NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 29 APRIL 1983
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 13, 2010
Sequence Number:
128
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 29, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
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Director of
Central
Intelligence.
mopsearer
CCEAS,C1
National Intelligence Daily
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Contents
Poland: May Day Demonstrations .......................................... 2
China-Vietnam: Border Tension Eases .................................. 3
South Africa-Angola: Prospects for an Incursion .................. 4
Western Europe: The Churches and the Peace Campaign .... 5
USSR-Sweden: Reactions to Submarine Report .................... 8
Libya-Brazil: Impasse Nearing an End .................................... 10
USSR-Afghanistan: Media Coverage of Anniversary ............ 10
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29 April 1983
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POLAND: May Day Demonstrations
The authorities appear confident that they can contain any
demonstrations this weekend, but they nonetheless are using a
combination of measures to discourage widespread participation.
The regime has been trying to reduce support for underground
Solidarity-sponsored demonstrations by publicizing allegations of
corruption by former Solidarity chief Walesa and by a recently
captured senior underground official who controlled the
organization's finances. The authorities also are publicizing Cardinal
Glemp's appeal for calm before the papal visit in June and his warning
last Sunday that even peaceful demonstrations could lead to violence.
Deputy Premier Rakowski and the National Police Commander on
Tuesday warned that demonstrators would not be treated leniently.
Rakowski at the same time rejected Walesa's appeal for talks on
national reconciliation on the grounds that Walesa had implicitly
endorsed demonstrations by his secret meeting with underground
leaders at the beginning of the month.
Comment: The demonstrations this weekend are unlikely to
approach the size of those of last August, when about 125,000 people
took to the streets throughout Poland. Some scattered
demonstrations, especially involving people leaving church, probably
will occur on Sunday, but the authorities should have little trouble
containing them.
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CHINA-VIETNAM: Border Tension Eases
Skirmishes continue along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, but
Chinese artillery barrages and ground incursions have tapered off and
Chinese forces appear to be returning to their normal state of
readiness.
The Vice Chairman of the Chinese National People's Congress
Standing Committee warned on Monday that China will strike again if
Vietnam widens the current conflict. Late last week, however, a
ranking Chinese military officer told US Embassy officials in Beijing
there would be no invasion of Vietnam-this year.
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South African Military Buildup
troop buildup
Virei. *
Angolan/Cuban
defensive line
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Prospects for an Incursion
Recent statements by South Africa anon Angola indicate Pretoria is
conducting military operations inside the buffer zone in Angola and
that a major incursion might occur soon.
South African military officials in Namibia told US officials this
week that an airstrike took place on Monday and that other actions
were under way. They implied there would be no major operation in
the next few days and said they would warn the US before one is
launched. In contrast, the Angolans have said publicly that Pretoria
recently has doubled its reconnaisance flights over south-central
Angola and is building up its forces east of Virei for an attack.
The South Africans privately claim that Cuba in recent months
has increased its forces in Angola. They also say a large Angolan
force with Cuban tanks currently is moving to recapture UNITA-held
positions in eastern Angola.
Comment: Although Luanda may be trying to regain some of the
ground lost to UNITA over the past few months, Pretoria's allegation
of a recent Cuban augmentation has not been substantiated. South
Africa ma be trying to build a case to justify a large-scale operation.
South Africa's military buildup over the past few months also
could be in response to efforts by the Angolans and Cubans to
improve their defensive line in southern Angola. Insurgent activity in
Namibia is at a low level, and the South Africans thus have no
compelling military reason to mount a new incursion into Angola that
almost certainly would risk clashes with Angolan and Cuban forces.
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WESTERN EUROPE: The Churches and the Peace Campaign
Recent statements by leaders of major churches in several INF
basing countries have allayed government concerns that those
churches might encourage anti-INF activity.
A statement published on Wednesday by West German Catholic
bishops does not condemn nuclear deterrence on moral grounds,
although it maintains that deterrence is an unreliable long-term
strategy for preventing war. The paper does not mention NATO's INF
deployment but says existing or future deployments of nuclear
weapons can be justified under certain conditions. The statement also
terms Marxism-Leninism a threat to peace and a system that should
be resisted.
