THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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lntelfi8r-t-enCe Memorandum
The Economic Situation In Cambodia
Secret
ER IM 71-57
March 1971
Copy No. t 2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDtIr,-1
The Economic Situation In Cambodia
Highlights
1. In the past two months, the impact of the
war on the Cambodian economy has become severe, as
continued disruptions to transportation have greatly
restricted imports, exports, and the internal dis-
tribution of goods. With pre-war stocks generally
depleted and with military spending rapidly pushing
up the money supply, inflation has greatly accel-
erated and confidence in the currency has plummeted.
There is no doubt that the standard of living of
most Cambodians has been reduced, as urban workers
suffer from unemployment and shortages of consumer
goods while farmers are in a cost-price squeeze.
Supplies of basic necessities, including rice, re-
main sufficient, however, so that the economy's
problems do not appear to threaten the population's
health or well-being.
2. The long-awaited 1971 budget was approved
by the cabinet on 19 March. Budgeted expenditures
total 18.7 billion riels (about $337 million), 62%
of which are allocated for the Ministry of Defense.
The projected deficit of 6.0 billion riels is about
35% below last year's in anticipation of increased
receipts from higher taxes and increased customs
revenues gene.-ated by the US aid program.
3. The price index for working class families
in Phnom P: 1h increased 1.8% during January, com-
pared with only 27% during the entire preceding
year. Infl,7tionary pressure eased considerably
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Economic Research.
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after mid-February, however, with the reopening
of road and railroad bridges, the destruction of
which had greatly slowed the flow of meats and
foodstuffs from Battambang Province for nearly
six weeks.
4. After being relatively stable for several
months at a rate of about 90 riels per US $1 --
compared with an official rate of 55.5 riels per
US $1 -- the black market rate in Phnom Penh had
declined to 130 riels per US $1 by 18 March. The
Hong Kong rate was even lower, as rumors of an
impending devaluation and the worsening economic
situation resulted in large transfers of capital
from the country.
5. By early March the rice harvest in Battam-
bang Province was about 90% completed. The crop
was bountiful, but farmers' earnings have been
sharply squeezed by rising labor costs and low
prices offered by buyers, whose warehouses are
already overflowing because of transport disrup-
tions. There have been no shipments of rice by
rail to Bangkok for export, despite an intergov-
ernmental agreement and secure conditions, and the
Thais appear to have taken over a larg' part of
the rice market in Senegal, Cambodia's principal
customer in recent years.
6. Continued insecurity along Route 4 ha:-
forced the diversion of maritime shipping from
Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. Petroleum shipments
are arriving in Phnom Penh with regularity and in
sufficient quantities to cover current needs.
The destruction of storage facilities at the
Kompong Som refinery will keep it out of operation
for at least several months, but this will not
affect the shipment of petroleum up the Mekong
from South Vietnamese facilities. Shipping on the
Mekong, however, continues to be threatened by
enemy gunfire and mines, which have held down the
volume and raised the cost of imports.
7. Charts on prices and currency outstanding;
imports, exports, and foreign exchange revenues;
and government borrowing from the Banque du
Cambodge follow the text.
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The 1971 Budget
8. After much delay in compiling and eval-
uating wartime requirements of the various minis-
tries, a revised draft budget for the current year
was finally approved by the Cabinet on 19 March
and now goes to the National Assembly, where it
is expected to be passed without change.* Costs
incident to the war and mobilization have boosted
proposed expenditures to 18.7 billion riels
($337 million**), compared to actual expenditures
of 13.8 billion riels in 1970 arid, only 8.4 billion
riels in 1969. On a monthly basis, 1971 expendi-
tures are expected,to average 30% above the rate
during the fourth quarter of 1970. The Ministry
of Defense is allocated 11.5 billion riels, or
62% of total expenditures.
9. Receipts are estimated at 12.7 billion
riels ($229 million), the bulk of which -- 5.8
million riels -- represents US counterpart funds.
Excise taxes and customs duties are expected to
account for 2.2 billion riels in revenue, general
taxes for 3.1 billion riels, and miscellaneous
receipts for the balance.
10. The new budget incorporates several Cabinet
revisions made on recommendation of the Finance
Ministry. The principal change is a reduction of
1 billion riels in proposed defense appropriations.
