NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 4 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 4, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
4 March 1982
7c5 S, ecire~
March ~3 ch 1982
CO NID 82-052JX
Top Secret
252
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/ Central America: Sandinista Repression. . . . . . . . . . 1
V Greece-Cyprus: Results of Papandreou's Trip . . . . . . . 5
b Romania: Ceausescu's Planned Diplomatic Activity. . . . . 7
g- Panama: Shakeup in the National Guard . . . . . . . . . . 8
G USSR: Credit Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
/() East Germany - USSR: Construction of Gas Pipeline . . . . 9
Morocco-OAU: Polisario Membership Issue . . . . . . . . . 12
South Africa: Ruling Party Rebels Ousted. . . . . . . . . 12
Special Analysis
9 Mexico - Central America: Lopez PortiZZo's Peace Plans. . 13
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Sandinista Repression
Systematic efforts by the Sandinistas to eliminate most of the
Miskito Indian presence along Nicaragua's northeastern border have
caused a large-scale exodus to Honduras in recent weeks.
Since December, the number of refugees at the Mocoron
camp in Honduras has grown from about 200 to 6,000. Many
Indians are still crossing into Honduras at points that
y the Nicaraguan Army does not control. The large influx
,.-'is seriously straining the ability of international re-
3 lief organizations to provide adequate food, housing, and
even more widespread.
at least 16 Indian villages--each consisting of from
15 to 110 buildings--have been either completely or par-
tially destroyed since December along a 160-kilometer
section of the border. Recent reports from refugees and
US officials in Honduras suggest that the destruction is
interior.
Meanwhile, Sandinista efforts to move entire communi-
ties away from the border have led to the forced resettle-
ment of about 8,500 Indians to camps in the Nicaraguan
Comment: By removing the Indian population and
destroying its villages, the Sandinistas intend to create
a heavily patrolled buffer zone that will facilitate
counterinsurgency operations along the border. These
harsh measures also are aimed at denying anti-Sandinista
bands located in Honduras support from disaffected Indian
communities. Nevertheless, by swelling the ranks of the
antiregime forces in Honduras and aggravating Indian
hostility toward the Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment is ensuring that it will face an enduring problem
in the East Coast region.
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GREECE-CYPRUS: Results of Papandreou's Trip
Prime Minister Papandreou on his visit to Cyprus last weekend
reassured Greek Cypriots of Athens' support without agitating Ankara,
and he apparently is trying to get the West Europeans to play a role
in settling the dispute.
Papandreou reiterated that the Cyprus problem has
top priority for Athens. He stressed his willingness
to embark on an international "crusade," possibly in-
cluding a broad-gauged international conference, if the
UN-sponsored intercommunal talks degenerate. Papandreou
made clear his pessimism about the chances of progress
in the talks, but he cautioned that the Greek side has
not yet given up on them.
Cypriot leader Denktash has noted that Pa
1 marks were "more moderate than expected."
/(4 Ankara has not reacted to the visit. Turkish
island's integrity.
In addition, Papandreou suggested that West German
Social Democratic Party Chairman Brandt would be an
ideal "catalyst" for achieving a settlement, and he
chastised Greece's EC partners for not taking more active
interest in the problem. He also singled out the UK for
ignoring its treaty obligations as a guarantor of the
Comment: Most of Papandreou's statements reflect
old themes, but his interest in stimulating some sort of
initiative by the Europeans is new. These comments ap-
pear to be another Greek effort to enlist the help of
Western countries in the hope that they will compel
Turkey to remove its troops from northern Cyprus. The
Greeks have long held that only the Western allies, par-
ticularly the US and West Germany, have enough influence
in Ankara to secure greater Turkish flexibility on Cyprus.
West European governments support the UN talks and
would be reluctant to endorse an international conference
because of Turkey's opposition to the idea and the pos-
sibility of Soviet involvement. Neither Brandt nor the
EC countries seem prepared to play an active role in
settling the dispute, but they might become more recep-
tive if both Athens and Ankara were to give their consent.
