POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVES ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DATE 0201. j __.i
DOC NO S'OV /tl F(v' cZOO6~
OIR 3 I
P & PD I I
15 August 1986
Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
Summary
Gorbachev's, comments in Vladivostok last month indicate that
his regime is indeed making a more determined effort to improve
the USSR's position in Asia, as several Soviet officials have
predicted within the past year. His remarks also suggest that
the Soviets, after years of 'hanging tough," are now willing to
address at least some of China's main security concerns--
especially on its northern border--in order to achieve that goal.
The Soviets could follow-up on Gorbachev's speech in various
ways: .
Adopt a more conciliatory position on China's territorial
claims against the USSR.
-- Announce a token force reduction in the Soviet Far East.
-- Withdraw some of their forces from Mongolia.
Judging from the evidence at hand, the Mongolian option may be
exercised first, perhaps even before the next round of Sino-
Soviet political consultations is held in Beijing this October.
The Soviets could, however, hold off until after the October
round ends, if only to get a better reading of Chinese intentions
before making any concessions.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of Soviet
Analysis. Information available as of 7 August 1986 was used in
its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division
SOV M 86-20068
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Gorbachev has not made any promises on the China border
question akin to his announcement that the Soviets will withdraw
six regiments from Afghanistan by the end of this year. But he
has shown more flexibility than any of his predecessors on three
issues--the Sino-Soviet border dispute, troop deployments on both
sides of that boundary line, and-the Soviet military presence in
Mongolia. These issues together are one part of the "three
obstacles" cited by China as impediments to improved relations
between Beijing and Moscow; the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and Soviet suDDort for Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia are the
other two.
In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev spoke about turning the
frontier between the USSR and China into a "zone of peace and
friendship" and noted that the two sides had already taken a few
steps in that direction, especially along the Amur River in the
Far East. He added that the official border there "could pass
along the main navigation channel"--raising the possibility of a
deal regarding Chimnaya Island (Heixiazi), opposite Khabarovsk--
long a major sticking point in the Sino-Soviet border
Gorbachev also called for major force reductions in Asia and
proposed starting in the Far East, adding that Moscow was ready
to discuss with Beijing "specific steps aimed at a balanced
reduction in the level of land forces." His statement on that
point was the first time any top Soviet leader has publicly
endorsed reductions of that sort since the Soviet military
buildup opposite China began in the mid-1960s.
Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet and Mongolian
leaders are examining the question of the withdrawal of a
"considerable number" of what we believe to be 60,000 Soviet
troops now stationed in Mongolia. He said nothing about any
preconditions for such a withdrawal. No Soviet leader has ever
publicly stated that the USSR was considering reducing its forces
in Mongolia--some units have been there "temporarily" since
1966. Moreover, both Moscow and Ulaanbaatar have insisted for
nearly a decade that China must sign a nonaggression pact with
Mongolia or find another way to alleviate Mongolian security
concerns before any Soviet troops can be withdrawn from
Mongolia.
Concrete progress on any of these matters will, of course,
require a good deal of give on both sides. Beijing has
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stonewalled repeated Soviet requests for a resumption of their
border talks, and Moscow has insisted repeatedly that it will not
improve relations with China at the expense of its friends or
allies like Mongolia. But Gorbachev and his colleagues
reportedly are convinced that Moscow has made some mistakes with
China over the past few years, as Gorbachev himself reportedly
stated in a wide-ranging critique of Soviet foreign policy at the
Soviet Foreign Ministry in late May.' They may believe that an
effort to accommodate Beijing on some of its main security
concerns is worth certain risks, given the strategic importance
of China in their overall scheme of things.
-- Sino-Soviet relations still lag behind China's ties with
the West, and Moscow could lose more political ground by
standing still if Washington and Beijing move closer.
-- An improvement in Sino-Soviet ties would weaken the US
position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle. Moscow also may
again hope for an opportunity to influence Chinese
domestic politics.
The following is a speculative look at various steps that
the Soviets might take--based on what we know about their
territorial dispute with China, the military balance along
China's northern perimeter, and the situation in Mongolia--to
follow up on Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. We would
emphasize at the outset, however, that the Kremlin has yet to
admit that there are any "disputed areas" along the border with
China, or that its military forces in that area pose any "threat"
to the Chinese.
Possible Soviet Moves on the Border Dispute
The Soviets have asked the Chinese on a number of occasions
- over the past five years to agree to a resumption of their border
negotiations, which have been suspended since June 1978. To
encourage the Chinese, Moscow could take a more conciliatory
position than previously on some or all of Beijing's main
demands--that Moscow admit that certain parcels of land are in
dispute, withdraw its military forces from those areas (all of
1 According to a Soviet diplomat in Beijing, Gorbachev
called for a more flexible and pragmatic approach, better
relations with all countries, and an improved style of work in
Soviet embassies. The diplomat added that Gorbachev had
specifically stressed the need for better relations with the
Chinese and had warned his audience against unrealistic
expectations that the relationship could return to the golden
days of the 1950s.
