NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 9 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010152-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 152
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
9 May 1983
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Contents
Portugal: Progress on Government Formation ...................... 1
Belize-US: Prime Minister's Visit ............................................ 3
Guatemala: Military Reorganization ........................................ 4 25X1
Thailand: New Coalition .......................................................... 6
China-South Korea: Smooth End to Hijacking Talks ............ 7
South Africa: Parliamentary Byelections ................................ 7
UN-Pakistan: Narcotics Control Effort Threatened ................ 8
Special Analysis
USSR: Prospects for Leadership Changes .............................. 9
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9 May 1983
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PORTUGAL: Progress on Government Formation
Both the Socialist and the Social Democratic Parties have agreed
to talks on formation of a government, but they are still divided over
the shape and policies of a coalition.
A referendum among Socialist Party members last week gave
party leader Soares an overwhelming mandate to negotiate the
formation of a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party.
That party finished second behind the Socialists in the general
election last month. The Social Democrats have agreed to talks with
the Socialists, but they also intend to open separate negotiations with
the conservative Social Democratic Center Party to bring it also into
the government.
Comment: Debate over participation in a Socialist-led
government has divided the Social Democrats. Some have
differences with the Socialists over economic policy, and almost all
are reluctant to assume responsibility for needed austerity measures.
A coalition that included the Social Democratic Center would
spread responsibility for belt-tightening measures among all three
major parties. Social Democratic Center participation could also
swing coalition policies toward Social Democratic views.
Soares, however, probably will not want to weaken his hold over
the government by including the Social Democratic Center. He
probably will argue that a three-power pact would leave the
Communists as virtually the only parliamentary opposition, thereby
undermining Portuguese democracy.
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George Price, has been the leader of Belize for over
20 years ... honest and deeply religious, he studied
for the priesthood in the US in the 1930s ... he
has sought US assistance in support of an active
drug interdiction and eradication program.
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Prime Minister Price arrives in Washington this week seeking
assurances of US support for Belize's territorial integrity and financial
aid for development projects.
Price's major concern is the threat to Belize's security posed by
the unresolved territorial dispute with Guatemala. Negotiations broke
down earlier this year, after Guatemala demanded almost one-fifth of
Belize's territory. The Prime Minister is worried that an eventual
withdrawal of British forces would encourage Guatemalan military
adventurism, and he reportedly will ask the US to help the UK
maintain its troops in Belize.
Economic conditions are forcing Price?to adopt austerity
measures and postpone development projects. He reportedly will
request US financial assistance for priority road and electrification
improvements. His leadership of the ruling party is being increasingly
challenged by conservatives concerned about his desire to increase
the role of leftists in the party apparatus.
Comment: Although Price would like the US to encourage the
British to maintain their military presence, he probably does not want
US troops stationed in Belize. The Prime Minister generally maintains
a neutral foreign policy and probably believes a US presence would
jeopardize his policy of noninvolvement in East-West disputes.
Price is sympathetic to the Sandinistas, but he has refused offers
to establish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. He is unlikm
however, to endorse current US policy in Central America.
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Boundary r pre$antahon r
not necessarily aotlbntap
Gulf of
Honduras
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9 May 1983
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GUATEMALA: Military Reorganization
A fundamental reorganization of the armed forces' command
structure apparently is intended to improve counterinsurgency
operations and to give regional military commanders more control
over local political activities.
Military zones have been made smaller to improve operational
efficiency. Each zone will contain at least one battalion, whose
commander will control all Civil Defense Forces, reservists, police,
and civilian government officials in the area.
A new General Staff already exercises operational control over
the zones. Security forces, currently under the Ministry of
Government, will be shifted to the Ministry of Defense. The detective
component of the National Police already has been transferred,
resulting in the dismissal of 265 policemen for corruption.
Comment: In the near term, the reorganization is likely to worsen
the shortages of personnel, weapons, and facilities. Streamlining
tactical command and control, however, will help the Army expand its
presence in the remote Western Highlands and the Peten. This will
enable the government to provide more support for priority
development projects there.
The acquisition of authority over additional personnel and
programs probably will strengthen the Army's political control.
