NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010194-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 194
• Publication Date: September 27, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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Contents
Lebanon: Wazzan Offers Resignation
Chile: Political Developments
Warsaw Pact: Planned Meeting of Foreign Ministers
USSR-Eastern Europe: Status of CEMA Summit
Special Analysis
Pakistan: Coping With Disturbances
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27 September 1983
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LEBANON: Wazzan Offers Resignation
Prime Minister Wazzan offered his and his cabinet's resignation
yesterday, probably to facilitate the opening of talks on national
reconciliation, but it may be a reflection of his own frustration at his
inability to act effectively as Prime Minister.
Wazzan said he wanted to resign to speed up the formation of a
"national accord government" that would preside over the coming
national reconciliation talks. President Gemayel subsequently asked
the Prime Minister and other cabinet members to remain at their
posts pending concrete developments in the negotiations.
Meanwhile, a Druze militia commander told US Embassy officials
that the Druze are using the cease-fire to consolidate their positions in
the Shuf and Alayh Districts to block any attempt by the Christian
Lebanese Forces or the Army to enter Druze areas. According to the
militia commander, the Druze have no intention of reaching a quick
agreement on the movement of the Army into Druze strongholds.
The cease-fire has held with only minor exchanges of fire in Suq al
Gharb, Kayfun, and a few other areas. Shia Amal militiamen, however,
captured 180 Army soldiers in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
Prior to the cease-fire, Army troops-with Shia Amal
agreement-had occupied checkpoints in the suburbs, but they
apparently violated the agreement by setting up an additional
checkpoint that would block the Druze-Shia infiltration route through
Ash Shuwayfat. Amal militiamen are demanding that plans for a
checkpoint there be abandoned in exchange for the release of the
Comment: Druze leader Junblatt, with the backing of Damascus,
had called for the resignation of Wazzan for several weeks. Wazzan's
attempt to resign was expected, but its timing-coming immediately
after the announcement of the cease-fire-apparently took Gemayel
by surprise.
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CHILE: Political Developments
There are indications that talks between the government and the
opposition may reopen early next month, but President Pinochet also
may be considering more aggressive actions against some opponents.
Archbishop Fresno, a key intermediary in the talks, expects a new
round of discussions in the next few weeks. He is anxious to see the
process resume because he believes popular discontent has reached
alarming proportions in the slums-the worst since the Allende era.
Fresno believes the climate for talks may be improved when the
presidency of the opposition Democratic Alliance passes next week
from outspoken government critic Gabriel Valdes-the president of
the Christian Democratic Party-to another party's representative.
The government's decision on Friday to drop the remaining
charges against Rodolfo Seguel and other leaders of the copper
confederation for organizing protests and strikes meets one of the
opposition's conditions for resuming the talks. Moreover, Interior
Minister Jarpa said publicly yesterday the government is ready to
Comment: Neither side wants to bear the onus for a breakdown
in the talks, and their resumption is increasingly likely. If the
government decides to use extreme tactics, however, it risks
destroying the dialogue.
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WARSAW PACT: Planned Meeting of Foreign Ministers
The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers will convene on 12 and 13
October in Sofia, according to the Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister.
The last Foreign Ministers' meeting was held in Prague in April. Last
week a Bulgarian diplomat in Prague said that Soviet General
Secretary Andropov's visit to Sofia would take place after this
meeting, but he claimed that the two events were not related.
Comment: The primary purpose of the meeting probably will be
to issue an appeal designed to encourage anti-INF sentiment in
Western Europe. The Foreign Ministers could offer a draft
nonaggression treaty along the lines of the one proposed by Warsaw
Pact leaders last January. Much of the groundwork for such a treaty is
likely to have been laid during the summer, when many East European
political and military officials visited Moscow. The Romanians could
prevent a consensus, however, as they apparently did both at the
meeting in Prague and at the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow in
June.
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USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Status of CEMA Summit
The long-delayed CEMA summit probably will be held late next
month. A senior Bulgarian official has told the US Embassy in Sofia
that it will take place after the annual meeting of CEMA premiers,
which reportedly is scheduled for 18 to 21 October in East Berlin. The
Bulgarian says an agreement reached this month to settle some
issues bilaterally rather than in the CEMA framework has made it
possible to schedule the summit. Prices for agricultural trade within
CEMA, for example, are to be negotiated bilaterally, instead of being
set by the organization for the entire region.
Comment: The Bulgarian's timetable tends to confirm other
recent reporting that preparations for the summit are nearly
completed. There has been no indication, however, of progress on
CEMA integration, Moscow's main goal for the meeting. The
agreement to schedule the summit appears mainly to reflect a desire
to reduce the embarrassment caused by repeated postponements.
