NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 9 APRIL 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010142-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: April 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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" Director of Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
9 April 1982
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Ton Secret
Contents
Argentina-UK: Continued Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Western Europe - El Salvador: Advocating Negotiations . . . 2
Poland: GZemp Seeks Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Syria-Iraq: Border Closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
North Yemen - USSR: Soviet Military Assistance . . . . . . . 7
Eastern Caribbean: Potential for Instability . . . . . . . . 8
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Buenos Aires and London have welcomed Secretary of State
Haig's diplomatic initiative, but Argentine President Galtieri
has stated that a British blockade of the Falklands would mean
//Both the Argentine and British Governments publicly
welcomed Haig's mission, but Prime Minister Thatcher
explicitly declined to use the term "mediator" for his
role. She reiterated that Argentine forces must evacuate
the islands before negotiations can begin.
high-level Navy officials are not pleased with the
Secretary's visit, expecting him only to present the
British position.//
Comment: //Thatcher's reaction reveals both her own
hardline views and the extent to which she remains vul-
nerable to criticism from her party's right wing. Senior
Argentine naval officers are notoriously hard line, and
their unhappiness probably does not reflect general
government views.//
British Political Developments
//Parliament has adjourned for the Easter holiday,
giving the government a respite for a few days from back-
benchers' public criticism.//
Comment: //Foreign Secretary Pym's good reputation
and Defense Minister Nott's announcement of the 200-mile
"military exclusion zone" around the island's have mollified
many critics. The government, however, will have to go
to great lengths to lend credibility to its announced
inquiry into the Foreign. Office's handling of the situa-
tion in the preinvasion period.//
Support for the UK
//The list of countries embargoing arms sales to
Argentina now includes West Germany, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria.
Australia has banned imports from Argentina, while Japan
has so far resisted both sides' overtures.//
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//EC officials meet again today to discuss joint
sanctions. Despite British pressure, most EC members
are reluctant to adopt the comprehensive sanctions the
UK wants.//
Comment: //The arms embargoes already announced
amount to over 75 percent of Argentina's normal supplies.
Most of the UK's EC partners hope a resolution of the
crisis will make additional sanctions unnecessary, but
the UK probably will continue to seek such support.//
Argentine Military Preparations
Galtieri yesterday continued to place Argentina on
a war footing and said that if a British blockade inter-
rupts resupply efforts "we will go to war."
Comment: Galtieri could be trying to force the
British to negotiate rather than face a declared war,
but his statement further limits his ability to accept
a compromise without appearing weak. Despite their
buildup on the Falklands, short supply lines, and mainland
airbases, the Argentines recognize their serious military
deficiencies. If the UK attempts to retake the Falklands,
however. the Argentines almost certainly will resist.
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Argentine Economic Measures
The economic reprisals announced on Monday by Argen-
tina--a freeze on British assets and restrictions on
foreign purchases--will have little immediate impact on
either the British or the Argentine economies. The
restrictions on foreign exchange affect only $550 million
in two-way trade, less than 3 percent of Argentina's
total and an even smaller percentage of UK trade. Buenos
Aires, nevertheless, is concerned that it may be unable
to meet service payments on debts to British banks--which
syndicate 50 percent of Argentina's external credit--but
UK banks apparently are reluctant to declare Argentina
Soviet-Argentine Activity
//Argentina has agreed to purchase $500 million worth
of oil equipment from the USSR over the next three years
and has agreed to extend its arrangement with Moscow to
purchase machinery on credit. The agreement ended the
scheduled week-long Soviet-Argentine Mixed Economic
Commission talks which began before the invasion. The
Soviet trade imbalance with Argentina totals about
$2 billion, and Moscow has sought to reduce its debt.//
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WESTERN EUROPE - EL SALVADOR: Advocating Negotiations
tiated settlement.//
//Most of the major West European political parties believe that
the election in EZ Salvador has worsened prospects for an acceptable
resolution of the conflict there, and they are encouraging a nego-
principles under different sponsorship.//
suggestions appear to have stalled, however, various
groups are suggesting ways of using basically the same
//Many parties have supported Mexican President Lopez
Portillo's ideas for achieving a comprehensive settlement.
