SPAIN: ISSUES GONZALEZ MAY WISH TO DISCUSS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202780001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
19 April 1985
Spain: Issues Gonzalez May Wish to Discuss
Summary
Gonzalez will want to use the President's
visit to showcase his success in overcoming
Spain's traditional isolation from the West. He
already has several accomplishments to cite --
particularly the agreement on Spanish accession to
the EC. The Prime Minister will want to highlight
the new prestige he has won for Spain among its
allies and to show his electorate that Washington
solicits Spanish views on major international
issues, such as SDI, the Geneva a ms talks, and
possibly Latin America.
Gonzalez's interest in some token of US
respect for Spanish views is, we think, all the
keener because he US has not
recognized the political costs e as borne in
moving his party toward the West -- particularly
on the issue of NATO membership. He has also had
to take considerable heat from leftist supporters
because of his backing for US access to military
This paper was prepared b of the Office of European Analysis. It
was requested by Peter Sommer, National Security Council. Questions and
comments may be addressed to Chief of the West European
Division, at
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bases in Spain. This kind of heat will intensify
later this year as the decision point on NATO
approaches.
Although Gonzalez sees the United States and
Spain in general agreement on most major issues,
he probably will try to explain Spain's own
perspective on issues such as NATO membership, the
future of US bases, bilateral trade, Spanish
interests in North Africa, and possibly the
situation in Latin America.
NATO
Voters remember two promises Gonzalez made in his
campaign: to create 800,000?new jobs and to hold a referendum on
NATO. They have been willing to accept the increase in
unemployment from 17 to 22 percent since then as beyond his
control, but even many NATO backers believe that he can and
should hold the referendum despite the continued two-to-one
margin of opposition to NATO membership shown in opinion polls.
We believe that Gonzalez may eventually renege on his pledge by
calling an early election if a referendum continues to look
unwinnable. He almost certainly could win an election contest
against his weak and divided opposition, even though backing out
of the referendum would anger many leftists and tarnish his
carefully cultivated image for honesty.
In short, we think Gonzalez is in a position to keep Spain
in NATO, and should be able to do so without trading away other
important Western interests in the process -- such as a strong,
continuing US military presence in Spain and eventual integration
into NATO's military structure.
US Access to Spanish Military Bases
Gonzalez believes that permitting US access to Spanish bases
contributes to the defense of the West as well as to good
relations with Washington. Nonetheless, as part of his effort to
drum up support for NATO, Gonzalez linked continued Alliance
membership last fall with a possible reduction in the US military
presence in Spain. (The presence consists primarily of access to
three air bases and one naval base.) He could raise this
possibility with the President.
Gonzalez is a nationalist as well as a supporter of Spain's
merger into the Western mainstream, but he would like to reduce
the number of foreign troops on Spanish soil as much as he can
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without hurting Western defense interests or Spain's ties with
the United States. He and other high level Socialists say that
Washington should look at Spain's continued membership in NATO
and a possible reduction in the US presence as a single package
that is a net plus for the Alliance. The Spanish also indicate
that the US presence at Torrejon Air Base on the outskirts of
Madrid is a political problem for them. Beyond these general
statements, however, they have not spelled out what they have in
mind, and Gonzalez probably does not yet know himself. Indeed,
the Spanish have indicated that they will not press for specific
changes until 1987 when negotiations begin to renew the current
bilateral agreement which expires in 1988.
Opinion polls showing wide popular opposition to the
stationing of foreign troops may have contributed to Gonzalez's
original decision to raise the issue last fall. The same polls,
though, show that most of the public does not think about the
issue unless asked about it. Gonzalez's failure to pursue the
matter publicly since then may indicate that he realizes that the
ploy could generate more problems for him than it solves.
If Gonzalez does bring up the base agreement, it would
provide an opportunity to point out the advantages of fuller
Spanish participation in the Atlantic Alliance. NATO membership,
for example, could provide an Alliance "cover" for US base use--
opinion polls show that Spaniards regard hosting NATO forces as
less objectionable than US forces alone. Full integration into
NATO might also qualify Spain for its own NATO command, something
that would make it easier to argue that the US presence is part
of a joint US-Spanish contribution to Western defense. This
argument would have added power because Spain has long focused
its security efforts on possible threats from North Africa, and
its most likely NATO command -- the Balearics-Gibraltar-Canaries
axis -- would strengthen Spain's defense posture in that
direction.
Trade
One sore point in bilateral relations has been Gonzalez's
view that the United States has taken protectionist measures
against Spanish exports, particularly steel products. Spanish
concern on these grounds has been alleviated somewhat because the
strong US dollar has contributed to a fall in Spain's trade.
deficit with the United States from $3 billion in 1982 to $1
billion in 1984.
