WAR BY ANOTHER NAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600750002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 25, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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(4-, Lui . )o..,. 4o 14" - "tawsA A T 214 q?I.O)1I
War By Another Name
An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986
The most divisive and controversial part of American
foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in
the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments,
to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote
economic development and democracy,
Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and
sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two
generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's
relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence,
establish strategically located client Communist states, and to
gain access to strategic resources,
But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the
facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are
undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:
-- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin
personally, played a central role in prompting North
Korea's invasion of the South in 1950,the cause of our
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first great post-war strategic debate over strategy in
the Third World,
-- Although the strategic consequences of a victory by
North Vietnam were hotly debated in the US, we now see
the Soviet Navy well entrenched in the great naval base
at Cam Ranh Bay, and Vietnam's economic and military
dependence on the Soviet Union; we recall the Soviet
military supplyline that made Hanoi's victory possible,
and remember Soviet help in the conquest of Laos and
Cambodia. The resulting human suffering in Southeast
Asia was even more horrifying than predicted.
Somehow many Americans thought their first loss of a major
foreign war -- Vietnam -- would have no important consequences,
especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by so-called
"detente" with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet,
it was in fact a major watershed in post World War II history,
especially as it coincided with the collapse of Portugal's
colonial empire in Africa; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia and
Nicaragua; and Congressional actions in the mid-1970s cutting
off all US assistance to the non-Communist forces in Angola,
thus signaling the withdrawal of American support for opponents
of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World,
The effects of American defeat in Vietnam, the revolutions
in Iran and Nicaragua, and the coming to power of bitterly
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antagonistic and aggressively destabilizing governments in all
three countries undermined the confidence of US friends and
allies in the Third World (not to mention in Europe and Japan)
and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the
Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for
years to come.
And they moved aggressively to create or exploit such
opportunities. Throughout the Third World, the Soviet Union
and its clients for the past ten years have incited violence
and disorder and sponsored subversion of neutral or pro-Western
governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, various
Caribbean States, Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Yemen, Oman,
Pakistan, New Caledonia, South Korea, Grenada, and many
others. The Soviet Union has affixed itself as a parasite to
legitimate nationalist, anticolonial movements or to those who
have overthrown repressive or incompetent regimes and tried
wherever possible to convert or consolidate them into
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships as in Nicaragua, Angola,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, And now these same regimes in the
process of consolidating power are fighting their own people.
Open warfare by invading Communist armies is being waged in
Cambodia and Afghanistan. And in most instances of state
support for terrorism, the government involved is tied in some
way to the USSR.
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These contemporary challenges to international order and
stability -- and to democratic values -- certainly grow
primarily out of localized and specific circumstances. To be
sure, there are local economic, social, racial, human rights
and other injustices. And many -- too many -- governments have
demonstrated their capacity to inflict hardship and violence on
their own people. But, that said, we cannot close our eyes to
a common theme across the entire Third World and that is the
pervasively destructive role of the Soviet Union and its
clients,
In 1919, Trotsky said that, "The road to London and Paris
lies through Calcutta." This conviction that the West could
more easily and effectively be weakened and made vulnerable
through the Third World than by direct confrontation remains
central to Soviet foreign policy. And if you question how
critical this is for Moscow, remember that the Soviets allowed
detente with the US, which was highly advantageous to them, to
founder substantially with successive Presidents in the 1970s
because the USSR refused to moderate its aggressive pursuit of
Third World opportunities -- in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and
Afghanistan.
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Subversion, Violence and Repression
In the mid-1970s, new Soviet tactics in the Third World,
combined with historic events and opportunities, emerged to
challenge Western presence, progress toward democracy and sound
economic development in the Third World, The new tactics were
designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of disastrous
setbacks such as their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and the
ouster of a Marxist regime in Chile in 1973. The strategy had
five parts:
-- First, the cornerstone of the new Soviet approach was
the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the
power of "revolutionary governments", They first
helped consolidate radical power in Angola, This was
followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops
to Ethiopia where that regime also became dependent on
their support.
