NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 21 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010174-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 174
• Publication Date: September 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
21 September 1983
OP sec, ut
21 eptem er 19983
Copy 2 8 5
CPAS Nib 83999.IX
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Contents
Lebanon: Fighting Abates ........................................................ 1
Chile: Prospects for Dialogue .................................................. 2
Ell Salvador: Rightist Violence ................................................ 3
Nicaragua: Arms Depot Destroyed ........................................ 7
Poland: Status of Debt Rescheduling ....................................... 7
Italy: Anti-INF Demonstrations ................................................ 8
Honduras: Counterinsurgency Operations .............................. 9
Western Europe-Turkey: Criticism of Constitution ................ 11
Special Analyses
USSR-Eastern Europe: Divisions Over Anti-INF Campaign .. 12
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21 September 1983
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J Ash
Shuwayfat
m(nbassador's
nce shelled
Alayh I
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/West / East
(Beirut
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LEBANON: Fighting Abates
As the fighting around Suq al Gharb died down yesterday, the US
Ambassador's residence came under heavy shelling, probably in
retaliation for the recent US naval gunfire support for the Lebanese
Army.
The Army retains control of Suq al Gharb, and there are
indications the Druze may be ready for a cease-fire
Since 28 August, the Army reportedly has lost 111 men killed and
850 wounded. Army Commander Tannous has told the US defense
attache his weary troops are near the breaking point. Tannous says
there are no units available to relieve the 5th and 8th Brigades on the
Alayh ridgeline.
Clashes between Muslim snipers and the Army continue in West
Beirut, and Shia militiamen control the city's southern suburbs. The
Army has declared a 24-hour curfew in the area separating Druze-
controlled Ash Shuwayfat from the Shia-controlled area of Beirut=
Saudi mediator Prince Bandar has told the US Embassy in
Damascus that Syria has agreed to a cease-fire plan that would go
into effect five hours after the agreement is announced. He indicated,
however, that some issues remain unresolved. The Syrians have
suggested that representatives of the Lebanese Government and the
opposition meet bef econciliation conference to discuss the
agenda.
Comment: Renewed attacks by Druze and Palestinian fighters
supported by Palestinian reinforcements probably would wear the
Army down. The Druze, however, may have been hurt even worse
than the Army by the fighting on Tuesday.
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CHILE: Prospects for Dialogue
Chances are improving for the resumption of the dialogue
between the government and representatives of the democratic
opposition, but major obstacles to a political settlement remain.
Archbishop Fresno, who has been active as an intermediary, has
announced that he is willing to help arrange a new round of talks. The
government has contributed to the improving atmosphere by
dropping some charges against the chief of the copperworkers' union
and by reducing restrictions on public meetings. Despite these
positive developments, press reports state some groups are planning
protests next month.
Comment: Key leaders on both sides probably are becoming
more concerned that the violent demonstrations cannot be stopped.
So far, however, both the government and the opposition have given
more attention to questions of political liberalization than to the
economic grievances of the poor and of youth-the groups most
likely to cause violence.
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EL SALVADOR: Rightist Violence
Ultrarightists apparently are using "death squad" activities to
discourage adoption of liberal reforms in the draft constitution and
support for a dialogue with the insurgents.
Union leaders lobbying for the adoption of articles in the
constitution that would establish more rights for workers and
peasants have been the main targets of recent bombings. Bombs also
have exploded near the homes of outspoken supporters of peace
talks with insurgents. According to US Embassy sources, some of the
victims claim that Roberto D'Aubuisson's party is behind much of the
rightwing violence.
Labor organizations claim that 10 workers and peasants were
killed by death squads earlier this month. Union leaders believe the
death squads are well financed. They claim the terrorists have the
support of some industrialists, landholders, members of the armed
forces, and at least one prominent jurist.
Terrorists reportedly fired on the National Conciliation Party
headquarters on 7 September, and they continue to threaten party
leaders. The party forms a key part of a center-right coalition in the
Assembly that is generally in opposition to the ultraright. According to
some party members, the terrorists hope to intimidate them into
joining D'Aubuisson's group in the assembly.
Comment: Rightwing terrorism is likely to continue as the
Assembly debates articles on unionism and the future of agrarian
reform. The violence also is aimed at discouraging support for any
real dialogue between the government and the leftist insurgents.
