to press on to the next target.
5. In the present circumstances, US policy must be directed toward
one overriding goal: removal of the wedge that now rests between the US
and South Africa. This is vital if we hope to keep open the road toward
evolution in that country, and by doing so keep closed the road toward
revolution. Moreover, a visible and successful effort to remove this
wedge will be seen by leaders of the other target countries--accurately--
as evidence of US resolve to support them. So they will be more likely
to resist the temptation to slow down or abort their own domestic reform
programs. And removal of the wedge will cool the enthusiasm, both of the
Soviets and of "public interest" groups whose leaders now think that
defeating the US is easy, for taking advantage of their current momentum.
Heal
Herbert E. Meyer
2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2
SECRET/SENSITIVE /
NIC #03888-85
2 August 1985
SUBJECT: The Real Stakes in South Africa
DCI/VC/NIC/H.Meyer:bha(2 Aug 8$
Dist:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - NI0/AF
2 - VC/NIC
1 - NI0/AL (Ford)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/07: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080006-2