COLLECTIVE STRUGGLE: LIBYA'S EMERGING STRATEGY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 November 1986
"Collective Struggle:" Libya's Emerging Strategy
Toward the United States
Summary
Six months after the US airstrikes, Colonel
Mu'ammar Oadhafi has resumed his policy of seeking
aggressively to project his influence abroad and
undermine US interests. His strategy is focused on a
diplomatic effort to break Libya's isolation in the
Middle East and Europe and a renewed program of
political action, subversion, and terrorism. We believe
the US raids in April 1986 have given greater urgency
to this strategy.
A central feature of Oadhafi's strategy is an
attempt to enlist radical groups worldwide in a
"collective struggle" against US interests:
-- The use of British bases in the airstrikes
last spring has heightened longstanding Libyan
interest in joining up with West European
groups opposed to the US military presence in
Europe. Oadhafi is pursuing cooperation with
Communist groups as well as pacifist elements
in Spain, France and the United Kingdom.
-- The attack on Oadhafi's residence in Tripoli
almost certainly has strengthened his
determination to find surrogates to confront
Washington with violent attacks. Available
evidence indicates Libyan efforts to enhance
ties with radical groups they believe are more
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Maghreb 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis at the request of the National Security Council. 25X1
Information as of 28 October 1986 was used in its preparation.
nuestions and comments should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli 25X1
Division
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willing to engage in violent activity
Qadhafi's most dangerous links,
however, continue to be his relationship with
radical Palestinians such as the Abu Nidal
Organization.
-- Tripoli also is stepping up its efforts to
subvert pro-Western regimes, particularly in
Africa. The Libyan effort seems directed
primarily against South Africa, although
moderate regimes in West Africa--such as Ivory
Coast or Togo--are also at risk.
Oadhafi's intentions to use terrorism against the
United States clearly exceed his capabilities. Libyan
money will not dictate the agenda of many of the
important groups, and most radicals in contact with
Tripoli are on the fringe of local society and have
little influence. At the same time, Qadhafi may be
ahle to identify some committed groups--including
Palestinian radicals and European leftists--willing to
support Tripoli during another crisis with Washington
by attacking US interests or organizing anti-US
Tripoli's Diplomatic offensive
after the US airstrikes on 15 25X1
April the Libyan regime was stung by the lack of support from the
Arab League, Western Europe, or its many client groups in the
Third World. Tripoli was especially eager to shore up its poor 25X1
relations with the Arab states.
Libya has continued to press for unity agreements with . 25X1
Algeria and Sudan, tried to ingratiate itself with Khartoum with
aid offers, and put itself forward in June as a mediator for the
chronic dispute between the two Yemens. Other signs of Libyan
"moderation" include renewed interest in thawing relations with
Tunisia, and Tripoli's refusal to bow to Syrian pressure to break
diplomatic ties with Morocco after King Hassan met with Israeli
Tripoli has gained little through its diplomatic efforts.
Libyan restraint failed to prevent Hassan's abrogation of the
Libya-Morocco union, and Oadhafi's mediation between the two
Yemens resolved nothing. Moreover, Oadhafi's unity proposal has
fallen on deaf ears in Sudan. In Western Europe, Libyan
relations have measurably improved only with Italy, which
recently ratified a cultural agreement and agreed to an exchange 25X1
of prisoners. According to our Embassy in Rome, even this
progress may have been arrested by Oadhafi's public denigration
of Italy in a speech on 7 October.
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Nevertheless, two developments have the potential to ease
Libya's isolation:
-- One development is the apparent Libyan willingness to
pay outstanding financial claims arising from the August
1985 expulsion of Tunisian workers. Settling these
claims would remove a key obstacle to a restoration of
relations with Tunis.
-- The other is the recent spate of stories in the Western
press alleging a US disinformation cam ai n a ainst
Lib a.