Of the 11.5 billion riels finally approved for the
Ministry of Defense, only 1 billion riels is al-
located to materiel expenditures, about 500 million
riels less than originally proposed, but the mili-
tary has made it clear that their acceptance of
the cut is conditional upon substantial MAP de-
liveries. The Cabinet also approved rate increases
of up to 50% for many existing taxes, thereby
adding 1.3 billion riels to expected revenues.
11. The changes trimmed the expected budget
deficit to 6.0 billion riels from the nearly 8.7
billion riels originally projected, but there
appears to be ample scope for further cuts in
* The Cambodian fiscal year corresponds to the
calendar year.
** At the official rate of 55.5 riels per US $1.
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appropriations for activities not related to the
war. The civilian budget for example, has been
increased by 7% over last year's -- to 7.2 bil-
lion riels -- although the government's loss of
control over substantial portions of the popula-
tion and territory would seem to justify reduced
appropriations. Education, for example, is al-
located over 30% of nonmilitary expenditures,
despite the fact that many schools have been closed
and large numbers of teachers and students have
entered the army. in addition, the allocation of
271 million riels to 17 recently formed "commis-
sariats" appears to duplicate ministerial alloca-
tions.
12. There are indications, however, that
budgetary considerations have compelled the govern-
ment to take a more realistic view of sustainable
military force levels.
a 210,000-man ceiling was in effect for Marc ,
despite the fact that 218,000 were on the payroll
in mid-February. The new ceiling apparently re-
flects a significant scaling down of mobilization
goals set by the general staff, since ground force
units authorized by mid-January would at full
strength total more than 300,000.
Monetary Developments
Money Supply
13. War financing continues to result in a
large monthly infusion of riels into the economy.
Net advances to the state from the Banque Nationale
du Cambodge amounted to 937 million riels for
December, bringing cumulative government borrowing
for all of 1970 to 6.5 billion riels. Net govern-
ment borrowing, however, dropped to only 625 mil-
lion riels in January, perhaps as a result of
delays in payment of military wages. Currency in
circulation reached 11.6 billion riels by the end
of 1970, an increase since March of 78%, compared
with an increase of 2% for all of 1969. By the
end of February, currency in circulation had
reached about 13 billion riels, representing an
increase of 12% for the first two months of 1971.
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Prices
14. Retail prices in Phnom Penh rose dras-
tically in January. Most of the increase was
attributable to a sharp reduction in deliveries
of meats and foodstuffs from Battambang following
the interdiction of both Route 5 and the rail line
from Battambang to Pursat. Both were reopened in
mid-February, after being out of service for five
or six weeks. The price index for working class
families showed an 18% increase for the month,
compared with a 27% increase for all of 1970.
Reports indicate that increases in the prices
of all meats accounted for most of t''e rise.
While government rice stocks are more than
adequate to maintain rice prices at present
levels and speculative buying is not apparent
in the case of any commodity, sustained declines
in supplies of important items will certainly
trigger even greater increases in price levels.
Black Market Currency Prices
15. The black market value of the riel showed
a steady deterioration during February and March.
After being relatively stabilized at about 90 riels
per US $1 for several months, a further decline
began in February and was accelerated by the an-
nouncement on 11 March that goods to be imported
under the first $10-million portion of the US
economic aid program would carry a 50% "war tax,"
thus pegging the effective exchange rate for these
commodities at 83 riels per US $1.* The black
market price of US dollars in Phnom Penh had
reached 130 riels per US $1 by 18 March. (The
official rate is 55.5 riels per US $1.)
16. The value of the riel has been consistently
lower on the Hong Kong market, reaching a record
low of 150 riels per US $1 on 19 March. The sharp
depreciation in the riel's value is attributable
largely to transfers of capital out of Cambodia in
anticipation of a devaluation. Rumors of an
* Last A9ay, when VC/NVA forces were rapidly ex-
tending their control over large sections of the
country, the value of the rieZ reached its 1970
Zow, but its value never dropped below 130 riels
per US $1.
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across-the-board devaluation have been circulating
in Phnom Penh for some time, and an IMF team of
experts due in Phnom Penh in late March to discuss
possible fiscal reforms is expected to push for
such a move.