Bringing the Civil Defense Forces under the military, however, should
help reduce human rights abuses. It also should help end the misuse
of these troops by local politicians and military commissioners
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Top cabinet positions remain unchanged in Prime Minister
Prem's new coalition government. The government consists of the
Social Action, Democrat, Thai Citizens, and National Democratic
Parties. Prem retains the defense portfolio, and Sitthi Sawetsila stays
on as Foreign Minister.
Comment: The coalition will command a clear voting majority in
parliament, but poor relations among leaders of the member parties
will keep the new government factionalized and potentially unstable.
The makeup of the new cabinet, however, indicates Prem's desire to
leave key government policies unchanged. The Thai Nation Party,
which was in the previous government but was eliminated after a
failed power play, apparently will form the core of the opposition.
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LDAI
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CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: Smooth End to Hijacking Talks
Unprecedented consultations between Beijing and Seoul have
concluded, and the visiting high-level Chinese delegation is to return
home with most of the passengers and crew of China's hijacked
airliner. Two injured crew members will remain in South Korea until
their health improves, and the jet will be repaired and flown out. South
Korea, however, turned aside China's request to extradite the
hijackers and plans instead to try them in accordance with
international conventions.
Comment: Both nations seem satisfied with the results of their
first official discussions since the Korean war. Without unduly
straining its relations with North Korea, China publicized its concern
over hijackers and defectors in gaining quick acceptance by South
Korea of international hijacking conventions. South Korea probably
sees the cordial outcome as leaving the door open for future contacts
with China on such issues as mutual emergency rights for commercial
aircraft.
SOUTH AFRICA: Parliamentary Byelections
The ruling National Party will be tested in three parliamentary
byelections tomorrow. The main issue has been Prime Minister
Botha's controversial proposals for constitutional reform that would
grant limited political rights to South Africa's Colored and Indian
minorities.
Comment: All three byelections probably will be decided by
narrow margins, but the National Party will retain a clear majority of
parliamentary seats whatever the outcome. A strong showing by the
Conservative Party, however, would be likely to prompt rightwing
Nationalists to question further the wisdom of the reforms Botha
presented to Parliament last week. The Prime Minister might modify
his proposals or delay pushing them through Parliament, but he would
be unlikely to abandon the reforms after investing so much of his
energy and credibility in them. If Conservative Party leader Treurnicht
is defeated, the party's viability as an alternative for Afrikaners would
be threatened.
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Opium-Growing Areas in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province
C't
Area
of map
Afghanistan
*KABUL
Soviet Union
O o0
North-West
00
IJ
(India
Pa Ikistan
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Major opium-growing area
Minor opium-growing area
s
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The US Embassies in Islamabad and Vienna report district-level
Pakistani officials consider the UN-funded rural development project
in the poppy growing area of Buner to be a failure. The Executive
Director of the UN's Fund for Drug Abuse Control has been told by
villagers that little development work has been done and that most of
the $4 million spent on the project so far has gone for administrative
overhead. Growers are threatening to renew poppy cultivation unless
the project is carried out faster and project officials stop spending
money on nondevelopmental activities. Pakistan, particularly Buner
subdistrict, is a major source of heroin consumed in the US.
Comment: Depressed opium prices in Pakistan have made
US-funded crop substitution programs more welcome, at least in
areas where the government has control or influence. The US rural
development project in the neighboring Gadoon subdistrict will
become more hazardous to carry out, however, if the hostility of the
poppy growers in Buner spreads to the cultivators in Gadoon.
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Key Politburo Members
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Nikolay Tikhonov
Premier
Konstantin Chernenko Andrey Gromyko
Senior Secretary? Foreign Minister
9 May 1983
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Special Analysis
USSR: Prospects for Leadership Changes
General Secretary Andropov has displayed strong public
leadership over the past month, and he now appears to be in a
position to arrange high-level personnel changes that are likely to be
announced next month at meetings of the Central Committee and the
Supreme Soviet. The removal of Premier Tikhonov through retirement
or appointment to the less powerful presidency would give Andropov
a chance to improve his standing within the Politburo. Despite the
apparent illness and continuing absence from view of Konstantin
Chernenko-Andropov's longtime rival for the top party post-
Chernenko probably will retain his posts in the Politburo and
Secretariat if his health permits and will continue to act as a constraint
on Andropov's consolidation of power.