4 March 1982
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Korea in April, and to Greece in May.
might try to arrange a meeting with President Reagan.
He also is planning visits to China and possibly North
of the UN General Assembly on disarmament this summer and
Ceausescu is now considering attending a special session
Minister Czyrek.
In addition to his talks with Secretary of State
Haig, Ceausescu has met in the past month with Italian
Communist Party Directorate member Pajetta, Yugoslav
Party Presidium President. Draaosavac, and Polish Foreian
Leadership or reduced his independence in foreign policy.
ROMANIA: Ceausescu's Planned Diplomatic Activity
President Ceausescu is embarking on a diplomatic campaign,
possibly including a visit to the US Later this year, to dispel any
impression in the West that his domestic problems have weakened his
Communists in their dispute with Moscow.
in order to demonstrate solidarity with the Italian
Comment: In Washington, Ceausescu would particularly
want to press his case for financial support and to re-
affirm the special relationship he believes he has estab-
lished with every President since 1969. Ceausescu last
visited China in 1978 and may wish to balance recent
high-level contacts with the US and the USSR by renewing
his relationship with fellow "independents" in Beijing.
The Romanians evidently sought the meeting with Pajetta
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Top Secret
X
PANAMA: Shakeup in the National Guard
his tenure would be temporary.
The sudden retirement of National Guard Commander
Florez yesterday clears the way for Chief of Staff
Lieutenant Colonel Paredes to control the Guard as he
prepares for his bid for the presidency in 1984. Paredes,
a conservative and essentially pro-US, is an intelligent
and popular leader. Florez assumed command following the
death of General Torrijos last July and recognized that
a power struggle.
Comment: Although Paredes evidently forced Florez
out, the shakeup does not appear to signal the start of
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European
ally discounted rates has virtually disappeared,
The market for Soviet promissory notes at tradition-
bankers still are confident the USSR will repay existing
loans, but that there is little interest in favor of new
Euromarket lending and that Western bankers would demand
2
a
- to 3-percent premium to trade in Soviet notes.
Moscow in recent years has used promissory notes to
obtain $400-600 million annually in medium-term import
it will send to the USSR as many
will not get additional supplies of gas.
of borrowing.
Comment: This development--another indication of
the erosion of Moscow's credit rating within the European
financial community--will force the Soviets to seek other
types of commercial credit and also increase their cost
EAST GERMANY - USSR: Construction of Gas Pipeline
carry natural gas from Siberia to Western Europe.
East Germany has announced that it will build two
of the Soviet segments of the new pipeline that will
as 8,000 skilled workers. The Soviets reportedly secured
East German agreement to help on the project only after
threatening to cut gas deliveries.
Comment: A threat to reduce gas deliveries would
be credible in light of Moscow's tough negotiating stance
with East Germany on other bilateral economic issues
during the past year. East Berlin can ill afford the loss
of skilled labor and apparently is reluctant to partici-
pate because of unsatisfactory experiences on similar
projects in the USSR. Although the East Germans may
receive some hard goods in compensation, they evidently
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MOROCCO-OAU: Polisario Membership Issue
on Tuesday resigned from the cabinet.
The walkout by Morocco and 18 other countries from
the recent OAU ministerial conference in Addis Ababa has
effectively postponed the question of membership for the
Polisario Front until the next OAU summit this summer.
Morocco initiated the boycott after the conference chair-
man seated a delegation representing the Polisario.
Most of the countries that walked out maintain that the
Polisario's government-in-exile is not a sovereign state
and that the referendum procedures adopted at earlier
OAU meetings should be used.
Comment: Support for Morocco may dissipate between
now and the next summit scheduled for August in Libya.
Some of those who walked out did so primarily because of
procedural objections to the seating of the Polisario,
and they may abandon Morocco if it is inflexible in deal-
ing with OAU mediation efforts. Rabat may at some point
temporarily withdraw from the OAU, which almost certainly
would end OAU mediation.
