TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ! j
bItK HLL
Review
Terrorism
26 May 1983
GI TR 83-011
26 May 1983
Copy 4 4 0,
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Secret
Terrorism
25X1 Review F
7
Chile: C
hange i
n
MIR Ta
ctics
25X1
(ALA)
9
Red Brig
(ocq
ades: S
till Ac
tive
25X1
11
Special
EURA
Analysis
: Righ
tist Terrorism in Italy
25X1
)
(
Chronol
ogy
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Chile: Change in
MIR Tactics
The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
remains the most violence-prone opposition group in
Chile, but heavy personnel losses last month and the
apparently growing cohesion of Chile's other, nonvio-
lent leftist political organizations have caused MIR
leaders to reevaluate their group's structure and
tactics. According to Chilean security forces, the
MIR plans to halt military operations at least tempo-
rarily and concentrate on recruitment, public rela-
tions, and inciting revolutionary peasant activity in
southern Chile. We doubt that the MIR will com-
pletely suspend military operations but believe that it
will scale them back in coming months as the group
attempts to recover from its recent setbacks and
weighs the option of closer cooperation with the
Chilean Communist Party (PCCH).
The MIR, founded at the University of Concepcion in
1965, suffered major losses at the hands of govern-
ment forces in the mid-1970s, and most of its leader-
ship fled the country. Since 1976 the MIR has been
rebuilding, and it tried to recapture public attention
and support in March and April of this year by
significantly increasing the bombing of water, electri-
cal, subway, and railroad facilities. Twenty-six bomb-
ings took place during March and April, and security
forces deactivated another 11 devices, including 40
kilos of plastic explosives found in an abandoned car
parked next to the presidential palace. We believe
that the increase in low-risk bombings could indicate
the MIR's declining capability to carry out more
sophisticated terrorist activities.
Instead of generating support for the MIR, these
attempts have drawn media criticism and strong
counterattacks from police and carabinero intelli-
gence units. Security forces killed two MIR
members in April, arrested several others-including
a political-military chief-and seized arms caches.
The strong police response prompted domestic MIR
leaders to move headquarters units out of the capital
to provincial cities,
and to focus on promoting a revolutionary 25X1
peasant movement in southern Chile. The MIR was
heavily involved in rural activism during the Allende
regime, and southern Chile's high unemployment and
farm foreclosure rates make it an attractive area for
MIR organizing efforts. 25X1
The MIR's recent setbacks and its concerns over
competition from the other leftist groups may have
improved chances for a closer alliance between the
MIR and the Chilean Communist Party. We believe
that MIR leaders have been concerned for some time
that the organization's image and position in Chile are
declining and that other leftist groups are drawing
away actual or potential MIR supporters. Coopera-
tion between the PCCH and the MIR has been
blocked in the past by disagreements over the latter's
use of violence, but the weakened state of the MIR
might make it more willing now to compromise on
questions of strategy. 25X1
Based on the MIR's history, we believe its shift away
from terrorist activity is only temporary. The MIR's
previous foreign supporters-including Cuba, Nicara-
gua, East Germany, and Libya-will probably pro-
vide more training and funding in order to restore the
group's military capability. The French Government,
which has assisted MIR activists to escape from Chile
recently indi-
cated its intention to concentrate on relations with 25X1
more moderate Chilean opposition groups. We be-
lieve, however, that the chill in Franco-Chilean rela-
tions in the wake of recent French criticism of
Secret
GI TR 83-011
26 May 1983
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Chilean police tactics may result in resumption of
limited French assistance to MlRistas fleeing Chile,
while still maintaining a policy of official support for 25X1
moderate groups.
25X1
Secret 8
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Red Brigades:
Still Active
Several operations by the Red Brigades (BR) in April
and May illustrate that, despite Italian counterterror-
ism successes, reorganization efforts have enabled
columns to remain active:
? An arson attack on a NATO warehouse in Vincenza
on 11 April was claimed by the 11 April BR column
and a self-styled Communist group.
? Bomb attacks on carabinieri stations in Pistoia
Province on 30 April and 4 May were claimed by
the 11 April BR column.
? The shooting of a Rome professor on 4 May was
claimed by the BR militarist party subgroup, the
Partito Communista Combattente.
? A safehouse in Rome belonging to the Red Brigades
affiliate group, Armed Proletarian Power (AAP),
was discovered on 11 May. The safehouse contained
material linking the group to the murder of a prison
guard in January 1983.
