SOMALIA: TRIBAL CHALLENGE TO SIAD

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000100090001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence w.-:
Somalia:
Tribal Challenge to Siad
ALA 84-10053
June 1984
Copy 2 71
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Directorate of, secret
Intelligence
Somalia:
Tribal Challenge to Siad
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 84-10053
June 1984
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secret
Somalia:
Tribal Challenge to Siad
Key Judgments Tribalism and intertribal violence, both chronic attributes of Somali life,
Information available are putting pressure on President Siad's regime and could eventually
as of 21 May 1984 undermine his political and military control. Resentment of Siad's own role
was used in this report.
in perpetuating tribalism is focusing criticism on his regime and is costing
him the backing of some traditional supporters.
Fighting among Somali tribal groups, who have recently gained increased
access to weapons, is weakening security and opening avenues for external
meddling. Somali dissident groups backed by Ethiopia and Libya encour-
age and participate in intertribal clashes to cause trouble for the regime
and to gain new recruits. Army and police units are having increasing
difficulty halting the fighting, which is eroding their ability to perform
their normal duties.
Siad's strategy for dealing with numerous competing clan interests-
rewarding supporters with political and economic favors while generally
repressing and dividing disloyal clans-is beginning to show signs of strain.
Siad so far has been reluctant to make significant political concessions to
clans that oppose his regime. We believe he recognizes that such a move
could damage the privileged positions enjoyed by his Marehan and
Ogadeni backers and could cost him their support. If Siad's relations with
the Issak and other opponents deteriorate further, we believe it likely that
he will resort to increasingly repressive tactics.
Over the near term, intertribal distrust will help thwart efforts to form
effective coalitions that could seriously. threaten Siad. Over the longer
term, however, we expect that tribal clashes, resentment of Siad, and
external meddling will continue to feed on each other and to undercut
Siad's control. Any successful move against Siad would most likely be led
by the military, where dissatisfaction with tribal favoritism is aggravating
frustration with dissidents and Ethiopia and with the perceived paucity of
aid from Western donors.
The United States, as Siad's major foreign ally, runs some risk of being ac-
cused by his opponents of condoning his tribal policies. Increased repres-
sion of the clans by Siad, for instance, could focus criticism on Washington
for failing to restrain him. If Siad were overthrown, hostility toward his as-
sociation with the United States could lead to some unease in bilateral
relations, although a successor regime would be concerned, at least
initially, with maintaining the flow of US military and economic assist-
ance. In any event, tribal violence and related dissident activities could
endanger US personnel involved in military assistance and rural develop-
ment programs in Somalia.
iii Secret
ALA 84-10053
'June 1984
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We believe that Libya and the Soviet Union, as well as Ethiopia, both
welcome and encourage signs of increasing resentment of Siad's tribal
policies. Libya and Ethiopia will continue their direct support of dissident
activity that exploits tribal tensions in order to create problems for Siad. If
Siad were overthrown, Libya and the Soviet Union would have new
opportunities to forge closer ties with his successor.
Secret iv
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Secret
Key Judgments
Rising Intertribal Violence
Increasing Access to Arms
3
Dissident Involvement
4
Security Forces Strained
5
Increasing Tribal Resentment of Siad
5
Reaction of the Military
7
Implications for the United States
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 Figure 1
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Djibouti
Woqooyi
Boorama Galbeed
Laas
Caanood
Dusa Marreb i
Abbe aid
Hay*'
Dire
Davy;
Jubbada
Hoose
Obock
Djibouti
%Seylac
Gulf of Aden
Indian Ocean
Boundary representarion is
nor necessarily author'rlarive
-?- Region boundary
o Region capital
Railroad
Road
702489 6-Ad
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Somalia:
Tribal Challenge to Siad
Introduction
Clan loyalty and interclan violence are basic and
accepted ingredients of Somali sociopolitical life. Al-
though Somalia is unusual in Africa because of its
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity,
endemic feuding among its six major clan families
and numerous subclans has been characterized by the
same intensity as conflict among ethnically heteroge-
neous tribes elsewhere on the continent.' These con-
flicts and occasionally shifting alliances are extremely
complex, and, in many cases, their causes are shroud-
ed in long-forgotten historical events
Among Somalia's many troublesome problems-in-
cluding severe underdevelopment, unpredictable food
supplies, draining border warfare, and a massive
refugee population-tribalism stands out as the most
pervasive and persistent threat to the country's stabil-
ity. Since coming to power in 1969, President Siad
Barre has publicly decried tribalism and commented
privately that such rivalries are Somalia's greatest
danger. Nonetheless, Siad's favoritism toward his own
Marehan clan and other supportive groups has fueled
both tribal strife and resentment toward his regime.