Counterfeit Riels
17. A recent announcement by the Banque
Nationale du Cambodge accuses the VC/NVA of
plotting to destroy the Khmer economy by circu-
lating counterfeit bills and warns the public
against acceptance of the fraudulent notes. The
notes reportedly are convincing facsimiles of the
500-riel note first issued at the end of February
1970.
18. Although recent arrests and seizures of
large quantities of the bogus notes in Battambang
point to a Thai-based operation, firm evidence is
lacking regarding its location or whether or not
it is Communist-organized. There are also sharply
conflicting reports as to the amounts of money in-
volved. There is no question, however, that a
serious counterfeiting problem exists, and Cambo-
dian authorities are gravely concerned.
there is already considerable panic
among market vendors and shopowners in Phnom Penh,
some of whom are refusing to accept any 500-riel
notes.
19. Just one year ago, widespread Communist
use of counterfeit bills (which also first ap-
peared in Battambang) forced the Cambodian govern-
ment to recall all 500-riel notes in exchange for
a new issue that was supposedly extremely diffi-
cult to counterfeit, By stipulating that after
7 March 1970 the old 500-riel note would have no
value and that a limit of 10,000 riels per person
could be exchanged, the government hoped to leave
the Communists holding an empty bag.
the Communists
had moved quickly to rid themsc>lves of the
counterfeits, successfully bilking many Cambodian
peasants in the process. The government, if possi-
ble, wants to avoid recalling the current issue,
since such an action, especially at the present
time, might further weaken confidence in the cur-
rency.
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US Economic Aid
20. A US-Cambodian agreement signed on 2 March
provides for $10 million in grant aid under which
the United States would reimburse Cambodia for
certain urgently needed commercial imports financed
with its own foreign exchange. The agreement rep-
resents the first commitment of funds from the
$70-million FY 1971 supplemental economic aid
package authorized by the US Congress in January.
A second agreement, signed the same day, provides
for $8.5 million in agricultural commodities to
be supplied under Public Law 480.
21. The FY 1971 aid program requires proceeds
from the resale of US commodities by Cambodia to
be deposited in a special counterpart fund. The
riels to be deposited will be calculated at an
effective exchange rate of 83 riels to US $1 --
the official rate, which remains at 55.5 riels to
the dollar, plus a 50% "exchange tax." The ex-
change tax, which did not require National Assembly
approval, is understood to be only a temporary
solution to the problem, since both the IMF and
the US government would prefer a unitary exchange
rate.
22. An IMF mission was due in Phnom Penh at the
end of March to push for adoption of certain aus-
terity measures designed to stave off further
deterioration of Cambodia's financial position.
Discussions wi_l probably center on such measures
as increasing customs duties and turnover taxes,
initiating 100% advance riel deposits against
foreign exchange purchases, increasing interest
rates on time deposits, and adopting a flexible
exchange rate. Cambodia has so far resisted ex-
ternal pressure for far-reaching reforms, espe-
cially devaluation, expressing the fear that a
change in the official exchange rate would aggra-
vate price increases and lead specifically to
pressures for military and civilian salary increases.
Nevertheless, Cambodian acceptance of the rate of
83 riels to US $1 for US aid imports is seen as
a useful first step in facilitating acceptance of
IY,-_. exchange recommendations.
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23. Although an agreement was signed on
27 March for a second $10-million tranche, on the
same reimbursable basis as the first tranche,
formal agreement on the remaining $50 million CIP
will await the outcome of IMF discussions.
The Rice Situation
Harvesting Problems
24. Battambang farmers continued to experience
great difficulty during February with their rice
harvest. Rain and, in some areas, Communist har-
assment slowed the work, but by far the most
serioucs bottleneck was a severe shortage of labor.
The assignment of troops to the Battambang governor
to help bring in the crop and the suspension of
FANK recruitment in the province during the harvest
season did not offset the absence of migrant workers
whose normal influx was deterred by insecurity and
increased transport costs.* Even the larger co-
operatives had difficulty hiring workers, despite
substantial wage increases. Field hands who would
normally receive 30 riels per day were receiving
upwards of 45 riels per day. Farmers who could
not afford to pay the high wages were forced to
offer a substantial portion -- in some instances
as much as 60% -- of their harvest as pay. This
form of sharecropping began in early January in
Svay Don Keo, Riang Kessei, and Thmar Kaul districts
but by early February was common throughout the
provLice.