? Manifestos appeared on factory buildings in Flor-
ence in early May, indicating the formation of a
new Tuscany BR column, the Umberto Catabiani
Brigade "Andrea." The banners said the column
opposed the militarization of Italy within NATO.
? In early May, four low-level BR support activists
were arrested in Turin while attempting to rebuild
the Piedmont BR column.
? Two members of the BR Partito Della Guerrigla-a
name the AAP has used in the past-were arrested
for an attempted post office robbery in Rome on
17 May.
It is clear that the Brigades are far from recovering
fully from police successes; several of the BR attacks
have shown inexperience, inefficiency, and outright
ineptness. Some of the arrested members appear to be
new recruits. The accidental discovery of the Rome
safehouse by police, moreover, has damaged the
Rome column. Material seized at the safehouse has
resulted in murder charges against several Rome
column members for the January slaying of a prison
guard. The abortive robbery and ensuing protracted
hostage-barricade situation conducted by the fugitive
group on 17 May resulted in the arrest of one
perpetrator and the eventual surrender of two other
terrorists. The shooting of an unarmed Rome profes-
sor on 4 May at pointblank range only resulted in
minor flesh wounds. 25X1
Although no evidence has surfaced indicating new BR
plans to attack US or NATO targets, the manifestos
in Tuscany suggest a possible threat to NATO facili-
ties, particularly in view of the former Tuscany
column's plans to attack NATO installations in the
area. Italian police reported that the widow of Um-
berto Catabiani: has recently gone underground and is
active within the BR structure, perhaps as a leader.
Police also speculate that the 11 April BR column and
the Tuscany column are trying to create the appear=
ance of many new columns forming nd of a steady
regrouping of the BR organization.a 25X1
Information regarding the extent and resurgence in
Italy of the group's operational capabilities is conflict-
ing. We expect the level of threat to US, NATO, and
Italian installations, presently not high, to increase
during the next several weeks. We suspect the recent
rise in BR activity is intended to coincide with Italian
national elections scheduled for 26-27 June. The BR
wants to press its claim as the "armed party" and as a
credible factor in Italy. We believe attacks will be
markedly less well executed and less lethal compared
to BR operations of the pre-Dozier era.
Secret
GI TR 83-011
26 May 1983
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Special Analysis
Rightist Terrorism
in Italy
Rightist political violence in Italy has a long history government for nearly 40 years. Rightist terrorists
dating back to the 19th century and to Mussolini's frequently hit public gathering places where they can
Black Shirts in the early 1920s. Relatively quiescent create mayhem. Other favorite but more specific
after World War II, rightist terrorists reappeared targets include leftist politicians, students, and jour-
who have acted against
dramatically on the Italian national scene in Decem- nalists, as well as magistrates
rightists. 25X1
ber 1969 when they bombed Milan's National Agri-
cultural Bank, killing 16 people and injuring nearly
terrorists have also carried out several bank
100. As with Mussolini's fascists prior to their arrival Rightist
robberies, primarily to help finance their operations.
in power, the new groups, in our judgment, have
The same motive-combined with a desire to develop
sought to create an atmosphere of tension designed to
another socially disruptive activity-may explain
make the government appear impotent and thus pro-
rightist involvement in the narcotics trade. According
yoke popular demands for a restoration of law and
to US Embassy officials in Rome, Pierluigi Pagliai,
order. In the few pronouncements of rightist terror-
wanted for complicity in the 1980 Bologna railway
fists, this "strategy of tension" has singled out various
station bombing, was involved in large-scale narcotics
segments of Italian society, particularly the PCI and
activities in Bolivia when he was captured there in
supporters of democratic government, for their "be-
trayal" of the Italian people.