This paper examines the state of clan-related prob-
lems in Somalia and the role of the regime in
manipulating tension. It also assesses the likely im-
pact of tribal discord on the regime's stability and on
the considerable US interests in Somalia.
Rising Intertribal Violence
Tribal fighting, long a feature of Somali life, is
becoming more violent and difficult to control. Feuds
among Somali clans-almost all of which have pri-
vate militias-continue to be provoked by such tradi-
tional issues of contention as water and grazing rights.
In recent years, however, these regional, age-old,
internecine feuds increasingly have taken on national
political overtones as the major dissident groups-the
' This paper-as do most Western observers of the Somali
domestic scene-uses the terms clan and tribe interchangeably
The Politics of Clan Rivalries
Genealogical divisions among Somalis have proved to
be more important for the social- and political order
than has cultural unity. Clan affiliation has long
been the cornerstone of sociopolitical relations in 25X1
Somalia, with lineage playing a significant role in
determining political loyalties. During the period
immediately following independence in 1960, the clan
families served as rallying points for the formation of
national political parties.
Although Somalia has long had the trappings of a
modern political system, power at the national level
has been established and maintained through a web
of shifting intertribal alliances, and political events
have often reflected intertribal feuding and warfare..
The anthropologist I. M. Lewis has noted that the
beliefs that "might makes right" and that political
ascendancy derives from superior fighting ability are
paramount in Somali politics. The notion that rights
can only be defended by force of arms has led to the
persistent and widespread acceptance of tribal feud-
ing as a political institution.
Tribalism contributed to the decline of the multipar-
ty system in Somali in' the 1960s. Party conflicts
generated by competing clan interests undermined the
operation of the government and the parliament and
distracted them from their ability to deal with the
country's general problems, thereby contributing both
to widespread disillusionment with the democratic
process and to the military coup of 1969 that brought
Siad Barre to power.
Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) and the
Somali National Movement (SNM)-and the Somali
Army have entered the fray.
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Figure 2
Indian Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Somali Clan Families
Darod
Digil
Dir
Hawiya
Issak
Rahanwein
ABGAL Subclan name
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Distribution of the Population,
by Kinship and Ethnic Groups
Somali Clan Families and Percent of
Major Subclans Population a
Darod
Dolbohanta
Majertain
Digil
Dir
Issak
Eidagalla
Habr Awal
Habr Toljaala
Habr Yunis
a These estimates were made in 1966 and are based on the
population within Somalia's borders. More recent and reliable data
are not available. Inclusion of ethnic Somalis outside the borders
would increase the percentage of Darod substantially.
The recent upward spiral of tribal violences has been
marked by several major clashes:
? A protracted tribal dispute began in February 1983
when a group of Dolbohanta tribesmen raided the.
Issak tribe's settlements and seized a number of
weapons. In May, the episode blossomed into a full-
scale battle pitting Dolbohanta militia and the
Somali Army against Issak-supported guerrillas of
the dissident SNM. Fighting continued through
June, leaving some 150 persons dead.
? Fighting between Marehan and Hawiya clans began
over water rights in the central sector border area in
February 1983 and continued sporadically through
the rest of the year. The SDSF and the SNM armed
and trained the Hawiya, while Marehan sympathiz-
ers in the Army provided fellow clansmen with some
arms Deaths re- 25X1
portedly averaged 40 to 50 per month late in the
year.
? Clashes between Hawiya subclans in the Kenyan-
Somali border area occurred throughout 1983, in-
volving an unknown number of dead and the theft of
more than 1,000 camels.
