NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 29 APRIL 1983

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 13, 2010
Sequence Number: 
128
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 29, 1983
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3.pdf551.48 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 25X1 Director of Central Intelligence. mopsearer CCEAS,C1 National Intelligence Daily Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Top Secret Contents Poland: May Day Demonstrations .......................................... 2 China-Vietnam: Border Tension Eases .................................. 3 South Africa-Angola: Prospects for an Incursion .................. 4 Western Europe: The Churches and the Peace Campaign .... 5 USSR-Sweden: Reactions to Submarine Report .................... 8 Libya-Brazil: Impasse Nearing an End .................................... 10 USSR-Afghanistan: Media Coverage of Anniversary ............ 10 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Top Secret 29 April 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 Top Secret POLAND: May Day Demonstrations The authorities appear confident that they can contain any demonstrations this weekend, but they nonetheless are using a combination of measures to discourage widespread participation. The regime has been trying to reduce support for underground Solidarity-sponsored demonstrations by publicizing allegations of corruption by former Solidarity chief Walesa and by a recently captured senior underground official who controlled the organization's finances. The authorities also are publicizing Cardinal Glemp's appeal for calm before the papal visit in June and his warning last Sunday that even peaceful demonstrations could lead to violence. Deputy Premier Rakowski and the National Police Commander on Tuesday warned that demonstrators would not be treated leniently. Rakowski at the same time rejected Walesa's appeal for talks on national reconciliation on the grounds that Walesa had implicitly endorsed demonstrations by his secret meeting with underground leaders at the beginning of the month. Comment: The demonstrations this weekend are unlikely to approach the size of those of last August, when about 125,000 people took to the streets throughout Poland. Some scattered demonstrations, especially involving people leaving church, probably will occur on Sunday, but the authorities should have little trouble containing them. Top Secret 2 29 April 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Top Secret CHINA-VIETNAM: Border Tension Eases Skirmishes continue along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, but Chinese artillery barrages and ground incursions have tapered off and Chinese forces appear to be returning to their normal state of readiness. The Vice Chairman of the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee warned on Monday that China will strike again if Vietnam widens the current conflict. Late last week, however, a ranking Chinese military officer told US Embassy officials in Beijing there would be no invasion of Vietnam-this year. Top Secret 3 29 April 1983 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Top Secret South African Military Buildup troop buildup Virei. * Angolan/Cuban defensive line Top Secret F 29 April 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 Top Secret SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Prospects for an Incursion Recent statements by South Africa anon Angola indicate Pretoria is conducting military operations inside the buffer zone in Angola and that a major incursion might occur soon. South African military officials in Namibia told US officials this week that an airstrike took place on Monday and that other actions were under way. They implied there would be no major operation in the next few days and said they would warn the US before one is launched. In contrast, the Angolans have said publicly that Pretoria recently has doubled its reconnaisance flights over south-central Angola and is building up its forces east of Virei for an attack. The South Africans privately claim that Cuba in recent months has increased its forces in Angola. They also say a large Angolan force with Cuban tanks currently is moving to recapture UNITA-held positions in eastern Angola. Comment: Although Luanda may be trying to regain some of the ground lost to UNITA over the past few months, Pretoria's allegation of a recent Cuban augmentation has not been substantiated. South Africa ma be trying to build a case to justify a large-scale operation. South Africa's military buildup over the past few months also could be in response to efforts by the Angolans and Cubans to improve their defensive line in southern Angola. Insurgent activity in Namibia is at a low level, and the South Africans thus have no compelling military reason to mount a new incursion into Angola that almost certainly would risk clashes with Angolan and Cuban forces. Top Secret F __1 4 29 April 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 Top Secret WESTERN EUROPE: The Churches and the Peace Campaign Recent statements by leaders of major churches in several INF basing countries have allayed government concerns that those churches might encourage anti-INF activity. A statement published on Wednesday by West German Catholic bishops does not condemn nuclear deterrence on moral grounds, although it maintains that deterrence is an unreliable long-term strategy for preventing war. The paper does not mention NATO's INF deployment but