October 1982. 25X1
A recent exhaustive study, Mauro Galleni's Report on Terrorist Groups
It is difficult to classify rightist terrorists in Italy as
Terrorism,' claims that rightist terrorists were respon-
Police reports seldom
sible for 68 percent of the 4,290 terrorist incidents members of a particular group.
recorded in Italy between 1969 and 1980. Galleni identify captured rightists by organization, and some
of the-leading rightist terrorists in Italy have been
credits rightists with 87 percent of incidents involving
The most
multiple deaths and 49 percent of the total loss of life.2 named in association withseveral groups.
prominent rightist terrorist is Stefano Delle Chiaie,
still at large, who is suspected by police of participat-
in major terrorist events from the 1969 Milan
The rightists tend to strike in leftist strongholds such ing
bank bombing to the Bologna train station massacre
as Bologna, which has had a Communist municipal
in 1980. Elio Massagrande and Pierluigi Concutelli
Galleni is a PCI official, but it should be noted that the PCI .
are other names prominent in the annals of rightist
terrorism. Their multiple associations lead us to sus-
are somewhat skeptical about some of his statistics, we find credible
pect that they use different labels to create the
his thesis that rightist tirrorists are as active as those on the left.=
Most t causing multiple deaths involve bombings. Of the
impression actually - the of case 25X1
178 persons killed by rightist terrorists between 1969 and 1980, 13, greater numbers and power than is
were killed by bombs, 85 in the Bologna incident alone.
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Italy: Rightwing Terrorist Groups/Organizations
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati
Rivoluzionari)
Third Position (Terza Posizione)
Popular Revolutionary Movement (Movimento
Popolare Rivoluzionario)
Black Order (Ordine Nero)
New Order (Ordine Nuovo)
AN National Vanguard (Avanguardia Nazionale)
MAR Armed Revolutionary Movement (Movimento
API
Armato Rivoluzionario)
Compass Card (Rosa dei Venti)
National Front (Fronte Nazionale)
Mussolini Action Squads (Squadre d'Azione
Mussolini)
The Phoenix (La Fenice)
Tolfa Brigands (Briganti della Tolfa)
Italians' Protection Association (Associazione
Protezione Italiani)
AF Aryan Brotherhood (Fratellanza Ariana)
GdI Executioners of Italy (Giustizieri d'Italia)
MFR Fascist Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Fascisti
Rivoluzionari)
Popular Revolutionary Opposition (Opposizione
Popolare Rivoluzionaria)
South Tyrolean Homeland League (Suedtiroler
Heimatbund)
New Order members, and in 1972 three of its mem-
bers-Franco Freda, Giovanni Ventura, and Guido
Giannettini-were indicted for the Milan attack. The
trial and appeals of the case continued until 1982,
ending in acquittal of the accused. In April 1973,
New Order attempted to bomb a Rome-Turin express
train. The resultant police investigation provided suf-
ficient evidence to bring about the legal dissolution of
the organization in November of that year.
The Italian security services reportedly believe that
New Order continued to exist as an underground
organization, but an established American scholar
claims that some New Order members reorganized
under the name Black Order. The scholar alleges that
Giancarlo Rognoni is the director of Black Order and
that the group has also co-opted members from such
other organizations as the National Vanguard, the
People's Struggle, and The Phoenix. In any case,
Italian authorities in late 1974 charged members of
Black Order with two major attacks. The first oc-
curred in May 1974 when a bomb exploded in a
public square in Brescia, causing multiple deaths and
injuries. The second came in August of that year
when an express train was blown up between Florence
and Bologna, again with multiple deaths and injuries.
Although Black Order has continued to strike public
targets, it has never again surpassed the damage
attributed to it in 1974.
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), in our judg-
ment, is now the most dangerous rightist terrorist
group in Italy. Its origins are unknown, but press
sources believe it to be an outgrowth of Black Order
or of the merger of several smaller organizations.
Although NAR's first reported attack did not occur
until 1977, Galleni credits them with some 119
attacks by 1980-a larger number of incidents than
attributed to any other rightist terrorist group for the
whole 1969-80 period. Unlike most rightist groups,
NAR claims responsibility for some of its attacks. If
Italian police and security service assumptions are
correct, however, it did not claim its most spectacular
accomplishment, the 1980 bombing of the Bologna
According to Galleni, at least four of the 11 terrorist
attacks between 1969 and 1980 resulting in multiple
deaths were perpetrated by New Order and its appar-
ent successor, Black Order. New Order's origins are
obscure. Scholars and Italian security services believe
that Giuseppe "Pino" Rauti and Clemente Graziani
founded it, probably in the early 1950s, as a paramili-
tary organization consciously modeled after Nazi
groups. One journalistic account asserts that the
group may have had as many as 2,500 members in the
1960s, but we regard that as exaggerated;
The group's first major attack was the 1969 Milan
bombing. Initial police investigations focused on left-
ists, but subsequent acts led to the arrest of several
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station; with 85 killed and 200 maimed, this attack
was the most deadly European terrorist event of the
postwar period.
