TALKING POINTS FOR DDCI ON EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404310001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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DATE
DOC NO t', NI ~(,,- pjdCj
OIR DDI/EURA/EE
P $ PD I
15 September 1986
Regional Trends
Despite numerous problems facing the East European regimes, continuity
and a "don't rock the boat attitude" prevail.
o All the aging political leaders remain in place. None seems likely
to succumb to health problems in the short-term nor to step down
voluntarily. Nowhere in the region is there a significant increase
in behind-the-scenes manuervering by potential heirs apparent to
force the issue.
o There are no indications of major policy shifts in the wind. The
regimes seem satisfied with their current course and are afraid that
change would upset carefully maintained political balances.
o Although economic stagnation is producing increasingly disspirited
populations, there are few firm indications of rising social
tensions that pose serious threats.
o The East Europeans have heeded Moscow's warnings not to get out in
front on relations with the West and not to go too far afield in
economic experimentation. For its part, Moscow has opted not to
force precipitous personnel or policy changes in East Europe
probably out of fear of opening Pandora's box and because it has
more important things on its agenda, including arms control and
relations with the US.
o Jaruzelski and Honecker will reestablish party relations with China
during upcoming visits to Beijing. For the East Europeans, expanded
contacts may bring economic benefits and increased international
prestige. The East Europeans probably calculate that Moscow's
encouragement of the process is a sign of Soviet acceptance of some
diversity within the Bloc.
The inertia of the regimes is ill-suited to the economic challenges
they face. Their flawed economic systems remain mired in low growth and
eroding living standards that have plagued the region since the late 1970s.
o Moscow's insistence that Eastern Europe contribute more to the
Soviet economy limits the resources available to meet the region's
needs.
EURM 86-20109
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o Although the East Europeans still look to the West for technology
and other inputs, uncompetitive exports, large debts, and Moscow's
suspicion of Western influence limit their access to the goods
needed for stronger growth.
o With the props of Soviet subsidies and Western credits removed, the
regimes need to correct the basic inefficiencies of their economies.
But ideological and bureaucratic resistance to reform remains
strong.
Poland
Party leader Jaruzelski strengthened his control over the party at his
June congress and probably will make further inroads against recalcitrant
party officials in upcoming party elections. His increased self confidence
and control is due in no small measure to strong signs of Soviet support.
To induce the US to remove sanctions and extend economic aid,
Jaruzelski has released nearly all political prisoners, and proposed a
"consultative council" with representatives from different social groups to
foster national reaconcilation.
o Regime spokesmen remain vague on what the council would do, but it
is clear Jaruzelski will not tolerate an official organization that
would publicly challenge his policies.
Church-State frictions are coming to the surface. Church leaders have
criticized the regime's plans to teach religion in the schools and called
for autonomous social organizations. The Church also recently withdrew, in
frustration, its efforts to create an Agricultural Fund.
While opposition sentiment remains widespread, it is deeply fragmented
and not inclined to seek confrontation. The recently released prisoners -
including senior Solidarity officials - will probably take some time to
reevaluate their position.
East Germany
The East Germans may be having more difficulty with Moscow than anyone
else in the Bloc, stemming largely from Soviet desires to control the pace
of inter-German relations.
o Moscow is probably behind East German intransigence in responding to
West German requests to staunch the flow of Third World refugees
into West Berlin. A tougher stance on inter-German issues entails
significant costs to East Berlin given the importance of Western
links to the economy's success.
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East Germany continues to record good economic results by East European
standards. The highest living standards in the region coupled with tight
controls ensure a quiet domestic scene
Czechoslovakia
The stalemate within the leadership, which can only be broken by
Husak's death or a push from Moscow, continues.
o Despite various Soviet hints that it would prefer a more dynamic
leadership, Moscow clearly does not want to endanger stability by
forcing change.
o Despite a gradual economic slowdown, the leadership's immobilism has
ruled out actions to correct highly orthodox central planning and
the decay of the industrial base.
Although there is wide-spread antipathy toward the regime, we do not
expect significant increases in overt opposition. At most, some will seek
involvement in the Church.
o The security service keeps very close tabs on dissidents and
recently arrested dissident jazz musicians.
Hungary
The inexorable approach of a succession combined with economic stresses
has produced political paralysis and a fraying of the social contract. A
growing volume of reports depict a broadly shared sense among Hungarians of
policy drift and discontent over stagnating living standards.
o Somel lbelieve Kadar has lost interest in governing.
Others say the problems are just overwhelming.
o Despite growing concern in the regime about the economy's downward
spiral, the leadership is unwilling to push ahead with its reform
program because this could entail reduced political control and
greater austerity.
o There are only scattered indications of increased open ferment among
workers; the dissidents, though vocal, are not well organized or
influential. Nonetheless, the regime, with an eye on the upcoming
30th anniversary of the October revolt, has shown a tougher line
Romania
The Ceausescu clan continues its absolute rule with some recent
evidence of increased prominence of Elena. Rumors of Ceausescu's imminent
demise for health reasons are exaggerated. Elena's increased influence on
her husband may lie behind the trend toward more open displays of
xenophobic nationalism.
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o Bucharest has recently increased domestic restrictions on contacts
with foreigners, from East as well as West.
Soviet-Romanian relations have been characterized by efforts of both
sides to look for areas of common interest and to tone down differences,
but signs of rapproachment are few.
o Romania's dire economic situation has compelled it to look more
toward Moscow, but the Soviets reject Romanian requests for
assistance.
o Ceausescu remains uncompromising in declaring Romania's maverick
foreign policy.
With Ceausescu unwilliing to alter his disastrous economic policies,
the question is whether there is a limit to the population's patience.
Bulgaria
Zhivkovl Idid not name a
second-in-command at the party congress in March or at recent National Day
celebrations as had been widely rumored.
o He is a shrewd politician who knows how to keep potential successors
in their place.
o Moscow may have been signaling its favorites when it recently gave
Politburo member Chudomir Aleksandrov and Foreign Minister Mladenov
the Red Banner of Labor award on their 50th birthdays. Other
contenders have not been so honored.
Earlier this year, Zhivkov responded to Soviet criticism of Bulgarian
economic performance by shaking up government and party bureaucracies,
echoing Gorbachev's nostrums about modernization, but not doing anything
really significant.
Yugoslavia
More than six years after Tito's death, nonaligned Yugoslavia is stable
and resilient but centrifugal regional forces and ethnic tensions are
hampering Belgrade's ability to govern.
o Economic problems are the top concern of the new Mikulic government,
but regime policies still do not address the basic problems of
inflation and excessive foreign debts.
o The greatest threat to stable relations among the many ethnic groups
continues to come from the Serbs and Albanians. Kosovo Serbs staged
several demonstrations in recent months and the national leadership
had to intervene to promote calm.
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o Belgrade has been encouraged by Gorbachev's restrained policy toward
the Non Alligned Movement as well as his arms control initiatives
and is actively negotiating to buy MIG 29's. Nevertheless, the
Yugoslavs still see the Warsaw Pact as the gravest threat to their
security and continue to look upon Moscow with suspicion.
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Distribution:
Orig - DDCI
3 - C/DDI-DDCI Ex Staff
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - D/EURA
1 - C/EURA/EE
1 - DC/EURA/EE
1-
1 - PS
1 - ORIGINATOR
1 - PRODUCTION
1 - CHRONO
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