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La Pelota Island, Nicaragua
Arms Depot Destroyed
Honduras
a Pelota
Island
North
Pacific Ocean
loo
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Caribbean
Sea
21 September 1983
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NICARAGUA: Arms Depot Destroyed
the arms transshipment facility in
Nicaragua at a Pelota Island -previously identified as a supply point
for insurgents in El Salvador-has been destroyed. The attack, which
was carried out by Nicaraguan Democratic Force
commandos on 12 September, destroyed the wooden pier and
heavily damaged two of the three support buildings. The Sandinistas
are charging US complicity in the attack, which they claim destroyed
an office and three boats belonging to a civilian fishing cooperative.
Comment: The raid is the first successful attack by anti-
Sandinista forces against a Nicaraguan supply point for Salvadoran
insurgents. Sea routes are important to the guerrillas in El Salvador,
and the attack on La Pelota may prompt the Sandinistas to provide
better security for other covert delivery operations.
POLAND: Status of Debt Rescheduling
The US Embassy in Paris reports that Poland's Western
government creditors reluctantly agreed last week only to reaffirm the
decision made in July to move ahead in principle with rescheduling.
They had expected to agree to open negotiations with the Poles by
mid-October-a timetable that now has slipped at least a month.
Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden are increasingly impatient with the
delay. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Warsaw reports that Austria has
approved a $30 million guarantee for grain financing, the first new
government-guaranteed credit for Poland since martial law.
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Comment: The delay probably prevents substantial progress
from being made on rescheduling government debt before the end of
the year. Allied creditors generally have supported Washington's go-
slow approach, and the neutrals have not been able to develop a
strategy of their own. Brazil has even asked to join the Western
creditors, after failing for two years to get some payments on its
$1.8 billion credit in bilateral negotiations with Warsaw.
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The Italian leftist extremist group "Autonomia," which last month
provoked clashes with police at the missile site in Comiso, plans to
stage further acts of violence during anti-INF demonstrations
scheduled for 23 to 26 September. The militants are urging pacifists
to abandon their insistence on peaceful protest. The security services
believe the extremists will try to instigate more clashes with police in
the hope that the resulting casualties will outrage the lethargic
Comment: The pacifists of the International Meeting Against
Cruises in the "peace camp" outside the base are not likely to join the
extremists. The group probably will try again to establish a peaceful
blockade and make greater efforts to prevent provocation by the
Autonomia group, but it may not succeed in controlling the militants.
The police, fearing a repetition of the public and official criticism of
their handling of the demonstration last month, are likely to respond
passively to protest activities. As a result, demonstrators again may
be able to block access to the base and slow down site construction.
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Oldncho
1onduras
Nicaragu
21 September 1983
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HONDURAS: Counterinsurgency Operations
Army troops in Olancho Department are mopping up remnants of
the insurgent group that infiltrated from Nicaragua in July.
the leader of the guerrilla force was
i in a ire ig on bun clay. About 25 of the original 100 or so
insurgents reportedly remain at large. Operations against them are
continuing, and the government plans to follow up with a civic action
campaign in the area.
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Comment: The operation in Olancho appears to have been
successful partly because of the effectiveness of the Army's
operations and partly because of the ineptitude of the guerrillas. The
decimation of the group and the death of the most capable Honduran
guerrilla leader may prompt the Sandinistas to reevaluate their efforts
to promote an active insurgency in Honduras. The plan to follow up
with civic action teams is likely to strengthen the government's
popular support in Olancho.
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The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly will consider
a resolution on 29 September that criticizes the Turkish constitution
as undemocratic, unrepresentative of the Turkish people, and
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. As a
result, the draft states the Turkish parliamentary deputies who will be
elected on 6 November cannot participate in the European Assembly.
Although Ankara has not been represented in the Assembly since the
military takeover in September 1980, it had planned to send a
delegation to the Assembly's session next January.
Comment: The resolution, which is likely to be adopted, reflects
West European disaffection following the regime's ban this year on all
but three approved political parties and its continuing restrictions on
press freedom. Despite this latest rebuke by its allies in Europe,
Turkey is unlikely to withdraw from the Council or weaken its ties to
Western Europe.