Recently the
Libyans again called in the EC ambassadors in Tripoli
and urged their governments to reassess their policy
toward Libya in light of the "false" US accusations.
Political Action in Europe: Courting the Left
The use of British bases in the US airstrikes in April
heightened the longstanding Libyan interest in opposing US
military bases and facilities in Europe. As early as last
January Oadhafi announced his intentions to align Libya with the
"Greens Movement" and other representatives of the "masses" who
would would work to remove the US armed forces from Europe. We
believe that since the US airstri'es the pace of Libyan contacts
with such elements has quickened.
Libyan political action often takes the form of sponsorship
of meetings of radical groups in Europe and Libya (See Appendix
I). Conferences in Europe--such as the "Symposium for Peace.in
the Mediterranean" held on Malta last July and others scheduled
for Cyprus in November and Athens in December--apparently are
straightforward Libyan propaganda exercises aimed at condemning
US policy in Europe, the Middle East, and toward Libya, and
legitimizing Libyan support for terrorism under the guise of
"national liberation" or revolutionary stru le.
We know substantially less about what transpires when
individual delegations of leftists visit Libya. Publicized
visits, such as one by the Swedish "Great Peace March
Organization," probably are to show that Libya is not isolated
and that Qadhafi is a proponent of world peace. Unpublicized
ones, such as the visits of "Green Party" groups from Spain and
France, provide the Libyans opportunities to channel support to
the groups and plan propaganda or protest activities against US
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We believe Tripoli has two primary objectives in supporting
West European radicals:
-- Complicating US efforts to enlist West European support
in isolating Libya by disassociating Tripoli from
terrorism in the eyes of the European public.
-- Strengthening groups such as the Greenham Common Peace
Camp in the United Kingdom and the Greens who are
putting pressure on European governments to restrict or
remove US military forces in western Europe.
Tripoli almost certainly views its support o
European leftists as raising the political costs to West European
governments of allowing US forces based in Europe to he used
against Libya.
The Anti-Imperialist Conferences: Trying to Unite the Radicals
Compared to its contacts with leftist and pacifist groups in
Europe, Tripoli's program of coordination with radical groups in
the Third World has a much higher profile. Following the pattern
of March 1986, the Libyan Anti-Imperialism Center organized in
September tour conferences bringing together a wide range of
groups under Libyan leadership. These groups include the ruling
parties of revolutionary states, guerrilla and terrorist
organizations, leftwing parties and politicians, Islamic
societies, and small local groups and individuals who the Libyans
believe to be sympathetic to Libya. In all conferences the
Libyans promoted "collective struggle" against "imperialism."
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The conferences publicly feature a good deal of breast-
beating and emphasize common themes:
-- Endorsement of Libyan policy, such as the claim to
sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra and condemnation of 25X1
US "aggression."
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-- The necessity for progressive forces to confront
imperialism with an escalating "collective struggle."
-- An emphasis on "practical action" and violence in
confronting "imperialism."
There was a special focus on Africa in all the
conferences. The most important conference gathered "African"
progressive forces (including black progressives from the
Caribbean and the United States) to coordinate their struggle
against US "imperialism" manifested by military bases in Africa,
multinational corporations, and support for "reactionary
regimes." The conference also urged:
-- Resistance to the reestablishment of diplomatic
relations with Israel.
-- Opposition to French military intervention on the
continent.
-- Promoting armed struggle against South Africa.
How Serious is Qadhafi?
In our view, Qadhafi's maneuvers are aimed at reminding his
international audience that he remains determined to serve as the
focus of resistance to US imperialism. In addition, Libyan
public statements define the Palestinian conflict with Israel,
the Libyan confrontation with the United States, and the black
struggle against the policy of apartheid in South Africa, as
struggles for "national liberation" that justify the use of
violence--a transparent attempt to legitimize Libyan support for
terrorism.