Less serious but significant fighting in 1983 involved
the Ogadeni, the Majertain, and other Hawiya sub-
clans. In 1984, clashes have been reported among the
Hawiya and between the Ogadeni and the Marehan.
Increasing Access to Arms. Many Somali tribes are
increasingly well armed, having obtained weapons
through purchase, theft, or as gifts from the Somali
Army, Somali dissidents, and the Western Somalia
Liberation Front (WSLF), a group created and
backed by the Somali Government to contest Ethiopi-
an control of the Ogaden. Ethiopia also has been a
source of arms for Somali tribes.
arms move freely across the Ethiopian
border because the police do not have the manpower
to halt this trafficking. Tribal arms inventories consist
mainly of rifles, such as AK-47s, but also include
machineguns, bazookas, and antitank rockets
Siad contributed to this general availability of weap-
ons by arming border tribes in an attempt to bolster
border security in the late 1970s. This move spurred a
tribal arms race as tribes in the interior-including
groups hostile to Siad and his clan-sought more
weapons for their own defense. Border tribes such as
the Issak, Hawiya Degodia, Ogadeni, and Dolbohanta
apparently are especially well armed,
the
Hawiya near Mogadishu are also now acquiring
weapons
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In an effort to contain the spread of arms and its
significant contribution to the increasingly violent
nature of tribal fighting, Siad ordered the Army and
the police in June 1983 to disarm disloyal tribes,
beginning with the Hawiya Abgal near Mogadishu.
Using such techniques as cutting off food and water
from recalcitrant tribes, the security forces have
recovered large amounts of arms
In our judgment, however, the disar-
mament campaigns will have little long-term impact
on intertribal tensions as the clans will have no
difficulty obtaining replacement arms.
both o the major organized
dissident groups, the SDSF and the SNM, have
attempted to exploit clan feuds to gain new recruits
and to expand their tribal bases beyond their tradi-
tional supporters-the SDSF with the Majertain and
the SNM with the Issak.
both groups are struggling
to gain the allegiance of the Hawiya-one of the
country's largest clan families-which is strategically
located in central Somalia and constitutes the major-
ity of the population of the capital. The Hawiya in
recent years have increasingly resented the regime's
favoritism toward the Marehan, a relatively small
Darod clan that'has enjoyed greatly increased politi-
cal and-economic power under Siad. The SDSF has
supported various Hawiya subclans with arms, funds,
and training since 1981,
the. SNM's recruitment efforts began
In our judgment, Hawiya receptivity to the dissidents'
approaches stems more from resentment of the Mare-
han and a desire to obtain arms than from an
ideological affinity with the dissident cause. Over the
long run, chronic intertribal mistrust will undermine
any alliance between the Hawiya and either the SNM
or the SDSF.. Nonetheless, the Hawiya's increased
access to arms, supplied by the dissidents, and hostil-
Two Somali guerrilla groups, both formed in 1981,
seek Siad's overthrow: the 3,000-man Somali Demo-
cratic Salvation Front (SDSF); and the Somali Na-
tional Movement (SNM),.which commands only afew
hundred armed adherents. Ethiopia and Libya pro-
vide training and financial and military assistance to
both groups. Military operations by the dissidents are
largely confined to small-scale harassing raids in
border. areas.
The SDSF operates in the Majertain-inhabited cen-
tral sector. Most Somalis view it as a Majertain
vehicle for regaining the power lost when'Siad seized
control in 1969; many Somalis are alienated by its
close ties with Ethiopia and its Marxist rhetoric. The
SDSF's military momentum has not fully recovered
from a serious defeat suffered in mid-1982 while
trying to capture the town of Galcaio.
