NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 10 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010155-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 155
• Publication Date: May 10, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CIC
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
10 May 1983
Top Seeft4-
CPA N
10 May 1983 25X1
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Copy 285
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Contents
USSR-Lebanon: Departure of Soviet Personnel .................... 1
UK: Election Called .................................................................. 2
Cyprus: Debate in the UN ........................................................ 3
Spain: Election Results ............................................................ 4
USSR-Spain: Soviets Seek Larger Presence .......................... 5
South Africa-Mozambique: Talks Make No Progress .......... 6
Hungary: Independent Peace Group ...................................... 7
Bulgaria: Tightening Discipline ................................................ 7
Jamaica: Financial Uncertainties ............................................ 8
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USSR-LEBANON: Departure of Soviet Personnel
Moscow's handling of the apparent departure of some of its
personnel from Beirut, yesterday appears designed to heighten
Press reports, quoting airport
officials, stated that between 60 and 150 Soviets departed on the
aircraft. Soviet Embassy officials claimed to Western newsmen that
about 90 dependents were returning to the USSR for the summer
because the Embassy was "afraid something might happen."
One report from the Phalange radio station stated that the
Soviets were also evacuating personnel from Amman and Damascus.
The Soviet Ambassador in Amman, however, categorically denied to
the US Deputy Chief of Mission that any of his Embassy personnel
were departing. No unusual Soviet flight activity has been detected to
An official TASS "statement" issued yesterday condemning the
Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement repeats Soviet claims that
Israel is preparing for war against Syria and adds that Jordan is now
being threatened as well.
Comment: The Soviet Embassy may be legitimately concerned
about the safety of Soviet dependents in light of the recent increased
factional fighting and incidents of terrorism in and around Beirut. The
Embassy's reported confirmation of the departure, however, is highly
unusual and appears calculated to give the move wide publicity.
Phalange radio often carries alarmist reports about Soviet
activities in the Middle East. Its claim about Soviet evacuations from
Amman and Damascus is unconfirmed by other sources and probably
untrue.F---]
The TASS "statement," Moscow's first official reaction to the
Lebanese-Israeli agreement, is designed to justify and encourage
Syrian opposition to the accord. By continuing and expanding upon
their almost four-month-old war scare campaign, the Soviets hope to
scuttle US efforts to achieve both a Lebanese settlement and a
broader Arab-Israeli peace agreement.
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UK: Election Called
The convergence of several factors favorable to the Conservative
Party persuaded Prime Minister Thatcher to call an election for 9 June.
Solid Tory support in the municipal elections last week,
Thatcher's continued popularity, good economic indicators, and the
apparent slide of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance in recent
polls all argued for going to the country now. Press reports state such
factors have led several of Thatcher's advisers who were counseling
against an early election to change their minds.
Polls published over the weekend show the Tories with a lead
of between 8 and 13 percent over Labor. In a recent Gallup poll,
59 percent of those questioned thought the Conservatives would win
the next general election.
Comment: The Tories have worried that the Alliance could
capture enough seats at their expense to force a hung Parliament, but
its drop in the polls to below 20 percent evidently has eased that
concern. Nevertheless, the Tories cannot afford to be complacent. An
election campaign normally sees a decline in the front-runner's lead, a
rise in support for the Liberal Party-and thus, presumably, for the
Alliance-and a solidifying of the ranks in the Labor Party.
Thatcher still has to decide whether to attend the Williamsburg
Summit. Although she probably would gain from media coverage of
the meeting, she has indicated she might counter Labor charges of
"complacency" by sending Chancellor of the Exchequer Howe in her
place.
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The start today of a debate in the UN General Assembly on a
Greek Cypriot draft resolution concernin the Cyprus issue could
jeopardize the intercommunal talks.
The US Mission at the UN says that the Greek Cypriots' resolution
calls for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus,
and, by implication, makes this a condition for progress in the
intercommunal talks. The resolution alleges that Turkish Cypriot
officials have issued deeds for property originally owned by Greeks
and recommends the convening of an international conference on the
Cyprus problem.
The Greek Cypriot draft also encourages the UN Secretary
General to take a leading role in solving the intercommunal problem.
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar stated last week that, while he did
not intend to take initiatives, he wants to sound out the parties in
order to encourage a fresh start in the UN-sponsored talks. The
General Assembly last debated the Cyprus issue in late 1979.
Comment: Ankara is likely to find the Greek Cypriot draft more
objectionable than the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in
1979. If the draft were to pass as it stands, Ankara might decide to
have the Turkish Cypriots break off the talks in Nicosia.
Turkey probably is concerned that conspicuous activity by the
Secretary General would undercut the negotiating plan of the UN's
special representative on the island. The Turks appear to favor his
idea of gradually carrying out mutual concessions. The Greek side-
and some UN Secretariat officials-seem to believe this approach will
not lead to a comprehensive settlement
Athens is likely to support Nicosia's diplomatic moves in New
York and to try to involve the EC in the issue. The other EC
governments, however, will be reluctant to take sides between Greece
and Turkey. 25X1
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The government probably will view the results of the local and
regional elections on Sunday as vindication of its moderate policies.
With over 90 percent of the municipal returns in, the Socialists
have won 43.4 percent of the vote, down from 46 percent in the
general election last October. Regionally, they appear to have gained
control of 11 of the 13 new autonomous legislatures.
The rightist Popular Alliance coalition has taken 26.2 percent, up
from 25 percent in October. The Communists, who had a total of
3 percent in October, won 8 percent of the vote.