One ominous indicator of Libyan intentions is the central
role played by the Anti-Imperialism Center in organizing the
September conferences. The Center long has arranged funding,
training, and materiel support for various "liberation groups"
around the world. Moreover, senior Anti-Imperialism Center
officials, such as Musa Kusa and Abd al-Salam Ashur, are radical
ideologues
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The September conferences, and the resolutions that have
emerged from them, are probably the fullest statement of
Qadhafi's current intentions toward the United States. Moreover,
available evidence indicates that Qadhafi is not confining
himself to a policy of rhetoric alone; since the US airstrikes
last spring he has been taking actions in support of his stated
aims.
In Latin America, the Libyans also have been trying to
increase their support to indigenous insurgent and terrorist
groups and to identify local surrogates willing to strike US
targets on behalf of Libya.(--
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Strengthened Ties with Radical Arabs
Tripoli also continues to nurture its links to radical
Middle Eastern--primarily Palestinian--groups. In our view the
experience, sophistication, and motivation of the radical
Palestinians, coupled with Libya's central interest in middle
Eastern issues, make the Libyan-Palestinian connection the most
dangerous relationship the Libyans have developed; we believe the
Palestinians are more likely than many of the other radicals to
work with Libya to mount serious terrorist operations against US
interests.
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The Libyans apparently are encouraging the Palestinians t
undertake operations against US interests
Prospects for Libyan Success
Qadhafi almost certainly will fall short of his goal of
confronting the United States with an effective, united front of
,adicals under Libyan tutelage. The disparate nature of the many
groups he hopes to unite--[narxists and conservative muslims,
pacifists and terrorists, Latin Americans, Africans, and Asians-
probably outweighs whatever common interest they have in
undermining US interests, particularly in support of Libyan
policy. In addition, most of the groups the Libyans are dealing
with are small, fringe organizations with little support or
serious capabilities; many of them come to Libya in hope of 25X1
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obtaining funding for their own parochial, often nonviolent
programs.
Of greater concern in our view, however, is that padhafi is
increasing support to groups whose agendas coincide with his
objective of undermining US and Western interests through
violence or political agitation. The apparently growing Libyan
cooperation with Latin American groups such as the AVC and Tupac
Amarus may presage a redirection of Libyan support away from the
generally nonviolent Anglophone Caribbean leftists and toward
more active and violent groups on the South and possibly Central
American mainland. In Africa, the South African ANC apparently
has reversed its earlier refusal of Libyan aid, and Qadhafi is
likely to use this to press the ANC to include US interests on
ANC target lists.
Libyan meetings with radical groups also may facilitate
Tripoli's identification of elements willing to support Tripoli
during a crisis with the US by mounting serious or symbolic
terrorist attacks, or by organizing demonstrations.
by institutionalizing the contacts, as the
Libyans seem to have done with the Pan-Arab Command, the Libyans
may be better able to allocate their resources for subversion and
terrorism. They may achieve the sort of coordination on a narrow
issue--such as operations in Lebanon or the radicalization of the
Palestinian movement--that they cannot obtain on a global
The likelihood of Libyan success in courting radical and
pacifist groups in Western Europe is unclear. Some of the
groups, such as the Spanish "Crida" or PCE/ML groups are
insignificant fringe organizations with little influence.
Others, such as the Greens, may be of more importance. In our 25X1
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view the danger is that Qadhafi may exploit his relationship with
these elements to influence their anti-US sentiments in ways that
help support Libya, as he has tried to do with the Onde Verde
radio station. Libyan cooperation with and funding of Soviet
front or Communist party activities are also of
concern, because of the relative sophistication of these
programs.
The growing Libyan cooperation with radical Palestinian
groups--particularly Abu Nidal--is an especially worrisome
development. The combining of Libyan resources with the
sophisticated terrorist capabilities of groups like Abu Nidal may
allow Oadhafi to pursue his policy of confrontation with
Washington via effective surrogates and thereby minimize the
risks to Libya of US retaliation. The Pan-Am hijacking in
Karachi may be a case in point, and Oadhafi's willingness to play
a role in such incidents may grow if he becomes convinced that
only direct evidence of Libyan involvement will prompt US
military action against him.