Andropov's discipline and anticorruption campaign now seems
focused on officials at a lower level, leaving ministers and regional
party secretaries with less reason for concern. Those changes that
have occurred at the higher levels involved transfers or were treated
as honorable retirements, while deputy ministers and party officials at
lower levels have been dismissed and subjected to party discipline.
This tactic appears to be a prudent compromise on Andropov's part.
In addition to a less threatening approach in his anticorruption
campaign at higher levels, Andropov has strengthened his position
among the leaders. In a Pravda article today, Defense Minister
Ustinov referred to Andropov for the first time as Chairman of the
Defense Council. This is a post Brezhnev held when he was party
chief, but its occupancy has been uncertain since Andropov took
Another move by Andropov involved taking responsibility for the
administration of party cadre appointments away from a Brezhnev
appointee to the Secretariat and giving it to a junior official from the
provinces. Control of this function-and assignment of supporters to
key posts-is essential to the establishment of firm leadership. The
appointment of someone not beholden to Brezhnev's old guard
should benefit the Secretary General.
Andropov convoked virtually the entire regional party leadership
to hear his vigorous reaffirmation of the national food program that
the party endorsed a year ago. This action demonstrates a firm
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alliance with Gorbachev, the party secretary responsible for
agriculture and a rising power within the party.
Andropov still requires periods of rest under medical supervision.
Even during these times, he has remained at the political forefront by
parceling out written responses to questions from media
correspondents and foreign citizens.
Future Leadership Assignments
Warsaw Pact attaches in Moscow have said that the vacant post
of the President will be filled in mid-June and that Ustinov is a likely
candidate. The presidency is an essentially ceremonial position,
however, and Ustinov's value as an Andropov ally would be
diminished in it.
A middle-level Soviet diplomat told a US official that Tikhonov
might become president, a move Andropov might prefer because it
would open up the premiership, a much more powerful post. The
recent promotion of Foreign Minister Gromyko, an ally of Andropov,
to First Deputy Premier makes him available to step in as Premier.
Andropov also could argue that Ustinov should be Premier as he
virtually ran the Soviet economy from 1963 to 1965, managing the
allocation of resources to both the defense and civilian sectors.
The 78-year-old Tikhonov may simply retire. This would give
Andropov two positions to fill, and he might allow Ustinov to assume
the presidency if Gromyko is appointed Premier.
There are some indications in Ustinov's and Gromyko's ministries
that both men might receive higher posts. First Deputy Chief of the
General Staff Akhromeyev has been promoted to Marshal, marking
him for further advancement. He could replace Ogarkov in the
number-two position if Ogarkov becomes Defense Minister
Gromyko has stayed on as Foreign Minister even after becoming
a First Deputy Premier, but some Soviet officials continue to predict
that Ambassador to the US Dobrynin is to become Foreign Minister.
There are, however, better placed candidates to succeed Gromyko. In
any event, Gromyko wrote of generational change in a recent party
journal article in a manner that suggests he may anticipate leaving the
supervisory responsibilities of Foreign Minister.
Chernenko's Foothold
Chernenko remains a force in Soviet politics as a possible
alternative to Andropov, although his current monthlong absence
from public view, probably due to illness, may have dissipated some
continued
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of his political strength. All the public signs of respect for Chernenko
continue; his signature appears on obituaries, his portrait is in its
customary place, and a party periodical has praised his latest book. If
he returns to his activities reasonably soon, he would still represent a
source of security for Soviet leaders who might wish to resist
Andropov's policies.
Andropov may eventually succeed in removing Chernenko or in
isolating him by promoting newcomers to the leadership. For the
present, however, if Chernenko returns to work, Andropov will
continue to treat him as a colleague. Andropov may now have
become more directly involved in cadre appointments, but Chernenko
could still have a strong say in these matters.
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