SOME ALTERNATIVES TO THE PAPADOPOULOS REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: November 9, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
9 November 1972
MEMORANDUM'
SUBJECT: Some Alternatives to the Papadopoulos Regime
This memorandum looks at the political situation
in Greece today. It finds some stirrings of opposition
to Papadopoulos. It judges that abrupt change is not
likely in the near term, but speculates as to the nature
of the regime(s) which might come after the present one
if and when it should be replaced.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It has been discussed with the Office of
Current InteZZigence and with the Clandestine Services
who are in general agreement with its judgments.
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1. Since leading a coup which ousted the elected
government of Greece in April 1967, Colonel George Papa-
dopoulos has gradually concentrated more and more power
in his own hands. He is at present Prime Minister,
Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Minister for Government Policy. In addition, he has
taken over the post of Regent for King Constantine, in
exile since his abortive attempt to upset Papadopoulos'
regime in December ?? 967.
2. In the last six months or so certain rumblings
of a political nature have begun to be heard from Greece.
Readers will recall that in the first two or three years
following the 1967 coup d'etat, activities-of exiled
Greek political leaders and others opposed to the regime
received considerable attention. The efforts of such
persons as Andreas Papandreou and Melina Mercouri to
stir up opposition and antipathy to the colonels' regime
were widely covered in the world press. The last two years
have seen less of this sort of publicity and apparently
less activity on the part of the exiles. The recent noises
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are of a different nature since they come primarily from
inside Greece. There was in late summer, for example, a
coup in. the planning stage, which Papadopoulos heard of
and circumvented. Officers have criticized the govern-
ment for inefficiency and corruption. The US Embassy in
Athens has begun to report on stresses.and strains in
Greek domestic politics, after several years of silence
on the subject.
3. Are we then getting forewarnings of imminent
change on the Greek political scene? At least one or two
observers, including C,L. Sulzberger in the October 16
Herald Tribune, have expressed the view that Papadopoulos
may be nearing the end of a natural term of office. It
is a fact that George Papadopoulos has enjoyed a tenure
exceeded in this century only by that of Prime Minister
Karamanlis which lasted for seven years.
But in the past
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the perennial long4tLg for the excitement of politics has
sooner or later o';' rcome the attraction of disciplined
rule. Hence, it r.i'ight seem that the end Of Papadopoulos'
regime is imminent,
4. Yet the signs that are visible do not seem to
indicate that the former political leaders are particularly
active or the.t the people in general are eager for immediate
political change, The country is in good economic shape;
per capita Gr,~,, has grown forty percent in real, terms in
the 1967-197:4. period. Unemployment is low thanks to modest
industrial e;c,pansion and migration of workers to Western
Europe. Greece's chronic balance of payments deficit has
been eased by the growth in remittances from Greeks working
in Western Europe. The administration has done a fair
amount in terms of public works projects and helping to
improve a.vricultural production. All these factors have
helped k,:ep the population -- if not deliriously happy --
at least willing to put up with Papadopoulos' regime.
Certainly no significant part of the population has been
stirred to risk its personal liberty or economic well-being
by launching a campaign against the present government.
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5. There have been stirrings recently within the
military junta. We know that a fairly large number of the
younger members of the junta are unhappy with the govern-
ment. They dislike the concentration of power in Papa-
dopoulos' hands. They are becoming increasingly outspoken
about the rise in corrupt practices by high officials
and cabinet ministers. These officers feel that the
junta's principal purpose of purging Greek society of its
evils is not being served. George Papadopoulos has been
very skillful at ferreting out moves against him and at
making the necessary counter-moves by repositioning officers
and maintaining the loyalties of key commanders. None-
theless, a coup could succeed.
