NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 9 MAY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200030033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: May 9, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
9 May 1984
May 1984
Copy 285
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Contents
Libya: Firefight in Tripoli .............................................................. 2
USSR-US: Nonparticipation in the Olympics .............................. 3
USSR-Cuba-Nicaragua: Possibility of MIG Deliveries ...............
Iraq-Iran: Another Attack on Shipping ......................................
Greece: Military Leaves Canceled ..............................................
Netherlands: New INF Basing Proposal .................................... 10
Tunisia: Campus Unrest .............................................................. 11
Oman: Military Exercise Completed ............................................ 12
Dominican Republic: Crackdown Continues 12
In Brief
Special Analysis
South Africa: New Maneuvering in Regional Diplomacy ............ 14
9 May 1984
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LIBYA: Firefight in Tripoli.
The small group of dissidents crushed by Libyan security forces
in Tripoli yesterday were apparently engaged in an operation
against Qadhafi's headquarters there.
According to press reports, about 15 commandos fought a running
battle with Libyan security forces for several hours before being
overcome by Libyan troops supported by armored vehicles. Libya
claimed that the commandos were pro-Arafat Palestinians infiltrated
from Tunisia and Libyans trained in the UK and Sudan. The French
press reported that by yesterday afternoon Tripoli was calm and
Qadhafi was unharmed.
Comment: The commandos probably were exiles hoping to capitalize
on recent domestic unrest in Libya and on Qadhafi's damaged
reputation following the shooting incident in London. They may have
intended to assassinate Qadhafi or bomb his headquarters and
perhaps expected to spark a military or civil uprising. It is not clear
whether they actually mounted an attack on Qadhafi's headquarters
n any event, such a small group would
have a virtually no c ance of success against Qadhafi's heavily
protected compound
The action-one of the boldest inside Libya by an exile group-could
cause Qadhafi to reverse his recent decision to halt attacks on his
opponents abroad. He probably will at a minimum launch a diplomatic
and media campaign declaring that Washington and London were
involved. Moreover, he could charge, Tunisia with complicity by
allowing the infiltration of the exiles.
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USSR-US: Nonparticipation in the Olympics
Moscow's decision not to participate in the summer Olympics in
Los Angeles is intended to dramatize its dissatisfaction with the
state of US-Soviet relations, primarily in order to increase
domestic and international reesure on the S Government for
more conciliatory policies.
The TASS announcement of the decision focuses on security issues,
charging "connivance" by US authorities in the activity of extremist
groups and claiming that anti-Soviet "hysteria" is being generated in
the US. More generally, the statement accuses the US of violating the
spirit of the Olympic Charter. It said that in these conditions the
participation of Soviet athletes is impossible and that to act differently
would be tantamount to approving the "anti-Olympian" actions of US
authorities and the games' organizers.
Comment: Moscow was almost certainly concerned both about
security and about opportunities for defection among its athletes. The
action, however, was taken for maximum political effect. Along with
suspension of the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear weapons, the
Soviet decision marks a departure from Moscow's approach to
bilateral relations for over a decade, when the USSR was luctant
to disrupt such highly visible contacts.
Following General Secretary Chernenko's statement last week
indicating that US efforts to improve the relationship are inadequate,
the action suggests a Politburo consensus that only unprecedented
toughness on Moscow's part will evoke a moderation of US policies.
The Soviets probably calculate that, by underscoring .tensions
between the two superpowers, they can bring greater international
and domestic pressure on the US to moderate policies particularly
objectionable to them. The decision is likely to be unpopular with
many Soviets and with Moscow's East European allies, especially the
East Germans, who, nevertheless, probably will feel compelled to
follow the Soviet example. The TASS announcement leaves little or
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USSR-CUBA- Possibility of MIG Deliveries
NICARAGUA:
Nicaragua reportedly is pushing to complete a new military
airfield and a deepwater Caribbean port by October, possibly in
anticipa n of new S deliveries that may include MIG
fighters. 7'
the Nicaraguan Air Force's command staff expects MIGs to be
delivered from Cuba when the new airfield at Punta Huete is
complete. The airfield reportedly is to be finished in October.
the Cu
working everts y to ma e e air ie opera Iona y then
icaraguan and Bulgarian
construction officials at u say that that Caribbean port has to be
ready to receive Soviet shipping by October. Soviet vessels previously
have delivered military support equipment to Nicaragua's Pacific
ports. Bulgarian ships have unloaded tanks and other heavy arms
offshore from El Bluff for transshipment up river to Rama, where port
facilities recently have been improved.
The US warning not to provide Nicaragua with modern jet fighters
and the US action in Grenada, combined with Soviet reluctance to
challenge the US militarily in Central America, probably account for
Moscow's and Havana's hesitation to deliver the planes. Nonetheless,
the Soviets and Cubans apparently want the ability to send the MIGs
if they chose to increase the level of tensions in Central America on
short notice.