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Special Analysis
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Divisions Over Anti-INF Campaign
The USSR is having trouble lining up support in Eastern Europe
for its efforts to stop or at least postpone NATO's planned INF
deployments. The East Europeans fear jeopardizing economic ties
with the West, and they have refused to agree to a strong common
position in the Warsaw Pact on military countermeasures. The Soviets
have extracted pledges of support from most of them, however, and
they may try to develop a unified position by convening another
Warsaw Pact summit this fall. Those countries that have the most to
lose from increased East-West tensions will continue to urge Moscow
not to make a harsh response. With the possible exception of
Romania, however, all will comply with the USSR's final decision.
The Soviets opened the current campaign against INF in May,
when they threatened to resume deployments of SS-20s in the
western USSR. They also alluded to placement of newer missile
systems in Eastern Europe by warning of other measures "in
agreement with other Warsaw Pact states."
The Soviets subsequently have held bilateral discussions with
each member of the Pact, with mixed results. After Hungarian party
chief Kadar talked with General Secretary Andropov in July, he signed
a communique that endorsed "effective retaliatory measures." He
apparently signed with reluctance, however, and Budapest has
avoided further comment on the subject.
The Poles also have been unenthusiastic in expressing support
for countermeasures. Only the Czechoslovaks and East Germans
have given strong public endorsements.
The Soviets have been vague on the nature of their
countermeasures, but the East Europeans have referred directly to
possible deployments of SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 short-range
missiles, SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, and even cruise missiles.
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The wide variety of Soviet actions mentioned by the East Europeans
suggests they are not fully informed about the USSR's deployment
plans. Moscow presumably hopes that these wide-ranging threats will
encourage stronger public pressure in Western Europe against NATO
deployments without committing the USSR to a particular course.
East European Concerns
Bucharest's fear of losing some of its independence from Moscow
has been the main factor behind its advocacy of a moderate approach,
to INF. The Romanians realize that an escalating arms race and the
consequent rise in East-West tensions would lead the Soviets to
increase their demand for greater economic and military cooperation
in the Pact. In addition, further cooling in the East-West climate might
reduce the availability of Western credits needed to avert a financial
crisis.
The Hungarians also fear that their economy would be seriously
hurt by reduced access to Western credits and markets. This, in turn,
could jeopardize the regime's reform program and weaken public
support for the government.
Polish leaders are preoccupied with domestic concerns and
anxious not to damage ties with the West, particularly financial
relations. They would prefer to avoid close identification with Soviet
countermeasures that could further damage their standing at home
and abroad.
Sofia is worried that Soviet missile deployments in Bulgaria would
require the introduction of Soviet troops and kill its proposal for a
Balkan nuclear-free zone. Neither Poland nor Bulgaria appears to
have come under much pressure to participate in the campaign
threatening countermeasures, which may reflect their low priority in
the USSR's counterdeployment plans. When Andropov visits Sofia
next month, however, he may urge Bulgarian leader Zhivkov to play a
more active role.
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the countries where the USSR
would be most likely to counter INF, have different concerns. East
Berlin needs to reassure Moscow of its willingness to cooperate while
insulating relations with West Germany from any increase in East-
West tensions. Prague's insecure leadership also has been eager to
demonstrate its support for Moscow on this issue and has little to lose
if East-West relations deteriorate.
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Outlook
As NATO's INF deployments draw near, Moscow's propaganda
on possible countermeasures probably will become more strident,
and its pressure on recalcitrant East European allies will become
more intense. The Soviets are aware that lack of unified support
would weaken their case with Eurocommunist parties and anti-INF
groups in Western Europe. This would seriously undercut Moscow's
opportunities for manipulating anti-INF sentiment in Western Europe
and for reducing the freedom of action of NATO governments.
The Soviet leadership will be anxious to obtain a collective
Warsaw Pact endorsement for strong countermeasures before the
NATO deployments occur, and it might convene a summit before
December. If Romanian leader Ceausescu continues to balk, the
Soviets may proceed without him. They probably would calculate that,
even without Romanian adherence, a strong endorsement from the
rest of the Pact would improve the credibility of the Soviet threat in
the eyes of West Europeans.
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