25. Although harvesting in the northern parts
of the province was reportedly 80% to 90% complete
by the end of February, it was far behind schedule
in many areas. Official crop estimates will not
be available for several months. Millers in
Battamba.ng now believe that the crop was even
better than last year's, but labor shortages and
insecurity in southern Battambang may hold the
harvest to a lesser volume.
The troops proved unwilling workers, and some
petitioned the governor for back pay, claiming
their wages were three months in arrears. This
has been a common complaint a-nong the military in
Cambodia, even in Sihanouk's time.
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Transport and Marketing
26. The transport of rice from Battambang to
Phnom Penh was all but suspended during most of
January and early February, when only three or
four trucks a day were making the trip.* Deliv-
eries were retarded by the destruction in early
January of rail and highway bridges between Battam-
bang and Pursat. Trucks traveli.Lig from Battambang
on Route 5 could proceed only as far as the de-
stroyed bridge near Svay Don Keo, where rice was
ferried across the stream in small boats, then
reloaded onto trucks waiting on the opposite bank.
Boat owners charging 45 riels per bag profited
handsomely from their new-found enterprise and
pushed transport costs to Phnom Penh up to 150
riels per bag.** However, the highway and railway
bridges were reopened to traffic on 10 and 19 Feb-
ruary, respectively, and by the end of the month,
traffic from Battambang was moving freely, with
800 tons of rice reaching Phnom Penh daily, but
still far below normal delivery rates.
27. The resumption of rice deliveries to the
capital helped ease an acute storage problem in
Battambang, but most millers and merchants ab-
stained from purchasing rice because of the large
stocks on hand and uncertain prospects. The few
who bought took only what they could process and
ship immediately. The three state enterprises
involved in rice-purchasing -- SORAPA, SATRAR, and
EAMB -- which were supposedly responsible for sup-
porting the price of paddy, were already well-
stocked and short of funds. For example, SORAPA,
which functions as the buyer for SONEXIM, was
offering 140 riels per picul (68 kilograms) of
paddy, well below government-established prices
of between 165 and 180 riels per picul. Re-
portedly, few farmers were accepting the offer.
SORAPA is reported to have purchased extremely
y Prior to the hostilities, when nearly c:ZZ
Battambang rice moved by rail shipments during
the three-month harvest season averaged 70 freight
cars per day, each car carrying 20 tons of rice
for a total of 1,400 tons per day.
** In normal times, transport costs for this trip
averaged about 28 riels per bag by train and 30
to 35 rieZs per bag by truck.
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small amounts of rice for this time of year,
perhaps because of the large stocks awaiting ex-
port in SONEXIM's Phnom Penh warehouses.
28, Because of the low price offered for paddy,
farmers are storing record amounts of rice despite
the risk of heavy losses. Although rice can be
kept for three years or more if adequately pro-
tected from moisture and vermin, small farmers
with poor storage facilities will probably lose
large portions of their reserves. Merchants in
Battambang are predicting that, because of the
price squeeze, farmers will cut back on planting
as they did this past year.*
Rice Exports
29. Rice exports in 1970 amounted to 200,000
tons and were valued at approximately $18 million.
Although this exceeds the 1969 total of 103,000
tons, valued at $14.5 million, it was an extremely
poor showing considering that the export of 450,000
tons had been projected before the outbreak of
hostilities.
30. Prcspects for rice exports in 1971 depend
almost entirely on improvement in transport and
security. There are still large surpluses in both
Phnom Penh and Battambang. A recent attempt to
move rice via the Mekong on six barges chartered
from a Manila concern proved to be feasible but
unprofitable. A shortage of trucks will be eased
substantially by the arrival in early April of
600 US MAP-financed trucks from Australia.
SONEXIM expects to get 150 of these trucks and
plans to employ most of them in transporting rice.
Insecurity on Route 4 and the Mekong, however,
continues to be the principal constraint to in-
creased rice exports.
31.. The Cambodians are particularly concerned
about fulfilling their commitments to Senegal,
their principal customer by virtue of annual
* There has been no reporting on the planting of
dry-season crops, 89% of which are grown in the
four provinces of Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo, and
Kompong Cham. Planting is r:suaZZy finished by
mid-March?