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them are in Soviet hands at present), and agree in advance to
return all territory that is subsequently determined to be
rightfully China's. A few Chinese leaders have, in recent years,
hinted at some flexibility on those points in their own public
statements, and while the Soviets almost certainly are not
prepared at present to make wholesale concessions, they may be
willing to make some conciliatory gestures:
-- The Soviets might start the bargaining by proposing that
both sides keep their regular army units and border guard
detachments out of all disputed areas along their common
border (see map 1). This gesture would cost Moscow very
little in military terms, but probably would be seen as a
significant move in Beijing. The Soviets currently have
only small border guard units stationed within those
disputed areas.
-- They could recognize Beijing's claims to almost all of the
700 disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Most
of those islands have little importance in either economic
or military terms. The Soviets could, at the same time,
offer to purchase the strategically important Chimnaya
Island [Heixiazi], opposite the city of Khabarovsk. We
doubt that they would hand the island over to the Chinese,
however, except as part of a final settlement on the
border dispute.
-- They might revive their suggestion about setting up a
joint commission to restudy the old treaties and other
relevent documents, and then conduct a new survey before
installing additional border markers where needed. This
approach would finesse for the moment the question of
which documents, other than formal treaties signed by both
sides, have a legitimate bearing on the subject.
Potential Force Reductions in the Soviet Far East
The Soviets could make some token unilateral gestures
involving their forces opposite China. Although our
understanding of how the Soviets see their military requirements
in that part of the world is imprecise, we can conceive of
several 'disengagement" packages that would probably not disturb
the existing balance of forces. The USSR has such an overall
advantage vis-a-vis China that even if the Soviet air and ground
troops in the area were cut by as much as ten percent--that is,
by about 60-70,000--they would still retain a decisive local
advantage in ground forces. While Beijing has about 1.7 million
troops opposite the USSR and Mongolia, its armed forces have much
less firepower and mobility than Soviet or Mongolian units.
China's main forces are, moreover, based 100-200 miles back from
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the border, and thus hardly in a position to mount a sudden
offensive into the USSR or Mongolia. This situation may change
in the coming years because the Chinese have abandoned their old
strategy of "luring the enemy in deep" for a more forward defense
posture,2 but the Soviets have a good opportunity at present to
deal from strength. While they presumably remain unwilling to
make moves which would significantly alter the military balance,
they could:
-- Withdraw or deactivate one or more of their ground force
divisions stationed in the Soviet Far East near the
Chinese border. Units guarding strategic targets, such as
the Trans-Siberian Railroad or the Vladivostok naval base,
probably would not be pulled out, but other units in that
area could be moved and not have a major impact on Soviet
capabilities.
Withdraw some SS-20s from areas close to China. The
Soviets would, however, have a hard time finding
alternative sites that would not have adverse effects on
European arms negotiations.
A leadership decision to remove significant numbers of
Soviet troops from the Chinese border would test Gorbachev's grip
on the Soviet Ministry of Defense. There are signs that he has
been managing leadership relations with the military pretty well
so far, and in the end would probably get his way on Chinese
border cuts of the size contemplated in this analysis.
Reducing the Soviet Presence in Mongolia
While determined to keep Mongolia in the Soviet camp, the
Kremlin could undertake any one of several moves to alleviate
Beijing's concern over the extent to which Mongolia has been
transformed into a staging area for an offensive Soviet drive
into China. The five Soviet divisions stationed in Mongolia are
the most combat-ready Soviet ground forces facing China. These
divisions, plus the three divisions that the Mongolians now have,
have acquired added importance in recent years as a counterweight
to the Chinese buildup on the Vietnamese border. The Soviets
could withdraw one or more divisions at this time, however,
without seriously eroding their overall security situation.
Indeed, they would only be trimming their military presence in
Mongolia back to its level during the 1970s. A move of this sort
would not necessarily call into question Moscow's support for
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Ulaanbaatar, and it could easily be reversed by reintroducing the,
withdrawn units if Sino-Soviet relations worsened.
-- Moscow also could make a greater effort to promote a Sino-
Mongolian political dialogue, especially if the Chinese
gave any sign of a willingness to negotiate a
nonaggression pact or an agreement on nonuse of force with
the Mongolians.
-- The Soviets may regard the consular pact signed during the
recent visit to Mongolia by a Chinese vice foreign
minister, the first agreement of its kind between China
and Mongolia in over 20 years, as an earnest of Chinese
good intentions toward Mongolia.