The northern-based SNM draws its support largely
from the Issak, who feel they have faced considerable
political and economic discrimination by the. central
government. Although it enjoys considerable sympa-
thy in the north, the SNM has not been able to
exploit Issak unrest, and it lacks an effective military
arm. The SNM has resisted Libyan pressure to merge
with the SDSF.
were training some 200 Hawiya in military opera-
Ethiopian military has not been directly involved in
Somalia's internal tribal fighting, presumably to avoid
being drawn into a confrontation with the Somali
military, which would tarnish its carefully crafted
image as "victim" of Somali irredentism.
ity toward the regime have resulted in attacks on Meddling by the WSLF. The Western Somali Liber-
government forces and ultimately could spread the ation Front, composed largely of Ogadeni tribesmen
violence to the Hawiya-dominated capital. and organized to pursue longstanding Somali claims
to Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, has
Ethiopia funnels arms, training, and logistic support become increasingly involved in the internecine fight-
to antiregime tribes via the dissident groups. In mid- ing,
1983, for example, the SDSF and the Ethiopian Army
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control.tribal fighting. Many paramilitary police who
would normally be used to curb tribal feuding are
used instead to supplement regular Army units guard-
unearthed growing resentment among some non-
Ogadeni members of the Army and the government
over the regime's financial assistance to the WSLF,
which they claim is being used to fight-other Somali
clans rather than the Ethiopians.
Siad has often stated privately that he derives little
benefit from WSLF actions in the Ogaden against
Ethiopia, We
believe he recognizes that government assistance to
the Front is contributing-more to internal unrest than
to organizing the irredentist fight against Ethiopia.
Nonetheless, Siad counts the Ogadeni among his
strongest supporters and is firmly committed to their
cause. We believe he is convinced that he must
continue to support them in order to retain the clan's
backing.
Security Forces Strained. Evidence indicates that
both the paramilitary police and Army units are
frequently shifted back and forth between border
guard and civil control duties because of the increase
in tribal fighting:
? In mid-March 1984, two companies of paramilitary
police usually assigned to border duty were moved
into a town near Burao in the north to contain
fighting between the Dolbohanta and the Issak
Habr Tojalo.
? An Army brigade tried to control a clash between
the Marehan and the Hawiya in central Somalia in
February 1983. In April, an infantry company and
two platoons of paramilitary police tried to separate
the tribes and guard water wells in the area. In
September, Siad was forced to send in the 6th
Commando Brigade to restore order.
? Two Army battalions were assigned to patrol the
highway between Belet Weyn and Dusa Marreb
following attacks by the Hawiya on private and
government vehicles in early 1983.
This shifting of units to deal with tribal problems is
straining military capabilities.
ing the border, while regular police lack the necessary
training to control tribal clashes. 25X1
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Siad has done little that is specifically aimed at
strengthening the military's efforts to deal with tribal
unrest. However, measures he has taken to enhance
the military's ability to counter the Ethiopian threat, 25X1
such as trying to obtain additional equipment from
the United States and other allies, will also have an
impact on its capacity to contain tribal fighting.
Moreover, we believe that Siad hopes that the security
forces' recent campaign to disarm the.tribal militias
will lower the incidence of violence.
Increasing Tribal Resentment of Siad
Siad's favoritism fuels intertribal tensions, particular-
ly the resentment of the Marehan and the Ogadeni by
less favored clans. In our judgment, Siad's favoritism - 25X1
toward selected groups has worsened tribal rivalries
and thus has helped foster violence among clans
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Siad grants disproportionate
po itica an economic favors to the Marehan and the
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Ogadeni and to groups whose allegiance he is trying
to gain. These. indulgences include appointments to
lucrative government posts, military promotions and
choice assignments, financial support, and opportuni-
ties to participate in profitable business deals. He
discriminates most actively against the Issak-a
northern clan he has long considered especially
disloyal.
The Issak have long been unhappy with Siad, but in
recent years, their disaffection has increased. A vari-
ety of repressive measures directed against the Issak,
including the arrest and trial of Issak dissidents, the
confiscation of Issak businessmen's property, and the
execution of an Issak colonel for disloyalty, resulted in 25X1
riots in Hargeysa in early 1982 that were only quieted
by the use of military force. Northern Army com-
mander Ganni's tough handling of the demonstrators
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Siad's tactics for dealing with tribal problems have
varied widely and have included accommodation, co-
optation, and coercion. He relies on his own consider-
able political cunning to devise ways of manipulating
and balancing clan interests in order to strengthen his
support base while dividing his opposition.