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IRAQ-IRAN:
Another Attack on Shipping
Iraq's attack on an oil tanker on Monday night probably will not
influence the spot market price for crude oil.
A 117,000-ton Saudi tanker was hit and abandoned about 90 nautical
miles south of Khark Island, where it had just been loaded. The US
Embassy in Kuwait says the tanker's cargo has not spilled or burned.
US AWACS aircra
ft detected two Iraqi
aircraft near the tanker the
night of the strike.
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Last week, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn said that Ira would soon 25X1
be able to increase its attacks on shi in .
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Comment: Baghdad hopes its attacks on oil tankers will deprive Iran
of the revenues it needs to continue the fighting. Iraq also is lobbying
major arms suppliers to stop shipments to Iran. The Iraqis believe that
Tehran will be forced to negotiate if it cannot make progress on the
battlefield and is deprived of arms and money. Iraq probably will
intensify its attacks on shipping when the Exocet-armed Mirage
aircraft become combat ready this summer.
This is the fourth tanker to be attacked since 27 March. Insurers have
raised insurance rates 0.5 percent to 2 percent for tankers calling at
Khark Island. Freight rates have risen moderately since the last Saudi
ship was hit on 25 April.
As long as the Iraqi attacks do not significantly inhibit tanker
operators from calling at Khark, Iran is unlikely to retaliate openly
against Arab Gulf states althoua may put political pressure on
states like Kuwait. F "7
To entice shippers, Iran may discount oil prices. It already is offering
insurance to cover damage inflicted in Iraqi attacks. Iran will also try
harder to intercept Iraqi aircraft over the Gulf and may try to interfere
with shipping for Iraq.
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USSR-VIETNAM: Concern About Relations
A high-level Soviet diplomat
recently stated that Moscow is worried about its relations with Hanoi
following President Reagan's trip to China. He expressed concern
that improved Sino-US ties would encourage the Chinese to put more
pressure on Hanoi which rn would increase its demands on the
USSR
Comment: The Soviet's comments seem to reflect informed personal
views rather than an official line. The principal source of friction in the
Soviet relationship with Vietnam currently appears to be the Sino-
Soviet dialogue, not Sino-US relations. China's increased pressure
on Vietnam probably will cause more problems for Moscow in its
relations with Hanoi, particularly if-as now appears likely-Beijing is
intent on teaching Hanoi its harshest "lesson" since 1979. Depending
on China's actions, the Soviets could soon be faced with difficult
decisions on whether to cancel First Deputy Premier Arkhipov's China
trip and whether to respond to possible Vietn e calls for Soviet
military support.
GREECE: Military Leaves Canceled
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canceled all military leave between 19 May and 17 June.O 25X1
he measure is in connection with the 220K I
election for the European Parliament on 17 June and specifically says
the order has nothing to do with any threat from Turkey.
Comment: Although the Greeks have canceled military leaves during
elections before, troops were normally confined to barracks for only a
few days before and after an election. The extension of this period to
a month conceivably may be related to the situation on Cyprus or to
the state of relations between Greece and Turkey. Prime Minister
Papandreou's view of the election as a national referendum reflects
his increasing sense of vulnerability amid growing tensions at home.
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NETHERLANDS: New INF Basing Proposal
The Liberals' suggested compromise for deployment of US cruise
missiles in the Netherlands is a response to Prime Minister Lubbers'
invitation for proposals to break the current impasse and preserve the
center-right coalition. The Liberals would accept full deployment of
the 48 cruise missiles allotted to the Netherlands but would renew
basing approval every four years. Under NATO plans, the first missiles
are to arrive in the Netherlands in late 1986.
Comment: Lubbers decided to postpone a basing decision until June
after his party-the Christian Democratic Appeal-was unable to
resolve internal differences on the INF issue. The Liberals are the
junior and more conservative partner in the government coalition.
Although their proposal would be likely to satisfy the NATO Allies,
the cabinet probably will not pursue it because Lubbers' own party
and the opposition parties almost certainly will oppose it.
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TUNISIA: Campus Unrest
. The heavyhanded use of force by security units at Tuni
scheduled appearance on campus of Minister of Family and Women's
Advancement Fathia Mzali, the wife of Prime Minister Mzali.
University professors went on strike last week to protest the
government's handling of the incident.
Comment: The incident will further weaken support for Prime
Minister Mzali, which already was damaged by the bread riots last
January. Mzali's political decline almost certainly will encourage
further challenges by the radicals, who have been restrained by more
pragmatic fundamentalist leaders. Although the spontaneity of the
incident probably rules out direct Libyan involvement, Tripoli may
be urging Tunisian extremists to exploit the growing unrest.
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he students were protesting the
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OMAN: Military Exercise Completed
Oman recently concluded a weeklong exercise simulating the
ula on the Strait of Hormuz.
he exercise involved airlifting
infantry units to the peninsula while amphibious forces escorted by
warships provided logistic support.