Libyan subversion in Africa also may increase as Tripoli
seeks to compensate for its isolation in the Arab world and
Western Europe by trying to play a larger role in Africa.
Although the emphasis on Libyan activities appears to he support
for South African insurgent groups, we believe Libyan influence
in the South African conflict probably will remain marginal.
nadhafi may have better prospects for success in West Africa,
where chronic economic and ethnic problems provide greater
opportunities for Libyan meddling.
In our view other countries at
risk include Togo, Cameroon, Niger, and Zaire--countries with
close ties to France or the United States, and, in the case of
Cameroon and Zaire, diplomatic relations with Israel.
Libyan contacts with US groups also bear watching. Oadhafi
often has threatened to mount terrorist attacks in the United
States, and since the US raids last spring he may believe that he
needs a capability to make good that threat. Available evidence
suggests that Tripoli does not yet possess resources in the
United States capable of mounting more than symbolic actions on
Libya's behalf.
na a i probably would have to turn to
other surrogates--perhaps Palestinians--if he wished to support a
major terrorist attack in the US.
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Appendix 1
Libyan-Organized Meetings with Radical Groups
Following is a chronology of known contacts with various
leftist, pacifist and in a few instances rightwing groups since
July 1986, when Tripoli began to emerge from the post-airstrike
slump of late spring. The major conferences held in September are
excluded from the chronology, but planned Libyan meetings are
included. In most cases the meetings listed below involved
officials of the Anti-Imperialism Center or Revolutionary
Committees.
5-6 July 86 -- "Symposium for Peace in the Mediterranean"
Ostensibly sponsored by Malta Peace Lab,
in Valletta. Known participants included:
Lebanon
A. Lebanese Popular Nasserist Organization (1)
B. Lebanese Progessive Socialist Party (1)
C. Lebanese Communist Party (1)
Malta
A. Malta Peace Lab
B. Government of Malta--Foreign Minister Sceberras Trigona
Palestinians
A. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-GC) (1)
B. Popular Struggle Front(l)
C. Fatah-The Awakening (Syrian-backed Fatah dissident group).(1)
Spain
A. "Euskadi Regional Solidarity Committee"
B. Canary Islands Independence Movement
C. Hispano-Libyan Friendship Association
D. Committee for Solidarity with the Arab Cause
E. Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Spain (PCE/ML)
F. Catalan Independence Movement CRIDA
Syria
A. Pan-Arab Command of the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party (1)
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A. Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. 25X1
15-20 September 86 -- Third General Conference for the Islamic
Call held in Tripoli. Five hundred delegates from 80 countries
attended.
15-22 September 86 -- Libyan former Foreign Minister Ubaydi,
secretary of the Libyan Arab Solidarity and Peace Committee
visits USSR. Meets with head of Soviet Peace Defense Committee
and Vice Chairman of Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. 25X1
Signed program of cooperation between Libyan Arab Solidarity and
Peace Committee and Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.
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22-23 September 86 -- Third meeting of the Political Secretariat
of the Anti-Imperialism Center held in Tripoli.
28 Sept-2 Oct 86 -- Delegation from Swedish "Great Peace March
Organization" visits Libya, meets with Qadhafi, planning with
Libyan "popular organizations" to hold "A Special Day for Peace
in North Africa"
29-30 September 86 -- Preparatory Committee for the Conference of
Arab Friendship Societies in Europe meets in Tripoli. Includes
delegations representing:
A. Palestine
B. French-Arab Solidarity Societies
C. Greek-Arab Solidarity Societies
D. Council of Friendship and Solidarity with the Peoples in
Algeria
E. Syrian Socialist Arab Ba'th Party
F. Permanent Secretariat of the Arab People's Congress (2)
G. International Secretariat for Solidarity with the Arab People
and Their Central Cause: Palestine (2)
29 September-3 October 86 -- General Education Conference, "the
First World Gathering on Jamahiri Thought, the Thoughts of
Mu'ammar Qadhafi," held in Tripoli.