Over the past year or so,Siad has used senior
government officials or tribal elders as emissaries to
try to negotiate intertribal disputes and to resolve
differences between the tribes and his government.
these agents
sometimes carry offers of bribes or promises of
regional development projects.
the Majertain now
in government are being given expanded authority to
offer economic and political favors, to fellow tribes-
men as a wav of increasing support for the regime.
Siad traveled to the north twice in 1983 to meet with
Issak elders but did little to redress their grievances.
We believe that his failure to follow through on
major Issak demands, particularly the release of
political prisoners, has increased the clan's disaffec-
tion from the central government:
in Hargeisa and his imposition of stricter security
controls following an SNM raid on a northern prison
in early 1983 have created new grievances. The Issak
also are disgruntled by Siad's abolition of a trade
system that had allowed Issak traders to reap large
profits on imports and by his failure to fulfill a
promise in December 1983 to release northern politi-
cal prisoners.
Some Hawiya clans are angry with Siad because of
the Army's support of the Marehan in clashes be-
tween the two clans. The Embassy reports, for exam-
ple, that fighting over a waterhole in mid-1983 esca-
lated when a Marehan military commander tried to
disarm the Hawiya but not the Marehan, killing
several Hawiya in the process. The Hawiya-as well
as the Issak-also resent Siad's attempt in mid-1983
In mid-1983, Siad approved a series of meetings
among the Darod for the purpose of organizing an
alliance aimed at cementing their control of the
government. The talks were abandoned because of
concerns that exclusion of the Issak
and the Hawiya would escalate tribal tensions
Shortly
after, Siad established a reconciliation council of
elders from all of the major clan families, but the
council languished after several fruitless meetings
he organization was only
a ploy by the central government to motivate tribal
leaders to encourage support for the regime among
their own peoples.
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Siad has not been reluctant to use coercion in tack- 25X1
ling the tribal problems. Even as he experimented
with the reconciliation council, Siad urged security
officials to take a firm approach toward the Issak,
to establish an alliance of Darod clans aimed,
at squeezing the
Hawiya and the Issak out of positions of power in the 25X1
government and the military.
The Gadabursi, a small subgroup of the Dir in the
northwest, may also be moving away from the regime,
in the Embassy's judgment, because of the govern-
ment's recent policies toward the clan. One of the
clan's main sources of income-smuggling goods from
Djibouti-has been hampered by the government's
refusal to pave a major trade route in the Gadabursi
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region and by police efforts in mid-1983 to crack
down on the clan's heretofore ignored contraband
key command posts.' On the other hand, most Issak
officers have been transferred from their restive
northern homeland to prevent any antiregime collu-
sion with fellow tribesmen. Moreover, the Issak re-
operations.
In our judgment, the increasing disaffection of the
Issak and other tribes makes them more susceptible to
recruitment by organized dissident groups and in-
creases their willingness to resist government security
Reaction of the Military
Blatant favoritism toward the Marehan and the
Ogadeni in the military has contributed to declining
morale, increasing anti-Marehan and anti-Ogadeni
sentiment, and criticism of the regime's role in Soma-
lia's tribal problems, according to reports from the US
defense attache.2 this
resentment was especially high following the embar-
rassing defeat of a Marehan-led battalion at a border
outpost by Ethiopian-supported dissidents in July
1983 and the government's failure to punish the
responsible Marehan officers. More recently, a reli-
able source of the defense attache reports that morale
among junior and midlevel officers has been further
weakened by the Defense Ministry's continued prac-
tice of basing promotions on tribal connections despite
the introduction of a merit system in September 1983.
