NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 19 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010166-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 166
• Publication Date: September 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
19 September 1983
CPAS NID 83-220JX
ep em er
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Contents
Lebanon: Government Drive Slows ........................................ 1
Western Europe: Concern About Forces in Lebanon ............ 2
Hungary-US: Foreign Minister's Visit ...................................... 3
East Germany-West Germany: Border Concessions ............ 5
Canada: Control of Energy Development ................................ 6
USSR-E9Ypt: Official Visit ...................................................... 7
USSR-US-Lebanon: Heightened Concern .............................. 8
Special Analyses
Lebanon: The Army Stretched Thin ........................................ 9
South Africa: Implications of the Referendum ........................ 11
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19 September 1983
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19 September 1983
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The Lebanese Army offensive to drive Druze and Palestinian
forces from the strategic Alayh ridgeline slowed yesterday, and the
Saudi initiative to arrange acease-fire continued.
Government ground attacks and airstrikes pushed Druze and
Palestinian militiamen from the Aytat-Kayfun area toward Baysur on
Saturday but did not inflict a major defeat. Fighting at Suq al Gharb
and in the Alayh hills resumed today.
The US Embassy in Jidda reports that Saudi Prince Bandar has
called on the Lebanese and Syrian Governments to ease the fighting
while he carries a message from King Fahd to President Assad.
Comment: Druze and Palestinian fighters are capable of
mounting another offensive on Suq al Gharb and are likely to do
so if the diplomatic stalemate continues.
The US naval gunfire into Syrian-held territory on Saturday
probably boosted the morale of Gemayel and General Tannous. The
show of support, however, probably also has hardened Gemayel's
resolve against making concessions.
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1 19 September 1983
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West European contributors to the Lebanon peacekeeping force
remain committed to participation but are expressing concern about
possible adverse consequences of increased involvement in the
fighting.
French President Mitterrand and Italian Prime Minister Craxi
agreed during their meeting late last week that their nations'
contingents would remain in the Multinational Force but would
operate strictly within the limits of existing agreements, according to
Italian press accounts. Italian Defense Minister Spadolini has publicly
stated, moreover, that Italy will not withdraw unilaterally from the
force.
Both France and Italy have called for the UN to take a greater role
in efforts to solve the conflict in Lebanon. Over the weekend French
Defense Minister Hernu publicly suggested that an expanded version
of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon should become the driving force
in securing peace.
Meanwhile, a senior British Foreign Office official has told the US
Embassy in London that the size and mandate of the British
contingent in the Multinational Force will not be expanded. He said
the force should not support the Lebanese Army in ways that might
be perceived as a direct challenge to the Arab world. The official also
said that London would have to reconsider its presence in Beirut
should the Lebanese Army collapse.
Comment: The West European contributors share the concerns
voiced by individual officials about adverse domestic reactions to
military casualties in Beirut and dangers to their links with the Arab
states.
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HUNGARY-US: Foreign Minister's Visit
Foreign Minister Varkonyi's visit to Washington, which begins
today, is aimed at maintaining good relations with the US, despite the
decline in East-West relations.
Comment: Budapest has been able to expand relations with the
US and the West generally by demonstrating loyalty to the USSR on
most major issues while arguing that some deviation will not harm
Moscow's interests. This latitude in foreign policy, which is second
only to Romania's among the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, probably
has been improved by party chief Kadar's apparent close ties with
General Secretary Andropov. Varkonyi may caution, however, that
further deterioration in East-West relations will make it more difficult
for Hungary to pursue its more independent policies.
Varkonyi is likely to present Hungary's case against INF
deployment. The Hungarians are concerned that NATO's INF
deployments and Soviet counterdeployments could aggravate East-
West tensions. They fear that this would damage Hungary's relations
with the West and bring it more tightly under the USSR's control. ~
The Foreign Minister probably will try to avoid discussing the
Soviet shootdown of the South Korean airliner. Although Hungarian
media have belatedly supported the Soviet line on the incident,
Hungarian officials have been restrained in responses to recent
demarches on the subject. The US Embassy in Budapest reports
widespread concern in the government that the incident will hurt
relations with Washington.
Hungary has reaped several benefits from its ties with the US,
including the return in 1978 of the Crown of Saint Stephen and the
acquisition of most-favored-nation trade status. Varkonyi probably
will inquire about the prospects for obtaining most-favored-nation
status on a multiyear basis, but will not push hard on this issue. ~
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Changes in East German policy on border and travel issues fall
short of West German expectations, but Bonn probably will view them
as concessions in response to the $400 million loan it announced in
July.
East German leader Honecker told the Mayor of West Berlin on
Thursday that as of 27 September children under 15 would be exempt
from the minimum daily currency exchange requirement for Western
visitors. He also promised a "modest easing" of the order requiring
guards at the Berlin Wall to shoot at suspected escapees and
unspecified "modifications" to controls on travelers. The Mayor told a
US official that the concessions were "far too little," given Bonn's
recent "forthcoming attitude," and said he was irritated by press
reports that he had implied Honecker would make major concessions.