Comment: The results indicate that the Socialists retain the
support of most centrist voters. Holding on to the centrist vote,
however, seems to have cost the Socialists some support on the left.
Prime Minister Gonzalez and other party leaders probably have
already concluded that, as a result of the government's moderate
course, it is unrealistic to ex ect the party to hold on to the majority of
the Communist electorate.
Popular Alliance leader Fraga will view the elections as confirming
his group's role as the main opposition to the Socialists. Although the
elections indicate broad support for the Alliance in all areas except
Catalonia and the Basque region, it failed to expand into areas not
traditionally controlled by the right. In the short run, the inability of
several small centrist parties to use the elections to establish
themselves as moderate alternatives to the Socialists and the Alliance
will offset Fraga's failure to make more substantial gains.
The Communists can claim to be on the political mend, but they
control only the city of Cordoba. The Socialists' strong showing is
likely to reduce to a minimum any need they feel to renew the pact
made in 1979 that gave the Communists a significant share of power
at the local level.
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USSR-SPAIN: Soviets Seek Larger Presence
The USSR considers Spain the most promising country in which
to enlarge its representation, following the expulsions of Soviet
personnel from other West European countries.
Comment:) (Spain wants to expand
relations with the USSR as part of a general effort to increase trade.
Madrid wants to regulate commercial relations with Moscow,
however, in order to bring the activities of Soviet representatives
under control. The expulsion from Spain in February of a Soviet
official accused of espionage demonstrates that the Socialists will
respond vigorously to illegal Soviet activities.
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SOUTH AFRICA-MOZAMBIQUE: Talks Make No Progress
A South African official has told the US Embassy that South
Africa and Mozambique failed last week to reach an agreement to
reduce each country's support for the other's insurgency. The
Mozambicans reportedly expressed willingness to curtail anti-South
African insurgents in Mozambique. They pointed to the recent killing
in South Africa of a key Mozambican insurgent leader as evidence of
Pretoria's involvement with the National Resistance Movement. South
African Foreign Minister Botha denied any involvement with the
insurgents and offered no concessions.
Comment: Mozambican President Machel is likely to ask the US
and other Western countries to urge the South Africans to be more
forthcoming. Pretoria's role in the insurgency presumably will be a
major item on Machel's agenda during his visits next week to the UK,
Belgium, and Yugoslavia. At the same time, Machel probably will
intensify his efforts to obtain more military aid from the USSR and its
allies.
CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: Update on Hijacking Talks
China reportedly signed a memorandum with South Korea today
on the disposition of the hijacked Chinese aircraft and passengers,
resolving a last-minute hitch in the talks. Beijing had refused
yesterday to agree to Seoul's demand for an official government-to-
government document. Nevertheless,
South Korea made every effort on other issues to accommodate
China's sensitivities, including avoiding any reference to Taiwan in the
discussions.)
Comment: China's concern over possible defections by members
of the crew or passengers if negotiations continued probably spurred
its decision to yield to South Korea. Indeed, Seoul was reportedly
prepared to raise the prospect of interviewing the passengers on their
preferred destination. North Korea's displeasure with the Chinese
delegation's visit to South Korea is likely to be intensified by this
concession to Seoul.
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HUNGARY: Independent Peace Group
About 450 members of the unofficial "Peace Group for Dialogue"
demonstrated publicly for the first time on Saturday. Western press
reports say that the demonstrators joined a march in Budapest
organized by the official peace organization but that they carried
banners with messages directed at both the US and USSR. The
autonomous peace group, which is based largely at Budapest
University, recently established chapters elsewhere in the country and
elected a coordinating committee at its first national congress last
week. It has developed some ties with peace activists in East
Germany but has avoided close cooperation with other domestic
dissident groups, hoping the government will tolerate its activities.
Comment: Until now, the peace group's cautious tactics have
enabled it to escape the harassment experienced by other dissidents
in recent months. The government wants to avoid damaging its
moderate reputation both at home and abroad, and it may hope to
get control of the group. If the group continues to seek publicity,
however, the authorities may come under pressure from
conservatives in the leadership and from the Soviets to move
against it.
BULGARIA: Tightening Discipline
Bulgarian police are cracking down on smugglers, corruption, and
worker absenteeism. According to the US Embassy, Sofia has forced
foreign smugglers, who previously operated freely in luxury hotels, to
adopt a lower profile. The police also are emulating recent Soviet
practices by checking popular restaurants during work hours and
arresting workers absent from their 'obs and those carrying
suspiciously large sums of money.
Comment: Sofia may be trying to reassure Moscow that it is
tightening controls on flagrant activities that prompted Western
charges of Bulgarian support for international arms and narcotics
traffickers. Some smuggling probably will continue, however, because
state trading organizations and Bulgarian intelligence are involved.
The tougher work discipline measures reflect growing official concern
ovening productivity and widespread black marketeering.
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Prime Minister Seaga last week announced new taxes and a
freeze on government spending in an effort to cut the growing budget
deficit in the next three years. He says his government had overshot
by $150 million the IMF target in March for net international reserves,
but he expects that new loans will close this gap soon. Although he
acknowledges unemployment is becoming worse, he hopes
government training programs will help somewhat.
Comment: Seaga appears to be counting on receiving a large
loan from private Kuwaiti investors, but recent US Embassy reporting
indicates this is unlikely. Jamaica's currency will probably continue to
lose value when the government shifts additional imports to a more
expensive exchange rate. Unemployment will remain an important
political worry, and Seaga's attempt to avoid large government make-
work schemes may crumble under political pressure. If this happens,
rising government deficits may jeopardize continued IMF support
before the end of the year.
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