NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 26 AUGUST 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010090-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: August 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
Director of
OCPAS/C:IG
X8 5
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
26 August 1983
mapserer
285
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Contents
Israel-Lebanon: Redeployment Delayed ................................ 1
France-Chad: Mitterrand Clarifies Policy ................................ 2
Pakistan: Unrest Continues .................................................... 4
Philippines: Speculation About the Assassination ................ 5
West Germany-Central America: Genscher's Visit .............. 8
USSR-Egypt: Soviets Propose High-Level Meeting ................ 9
Belgium: Progress on INF ........................................................ 10
USSR-NATO: Invitations to Exercise ...................................... 10
South Africa: Constitutional Referendum .............................. 12
Special Analysis
Poland: Solidarity's Third Anniversary .................................... 13
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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26 August 1983
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Redeployment Delayed
Defense Minister Arens has indicated that Israel will delay its
withdrawal to the Awwali River until late on Tuesday to allow time for
Druze leader Walid Junblatt to meet with Lebanese Government
representatives in Paris this weekend.
Junblatt and Lebanese officials are to discuss Druze demands
that the Christian Lebanese Forces militia reduce its presence in the
Shuf and Alayh districts before the Lebanese Army moves there.
Junblatt also wants the government to consider Druze demands for
several political reforms.
Phalange Party leader Pierre Gemayel yesterday declared that
the presence of the Lebanese Forces in the Shuf and Alayh districts
will not be necessary after the Army deploys. An influential Phalange
Party member had indicated to the US Embassy earlier this month,
however, that the Phalange might issue such an announcement only
as a ruse. Instead of withdrawing, Lebanese Forces commanders
planned to dismantle their troops' barracks and disperse their units to
Christian villages in the region.
The Israelis and the Lebanese are continuing their efforts to
coordinate the realignment of the Lebanese Army.
Comment: The Druze are likely to recognize the Lebanese
Forces' ploy. Junblatt, who is notorious for changing his mind at the
last minute, reportedly is in Damascus. The Syrians might persuade
him not to meet with the Lebanese. Even if an agreement is reached
between the Druze and the Lebanese Government, carrying it out will
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FRANCE-CHAD: Mitterrand Clarifies Policy
President Mitterrand went beyond previous statements yesterday
by suggesting that France does not rule out a north-south federation in
Chad as a realistic solution to the conflict there, but he added that it is
up to the Chadians.
Mitterrand, in a press interview, reiterated opposition to partition,
but he encouraged all Chadians to work for a settlement. If this effort
should fail, he advised the Chadians to call for a "peaceful inter-
African intervention." He said he was not hostile to dissident leader
Goukouni but criticized him for inviting Libyan intervention.
The French leader also played down reports of friction with
Washington. He said that Paris had not ignored Washington and that
the US had "paid a lot of attention" to France. Although Mitterrand
denied that France had asked for AWACS, he noted that the French
received intelligence on Libyan troop movements from the aircraft.
In addition, Mitterrand announced the visit yesterday of a special
envoy-later reported to be Defense Minister Hernu-to N'Djamena
and his own plans to meet soon with Chadian President Habre.
Centrist politician Maurice Faure, one of Mitterrand's confidants, is
already in Ethiopia for talks with OAU Chairman Mengistu.
Comment: Until now, France had rejected partition and
emphasized preservation of Chadian territorial integrity. Although
Mitterrand may hope that the Libyans would accept a compromise
along these lines, the Chadians almost certainly would reject it.
Habre-who recalled his Charge in Paris after the interview-will
regard Mitterrand's statements as proof that France wants to protect
its own prestige and interests through a stalemate.
Mitterrand and Hernu are likely to try to persuade Habre to enter
negotiations. Mitterrand's remarks about Goukouni may be intended
as a warning to Habre that, if he is recalcitrant, the French could deal
with the dissident leader.
The President's conciliatory comments about Washington
probably reflect concern that relations could be harmed by open and
protracted debate, especially in the press.
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Boundary representation is ~/~~
not necessarily authoritative.
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Violent protests are continuing in Sind Province, but opposition
leaders believe that the agitation will die out within two weeks unless it
spreads to Punjab Province.
Although the unrest has diminished slightly during the past two
days, serious clashes occurred around Larkana. The city is the
stronghold of the Pakistan People's Party, the largest opposition
group.
The US Consulate General in Karachi estimates the death toll at
30 to 35 and reports new gun battles between rioters and police.