SOUTH AFRICA: Ruling Party Rebels Ousted
Comment: Although Botha's personal triumph has
prevented the rightwing revolt from spreading, it has
resulted in the largest split in a ruling party in over
40 years. The ease of Botha's victory probably under-
states the extent of rightwing sentiment throughout the
National Party.
The parliamentary caucus of the ruling National
Party yesterday expelled Andries Treurnicht and 15 other
rightwing members who oppose Prime Minister Botha's
plan for Colored and Indian participation in the national
government. Six members of parliament who voted against
Y Botha in the caucus meeting last week recanted and re-
main in the party. Treurnicht and another Botha opponent
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US.
MEXICO - CENTRAL AMERICA: Lopez Portillo's Peace Plans
President Lopez PortiZZo's recent speech in Nicaragua, which
proposed guidelines for easing regional tensions, signals his desire
to carve out a Larger role for Mexico in shaping events in Central
America. Although he wants to use his Last nine months in office
to enhance his reputation as a conciliator, his policy will continue
to Loan more toward Leftist revolutionary positions than toward the
image and projecting its influence.
The Mexican President's stance reflects his concern
that the US is adopting increasingly hardline policies
toward Cuba, Nicaragua, and the insurgents in El Salvador.
The growing divergence between his policy and majority
sentiment in Latin America in approaching Nicaragua and
El Salvador has not shaken his confidence in his analysis
of and prescription for the region. It probably has,
however, reinforced his interest in strengthening Mexico's
renewed.
Conciliation Efforts
Promoting a compromise between the US and Nicaragua--
and thereby also easing strains between the US and Cuba--
is at the heart of Lopez Portillo's initiatives toward
Central America. He is mindful of the US proposals made
to the Sandinistas last August and believes that common
ground can be found if both sides make concessions. He
is proud of Mexico's role in facilitating the meeting
last November between Secretary of State Haig and Cuban
Vice President Rodriguez and wants to see such contact
Lopez Portillo shifted tactics when he urged that
Nicaragua halt its arms buildup, even though he made
such a move contingent on US action aimed at reassuring
the Sandinistas. By making release from prison of the
three Nicaraguan business leaders a precondition for his
visit to Managua last month, Lopez Portillo also has
demonstrated a new willingness to use the leverage that
his government has developed through its generous economic
assistance and steady political support.
Top Secret
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El Salvador on 28 March.
Nevertheless, the Mexican leader remains committed
to backing the Sandinistas. His recent private state-
ments to some US citizens indicate that he continues to
tolerate Sandinista behavior and to blame US hostility
for the radicalization of Nicaragua. Now that Lopez
Portillo has emphasized that support for the Sandinistas
is a cornerstone of Mexican policy, any efforts by him
to exert strong pressure on Nicaraguan leaders would
jeopardize his carefully cultivated position as friend
of the Nicaraguan revolution and provoke a backlash from
the Mexican left.
Position on El Salvador
Lopez Portillo has not provided the comprehensive
blueprint for El Salvador that Mexican officials had
promised, although he has restated his continuing support
for a negotiated settlement there. This omission prob-
ably reflects the President's hope that his views might
be given a more careful hearing after the election in
Past efforts to broker negotiations between the
insurgents and the Salvadoran Government have persuaded
Mexico that some cogoverning Christian Democrats favor a
3 dialogue. Lopez Portillo may believe that President
Duarte's party will be in a better position to pre
military on this issue if it wins a solid victory.
The effort by Mexico to undercut the legitimacy of
the Salvadoran election late last year by sponsoring UN
resolutions critical of the Duarte government backfired
3 when the majority of Latin American governments rallied
behind the junta's electoral plan. As a result, Mexico
did not oppose the decision by OAS member states last
month to send a team to observe the elections.
settlement.
Mexico has a tradition of acting alone in hemispheric
affairs, however, and its relative isolation on El Salvador
has not diminished Lopez Portillo's commitment to a polit-
ical solution. He may, in fact, see the apparent growing
strength of rightist parties in El Salvador as a develop-
ment that could cause the US to reconsider a negotiated
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Too Secret
Top Secret
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