AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201740001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Afghanistan Situation Report
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NESA M 86-20002CX
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7 Januarv l 986
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AFGHANISTAN SITOATION REPORT
7 January 1986
SOVIET AND AFGHAN OPERATIONS NEAR BAGRAM AIRFIELD
Several thousand Soviet and Afghan troops are
conducting air and ground operations in the
Shomali Plain region, probably mainly in an
attempt to prevent the insurgents from interfering
with convoy traffic on the major transportation
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route between the So
vie
t Union and Kabul.
LERY AUGMENTATION IN
AF
GHANISTAN
1
The Soviets are grea
tly
increasing their holdings
of automatic and sel
f-
ro elled mortars in
Afghanistan.
TAN: PARLIAMENT SUP
POR
TS AFGHAN POLICY
2
'"he Pakistan Nationa
Islamabad's policy o
opposition parties w
l A
n A
ill
ssembly appr
fghanistan,
continue to
oved
although
use it as an
antigovernment issue
.
NI ELECTED RESISTANC
E S
PORESMAN
2
As part of a planned leadership rotation, Ahmad
Gailani became the new resistance spokesman on
1 January. His secular approach may create
tension in relations with other insurgent leaders
and with Pakistan.
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IN BRIEF 4
SOVIET MINE WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN: A PRELIMINARY 6
LOOK
The Soviets continue to improve and increase their
use of mines in defense of their garrisons and
airfields and to disrubt insurgent supply
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near pastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Questions or comments
should be directed to
7 January 1986
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7 January 1986
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Approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet and Afghan troops
from garrisons north of Kabul are conducting operations
in the northern Shomali Plain near Bagram Airfield,
The activity near Bagram
is probably designed mainly to clear the strategic
transportation route from the Soviet Union to Kabul,
which was recently closed to traffic due to insurgent
harrassment of supply convoys.
mortars in Afghanistan to 211_ and quadru led the number
of 240-mm self-propelled mortars to 21.
Comment: The increase in heavy weapons reflects the
recent Soviet preference for using firepower in lieu of
manpower in Afghanistan. The mobility of the self-
propelled and truck-mounted systems will enable the
Soviets to respond to insurgent activity more rapidly
and effectively.
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The National Assembly endorsed Islamabad's Afghan
policy in the 24-28 December debate on foreign policy,
the first since 1976. Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan told
the joint session Islamabad believes the UN process is
an adequate framework for arriving at a mutually
acceptable settlement--even though it means excluding
the resistance from a formal role in the negotia-
tions. He confirmed that Islamabad would continue to
reject direct talks with Kabul because such a move
would legitimize not only the Kabul regime but the
manner by which it was installed.
Comment: The government almost certainly anticipated a
more contentious session; the Assembly may have been
preoccupied with the 30 December lifting of martial
law. Many delegates are probably unenthusiastic sup-
porters of Islamabad's Afghan policy, but they probably
believe Pakistan has no better options.
Elements in the extraparliamentary opposition almost
certainly intend to develop Afghanistan as an anti-
government issue. Several parties, including the
leading opposition People's Party, say that Islamabad's
argument against direct talks is fraudulent because the
Zia regime itself is not legitimate.
Ahmad Gailani, head of the National Islamic Front,
became the new spokesman of the Afghan resistance alli-
ance on 1 January. His three-month term is part of the
scheduled leadership rotation determined when the alli-
ance was formed last May. Gailani is the first of the
nonfundamentalist, traditionalist leaders to head the
resistance. He will lead the resistance delegation to
the Organization of the Islamic Conference now in
session in Morocco.
Comment: Gailani is the most secular in outlook of the
exile leaders and reportedly would favor a pro-Western
parliamentary form of government in Afghanistan, possi-
bly including the retention of former King 7,ahir Shah,
with whom he has close ties. He is well known in the
West--where he has visited often--and makes effective
use of media.
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Gailani's relations with Islamabad--as well as with
fundamentalist resistance leaders--are reportedly
strained, however, and his tenure may prove divisive.
Members of Gailani's group frequently accuse the
Pakistanis of diverting arms meant for the resistance
and have leveled charges of corruption at senior
Pakistani officials. The Pakistanis maintain that
Gailani's group does not undertake a significant share
of the fighting.
Gailani may try to use his position to remedy alleged
inequalities in the distribution of humanitarian relief
aid. The head of the new cross-border relief organiza-
tion, Pakistan Welfare International, for example, is
an Islamic fundamentalist who reportedly has been
accused of favoring fundamentalist resistance groups in
disbursing relief materials.