Comment: Such exercises are strengthening Oman's capability to
reinforce and support its garrison on the peninsula to defend against
an Iranian attack. Its greatest weakness, however, remains its inability
to provide sufficient air support over the peninsula from hasp.-, that
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Crackdown Continues
The arrest of more than 100 members of opposition groups last
weekend and of two labor leaders on Monday probably were
desianed to head off A rike and more demonstrations.
military units have been put on alert
in anticipation of a general strike
Comment: President Jorge Blanco has maintained control so far by
using tough tactics to intimidate the opposition. He continues to be
aided by the inability of opposition elements to decide on a common
approach. The Popular Struggle Committees are a new feature in
domestic politics. They consist largely of the unemployed and
apparently are not controlled by any of the established political
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In Brief
.. could include Tornado jet fighters, Hawk jet trainers,
and hand-held surface-to-air missiles ... reflects Saudi
disenchantment with US nniicies and desire to broaden source of
supply.
- French President Mitterrand criticizing upsurge in the number of
Polish political prisoners and promising a high-level protest ...
may be designed to stress his impending visit to Moscow will not
produce softening of position on human rights
- Three-day congress of ruling West German Christian Democratic
Union begins today ... almost certainly will show unified suooort
for government security and foreign policies.
Americas - Censorship partially lifted in Suriname last week, put private
media still operating under tough restrictions ... new policy a
compromise between moderate Prime Minister Udenhout and
Army Commander Bouterse's leftist advisers.
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: New Maneuvering in Regional Diplomacy
South Africa is showing increased confidence following the
signing of the nonaggression pact with Mozambique in March.
Pursuing an ambitious diplomatic agenda, Pretoria has
intensified pressure on its other neighbors to agree to formal
security pacts. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have been
targets of South African pressure to agree to such pacts, even
though in the past they have placated Pretoria on security issues.
On the Namibian question, the South Africans are exploring the
possibility of arranging a regional settlement outside the UN
To compel Botswana to accede to a security agreement, Pretoria
warned that it would encourage domestic opposition to the
government in Masire if it refused to accept the South African draft.
It also reminded Botswana ' ' y to South African
economic pressure.
South Africa has put Lesotho on notice that it could use economic
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leverage to force greater cooperation on security issues_
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Swaziland has signed a nonaggression pact with South Africa and an
actively restricted the ANC, but Pretoria is demanding it do more.)
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everal Swazi police
guerrillas have recent y ied in shootouts in Swaziland,
according to press and US Embassy reporting.
On the other hand, South Africa is rewarding Mozambique, which has
taken vigorous action against ANC military cadre since signing the
Nonaggression Pact. Pretoria in the past month has provided drought
relief assistance and has agreed to pay higher prices for the electric
power it buys. It also has expedited contacts between private South
African investors and Maputo government in addition to appealing for
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Pretoria's Namibian Gambit
Although South Africa has publicly and privately reaffirmed its
commitment to the UN plan for Namibian independence, there are
signs that some leaders in Pretoria prefer a regional solution if the cannot arrange a Cuban withdrawal.
Some South Africans apparently believe that SWAPO can be
maneuvered into joining a coalition government. They undoubtedly
believe that SWAPO President Nujoma is vulnerable as a result of the
Angolan-South African disengagement agreement, which requires
Luanda to prevent SWAPO infiltration into Namibia.
Pretoria recently released several SWAPO political prisoners,
including the movement's founder, Toivo ja Toivo, who is a potential
challenger of Nujoma for the leadership of the organization. This
probably was intended to undercut Nujoma and to strengthen the
prestige of the Multi-Party Conference, which had appealed for the
Representatives of SWAPO, the conference, and South Africa's
administrator for Nambia are to meet in Lusaka on 11 May. Pretoria
may see this as a step toward a regional settlement.
The Multi-Party Conference hopes to present SWAPO with a draft bill
of rights that would serve as, the basis for an accord between the two
groups. Prime Minister Botha recently told Parliament his government
would not stand in the way of such an agreement.
SWAPO and the Frontline States, however, are wary of South Africa's
intentions. SWAPO has publicly affirmed that it will only discuss ways
to carry out the UN plan at the meeting in Lusaka and says it will not
meet with the conference. Zambian President Kaunda told senior US
diplomats last week that he could support only a UN solution to
Namibia, but he probably would accede to any plan accepted by
SWAPO. The Summit of Frontline States last week also reaffirmed its
support for the UN plan.
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South Africa clearly has the diplomatic initiative and is enjoying some
success. It will continue its aggressive regional policy. The scheduled
trip of Botha later this month to at least Zaire and several West
European capitals will strengthen this confidence. It is the first trip to
Western Euro e by uth African head of government in seven
years. F a~
SWAPO is unlikely to accept Pretoria's proposed settlement now, but
South Africa probably will continue to put military and diplomatic
pressure on the group to end its insurgency.
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