says existing or future deployments of nuclear weapons can be justified under certain conditions. The statement also terms Marxism-Leninism a threat to peace and a system that should be resisted. The Italian Catholic bishops released a statement two weeks ago that also disappointed peace activists by omitting specific mention of INF basing in Italy. Although the bishops reaffirmed their commitment to the pursuit of peace, they criticized oversimplified peace proposals and rejected the use of violence by protesters. In a veiled criticism of the Communist Party, the bishops spoke out against partisan exploitation of the peace issue. The British Government has welcomed the evolving position of the Church of England on nuclear weapons. In February the Church Council voted by a 3-to-1 margin to reject unilateral disarmament. At the same time, however, it also approved the policy of "no first use" for nuclear weapons. Comment: Dutch Catholic bishops are still working on a statement that may take a stronger stand against nuclear weapons. Moreover, West German Protestants, who will debate nuclear weapons issues at a convention from 8 to 12 June, probably will be more critical of NATO policy than the Catholics. The recent statements will not prevent the Catholic Pax Christi International and other church-affiliated peace groups from continuing their activity against INF. Nevertheless, governments probably believe that the positions taken recently by religious leaders will reinforce the tendency of many church members to stay out of the peace campaign. Top Secret 5 29 April 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 Top Secret USSR-SWEDEN: Reactions to Submarine Report One Soviet official has admitted privately that Stockholm's charges that Soviet submarines have routinely violated Swedish territorial waters are true. Soviet Central Committee member and USA Institute head Arbatov-who was aware that the Swedish report was about to be released-said on Monday that Sweden was "waking up from the naive dream" that its neutrality would keep its waters free of foreign submarines. Arbatov, in private remarks to a group at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, asserted that both NATO and Warsaw Pact vessels had penetrated Swedish territorial limits. He joked that he would not want to be in the shoes of the Soviet captain whose submarine ran aground off the Swedish coast in October 1981. TASS on Wednesday asserted the Swedish Government has no firm evidence for the accusations contained in the report it released on Tuesday. It claims publication was intended to prompt an increase in Swedish arms expenditures and to create tensions in the Nordic region that would benefit NATO. Comment: Public Soviet reaction to the Swedish report will continue to emphasize that the evidence is incomplete and to blame its issuance on the US and other NATO countries. Although Moscow also will warn Stockholm of potentially serious damage to bilateral relations, it probably will try to limit the report's actual impact. The document has already led to the recall of the Swedish Ambassador for consultations and to the cancellation of visits to the USSR planned by Swedish and Danish officials. The Soviets will not reflect Arbatov's candid cynicism as they try to reassure the Swedes, who interpret their neutrality policy literally. While the USSR probably will not make a substantial cutback in its submarine operations off Sweden's coasts, the Soviets are likely to exercise more caution in the near future Top Secret 8 29 April 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 LIBYA-BRAZIL: Impasse Nearing an End Tripoli has officially accepted Brasilia's proposal to have Ital return the arms found aboard Libyan aircraft. cargo departs. According to press reports, the Libyan aircrews are afraid to return home without the cargo. Comment: Libya's willingness to compromise reflects concern that delay would cause diplomatic relations to deteriorate further. When President Figueiredo returns from Mexico today, he presumably will work to facilitate the early shipment of the cargo and a prompt departure by the aircraft. USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Media Coverage of Anniversary Soviet coverage of the fifth anniversary of the Marxist takeover in Afghanistan this week has been extensive and optimistic, conveying the impression that developments are increasingly working in Kabul's favor. The media are alleging that the government's land reform program is succeeding and that President Babrak's regime is gaining widespread popular support. The Soviet military journal carried an interview with the Afghan Defense Minister, in which he asserted that rumors of demoralization in the Afghan Army were fabrications of Western media and that final victory against "counterrevolution" is approaching. Comment: This coverage is more typical of overall Soviet media treatment than the candid series of articles in the past few months that reported some insurgent successes and gave thinly disguised accounts of Soviet combat involvement. The changed tone could reflect the progress of recent efforts by the Soviets to seek at least temporary truces with some of the insurgent groups. In addition, the leadership presumably does not want to risk increasing domestic concerns by giving realistic coverage to Soviet problems in Afghanistan. ` Top Secret 10 29 April 1983 25X1 25X1 I 25X1 I 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3 Top Secret Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000200010128-3