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seven SU-24
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fighter-bombers at a Soviet airbase in the
Turkestan Military District. The last time the
fighter-bombers were deployed to the Karshi/
Khanabad Airbase, in April 1984, they supported
combat operations in the Panjsher Valley. The SU-
24 can deliver twice as much ordnance per mission
as any aircraft in Afghanistan.
The Australian couple held prisoner in Afghanistan
since May were released on 27 December. They said
they had been kidnapped in Pakistan and taken
across the border, where they were picked up by a
Soviet helicopter and flown to Kabul. The Afghan
Foreign ministry claimed the regime knew nothing of
the couple's whereabouts.
A private TAest German aid organization has selected
GO Afghan insurgents--representing various resist-
ance groups and almost every province--for an
intensive media training course in West Germany.
The course will begin this year, and the aid
organization will provide each Afghan with a
portable video camera for documentary work in
Afghanistan. The Afghan Government cited the
training program in a formal protest note lodged
with West Germany over that country's "hostile
propaganda campaign."
-- The Afghan regime seems to be trying to bolster its
international image by playing up its relations
with India. In late December, 3abrak Karmal
received a delegation of Indian parliamentarians in
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Kabul and P~ahmud Barialay, secretary of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's Central
Committee and Ba'prak's brother, reportedly met with
Rajiv Gandhi in India at a ceremony celebrating the
centennial of the Indian National Congress Party.
-- The Afghan Government recently announced that
Ethiopia had agreed to the appointment of Nur Ahmad
Khorami as ambassador--an apparent effort to raise
the regime's diplomatic profile.
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SOVIET MINE WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN: A PRELIMINARY LOOR
NESA
The Soviets have used mines extensively in Afghanistan
to combat the insurgency. They have employed mines to
interdict insurgent supply and movement routes, to
remove staging points for insurgent ambushes along
roads where an open zone cannot.-be cleared, and to
provide protection for outposts and airfields. In the
past year, the Soviets have also improved their use of
mines by testing new varieties, using new emplacement
systems, and different minefield configurations.
Insurgent countermeasures against Soviet mines have
improved, but insurgent leaders ar_e increasingly
worried about the effectiveness of Soviet mine
warfare.
Development of Soviet Mine Warfare
The Soviets began minelaying operations to combat the
insurgents in Afghanistan in July 1980. They first
concentrated on the provinces along the Pakistani
border in order to hinder insurgent resupply opera-
tions. The Soviets soon expanded their minelaying
effort to areas around airfields, along key routes
traveled by Soviet columns and in otential ambush
ositions.
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Other new developments this year include:
earlier
this year that the Soviets were using a new mine
cluster. The cluster consists of one four-
kilogram mine and several parrot-type anti-
personnel mines, probably emplaced by artil-
lery. Press reports in March indicate that the
Soviets planted a new type of mine system after
operations in a side valley of the Panjsher
Valley near Rokheh. The system consists of a
box of cells located three to four meters away
from a cylindrical-shaped device. This is sur-
rounded by six five-kilogram charges placed in a
circle. The entire system is hidden
underground.
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during
the summer the Soviets began using a vibration-
detonated mine. The mujahedin claim that the
mine is detonated by footsteps or the sound of a
nearby voice. This could possibly be the mine
with seismic sensors
be detonated selectively within a 10-kilometer
-- In November the Soviets began using a new anti-
personnel fragmentation mine.
unlike previous
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fragmentation mines, it does not need to be
manually emplaced and can be delivered in per-
cussion-fired canisters that sow up to 240 mines
at a time. The system is mounted on the BTR-60,
the BMP, or possibly on helicopters. It is not
]mown if the new fragmentation mine can easily
be defused.
Insurgent Countermeasures
When unable to avoid Soviet minefields, the mujahedin
develop methods to defeat them. In order to overcome
tripwire mines, such as the POMZ-2 antipersonnel mine,
the insurgents toss grappling hooks attached to
approximately 40 meters of nylon line ahead of them-
selves during an assault. The hooks are then pulled
back to catch on the wires used to trigger the mines.
Also, the mujahedin use a weighted net made of prima-
cord Ito blow up area-planted mines.
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Outlook
Soviet use of mines against the insurgents will
increase. The continued introduction of command-
detonated mines, coupled with covering fields of fire,
should improve the effectiveness of mine use by the
Soviets. Minelaying in the countryside and along
routes of movement will continue to be a nuisance to
the insurgents and, as the Soviets develop more lethal
mines that are increasingly difficult to detect and
defuse, effective countermeasures will also be more
difficult. However, the Soviets are a long way from
their goal of using mines to close the major insurgent
supply and escape routes. Moscow would have to adopt
more active measures, such as quick-response forces, to
significantly limit insurgent mobility.
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