Now that the Mexican initiative and other Latin American
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POLAND: Glemp Seeks Dialogue
results.
The Church is making new efforts to edge the regime toward
a more conciZiatoru policy but is not optimistic about any quick
Archbishop Glemp told the US Ambassador on Monday
that the Church was planning to release a document later
this week for the "guidance of society" to help stimulate
renewed dialogue with the authorities. Glemp fears,
however, that some may reject the document, and he plans
to follow up by meeting with Premier Jaruzelski soon
after Easter.
The Archbishop stated that the government's failure
to be more responsive to the interests of the people
reflects in part Jaruzelski's willingness to listen to
hardline advisers who argue that the regime can win by
using coercion. Glemp also said the leadership is avoid-
ing difficult decisions while awaiting the outcome P~f
the repercussions of President Brezhnev's illness.
Glemp added that the government opposes the Pope's
planned visit to Poland in August and indicated that the
visit probably would be postponed if there is no serious
Church-State dialogue. He gave no hint that he expects
major unrest this spring and appeared resigned to the
fact that Poland faces a long and difficult road to eco-
nomic recovery.
Comment: This assessment by the Archbishop differs
substantially from the pessimistic analysis he offered
the Ambassador in late January. Although it clearly is
not optimistic, the current evaluation reflects Glemp's
belief that the Church will have to play its traditional
conciliatory role despite the existing political stalemate.
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SYRIA-IRAQ: Border Closing
the border by either country.
Syria announced yesterday it was closing its border
with Iraq, because it said the Baghdad Government had
been sending saboteurs and weapons into Syrian territory.
Trains may continue to cross the border for one week, and
residents of either nation now stranded on the wrong side
have until tomorrow to return to their own countries.
There are no indications of major troop movements toward
through Syria. The Syrians currently obtain 100,000
barrels per day from the pipeline, but Iran recently
Comment: Syria's already poor relations with Iraq
have deteriorated since Damascus accused Baghdad of
fomenting the uprising in Hamah in February. Baghdad
probably fears that the border closing yesterday could
lead to a shutdown by Damascus of Iraq's oil pipeline
agreed to supply Syria with nearly twice that amount.
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NORTH YEMEN - USSR: Soviet Military Assistance
//North Yemeni Prime Minister Iryani informed the
US Ambassador on Monday that Sanaa will send more mili-
tary personnel to the USSR to train on advanced weapons,
including surface-to-surface missiles. President Salih
requested such weaponry during his visit to Moscow last
October, and discussions on the terms of purchase con-
tinue. About 1,500 North Yemenis are studying in Soviet
military academies, and 500 to 700 Soviet advisers are
assisting North Yemeni forces.//
Comment: Salih probably wants to maintain a balance
between the Saudis, who he depends upon for financial
assistance, and the Soviets, who he relies upon for
weaponry, spare parts, and ammunition. He also may hope
that his willingness to increase military ties with the
Soviets will encourage them to mediate a reduction in
South Yemeni support for insurgents of the National
Democratic Front. Salih, however, is risking the possi-
bility that the Saudis may reverse their recent decision
to increase support for his regime. He assured Riyadh
after his visit to Moscow that he had not discussed arms
purchases there.