Siad uses his control over military personnel actions
not only to retain loyal officers, especially Ogadeni
and Marehan, in key positions but also to weaken the
power of officers from less favored tribes.
he Ogadeni are t he largest,
single tribal group in the military, in disproportion to
their representation in the whole population,, and that
Siad considers the Ogadeni to be among his most
loyal troops. Siad relies on highly trusted subordinates
to control both the military and security organizations
and has placed members of his own family and clan in
7 Estimates of the tribal composition of both the military and the
general population are largely impressionistic, as census reports do
some 30 percent of the military is Ogadeni, 30 percent Hawiya, 1.5
percent Issak, 8 percent Majertain, and 8 percent Marehan. (The
remaining 9 percent may belong to unspecified minor tribes.)
aca emy in oga is u
Issak, and 50 Marehan
ceive fewer promotions and perquisites, such as train-
ing in the United States. We agree with senior US
military observers who believe that these practices
have eroded morale and have allowed the promotion
of less qualified persons, thus contributing to incom- 25X1
petency in the officer corps. 25X1
Although we do not know how widespread the resent-
ment of Siad's tribal favoritism is within the military,
we believe that it is strongest among non-Marehan
and non-Ogadeni, who see their opportunities for
career advancement stifled. However, discontent is
also evident among the Ogadeni.
Outlook
We believe that tribalism and tribal violence, both
firmly rooted in the Somali culture, will remain key
attributes of Somali sociopolitical life. We have ob-
served events in recent years that, in our analysis, will
ensure that intertribal tensions remain high: 25X1
? Feuding clans will continue to have relatively easy
access to weapons-from dissidents, Ethiopia, and
the Somali military-despite occasional disarma-
ment efforts by the central government.
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? The dissident SNM and SDSF will try to stir up
tribal fights in order to create problems for the
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regime.
'The commandant of the National Security Service, Jabril, is a
Majertain but is married to a member of Siad's Marehan clan,
while the commandant of the National Police is an Ogadeni-the
tribe of Siad's mother. Hashi Ganni, a Marehan, is now command-
er of the 26th Army Corps in the north. Siad's son-in-law, Morgan
Hersi, is head of the 21st Army Corps at Dusa Marreb. Marehan
clan members head other key Army commands as well as filling a
disproportionate number of slots in the Mogadishu area and in the
Ministry of Defense. Ogadeni members command the 4th Division
at Galcaio and the Mogadishu garrison. Ministtr of Defense
Samantar belongs to a minor clan with no power base and thus, in
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o Siad's favoritism toward the Marehan and the
Ogadeni will foster growing resentment among im-
portant clans such as the Issak and the Hawiya.
our view. Siad almost certainly will face increasing
disaffection from Issak and Hawiya officers who
resent the favoritism in promotions and assignments
Tribal problems are putting pressure on Siad's regime
by:
c Decreasing security in the countryside.
o Creating opportunities for exploitation by
Ethiopian-backed dissidents.
c Eroding Siad's base of support.
c Weakening military morale.
c Generating demands by less favored clans for more
equitable treatment.
Triggering disputes over the government's backing
of the WSLF, as it meddles in clan fighting.
Considering the seemingly intractable nature of So-
malia's tribal problems, perhaps the best that Siad-
or any Somali leader-can hope for is to deflect
criticism from himself, to weaken the dissidents'
ability to exploit the tribal problems, and to maintain
the strong backing of the military. Siad attempts to
balance competing clan interests to ensure his own
political survival, and in this he is aided by intertribal
distrust that helps prevent the formation of opposition
coalitions.
Reaching lasting accommodation with disaffected
tribes such as the Issak would require concessions. that
Siad so far has been unwilling to make, including the
release of political prisoners, a return to a trade
system favorable to Issak businessmen, less repressive
treatment of the Issak by security forces, and less
discrimination. against Issak in the military. A more
equitable allocation of political and economic favors
among all clans would threaten the privileged position
of Siad's key supporters and could cost him their
backing.
If, as seems likely, Siad's relations with openly antire-
gime tribes worsen, his past behavior suggests that he
would turn to increasingly repressive measures rather
than to conciliation. Such tactics, in our view, would
generate even more antiregime sentiment among op-
position tribes and could lead to a tribally inspired
military move against his government. Even without
more repressive government measures, military dissat-
isfaction with tribal favoritism is likely to mount, in
shown to Marehan and Ogadeni officers.