Bazaars closed in several Sindhi cities yesterday, but merchants in
Punjab ignored opposition calls for a general strike.
Students involved in riots are demanding the release of former
Prime Minister Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, from house arrest. The US
Embassy reports rumors that Nusrat Bhutto, party chairman and wife
of the executed Prime Minister, plans a dramatic return to the
country. President Zia's opponents are circulating an unsigned appeal
purportedly from Nusrat that calls on Punjabis to join the anti-Zia
movement.
Comment: Punjab remains the key to the opposition movement's
prospects. Zia could not be confident of containing disturbances
there if politicians and local leaders decide to organize protests.
Landlord politicians and local elected officials have been the main
organizers of protests in Sind.
The People's Party retains strong support among the rural and
urban poor in Punjab, and these groups could be galvanized by either
of the Bhutto women. Nusrat is undergoing medical treatment in
Europe, but her politically talented daughter could lead the movement
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PHILIPPINES: Speculation About the Assassination
Several theories about Benigno Aquino's assassination have
emerged in Manila.
A source of the US Embassy reports that Aquino may have been
murdered by one of his numerous enemies from Tarlac Province. In
his early political career, Aquino used violence when dealing with
political opponents and economic rivals. According to the source,
such individuals had the strongest reasons to kill Aquino.
Another Embassy source says most university students and
members of the opposition continue to believe that the first family
ordered Aquino killed. Several prominent members of the ruling party
speculate that low-level government officials had Aquino killed,
without the knowledge of President Marcos, because they thought it
Meanwhile, the Embassy reports that Marcos remains
inaccessible to many of his senior deputies. According to the
Embassy, Marcos does not appear to have fully recovered from his
medical problems.
Comment: Although available evidence does not support any one
of the theories, many Filipinos evidently believe that the government
is responsible. Marcos's continued seclusion may be adding to this
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Foreign Minister Genscher will travel to Costa Rica at the end of
next month to attend a conference of West German ambassadors.
One West German magazine speculates that Genscher may seek a
role as mediator in the region. Officials in the Foreign Ministry
discount this notion, however, claiming that the government
recognizes US prerogatives in the area.
Comment: Genscher's planned trip probably is in response to the
high public interest in Central America. It also may be a factfinding
mission. Government policy appears to be in a state of flux, and
spokesmen for the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats
recently have given conflicting views on the question of economic aid
to Nicaragua. Both the Christian Democrats and the opposition Social
Democrats have drafted policy proposals on Central America,
promising a lively debate when the Bundestag reconvenes next
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USSR-EGYPT: Soviets Propose High-Level Meeting
Egyptian President Mubarak told the US Embassy on Tuesday
that the Soviets have proposed that he and Foreign Minister Gromyko
meet next month at the UN General Assembly session. Mubarak said
he has declined but notes that Foreign Minister All might meet with
Gromyko. The President says that, even if a meeting takes place, it
will not signify any change in Egypt's basic policy toward the USSR.
The last meeting of Egyptian and Soviet Foreign Ministers was in
1977.
Comment: The proposal suggests Moscow believes that the US
peace initiatives in the Middle East are foundering and that there is an
opportunity for breaking the impasse in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
The USSR had seemed hesitant this year about normalizing ties,
partly because it did not want to give the wrong indications to Arab
radicals while it was trying to ensure their opposition to Washington's
Arab-Israeli peace plan and the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. A
Foreign Ministers' meeting would help accelerate the gradual
improvement in relations that has occurred since Mubarak took office
in 1981. Cairo has stated repeatedly that it wants normal relations
with both the US and USSR and that an exchange of ambassadors
with Moscow is only a matter of time.
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BELGIUM: Progress on INF
The Belgians have told US officials that open bidding for INF-
related construction will begin early next month. Some cabinet
members have balked at confirming to the public that Florennes is
the base site.
Comment: Brussels is trying to maintain the deployment
schedule while avoiding a definitive decision to deploy INF. Once
progress on construction becomes known, the Belgians probably
will make a final confirmation of Florennes in the form of a low-key
announcement. Brussels has used this tactic successfully in the
past to avoid any controversy that could accompany formal
announcements concerning INF.
Turkey, Greece, and Italy have been invited by Moscow to send
representatives to observe the Dnestr-83 exercise from 5 to 10
September in the Odessa Military District, according to a Turkish
diplomat. The Soviets say the exercise will involve fewer than the
25,000 troops that would require Moscow to issue prior notification
under the terms of the Helsinki Accords. Nevertheless, the USSR did
make such an announcement last week.