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1;)urc:haares in excess of 60,000 tons of low-quality
broken rice in three of the past four years. At
the end of the year, SONEXIM held ;.n. Phnom Penh
more than 100,000 tons of rice grown expressly for
Liic' ?.enegalese. * Faced with severe transport
problems and fearful of defaulting, the Cambodians
in i.0ebruary arranged for the Thais to ship 10 , 300
tons of rice to Senegal on the Cambodians' account,
according to a Thai press report. The Thai sale
comes as a surprise, however, in view of the fact
that Eattambang warehouses are overflowing with
surplus rice and an agreement concluded last fall
authorizes the export of Battambang rice via E:;ng-
kok "in the event that Cambodia's own ports are
inaccessible." Apparently, hopes that rice might
move by this route have proved to be unrealistic?
32. The Cambodians, however, may already have
lost most of the Senegalese market to the Thais,
who, according to a Bangkok press report, have
contracted for the sale of 80,000 to 100,000 tons
of broken rice this year. Sales of this magnitude
apparently would severely lim_t the Cambodians'
chances, since Senegal's annual, rice imports have
averaged only about 160,000 tons in recent years
and amounted to only 146,000 tons of rice in 1969,
the last year for which annual statistics are
available.
Petroleum Production and Supplies
33. Enemy mortar and rocket fire struck the
storage area of the Kompong Som refinery on 2 March
starting fires that destroyed or badly damaged
eight tanks, comprising about three-fourths of
storage capacity The re-
iinell, ry itself was not hit
Although a government monopoly over rice ex-
ports was abolished last October, SONEXIM? remains
the focal point of rice collection and export.
Private traders have been unwilling to commit
funds because of the high cost of shipping and
insurance and the risk involved.
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34. The refinery must remain out of operation
until much of the damage has been repaired. Cam-
bodian officials estimate that a complete restora-
tion would take six to eight months, at a cost of
up to $4 million. Their estimate appears to be
high. All eight tanks can probably be replaced
for about $1.5 million, and reported damage to
other equipment seems substantially less costly
to repair. Furthermore, nit all of the tanks need
be replaced. The refinery has never been operated
t more than two-thirds of its designed annual
c,;pacity, and operations over the ppst year have
been on a considerabiy smaller scale. Limited
but efficient operations could be resumed with
only one of the crude oil tanks -- the three
largest and most costly tanks destroyed or
damaged -- and probably with fewer than the five
diesel product tanks that were destroyed or damaged.
The threat of additional attacks by strong enemy
units that have operated in southwestern Cambodia
for several months, however, may cause the Cambo-
dians to postpone reconstruction until the security
situation is substantially improved.
35. The shutdown of the refinery will have no
significant or immediate effect on the flow of
petroleum to Phnom Penh because the continued in-
security of Route 4 has prevented the trucking of
more than a few hundred tons of petroleum from
Kompong Som since the route was reopened in late
January. The refinery had been shut down after
the closure of Route 4 last November, and did not
resume operations until February, after the ini-
tiation of a systematic transfer of petroleum
products by tanker to Nha Be, South Vietnam.*
These shipments were to replace products shipped
up the Mekong to Phnom Penh under emergency
arrangements with the South Vietnamese.
36. Loss of the refinery's output will put an
added strain on Cambodia's limited foreign ex-
change reserves, however. Products now being im-
ported from South Vietnam will have to be paid
for in cash instead of being replaced by shipments
No petroleum shipments tc Phnom Penh via either
Route 4 or Route 1 have been reported since mid-
February.
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from Kompong Sam. At the current rate of shipments
of approximately 10,000 tons a month, these will
cost on the order of $300,000 a month (c.i.f.
Saigon),* compared with estimated foreign exchange
expenditures for crude oil of about $1.70,000 per
month to provide most of the same products from
the refinery. There will be an additional loss
of foreign exchange earnings from the export of
surplus refinery products. Last year, with the
refinery operating at considerably less than half
of its capacity, Cambodia's petroleum export earn-
ings totaled $600,)00.