Over the long term, this sentiment will exacerbate
other sources of frustration in the armed forces and
could touch off a coup. According to US military
observers, these sources of frustration include the
military's inability to gain the upper hand over both
the dissidents and Ethiopia, as well as persistent
unhappiness with the amount and type of military
equipment supplied by the United States and other
allies
While disaffected Issak or Hawiya officers appear to
have the strongest motivation to attempt a coup, they
also have relatively weak power bases within the
military, and their capacity to engineer a successful
coup seems, doubtful. Paradoxically, Ogadeni or
Marehan officers might feel compelled to move
against Siad themselves if they judged that a coup
were essential to preempt a strike by a disaffected
tribe and thus to ensure their continued domination of
the Somali military.
We have no evidence now of coup plotting by any
military faction in Somalia. Although a number of
Siad's supporters have warned him of disloyal mem-
bers in the military or in government in the past and
could be expected to do so again, they often are
motivated primarily by the desire to undercut person-
al rivals, and the alleged threats to Siad are not
necessarily real. Thus, Siad's informants cannot be
counted on for accurate early warning of impending
danger.
If the tribal situation becomes a more serious problem
for Siad, a number of indicators should provide early
warning:
c Dissatisfaction of Marehan or Ogadeni military
officers or tribal leaders with Siad.
o Increasing tribal violence near or within
Mogadishu.
o Urban riots protesting Siad's tribal policies.
o Significant deterioration of the security forces' ca-
pacity to quell or contain tribal violence.
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? Formation of political or military alliances among
.antiregime tribes.
? Growing support of SDSF and SNM among tribes
traditionally backing the movements.
? Successful recruitment by dissidents among other
tribes.
? Increasing participation by WSLF in tribal clashes.
? Direct participation by Ethiopia in tribal fighting
within Somalia.
? Libyan or Soviet meddling in tribal disputes.
Implications for the United States
Siad's hold .on power depends on the continued sup-
port of the armed forces. His influence within the
military, in turn, is heavily dependent on the family
and clan ties he has established with top commanders.
some of Siad's
Mare an supporters are concerned that US recom-
mendations for improving the leadership and training
of the armed forces will increase the self-sufficiency
of the officer corps and weaken Siad's personal con-
trol over the military. This aspect of US military
counsel is likely to come increasingly under criticism
from Marehan and Ogadeni officers who see a threat
to their privileged positions.
As Siad's major foreign ally,. the United States risks
accusations by Siad's tribal opponents that Washing-
ton condones the worst aspects of his tribal policies.
As a result, increased repression by Siad could sharp-
en anti-US sentiment among the tribally based dissi-
dents groups. Both the SDSF and the SNM threaten
periodically to attack US personnel in Somalia, al-
though neither group has yet done so. US military
facilities in the north and US personnel stationed at
these facilities or the Embassy would be the most
likely targets for insurgent attacks. We believe that
Somali security forces would have difficulty defend-
ing US personnel and property against a major dissi-
dent attack. US personnel engaged in development
projects or other work in rural Somalia could be
caught in the crossfire of intertribal fighting at any
If Siad's tribal opponents topple him, the new regime
may be less favorably disposed toward the United
States, and a period of some stress in bilateral
relations could ensue. Because Siad's successor would
almost certainly come from the military or have
strong. military backing, any strong anti-US sentiment
in the new regime would be tempered at least initially
by the realization that Somalia is dependent on a
continuing flow of Western military and economic
aid. We believe this would also dampen any sentiment
to turn back to the Soviets in a major way. Moreover,
so long as Moscow remains deeply involved in Ethio-
pia, any conceivable Somali Government would find it
difficult to reestablish close ties with the Soviets.
Siad's mounting tribal problems also present renewed
opportunities for Soviet or Libyan meddling in Soma-
lia that would be inimical to US interests in the area.
Libya almost certainly condones the dissidents' in-
volvement in the tribal fighting. Although we have no
evidence of direct Soviet sponsorship of anti-Siad
dissidents, the Soviets have made no secret of their
dislike for Siad and that they would welcome the,
disintegration of his regime.
If Siad were overthrown, we believe that Libya and
the Soviet Union would both. try to ingratiate them-
selves with a new regime, perhaps with offers of aid,
in order to undermine US influence in Somalia. In our
view, they would be particularly eager to end US-
Somali military cooperation.
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