Comment: This invitation to the countries on NATO's southern
flank, where forces from the Odessa Military District would be
expected to operate, will help the Soviets appear more open in
their military activities. This marks the first time since 1979 that
Western observers have been invited to attend a Soviet exercise. F
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Prime Minister Botha's decision to set 2 November as the date for
the referendum by whites only on a new constitution apparently
reflects his concern about the erosion of white support for the reform
package. The constitution would grant limited political rights to
Coloreds and Indians. The ruling National Party, in the first use of
cloture since 1963, has moved to end debate in Parliament on the
reform bill by 31 August. Botha also has postponed a provincial
byelection to make it coincide with the referendum.
Comment: Although a recent poll showed that opposition to the
new constitution is growing among whites, Botha's powerful party
machine probably can win a close victory in the referendum. Botha
presumably rescheduled the byelection to ensure that a setback in
the province would not affect the referendum.
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Special Analysis
POLAND: Solidarity's Third Anniversary
Some street demonstrations and violence are likely to accompany
a limited boycott of public transportation and the media next
Wednesday as Solidarity supporters commemorate the third
anniversary of the signing of the Gdansk Accords. The level of protest
actions probably will be lower than last year, however, when more
than 125,000 Poles demonstrated. The government has followed a
familiar pattern of threatening workers with economic sanctions and
increasing police presence in the streets. Events next week are
unlikely to change either the regime's strategy for dealing with
Poland's difficult political and economic problems or the
determination of Solidarity supporters to press their case.
Former Solidarity chief Walesa and the underground leadership
have called for mostly symbolic forms of protest. Walesa recently
participated in a small demonstration, but he probably will stay away
from large protests next week. Although Walesa does not expect
concessions from the authorities as a result of demonstrations, he
believes that the union's supporters periodically have to show their
determination to pursue their goals.
Large segments of the work force are still loyal to the ideals of
Solidarity, but they have become resigned to their inability to wrest
concessions from the authorities. Faced with economic austerity,
workers have become increasingly concerned about losing their jobs
or suffering other economic penalties.
At the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk, the work slowdown supported
by Walesa apparently has drawn little support. US Embassy officers
noted that, at small demonstrations in Gdansk several weeks ago, the
people were calm and less intent on demonstrating than they had
been in May. In recent months Protesters have dispersed quickly
when confronted by the police.
The Regime's Response
They also have sought to sow confusion among
workers by publicizing the statement of a senior underground activist
who turned himself in, urging his colleagues to give up the fight. In
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addition. they have mounted a vicious propaganda attack against
Walesa.
The regime's preparations reflect lingering uncertainty about
Solidarity's strength. More importantly, they indicate a belief that
signs of weakness would encourage more opposition.
Despite the formal lifting of martial law, the military still plays a
key role. The governor of Gdansk, a major general, has taken the lead
in threatening would-be protesters. The local defense committee, a
military organization, has ordered the civilian authorities to maintain
law and order.
Solidarity activists have told US Embassy officers that the regime
has been distributing fake antigovernment literature of an
inflammatory nature. They speculate that the government would like
to provoke demonstrations as a pretext for arresting more activists.
The authorities probably will not try to arrest large numbers of people,
however, because this would undermine Premier Jaruzelski's efforts
to obtain removal of Western sanctions.
No Sign of Reconciliation
Although the authorities have the security situation under control,
they have not been able to devise policies that would increase their
legitimacy. The abolition last week of the prestigious Polish Writers'
Association-for its refusal to rescind its support of Solidarity-will
make it more difficult for intellectuals to come to terms with the
regime. It also will undercut the government's efforts to drive a wedge
between workers and intellectuals.
The new officially sponsored trade unions and Jaruzelski's new
mass organization-the Patriotic Movement for National Renewal-
have attracted little support. The lower levels of the party remain
ineffective and demoralized.
In the coming weeks, as the party prepares for a plenum on
ideology, the regime could use tougher rhetoric against the Church.
One minor party official recently urged members to stand up against
religious beliefs and implied that those not willing to do so should
leave the party.
Prospects
Periodic protests, including the ones next week, will be an
inherent part of Polish political life for the next several years. The level
of violence will depend largely on how aggressively the police
disperse demonstrators. In coming months, the authorities may find it
more difficult to control the small, spontaneous protests against
economic policies that are beginning to occur than the larger protest
actions for which they can prepare.
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