There are indications that the East Germans already have
modified the shooting order. Several escapees have recently crossed
into West Germany unharmed by either East German guards or
automatic firing devices. Two East Berliners who recently escaped
over the Wall reportedly believe that guards deliberately shot wide of
Comment: West German leaders have been hoping for more
substantial concessions, particularly an across-the-board reduction
of the currency exchange requirement and elimination of the shooting
order. Favorable media reaction to Honecker's moves could,
nonetheless, help Bonn justify the $400 million loan. Bonn's initial
reaction has been cautious, and Chancellor Kohl insisted on Saturday
A positive consensus on Honecker's policy changes is likely to
develop in West Germany, which could open the way for another large
loan next year. Any such development would be threatened, however,
by any East-West confrontation over INF.
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5 19 September 1983
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CANADA: Control of Energy Development
Ottawa apparently intends to require greater participation
Canadian business in the production of offshore oil and gas.
The government reportedly has intervened to increase Canadian
participation in a development contract for the Sable Island natural
gas field off Nova Scotia. According to a senior officer of a US energy
company, Ottawa insisted that his company transfer work from a US
firm's Canadian employees to those of a Canadian-based company.
This intervention had delayed awarding the contract, and Energy
Minister Chretien has asked to be informed early of future contract
proposals.
Comment: Sable Island is the first offshore project to reach the
stage where large procurement of goods and services is required. It
will be the first critical test of Ottawa's policy to require greater use of
Canadian-made equipment and Canadian labor.
Most foreign companies already have programs promoting
Canadian procurement. As more projects reach the development
phase, it will become increasingly clear how forcefully Ottawa intends
to intrude in the procurement process.
The National Energy Program originally required Canadian
suppliers to be used where they were "competitive," but the term was
never precisely defined. After international protests, the language was
softened to the current admonition that Canadian companies receive
"full and fair opportunity" to provide goods and services. Ottawa's
recent intervention, however, suggests that it intends to be guided by
the original wording.
The economic nationalists in the government remain powerful
and support the stringent application of domestic procurement
requirements. In addition, Chretien and other cabinet members may
move to use the nationalistic appeal of the National Energy Program
to court voters in preparation for a general election expected late in
1984.
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6 19 September 1983
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The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Department,
Oleg Grinevskiy, arrived in Cairo yesterday for four days of talks with
Foreign Ministry officials, according to Egyptian media reports.
Comment: Grinevskiy is the highest level Soviet diplomat to pay
an official visit to Egypt since former President Sadat expelled the
Soviet Ambassador in September 1981. He is likely to recommend
the earliest possible exchange of ambassadors. Moscow probably
views Cairo's willingness to receive Grinevskiy as an important step in
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7 19 September 1983
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USSR-US-LEBANON: Heightened Concern
Moscow evidently has concluded that the increased involvement
of US forces in the fighting in Lebanon requires a more assertive
Soviet response. Over the weekend TASS noted both a US Marine
officer's statement that warships of the Sixth Fleet had fired upon
Syrian-controlled areas east of Beirut and a Syrian pledge to retaliate,
and charged that US "interference" in Lebanon has entered a "new
phase." Pravda, claiming that US forces are now oparnly suppressing
"patriotic forces" in Lebanon and threatening Syrian troops, said the
Soviet "people" are outraged by the US "interference."
Comment: The Soviets probably hope to signal both Damascus
and Washington that they are not standing idly by, but their reaction
remains cautious. Pravda's claim that the Soviet "people" are
outraged does not commit the prestige of the government, much less
the leadership, and falls far short of a warning. There has been no
authoritative media commentary since 31 August.
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19 September 1983
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: The Army Stretched Thin
The Lebanese Army is stretched to the limit as it controls Beirut
and the northern part of the Alayh ridgeline dominating the capital.
Casualties, fatigue, tensions among the religious groups in the Army,
and desertions are eroding its strength. Prolonged fighting probably
would split the military along confessional lines.
Since repulsing aDruze-Palestinian assault at Suq al Gharb on
11 September, the Lebanese Army has consolidated its positions on
the ridgeline extending from Alayh to Ad Damur and appears capable
of withstanding Druze and Palestinian attacks. With increasingly
effective support by its artillery and the entry of the recently
rehabilitated Lebanese Air Force, the Army has broken up several
attacks and mounted limited offensive operations.
The Army has committed almost its entire combat force to bring
about its relative success in preserving government authority in a
limited area. Of the Army's eight-brigade strength on paper, four
brigades are nominally at 70-percent strength, one is at 40-percent
strength, and the rest, for practical purposes, are nonexistent.
The five strongest brigades are in the Beirut area-either on
security duty in the capital or holding the ridgeline. Of the virtually
nonexistent brigades, two are under Syrian control in the Bekaa
Valley and Tripoli, and one is facing the Syrians in the Kasrawan and
AI Matn Districts.
Lacking reserves, the government would be hard pressed to face
an uprising by Amal militiamen in West Beirut or Druze-Syrian attacks
in the Kasrawan or AI Matn Districts. Casualties since the fighting
began-reportedly 60 to 80 killed and 390 to 430 wounded-have
further reduced the Army's strength, though many of the wounded
have returned to duty.