37. Since late January, convoys have arrived
in Phnom Penh wit.': petroleum shipments at about
12-day intervals. In the first 60 days of
operation of the heavily armed rive~.ine convoys,
nearly 22,000 tons of petroleum were delivered to
Phnom Penh via the Mekong. These deliveries have
been more than sufficient to cover the needs of
FANK and essential civilian consumers, but stocks
in Phnom Penh's central stc-rage depots only occa-
sionally exceeded a three-week supply, and those
for some products at times became critically low
when delivery schedules got out of step with con-
sumption patterns. Ly 1 March, however, the
situation apparently had improved enough to permit
the lifting of petroleum rationing regulations
that had been in effect since early ')ecember.**
33. Despite FANK efforts to improve security
along the Mekong, travel on this vital route
remains hazardous. As of mid-March, three of the
last four convoys that included petroleum-carrying
vessels either had been fired upon or encountered
enemy mines, The heaviest recent, attack occurred
on 22 February, when enemy rocket and mortar fire
exploded and destroyed one ammunition barge, in-
flicted heavy damage on one tugboat, and scored
hits on a tanker and two freighters. On 16 March
a tugboat towing petroleum barges was severely
damaged when it struck a mine. The continuing
insecurity of the river poses a serious threat to
Phnom Penh's petroleum supplies: petroleum
to Plznom Penh are
whipping coo to from Saigon
not included in thie cotimate.
** This ctctement iv baocl on a prece report and
h(6 not vec-n verified by offic=_,Z sourceu.
SI?CIZE' F
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1'RtI?'I
S
shipments up the Mekong are carried exclusively
by foreign vessels whose owners and crews might
at some point find the service too dangerous to
be continued.
39. Petroleum consumer.: in I3atttunbang are
receiving adequate snj-pplie : from Thailand. In
the three months since mid-December, Thai. truckers
delivered abut 7,000 tons of assorted petroleum
products from facilities, near Bangkok. Deliveries
included more than 400 tons of aviation gas, some
of which was transferred in Cambodian trucks to
Pochentong Airfield near Phnom Penh. In Kanapot
Province, insecurity along Route, 4 and 3 during
the first two weeks of March disrupted petroleum
deliveries; from Kompong Som refinery, causing
temporary shortages.
Imports
40. In Phnom Penh, prices of imported goods
have increased nearly 50% since the turn of the
year 25X1
In outlying
areas, imported goods are said to cost up to 40%,
more than in Phnom Penh. The only exception is
the I3attambang area, where foreign goods are
cheaper than in Phnom Penh, thanks to a lively
(but largely illegal) Gros?-border trade with
Thailand.
41. The increasing scarcity of. imported good,
in 19 7 0 wa:, c LLri.),ULO)o1C: 1argge f to i. h c~~}'1c.ttt ire t1l ' :;
efforts to conserve foreign exchange. 11)c,rne
import:: of goods other than pet:roloum and petro-
leum products; declined steadily throughout 1970,
as shown in the following tral:iulation:
71, 300 51,600 44,800 11,600
42. Since late November, int(.erdictinn c.-)! the
main highways from Kompr,nq Som has been ,Y further
constraint on import!;. Only a few hundred tons of
- 1s, -
SEC :R . F'"I'
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SECRET
imports have been moved overland to Phnom Penh
from Kompong Som.* The government is attempting
to reduce its reliance on the highway by promoting
greater use of the port at Phnom Penh. Conse-
quently, 40 seagoing cargo ships** called at Phnom
Penh in the three-month period of December-February,
compared with only 42 in the preceding eight
months. Many of the ships that arrived at Phnom
Penh in December and January had been diverted
from Kompong Sam, and in January at least four
ships brought in cargoes that previously had
been offloaded at Kompong Som.
** These data exclude calls by barges. and ships
of less than 300 GRT.
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SECRET
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CAMBODIA
Indices of Currency and of Prices,1970-71
CAMBODIA
Imports, Exports, and
Gold and Hard Currency Holdings
MILLION US $
IMPORTS
E
/
/
GOLD AND
Feb /
HA
RD CURRENCY
/
EXPORTS
F
E.Ollicial projection oxp)icity based on prospect of foreign aid
F..Official revised projection
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 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
1970 1971
CAMBODIA
Government Borrowing
from the Banque Nationale du Cambodge
1970-71
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