This tactic of using Third World Communist or
radical states as surrogates in the Third World
subsequently involved assisting Vietnam's conquest of
the remainder of Indochina, Libya's designs in Chad and
plotting against Sudan, South Yemen's aggression
against Oman and North Yemen, and Cuba's support for
regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada and Suriname as well as
the insurgency in El Salvador,
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-- Second, when radical governments came to power without
the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua, Soviets
directly or through their surrogates such as East
Germany helped in the establishment of an internal
security structure to ensure that any possible
challenge from within would be stamped out,
-- Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these
tactics with more traditional offerings such as
technical and political training in the USSR, the rapid
supply of weapons, and the use of a wide range of
covert actions to support friends and to help defeat or
destabilize unfriendly challengers or governments.
-- Fourth, the USSR proved in Afghanistan that it would
still be willing to launch its own forces at targets on
its periphery -- and perhaps elsewhere -- when and if
circumstances are right.
-- Fifth, and finally, the Soviets advised new radical
regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try
to keep their links to Western commercial resources,
foreign assistance and international financial
institutions. Soviet ambitions did not cloud their
recognition that they could not afford more economic
dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.
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Soviet support for the radical regimes that it has helped
established has been sustained. The Soviets and their East
European allies have provided military and economic assistance
to Nicaragua over the past five years approaching $2,5 billion
dollars. Compare this with the highly controversial $100
million American program to assist the resistance in that
country, The Soviets have provided a full range of military
weapons and support and also have become Nicaragua's major
source of economic aid, They are attempting to shore up a
Nicaraguan economy rapidly deteriorating because of slumping
industrial and agricultural production, falling export earnings
and cutbacks in Western funding, The Soviet Union has replaced
Mexico as Nicaragua's primary supplier of oil,
In Angola, total Communist military and economic assistance
now stands at almost $3,5 billion, most of it since 1984.
Almost all of that assistance is military. The Soviets are not
particularly generous, however, and because Angola in the past
has had the ability to pay, the Soviets and Cubans have
required payment for material and technicians in hard currency,
thus adding to the country's economic problems.
It is in Afghanistan, however, that the full measure of
Soviet ambitions in the Third World can be taken most clearly.
More than 100,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, with more
than a million troops having served, The cost to Afghanistan
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has been high, Some four million people, more than a quarter
of the population, have had to flee their country. Thousands
of children are being sent to the Soviet Union for education
and ideological training. Yet, after seven years, the Soviets
are still unable to create a regime that can gain public
support -- and, in fact, just last week dumped Babrak Karmal,
who they brought in from exile in Moscow after the KGB
assassinated his predecessor. Afghanis drafted into government
military service use the first opportunity to desert or defect,
often to the Mujahedin freedom fighters. Despite horrendous
losses and incredible suffering, the Mujahedin have fought the
Soviets to a standoff over seven years and are daily increasing
their military capability and the cost of the war to the
Soviets,
Indeed, a new phenomenon that Soviets have faced in recent
years is that they find themselves on the defensive, supporting
high cost, long term efforts to maintain in power repressive
regimes they have installed or coopted in Afghanistan, Angola,
Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mozambique, South Yemen and Nicaragua,
Taken together, nearly half a million resistance fighters have
taken up arms against some 400,000 Soviet, Vietnamese and Cuban
troops occupying these countries.
The Soviets' aggressive strategy in the Third World has, in
my view, four ultimate targets -- first, the oil fields of the
Middle East which are the life line of the West and Japan;
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second, the Isthmus and Canal of Panama between North and South
America; and, third, the mineral wealth of Southern Africa,
Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam,
and Mozambique and Angola in Southern Africa bring Soviet power
much closer to the sources of oil and minerals on which the
industrial nations depend and put Soviet naval and air power
astride the sea lanes which carry those resources to America,
Europe and Japan, The fourth target is the West itself -- to
use conflict in the Third World to exploit divisions in the
Alliance and to try to recreate the internal divisions caused
by Vietnam in order to weaken the Western response and provoke
disagreement over larger national security and defense policies,
Terrorism
Let me now turn to terrorism, Terrorism, including state
supported terrorism, is not a new phenomenon. Unhappily, it is
a familiar fact of life in the internal affairs of too many
countries -- as well as in nearly all wars, Even so, terrorist
murder in peacetime of innocent bystanders -- men, women and
children -- is very rare in the West and it is especially
frightening when perpetrated by states and causes remote from
us, And when it becomes the primary means of waging war for
smaller states, it becomes a real danger, Growing out of the
Lebanese Civil War and the overthrow of the Shah, support for
terrorism by Syria, Libya and Iran f bare.ne a significant and
lethal component of international terrorism and has bee an
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established instrument of foreign policy of those and other
countries.