NAR has also targeted magistrates on several occa-
sions, killing some who pronounced sentences against
rightist terrorists. It murdered Rome magistrate
Mario Amato in 1980, for instance, apparently be-
cause he had uncovered incriminating evidence on two
NAR members. In October 1982, NAR claimed
responsibility for an armed bank robbery and an
attack on a police station in Rome. We do not know
the size of NAR's membership, but the number of
incidents claimed by the organization and the known
members arrested indicate that the group remains
large enough to be dangerous
Press reports, as well as Galleni, mention some groups
about whom we know nothing beyond their names and
the dates of some of their actions. Examples are the
Mussolini Action Squads, reported by Galleni to have
made at least 70 attacks in Milan between 1969 and
1980. Two others, the Tolfa Brigands and Popular
Revolutionary Opposition, each have at least a dozen
actions to their credit since 1979, mainly in Rome.
Small groups that appear only intermittently are also
characteristic of the Italian rightist terrorist scene.
Galleni cites at least 50 such organizations.
Although most Italian rightist terrorist groups are
nationally oriented neofascists, a significant exception
is the South Tyrolean Homeland League (SHB).
During the 1960s these Germanic separatists bombed
railroad stations, power lines, and bridges and also
attacked Italian police officials, principally in the
northern Provinces of Trent and Bolzano. Only minor
incidents have occurred since 1980, although local
dissatisfaction with Rome's unfulfilled promises for
ethnic Germans in the South Tyrol could lead to more
incidents in the future.
Political Party and Government Links
One respected Italian journalist asserts that rightist
terrorism requires a "propitious ideological terrain."
In part this is provided by the reaction to the Italian
Communist Party, Europe's largest Communist party
and Italy's second-largest votewinner since World
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War II..The party's electoral success and fascism's
traditional militance and violence against Commu-
nists make the PCI an obvious focal point for rightist
reaction.F___1 25X1
Propitious terrain is also provided by the neofascist
Italian Social Movement (MSI), which probably has
important links to rightist terrorists. Founded in 1946,
the MSI has consistently remained Italy's fourth-
largest party. It regularly wins at least 5 percent of
the votes in national elections and peaked at 9 percent
in 1972. The party has always insisted that it is a
responsible organization working for its goals through
legitimate democratic processes. The MSI has empha-
sized its democratic bona fides under the leadership of
Giorgio Almirante, party secretary since 1969, but we
believe that Almirante may have tried to.create a
legalistic facade behind which he and other MSI
members have tolerated or aided rightist terrorism.
25X1
There is considerable evidence that some MSI mem-
bers either engage in rightist terrorism or are in, close
contact with those who do. The founder of New
Order, Rauti, for example, is a leading MSI member.'
In addition, the MSI-unlike Italy's respectable con-
servative parties-claims that any measure is admissi-
ble in the fight against Communism. Italian courts, in
fact, have convicted MSI activists of political violence
against individuals as well as the offices of several
political parties. They have also closed at least one
section of the party for harboring criminal elements.
25X1
Potentially more serious than the MSI connection, in
our judgment, are scattered indications of links be-
tween rightist terrorists and members of Italian secu-
rity services and police forces. Press comments , ,
abound, alleging that the government turns a blind
-eye to rightist crime or, worse, is its accomplice. The
' Rauti reportedly formed New Order because he differed with
MSI policies under then secretary Arturo Michelini. When Almir-
ante became MSI secretary in 1969, Rauti brought New Order
back into association with the party. Rauti was elected to the
Chamber of Deputies on the MSI ticket in 1972 and has twice been
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cloud of speculation and allegation about Italian
security service involvement with rightist terrorism
began with press reports of a suspected coup plot in
June-July 1964. The leading figure implicated in the
scheme was Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo, head of the
now disbanded Armed Forces Information Service
(SIFAR), who was subsequently elected a senator on
the MSI ticket. The parliamentary commission that
investigated the case filed a split report. The majority
found no evidence of coup plotting, but a dissenting
multiparty minority found evidence of illegal activity
by SIFAR while it was headed by De Lorenzo.4 F
In a more serious incident, Prince Junio Valerio
Borghese and 75 codefendants were indicted and tried
for plotting a coup in 1970. Borghese, a former naval
officer, received Italy's highest military award in
World War II and later founded a rightist organiza-
tion called National Front. The trial ended in 1978-
several years after Borghese's death by natural
causes-with the conviction of 46 of the defendants
for conspiracy and participation in a subversive orga-
nization. Among those charged but acquitted were
Gen. Vito Miceli, a former head of the Defense
Information Service (SID) and an MSI party official.