The Problem with' Demilitarized Zones
We have examined the possibility that Moscow might, as a
more significant gesture, offer to keep all regular ground force
units, as distinguished from KGB border guards, some distance--
say, 30 kilometers--from the Chinese border. Such an offer could
even be part of a package of confidence-building measures (CBMs)
that also provided for advance notice of any military exercises
or major troop movements within, say, 200 kilometers of the
border, better cross-border communications, and the like.
Our analysis of the Soviet force posture along the border
indicates, however, that creation of such a narrow "demilitarized
zone" would require the USSR to.relocate some seven divisions and
dismantle an extensive system of fortified zones along the border
(see map 2). A move of this magnitude would, in our view, be
well beyond the kinds of gestures examined so far and have
significant strategic implications. It would, for example,
require the Soviets to leave long segments of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad unprotected, and probably would have large cost
implications. Accordingly, we believe that such a demilitarized
zone, while probably impressive to the Chinese, would be such an
important military concession by the Soviets that it would be
seriously considered only as part of a major political
agreement.
Implications
Although all of these possible gestures would fall, well
short of Beijing's stated demands regarding the "threat from the
North," they would point to a Soviet willingness to discuss
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Chinese concerns in that area seriously. In time, moreover, they,
might lead to further progress on the Sino-Soviet border dispute,
significant force reductions on both sides of that line, or some
sort of an understanding on Mongolia.
If the two sides were to make progress on any of these
issues, it would be the most significant development in their
relationship since the low point in 1969, following the sharp
clashes along their border. Moscow and Beijing would, of course,
still have major differences--especially over Afghanistan and the
Vietnam/Cambodia question. But even a hint that the Soviets and
Chinese were making progress toward what Gorbachev termed "the
creation of an atmosphere of good-neighborliness" along China's
northern perimeter would have an impact in the West, complicating
US and allied dealings with both the USSR and China.
There could, at the same time, be certain negative
consequences for the Soviets. In particular, the Japanese would
almost certainly, regard any Soviet concessions to the Chinese on
their border dispute as a precedent for their own territorial
claims against the USSR. The Japanese might well fail to
recognize the differences between the two cases, and decide to
press their claims to the Northern Territories with more vigor in
the future, believing that this approach would eventually force
the Soviets to return at least some of the islands to Japan. By
the same token, Hanoi and Kabul could well become a good deal
more worried about the possibility that Moscow might sacrifice
their interests to its own, and thus seek even more in the way of
Soviet reassurances.
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 I I I 111 I l IIII II I_LULLIi III I_L __
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Secret
Soviet Union. Chinese claim the Soviets hold Islands In
the Amur and Ussuri and areas In the Pamirs which
were not given to Tsarist Russia even by the 'unequal
treaties' 01 the 19th century.
Disputed Areas
on the
Sino-Soviet Border
Q Principal areas In dispute between China and the
Chimnaya Island (Heuriazi)
`oviet Union
Map 1
Khabarovsk
(Hei.ie`i) Khabarovsk
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Map 2
Soviet Divisions Opposite Northeast China
Soviet Union
0 110 KYOttNt.rn
60 Statute Miles
Note: This map-shows only those divisions deployed in-:,the Soviet
Far East near the Chinese border.
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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution
White House
The Honorable Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
NSC
White House
Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
USSR-Eastern Europe
NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
Ron St. Martin
Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
Robert Lilac
Director, Political-Military Affairs
NSC
Room 391, EOB
James H. Kelly, Jr.
Senior Staff Member
East Asia
NSC
State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327, Department of State
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
The Honorable Veron A. Walters
US Ambassador to the United Nations
US Mission to the UN
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Inititatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution (Continued)
State
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Department of State
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
Ambassador Gaston J. Siqur
Assistant Secretary
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 6205, Department of State
James Lilley
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 6205, Department of State
Thomas Simon
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
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Robert W. Drexler
Director, Regional Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4210, Department of State
Sherrod McCall
Director, Office of Research and Analysis
for East Asia and Pacific
INR
Room 8840, Department of State
Galen Fox
Chief, Northeast Asia Division
Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific
Room 8840, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution (Continued)
State
Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SEE
Roan 4758, Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
Richard Solomon
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311, Department of State
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
Room 4E808, Pentagon
The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4D825, Pentagon
Andrew Marshall
Director of Net Assessment
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Room 3A930, Pentagon
Col. David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3A948, Pentagon
Carl Jackson
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East and Pacific Affairs
Room 4D825, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. John M. Mollering, USA
Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E872, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser
Director, J-5 Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution (Continued)
DOD
Vice Admiral Powell Carter
Director
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS
Room 2E936, Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Politico-Military Affairs
DIA
Room 2C238, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Room 2E466, Pentagon
Maj. Gen. Schuyler Bissell, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
RADM Willliam 0. Studeman
Director of Naval Intelligence
5C572, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA
Director, NSA
T532/CDB
Fort Meade, MD
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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
Internal Distribution
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