At the some time, looming in the background of Middle
Eastern terrorism -- and terrorism elsewhere as well -- are the
Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. Let there be no
mistake or ambiguity about it: the Soviet Union supports
terrorism. It has directly and indirectly trained, funded,
armed and even operationally assisted terrorist organizations
such as Fatah, Abu Nidali~and others. Ne rly every terrorist
group in the Middle Eas his links to the R or one of its
clients. Just by way of example:
-- In 1982 Israel found in the PLO camps in Lebanon nearly
three dozen Soviet tanks, Soviet antiaircraft guns,
armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers,
1200 anti-tank weapons, and more than 28,000 small
caliber weapons.
-- In the 1970s, Turkish officials uncovered in the hands
of Turkish terrorists thousands of Czech CZ-75 pistols,
Polish submachine guns, Hungarian pistols -- and in
1981 they found Soviet bazookas, AK-47 rifles and F-1
hand grenades,
-- Elsewhere, the M-19 terrorists who attached the Palace
of Justice in Bogota, Colombia a year ago were armed
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with US M-16 rifles which we left in Vietnam. Cuba was
the source of the large quantities of weapons recently
found cached for terrorists in Northern Chile, Again,
weapons we abandoned in Vietnam, And I could go on.
It is this umbrella of Soviet support, and the associated
role of Soviet clients such as Syria, Libya, Vietnam and
Nicaragua that allows large scale terrorist operations to
continue, And, finally, in addition to their support of these
groups, the Soviets refuse to play any role in international
efforts to curtail terrorism,
It has not been lost on the Soviets that the practitioners
of terrorism who make spectacular strikes against the West by
bending or redefining the rules -- as in Lebanon -- are finding
ways past the West's defenses, both physical and
psychological. This has allure -- and is a good line of attack
-- for Moscow in a world when nuclear and conventional military
balances change slowly and where Soviet economic, political and
ideological power is stunted. Such an attitude toward
terrorism is not surprising given the fundamental role that
terrorism played in the establishment ofJSoviet power and the
conduct of its pol ic~`Y ~M~ -o-~ 'hose `who-' Ie e revolution,
Trotsky, said that the revolution "kills individuals and
intimidates thousands" -- it is necessary to kill some in order
shatter the will of the rest, No one in the intervening 65
years has found a better statement of the purpose of terror at
home or abroad,
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Conclusions: What is to be Done
As we reflect on the last forty years of war, subversion,
instability and terrorism in the Third World, it is clear that
the Soviet Union and its surrogates have played and are
continuing to play a major role. Their involvement is a common
feature as is their ability relentlessly to sustain their
participation over many years, It is imperative that, at long
last, Americans recognize the strategic significance of this
Soviet offensive -- that it is in reality, a war, a war waged
between nations and against Western influence and presence,
against economic development and against the growth of
democratic values. It is war without declaration, without
mobilization, without massive armies, It is, in fact, that
long twilight war described nearly a quarter century ago by
President Kennedy,
What then are we to do? From Harry Truman to Ronald
Reagan, our Presidents have recognized the importance of this
struggle in the Third World -- some sooner than others. But
public and Congressional understanding and support have waxed
and waned, What we need is a vigorous strategy we can sustain
in a struggle Secretary Shultz has said is "the prime challenge
we will face, at least through the remainder of this century,"
I would like to suggest several steps, none of them new, and
many of them in train now, that should be integrated into a
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strategy to meet the long term Soviet challenge and promote
democracy and freedom in the Third World,
1, First, Congress and the Executive Branch, Republicans
and Democrats, must collaborate more closely in the setting of
strategy. There seems to be more agreement on the nature of
the threat than on what to do about it. Cooperation and
support in recent years has been good in some areas; not so
good in others. There have been close calls and too often
prolonged delays in getting help to our friends, Too often in
the past, opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost
by clashes between the two Branches, or by partisan politics.