14 October 86 -- Libya convenes meeting of the General
Secretariat of the Pan Arab Command, in Tripoli. A number of
Arab radicals attend. (See Appendix 6)
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Appendix 6
Meetings of the General Secretariat of the Pan-Arab Command of
Arab Revolutionary Forces
The Pan-Arab Command is an umbrella organization founded by
Qadhafi in March 1985 for the purpose of uniting the various
"revolutionary forces" in the Arab world and coordinating their
activities. A second meeting of the Command was held in Tripoli
in February 1986, which prompted the Israelis to unsuccessfully
attempt to capture some of Palestinian participants by forcing a
Libyan jet en route from the conference to Damascus to land in
Israel.
The stated aims of the Pan-Arab Command include the
destruction of Israel, the toppling of "reactionary" regimes, and
the confrontation of US imperialism, specifically the
"liquidation" of its military bases and the striking of its
interests "wherever they might exist." Although there clearly is
a great deal of propaganda and public relations surrounding the
creation of this organization, we believe Qadhafi views it as a
potential framework for uniting radical Arab groups, much as he
viewed his union with Morocco as a framework for Arab unity at a
The General Secretariat probably is a sort of steering
committee for the command that allows Qadhafi to discuss in
general terms the coordination of Libyan support to various
radical Palestinian and other groups. We believe it unlikely,
however, that Qadhafi would employ such a forum for the planning
of specific terrorist acts, because of concern for operational
security. The General Secretariat may have met twice since April
1986. The first meeting, in late August, was not publicized nor
referred to aa the "Pan-Arab Command."
second meeting, which was publicized, may not have been a
F The
success, however, as it failed to issue the usual "political
statement" at the end of the conference. If in fact the
participants failed to agree on a public communique, this
suggests that Qadhafi's prestige with the radical Arabs may he
diminished. Many of the groups also may be reluctant at this
time to risk being branded as terrorists by publicly associating
themselves with Libya's inflammatory rhetoric against the US.
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SUBJECT: "Collective Struggle:" Libya's Emerging Strategy
Toward tha rTG
NESA M# 86-20166C
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL: Copy 1 - Lt. Col. Oliver North (NSC)
2 - Howard Teicher (NSC)
3 - James Stark (NSC)
4 - Ronald C. St. Martin (NSC)
5 - Clark Murdock (NSC)
6 - Donald Gregg (NSC)
7 - Michael Ussery (State)
8 - Arnold Raphel (State)
9 - Morton Abramowitz (State)
10 - James Bishop (State)
11 - Martin Van Heuven (State)
12 - Richard Solomon (State)
13 - Charles Duelfer (State)
14 - Richard Sokolsky (State)
15 - L. Paul Bremer III (State)
16 - Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots (Pentagon)
17 - Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser (Pentagon)
18 - Sandra Charles (Pentagon)
19 - James L. Woods (Pentagon)
20 - Robert Pelletreau (Pentagon)
21 - Gary M. Jackson (US Secret Service)
INTERNAL:
22 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
23 - DO/NE
24 - DDI
25 - ADDI
26 - NIO/AF
27 - NIO/CT
28 - NIO/NESA
29 - CPAS/ILS
I~/ice &~ .
30-35 - CPAS/IMC/CBdnzZ;r-.d 35-
36 - C/PES
37 - PDB Staff
38 - NID Staff
39- CTC/TAB
40 - CTC/STB
41 - D/NESA
42 - DD/NESA
43 - C/NESA/PPS
44-45 - NESA/PPS (One copy to analsyt to source
46 - NESA/IA
47 - NESA/PG
48 - NESA/SO
49-53 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/MJ
3 November 1986
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