Confessional Tensions
The Army, apparently worried by the possibility of disintegration,
has tried to deploy troops on a confessional basis. Heavily Christian
battalions police Christian East Beirut and hold the Alayh ridgeline
against the Druze. Muslim-led and -manned battalions are deployed
in West Beirut.
continued
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Recent reporting suggests, however, that increasing numbers of
Muslims are deserting, particularly from battalions in West and south
Beirut.
Many of the deserters probably are recent volunteers or draftees.
Many volunteers no doubt intended from the first to obtain training
and then desert to their own militias. Reservists who have been called
up are even less reliable.
As Muslims desert, the Lebanese Army necessarily becomes
increasingly what its opponents fear-a Christian army protecting
Christian interests. Even among the officers there are reports of
mistrust, with Christian officers intentionally keeping their Druze
colleagues ignorant of operational plans
The Army becomes more closely identified with the Christian
militia as the fighting continues. Its defense of Suq al Gharb-a
Christian stronghold-reportedly is viewed by Muslims as an example
of close cooperation with the Lebanese Forces.
Outlook
The Lebanese armed forces have performed well in combat,
proving that they can hold their own against irregulars and militia.
Confessional differences, however, are proving to be a damaging
weakness. If the fighting continues, the Lebanese Army's strength
and credibility will continue to erode.
Without a strong and credible Army, the government would be
unable to extend its control beyond Beirut and the Christian
heartland, and it would become what Muslims fear most-a Christian
ministate allied with Israel.
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10 19 September 1983
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: Implications of the Referendum
Foreign policy questions will have low priority in Pretoria over
the next six weeks as the South African leadership prepares for the
all-white referendum on the new constitution now to be held on
2 November. The outcome of the vote will strongly influence the
government's stance on Namibia, racial reform, and other issues
important to the West. Recent polls indicate the voters probably will
approve the proposals to create separate parliamentary chambers for
Coloreds and Indians. The dominant Afrikaner community is divided,
however, and a negative vote by a majority of Afrikaners could place
Prime Minister Botha in political jeopardy.
Parliament approved the new constitution on 9 September, but
the government's action in forcing cloture will only heighten debate
on the issues in the coming months. White politics have been
consumed by the debate over the new constitution since the ruling
National Party split over the issue last year. The controversy has
pitted Botha against opponents on both the right and left.
The conservative Afrikaner parties believe the reforms will
eventually lead to black majority rule by eroding Afrikaner political
dominance. The liberal Progressive Federal Party, the largest
opposition party, holds that the reforms are meaningless because
they do not address the black majority and they can only promote
To meet this challenge, the National Party is conducting the most
intensive media campaign in the history of South Africa. It has
received approximately $3 million in contributions from the Afrikaner
and English business communities, according to the US Embassy.
In a bid to gain the support of Afrikaner voters, the government
recently announced a 12-percent pay hike for the country's 1 million
civil servants, most of whom are Afrikaners. The formidable National
Party machine is working through cultural, social, and religious
organizations to reduce defections by Afrikaners to the rightwing
parties opposing the referendum.
Botha also is seeking to offset the loss of Afrikaner voters by
appealing to English voters. Although the latter are ambivalent about
the reforms, they recognize that the Prime Minister's defeat would
strengthen the role of conservative Afrikaners.
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11 19 September 1983
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The Prime Minister has obtained the endorsement of English
newspapers, as well as that of a former leader of the opposition. The
tactics of the National Party have frustrated the Progressive Federal
Party, whose leaders believe that the referendum will win strong
support in the English community.
Botha on the Spot
The election will have no effect on the composition of the
parliament, where Nationalists hold more than three-fourths of the
seats. If Botha loses, wins by only a narrow margin, or fails to carry a
majority of Afrikaner voters, however, his tenure as Prime Minister
could be in jeopardy.
Botha's embarrassment could lead the National Party to consider
replacing him with a less reform-minded leader who could heal the
splits in the Afrikaner community. A weakened Nationalist
government would be less willing to negotiate a settlement on
Namibia. It would be particularly opposed to a settlement that would
allow its conservative opponents to attack it for selling out Namibian
whites or allowing the South-West Africa People's Organization to
come to power.
A victory by Botha over the Afrikaner right might give him
additional confidence in dealing with the question of Namibia, but it
would not encourage him to try major new reforms. Botha would be
more likely to concentrate on implementing the new constitution while
continuing a limited reform program aimed at improving the
economic well-being of urban blacks. He would, however, avoid new
political initiatives that further strain the National Party and Afrikaner
Prospects
The Prime Minister probably will be able to make up the loss of
Afrikaner voters by strong support in the English community. The
most recent survey indicates that 61 percent of white South Africans
approve of the new constitution.
Security issues, however, could affect the outcome. Another
major terrorist incident, a major SWAPO offensive in Namibia, or
serious civil disorders by blacks could be seen by many whites as a
failure of the National Party to protect their interests. In the coming
weeks the government may seek to maintain the confidence of white
voters by acting forcefully against insurgents or neighboring
governments that support them.
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12 19 September 1983
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