6. There are, basically, two directions which a
successor military regime might follow, depending on the
identity of the officers carrying out the coup. Thus,
one led by retired Colonel Stamatelopoulos (who recruited
many of the officers for the 1967 coup), in association
with Military Police head Ioannides,would probably move
slowly toward constitutional government and greater parti-
cipation in the political process which the 1968 constitution
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provides for. One dominated by the younger officers in
the junta would probably set up a tighter, more dictatorial
regime. In other respects, neither would be much different
from the present regime; i.e., pro-NATO, vocally anti-
communist, puritanical. Either would probably start off
by claiming to be more efficient and more dedicated to
purifying Greek society.
7. Probably the most important effect of a successful
military move against the present government would be to
call into question the legitimacy of the Athens government.
A second military move
would look more like a power-grab by self-seeking military
officers. If Colonel X felt called upon to seize power,
then Colonel Y could feel equally justified if he felt he
was more efficient. If the regime in Athens were to change
frequently through thD agency of military force, we believe
that the civilian sid>, of the Greek political scene would
heat up fairly quickl;r.
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8. At this stage, the political forces of the pre-
April 1967 era are pretty much in disarray. Former Prime
Minister Xaramanlis (now 65) has been living in self-
imposed exile in Paris since 1963. He too is dropping
hints that he would like to xeturn to Greece, but his
temperament would probably cause him to insist on returning
in a leading -- indeed dominant -- role. This 4 military
regime almost certainly would not permit. It is more
likely that Kara.manlis would return to Greece -- if at
all -- to live out his days in retirement, although there
is an outside chance that circumstances might develop
in which he could be the man on the white horse. The
forces of the left side of the political spectrum, symbo-
lized by Andreas Papandreou, were badly torn up by the
coup and Papandreou would never be allowed back by the
present or any likely ruling military junta. Those
politicians still living in Greece lack their own organi-
zations. We know of no new political organized groups
(Of course, if
the system were liberalized, political groupings would
rapidly appear.)
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9. Fears that political developments could getout
of control and that the stability, order, and economic
well-being which the Papadopoulos regime has achieved be
put in jeopardy could lead the Prime Minister's senior
colleagues to put extreme pressure on him to make some
reforms. Responding to such pressures would require the
Prime Minister to surrender much of the power he has
arrogated to himself. He might accede, but the role of
a virtual figurehead would not be in keeping with his
temperament. He probably would resist any effort to
diminish his personal power and, by holding on to it,
help to build'.up pressures for a coup.
10. Papadopoulos, or indeed any successor, still has
the problem of what to do about the Greek monarchy. It
is in no ser?se an alternative to the present system of
government. There are those in Greece who would like to
make the country a republic again, notably the younger
anti-Papadopoulos officers in the junta. The monarchy
can, however, with the right incumbent, serve a symbolic
role as an above-politics rallying point for the country.
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Papadopoulos probably would be willing to have a King in
Greece again at an opportune time; so might a successor.
But Constantine, who has recently indicated in a speech
that he is willing to come back to Greece on almost any
terms, may not be the one.
Greece might seek another member of the family
or turn to a regency for Constantine's young son.
11. All things considered, Papadopoulos will probably
remain in office for some time to come. He could be
overthrown by a coup, but on the whole we think that his
skill at ferreting out plots is adequate to keep hire
going for another year or two. What does seem predictable
however, is that a change in the Greek political setup,
e.g., Papadopoulos' replacement by another military group
or a decision by Papadopoulos or a successor junta to
implement key provisions of the 1968 constitution,would
start an era of politicking in the country. Once the
Greek body politic sees that change is possible, the old
political volatility is almost certain to reappear with a
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vengeance. But where? The best guess is that such develop-
ments are from two to five years away. But that is only a
guess. We do feel quite sure that the immediate successor
to George Papadopoulo$ will be another military government.
Such a regime might be more willing gradually to open the'
gates to civilian politics. But any full restoration of
the democratic process (Greek-style) will almost certainly
not come about until a successor regime to that of Papa-
ciopoulos has had a time in office.
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