Embassy officials in Rome have noted considerable
public cynicism at the contrast between the strict
judicial treatment of leftist terrorists-such as those
involved in the kidnaping of Brigadier General Dozi-
er-and the outcome of rightist cases. The principal
defendants in the 1969 Milan bank bombing were not
convicted until 1978 and ultimately were acquitted on
appeal in 1982. The defendants in the Brescia bomb-
ing case were also acquitted, and no one has yet been
tried for the Bologna bombing. Pagliai died in No-
vember 1982 as a result of wounds suffered in his
capture in Bolivia, but Delle Chiaie, who was report-
edly with him, eluded capture.
The Defense Information Service (SID) replaced SIFAR in a
~eorQanizat.on that took place following the De Lorenzo incident.
Guido Giannettini, indicted in the Milan bank case,
had been an undercover agent for SID.' His arrest
and ultimate acquittal therefore inspired considerable
press speculation about SID involvement either in the
planning of the bombing or its subsequent handling by
police and judicial authorities. 25X1
Serious questions have arisen in the public mind on
links between fascist organizations and Licio Gelli,
founder of the illegal P-2 Masonic Lodge whose
discovery caused the fall of the Forlani government in
1981.6 A former head of Italy's domestic security
service (SISDE), who was fired for his reputed P-2
membership, has admitted that Gelli was once a paid
informer for that agency. Press speculation has ar-
gued that Gelli was actually the instigator of the
Bologna station bombing, claiming that he chose
Delle Chiaie to plan the attack to create a "hot
summer" atmosphere to divert attention from the
lodge's financial schemes.
It is perhaps impossible to determine the facts of
Gelli's or others' involvement in rightist terrorism.
Nevertheless, we believe the intense press insinuations
of such relationships, and of security service connec-
tions to other incidents, have added to public distrust
of the government as well as of the motives and
interests of the parties, especially the dominant Chris-
tian Democrats. Thus, each subsequent scandal or
"revelation" feeds the public's suspicions of rightist
terrorists and the interests with which they might be
connected. The result, in any event, is considerable
' Giannettini was a journalist for the MSI national newspaper. The
publication in the early 1970s of his name and those of other New
Order members affiliated with the party led Almirante to denounce
New Order publicly. Despite that effort to dissociate the party from
known terrorists, Rauti has continued to sit in parliament as an
MSI deputy.0
6 The P-2 lodge was discovered in early 1981. Its membership list
implicated many leading Italian politicians and public figures in
allegedly subversive activities. P-2 is also believed to have been
involved in covering up several major scandals over the past decade.
Gelli, who fled Italy in 1981, was captured by Swiss authorities in
September 1982 and is now awaiting extradition. He is wanted not
only for his illicit lodge activities but also in connection with various
financial scandals accompanying the collapse of Italy's largest
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harm to the reputation of Italian security services,
according to the US Embassy.
International Connections
Only scattered evidence exists on international sup-
port for Italian rightist terrorists. Several captured
terrorists have claimed in published interviews that
some of their cohorts were trained at PLO facilities in
Lebanon, but those assertions are not confirmed. In
one instance, a repentant rightist told of being trained
by Phalangists in Lebanon. Italian security service
officials believe that there has been some contact
between Italian rightist terrorists and similar or sym-
pathetic groups in Spain, West Germany, and France.
such help appears to be only intermittent.
a New Forces training camp in the Pyrenees-but
West German security services have no confirmed
reports of collaboration between West German and
Italian rightist terrorists but are investigating the
alleged involvement of one West German citizen in
the Bologna station bombing. Italian police also claim
evidence of contacts between the Italian rightist ter-
rorist Marco Affatigato and a French police official,
Paul-Louis Durand, who is known to be active in
extremist circles and thought to have been in Bologna
immediately prior to the explosion. There is no evi-
dence, however, of collaboration between French and
Italian rightists in either the planning or execution of
the Bologna bombing. After the banning of New
Order, five Italian rightist terrorists took refuge in
Spain and were subsequently reported to have been in
contact with Spanish counterparts. There is substan-
tial evidence of Italian terrorist assistance to Spanish
groups-such as the sighting of Italian neofascists in
Outlook
In Italy, only the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei has
recently shown a capacity for sustained action. Re-
porting for the final months of 1982 shows that
Italian authorities have stepped up arrests of rightist
terrorists, possibly in response to public pressures.