The Italian Catholic bishops released a statement two weeks ago
that also disappointed peace activists by omitting specific mention of
INF basing in Italy. Although the bishops reaffirmed their commitment
to the pursuit of peace, they criticized oversimplified peace proposals
and rejected the use of violence by protesters. In a veiled criticism of
the Communist Party, the bishops spoke out against partisan
exploitation of the peace issue.
The British Government has welcomed the evolving position of
the Church of England on nuclear weapons. In February the Church
Council voted by a 3-to-1 margin to reject unilateral disarmament. At
the same time, however, it also approved the policy of "no first use"
for nuclear weapons.
Comment: Dutch Catholic bishops are still working on a
statement that may take a stronger stand against nuclear weapons.
Moreover, West German Protestants, who will debate nuclear
weapons issues at a convention from 8 to 12 June, probably will be
more critical of NATO policy than the Catholics.
The recent statements will not prevent the Catholic Pax Christi
International and other church-affiliated peace groups from
continuing their activity against INF. Nevertheless, governments
probably believe that the positions taken recently by religious leaders
will reinforce the tendency of many church members to stay out of the
peace campaign.
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USSR-SWEDEN: Reactions to Submarine Report
One Soviet official has admitted privately that Stockholm's
charges that Soviet submarines have routinely violated Swedish
territorial waters are true.
Soviet Central Committee member and USA Institute head
Arbatov-who was aware that the Swedish report was about to be
released-said on Monday that Sweden was "waking up from the
naive dream" that its neutrality would keep its waters free of foreign
submarines. Arbatov, in private remarks to a group at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, asserted that both
NATO and Warsaw Pact vessels had penetrated Swedish territorial
limits. He joked that he would not want to be in the shoes of the
Soviet captain whose submarine ran aground off the Swedish coast in
October 1981.
TASS on Wednesday asserted the Swedish Government has no
firm evidence for the accusations contained in the report it released
on Tuesday. It claims publication was intended to prompt an increase
in Swedish arms expenditures and to create tensions in the Nordic
region that would benefit NATO.
Comment: Public Soviet reaction to the Swedish report will
continue to emphasize that the evidence is incomplete and to blame
its issuance on the US and other NATO countries. Although Moscow
also will warn Stockholm of potentially serious damage to bilateral
relations, it probably will try to limit the report's actual impact. The
document has already led to the recall of the Swedish Ambassador
for consultations and to the cancellation of visits to the USSR planned
by Swedish and Danish officials.
The Soviets will not reflect Arbatov's candid cynicism as they try
to reassure the Swedes, who interpret their neutrality policy literally.
While the USSR probably will not make a substantial cutback in its
submarine operations off Sweden's coasts, the Soviets are likely to
exercise more caution in the near future
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LIBYA-BRAZIL: Impasse Nearing an End
Tripoli has officially accepted Brasilia's proposal to have Ital
return the arms found aboard Libyan aircraft.
cargo departs. According to press reports, the Libyan aircrews are
afraid to return home without the cargo.
Comment: Libya's willingness to compromise reflects concern
that delay would cause diplomatic relations to deteriorate further.
When President Figueiredo returns from Mexico today, he
presumably will work to facilitate the early shipment of the cargo and
a prompt departure by the aircraft.
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Media Coverage of Anniversary
Soviet coverage of the fifth anniversary of the Marxist takeover in
Afghanistan this week has been extensive and optimistic, conveying
the impression that developments are increasingly working in Kabul's
favor. The media are alleging that the government's land reform
program is succeeding and that President Babrak's regime is gaining
widespread popular support. The Soviet military journal carried an
interview with the Afghan Defense Minister, in which he asserted that
rumors of demoralization in the Afghan Army were fabrications of
Western media and that final victory against "counterrevolution" is
approaching.
Comment: This coverage is more typical of overall Soviet media
treatment than the candid series of articles in the past few months
that reported some insurgent successes and gave thinly disguised
accounts of Soviet combat involvement. The changed tone could
reflect the progress of recent efforts by the Soviets to seek at least
temporary truces with some of the insurgent groups. In addition, the
leadership presumably does not want to risk increasing domestic
concerns by giving realistic coverage to Soviet problems in
Afghanistan.
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