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7 27 September 1983
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Special Analysis
PAKISTAN: Coping With Disturbances
President Zia is trying to ride out the current civil disorders in Sind
Province by dealing firmly with violent protests while seeking to co-opt
moderate members of the opposition. His hold on power remains
strong, but his political skills will be severely tested by the unrest in
Sind and negotiations with opposition groups.
Unrest in Sind is likely to intensify as the government tries to
conduct local elections. A prominent leader of the Pakistan People's
Party has called for a general strike tomorrow. The US Consulate
General in Karachi reports that Sindhis are threatening supporters of
the principal Sunni party in the urban areas of Sind if it does not join
the agitation.
The national leader of the Sunni party is under pressure from its
influential wing in Punjab to call off an announced decision to launch a
campaign on Saturday against martial law, according to US
diplomats. The Sunni leader is discussing negotiations with the
government, and he may use this as a pretext to postpone joining the
agitation.
A prominent cleric and member of Zia's Federal Advisory Council
from Lahore, capital of Punjab Province, recently criticized the
President's Islamization policies and said national elections would
have to be held within a year. Such criticism is embarrassing to Zia
and suggests that, if the disturbances spread to Punjab, he cannot
count on support from religious leaders.
Dealing With the Opposition
The President apparently believes he can outlast the
disturbances-as has been the case with lesser disorders in the
past-without making major concessions. He has been careful so far
to keep from using the Army as a last resort in dealing with the unrest.
The regime is looking for ways to put pressure on traditional Sindhi
leaders by reviewing their compliance with land reform and by
reinstituting old felony indictments.
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Zia has sought to emphasize his commitment to Islamization to
keep Islamic groups in Karachi and in Punjab Province from joining
the agitation. He also has agreed to allow influential opposition
landlords in Punjab to run in elections on a case-by-case basis. In
addition, his regime has tried to intensify concern in Punjab that the
Indians and Soviets are exploiting unrest in Pakistan.
During a recent tour of Sind Province, Zia made minor gestures to
Sindhi opinion. He might remove senior bureaucrats in the province,
including the Punjabi Chief Secretary, who are widely believed to be
corrupt.
Zia also could replace the Governor, a senior Army officer who
was a member of the original Army group that overthrew the civilian
regime in 1977. Zia would have trouble, however, finding a senior
officer to replace him who is not a member of one of the communities
disliked by Sindhis.
Prospects for Negotiations
Zia appears determined to carry through with his basic plan to
hold elections, amend the constitution to strengthen presidential
powers, and lift martial law by March 1985. His claim that he is ready
to change some of the plan's details apparently is designed to divide
the opposition.
Continuing unrest in Sind Province will require Zia to negotiate
eventually with some opposition leaders. Failure to negotiate now
would mean greater concessions later if the civil disturbances spread.
The moderate landlords in the People's Party evidently have
increased their support by leading protests. If the protest campaign in
Sind dies down, they may be prepared to negotiate. They have
common interests with the regime in seeing that the more extreme
groups that want land reform and rapid social change do not gain
strength.
These landlords will demand earlier elections and the restoration
of parliamentary government, but the key issue will be their right to
participate in elections. Zia has to find a way to reassure them that
Sindhi interests will be represented in Islamabad and that their place
in the social order will not be diminished.
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Once talks begin, Zia and various opposition groups probably will
be involved in negotiations for several months. In negotiating with the
moderates, Zia would have to watch his right flank carefully,
particularly if it appeared that some elements of the People's Party
might gain important concessions.
Zia would then face competing demands from conservative and
Islamic groups. These groups, which have supported him in the past,
deeply distrust the People's Party. They are maneuvering to gain
leverage with the regime, and Zia may offer them places in an interim
The announced decision of the principal Sunni party to oppose
the government and the willingness of a prominent cleric in Punjab to
criticize Zia suggest that support for the government among Islamic
and conservative groups is weakening. For now, Zia still has the
strong support of the Army and retains the upper hand in the crisis.
His position would be quickly imperiled, however, if the religious
parties in Punjab decided to challenge his regime in the streets.
There is substantial opposition to Zia in Punjab. From all
indications, however, most Punjabis do not believe the time has come
for the President to go.
A mishandling of the local elections or prolonged disturbances in
Sind could persuade the Punjabis that Zia had lost the ability to
govern. In these circumstances, the opposition movement would
rapidly gain momentum in the country's key province.
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