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EASTERN CARIBBEAN: Potential for Instability
segment of the population.//
//The resiliency of democratic traditions among the small states
of the eastern Caribbean--demonstrated repeatedly in elections over
the past several years--has at least temporarily halted a drift
toward radicalism. Nevertheless, economic deterioration remains
an underlying threat to political. stability, particularly among the
growing ranks of unemployed and alienated youth who comprise a large
skills. //
//Since the late 1970s, the English-speaking islands
have been especially hard hit by the international eco-
nomic slowdown. Export earnings have been hurt by de-
clining commodity prices, while high oil prices have
pushed up import costs. Foreign investment has stagnated,
unemployment has climbed steadily, and increased middle
class emigration has siphoned off managerial and technical
by the Caribbean Basin Initiative.//
//Seven former British colonies in the region have
achieved statehood since 1960, bringing the total of in-
dependent Caribbean countries to 15. Economic and polit
ical dislocations occasioned by the British withdrawal
have weakened security prospects for the region. Most
of the islands look to Washington to fill the gap and
welcome the potential economic and security gains offered
be limited in the future.//
//The more stable and prosperous islands, such as
Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, began to suffer eco-
nomically last year. Until recently, Trinidad and
Tobago's oil wealth enabled it to play an important role
in the eastern Caribbean as an aid donn, but this will
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//Barbados is exceptionally well managed by West
Indian standards, and the framework underlying the
economy is well developed, but it has fallen on hard
times because of lower revenues from sugar and tourism.
Faced with the highest budget deficit since Barbados
became independent in 1966, Prime Minister Adams has cut
expenditures and raised taxes. The recession has added
to labor unrest.//
//The poorer islands not only are more vulnerable to
adverse foreign economic developments but have had to
contend with a series of natural disasters. Dominica
is still struggling to recover from hurricanes in 1979
and 1980 that nearly destroyed its banana industry, a
main source of foreign exchange. Prime Minister Charles,
a staunch supporter of US policies, has been a target of
several conspiracies to overthrow her government.//
//St. Vincent has recuperated from earlier volcano
and hurricane damage, but, with unemployment near 40 per-
cent, the government of :Prime Minister Cato is the target
of constant criticism by the island's emerging leftist
movement. Allegations of government corruption and
ineptitude also have appeal among youthful dissidents in
the northern Grenadines, which belong to St. Vincent.
The weakness of the opposition parties has strengthened
the radicals, who are receiving encouragement from the
pro-Cuban government of :Prime Minister Bishop on nearby
Grenada.//
//St. Lucia's weak political institutions would be
vulnerable to unrest because of high unemployment. Mod-
erate former Prime Minister Compton is the front-runner
in elections scheduled for May, but coup rumors featuring
leftist George Odlum are creating anxiety, and police
officials fear an outbreak of violence. Odlum's contacts
with radicals in Martinique, Antigua, and Grenada, as
well as his known Libyan connections, have added to the
concern, but St. Lucians probably would resist any attempt
to seize power illegally.//
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and the recent fragmentation of the opposition are en-
couraging the small but articulate leftist movement.//
//Antigua-Barbuda and St. Christopher-Nevis have
somewhat healthier economic situations, but unemployment
of nearly 20 percent is a source of discontent. Divisions
within the government of Prime Minister Bird on Antigua
issue of autonomy for Nevis..//
//Premier Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis, which
enjoys complete autonomy as a dependency of the UK, has
the support of the majority.. Opposition from the
socialist-inclined Labor Party is weak, although an
eventual decision to advance toward independence probably
would lead to friction, particularly over the thorny
Prospects
remain a threat.//
//The security establishments on these islands are
small and weak. Leftist radicals, impatient with the
pace of change and opposed to the parliamentary system,
propaganda.//
//Many leftist leaders, who distrust US intentions,
look to Grenada and to Cuba for advice and material sup-
port. Grenada will continue to help coordinate support
for their activities and publish and broadcast their
tries to promote leftist activities there.//
of deep-seated economic problems in the new island coun-
//The radicals, however, probably will be kept in
check for now by most political parties, by the private
sector and the press, and by religious and labor groups.
In addition, the Caribbean Basin Initiative is likely
to undercut the plausibility of radical claims that
Washington is insensitive to regional needs. Havana
and its allies nonetheless will continue to take advantage
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