If common understanding of the Soviet challenge in the Third
World cannot be translated into a program of action that can be
counted on for more than a year at a time, if that, we will
have little success. At the some time, those who would lay
claim to a constructive role in protecting our interests and
advancing stability and freedom in the Third World cannot
oppose overt military action and covert action and at the same
time also reject security assistance and economic assistance
for key countries, The United States must have some means to
help our friends in the Third World defend themselves and grow
economically, and support for those means must be bipartisan
and stable.
2. Second, more must be done to educate the public, the
Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in
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the Third World. A continuing information program to inform
and tie together developments in areas widely distant is needed
and must be pursued over a long term,
3, We must, as a country, give priority to learning more
about developments in the Third World and to providing early
warning of economic, social, and political problems that
foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by
the USSR or its clients. We should serve as a clearing house
of information useful to threatened countries, for example,
seeing to it that lessons learned in successful
counterinsurgencies or economic development programs are shared.
4, The US must establish priorities in terms of major
commitments. If our early help fails to prevent serious
trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips
on the table? Also, I believe we should at least try to make
such choices in consultation with key members of Congress so
that their support at crucial moments is more likely, Great
losing battles in Congress for foreign military sales or
economic assistance for important Third World friends, played
out on the world stage and at critical times, represent
devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going far
beyond the affected country.
5. We must be -- and are -- prepared to demand firmly, but
tactfully and privately, that our friends observe certain
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standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is
required by our own principles and essential to political
support in the US. Moreover, we have to be -- and are --
willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues
they must address to block Soviet and other foreign
exploitation of their problems -- issues such as land reform
and corruption. We have a right and a responsibility to
condition our support -- but must do so in ways that make it
possible politically for the recipient to comply.
6, We need to change our approach to foreign military
sales so that the US can provide arms more quickly to our
friends in need -- provide them the tools to do the job -- and
to do so without hanging out all their dirty linen for the
world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to
humiliate those whom we would help,
7, Covert action can be used, as in the past, to create
problems for hostile governments, and to provide discreet help
to friendly organizations and governments. Indeed, at times it
may be the only means we have to help them,
8, We must be prepared to use overt military forces where
circumstances are appropriate, as in Grenada and Libya,
9, We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest
asset in the Third World -- private business, No one in the
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Third World wants to adopt the Soviet economic system, Neither
we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale
economic assistance to the Third World, Investment is the key
to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and
we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy
to promote investment in the Third World, The Soviets are
helpless to compete with private capital in these countries,
10, Finally, we need to have a strategy supported with
consistency through more than one Presidency. This
Administration and Congress in recent years have gone further
than any of their predecessors in developing and sustaining a
coherent strategy. But more must be done, and it must endure.
After all, we now face a Soviet leader who could be in power
well into the 21st century,
We are engaged in a historic struggle with the Soviet
Union, a struggle between age-old tyranny -- to use an old
fashioned word -- and the concept that the highest goal of the
State is to protect and foster the creative capabilities and
liberties of the individual, The battle lines are most sharply
drawn in the Third World, We have enormous assets and
advantages in this struggle, We offer an economic model based
on private enterprise for long term development, independence,
stability, and prosperity. We offer a model of freedom and
democratic ideals: we offer religious tolerance and spiritual
values. and we have democratic allies willing to help. As the
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President has said, we welcome the democratic revolution in the
Third World and are committed to promoting national
independence and popular rule. In contrast, the Soviet Union
offers only a model police state, a new form of colonial
subservience, the morality of the gun, and the austerity of
totalitarian socialism.
Our experience over the last forty years makes clear that
Soviet aggression and subversion in the Third World cannot be
stopped by negotiation alone (if at all); it must be resisted
-- politically, economically and militarily,
As a country, we must develop realistic policies, public
support for those policies and make the long term investment
essential to a constructive role in helping to bring peace,
stability, prosperity and freedom to the Third World, The
East-West struggle to influence the future of the Third World
is a classic confrontation of the Soviet capacity to destroy
arrayed against the democratic nations' capacity to build,
Americans cannot and must not be indifferent to the outcome,
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