Gonzalez may concentrate on military equipment exports in
talking with the President. Bilateral military trade is weighted
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68 to 1 in Washington's favor. The US decision last year to buy
the British Sherpa plane instead of the Spanish built CASA C-212
fueled Spanish suspicions that the United States is not willing
to give them the same treatment as other, more established US
arms suppliers. Gonzalez may press for some commitment to
redress these military trade imbalances.
Gonzalez may also seek the President's assurance that Spain
will continue to have access to U'S high technology, which he
believes is important to Spain's long-term economic growth. In
January, the United States responded to Spain's slow progress in
tightening up its lax export control system by putting a hold on
AT&T's application to enter into a joint high technology venture
with Spain's state-run telephone company. Although the Spanish
have since announced a decision to begin talks on export control
with both the United States and COCOM, the Cabinet is divided on
how to proceed. Gonzalez may ask the President's forebearance on
the grounds that Spain is finally moving in the right direction.
The prime minister may stress that he cannot appear too willing
to do Washington's bidding while the issue of NATO membership
itself is still unresolved.
North Africa
Gonzalez also may raise with the President his concern about
increased tension in North.Africa. Although Spain cultivates
good relations with all the North African states, it is
suspicious of them and worries, in particular, that Moroccan King
Hassan's generally good relations with Washington might embolden
him to move against Spain's enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Joint
US-Moroccan military activities -- including an amphibious
exercise near the enclaves--have stoked Spanish fears on this
score. The US policy of giving only short or no notice of such
exercises has further unsettled the Spanish. Another reason for
Spanish touchiness over the enclaves is that neither NATO
membership nor the bilateral agreement with the United States
provides an explicit security guarantee for them. Leftists have
used that fact to attack Gonzalez's pro-Western policies, and h
Prime Minister may ask for greater US support in this area 25X1
The Middle East
Gonzalez may tell the President that Spain will recognize
Israel within the next few months. He believes that the United
States wants him to take this step, and he has prepared the
ground for it with a number of small measures over the past two
years. He also probably believes that Spain's impending entry
into the EC -- whose other members recognize Israel -- will mute
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the Arab reaction. 25X1
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Latin America
Gonzalez may bring up the situation in Latin America,
particularly if he feels pressed on other issues -- for example,
for integration into NATO, COCOM membership, or assurances on the
US military presence in Spain. He also believes that he knows
that area well, is respected by political leaders there, and can
assume the role of an international statesman in talking about
Latin America.
Gonzalez also believes that he has an important message to
convey about Nicaragua. He recognizes the basically anti-
democratic thrust of the Sandinista regime, but thinks that
military pressure is ineffective and that a combination of
diplomatic pressure and internal demands for liberalization might
make Managua change its ways. This conviction stems in part from
Spain's own transition to democracy as a result of a similar
combination of forces after Franco's death in 1975. Gonzalez
does not seem to recognize the critical difference between the
two countries -- that in Spain the King saw his future linked to
democratization, while in Nicaragua the Sandinistas have timed
theirs to the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime.
Like other high- eve
Spanish Socialists, Gonzalez sees the Cuban revolution and Castro
himself as tired, dependent on Moscow, and false to their
ideals. Nonetheless, Spaniards across the political spectrum
retain a lingering interest in Cuba as one of the last of their
former possessions to break away. (Even under Franco ties were
warm between Madrid and Havana). More importantly, Gonzalez
believes that Washington will eventually have to arrive at an
understanding with Castro to obtain peace in the region--a belief
that Castro has reinforced by his claims that he wants to arrive
.at an understanding with the United States.
Gibraltar
Finally, Gonzalez may ask the President to urge the United
Kingdom to be more forthcoming on the sovereignty issue in the
ongoing talks on the future of the Rock. He would probably not
make much of this point, however, because he knows that the issue
will take considerable time to resolve, and he has not been
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displeased with the progress made so far. He would also probably
not be surprised if the President reminded him that the best way
to integrate Gibraltar into Spain is to integrate Spain fully
into Western Europe through active participation in the EC and
NATO. The British have already indicated privately to US
officials that they might accept an eventual Spanish NATO command
headquartered on the Rock.
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Distribution:
Original - Peter Sommer, NSC
Copy 1 DDI
1 ADDI
1 NIO
1 OD/EURA
2 EURA Production Staff
4 IMC/CB
1 WE/IA
1 WE Division
1 Author
EURA/WE/IA 19Apr85 25X1
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