Because much rightist terrorist activity occurs in
response to leftist activity-creating a kind of circular
terrorism-recent police successes in reducing Red
Brigades cadres may also persuade the right tempo-
rarily to assume a low profile. As long as the PCI
remains an important political force, however, rightist
terrorists will retain their old motive for terrorist
action. Their threat will be all the more worrisome if
they receive assistance from the Italian Social Move-
ment and from sympathetic police and security offi-
cials. 25X1
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Statistical Overview
Total, 632
Of which: US targets, 294
Category of
InlernaIional
I'errorisl Incidents,
I982-83,by
Month
30
20
0 J A S 0 N D J F M A M J
1982 1983
i I
Total 73 90 49 57 42 46 55 58 71 69 22 632
Barricade,
hostage
? Figures for the most recent months are subject
to change as additional data are received.
bBreak.ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc.
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received.F___1 25X1
purchases. 25X1
1 March 1983 Belgium: Onkruit Demonstration
In Louvina, 30 members and sympathizers of the antimilitarist organization,
Onkruit, staged a demonstration at a Belgian military base, protesting weapons
13 April 1983 Spain: Narcotics Connection to Basque Terrorists
In Guipuzcoa Province, Basque police discovered approximately 7 metric tons of
cannabis valued at $1.3 million. Police speculate that the Basque terrorists are
losing public support for their kidnapings, bank robberies are becoming too risky,
and the terrorists may now be financing their activities through narcotics
trafficking.) 25X1
abandoned car parked next to the presidential palace contained 40 kilograms of
plastic explosive. Details of the incident are being closely held within the Chilean
Government. 25X1
23 April 1983 West Germany: Discovery of Incendiary Bombs
Twenty incendiary bombs that ignite on impact were found near the Baden-
Wurttemberg railroad line, which is used solely for transport of US military
weapons. German authorities have had several reports that anti-NATO and anti-
US militants plan to conduct unspecified operations against the US "bomb trains."
We suspect this attack may be linked to a West German antimilitarist group,
Krieg dem Krieg (War Against War), which was observing and photographing
military trains in August and September of 1982 shortly before a US freight train
was the target of a bomb attack on 29 September 1982.1 25X1
30 April 1983 Spain: Assassination Claim by GRAPO
In La Coruna, the First of October Antifascist Revolutionary Group (GRAPO) has
claimed responsibility for the killing of a Civil Guardsman. We believe that this
attack-coupled with the 19 April killing of a police officer-indicates that
GRAPO has reestablished its capability to conduct terrorist attacks in Spain.
GRAPO's anti-US/anti-NATO orientation also indicates the possibility that
GRAPO may target US interests. 25X1
Chilean police recently discovered that an 25X1
Secret
GI TR 83-011
26 May 1983
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Late April 1983 Peru: Aggressive Army Policy
Peruvian Army leaders informed President Belaunde that they intend to take a
more active role in the counterterrorist campaign in Ayacucho and are adopting a
"no prisoners" policy; however, we have seen no evidence that such a policy is ac-
tually in effect. The President reportedly asked that the Army make every effort to
respect human lives and rights.
in our estimation, indirect endorsement of this activity.
Honduras: Terrorist Leader Captured
Honduran authorities arrested Efrain Duarte, leader of the terrorist group Popular
Revolutionary Forces-Lorenzo Zelaya that was responsible for the 1980 and
1981 machinegun attacks against the US Embassy, the 1981 ambush of a US
mobile training team, and bombings of several US-owned businesses and their
Honduran subsidiaries.
Early May 1983 Honduras: Terrorists Declare War
Honduran revolutionary groups followed up their public announcement of creating
a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board with a declaration of "popular
revolutionary war" against the Honduran Government. Official Cuban and
Nicaraguan radio stations have broadcast the announcements, thereby providing,
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military facilities 25X1
6 May 1983 West Germany: Possible RAF.Targeting of US Installations
During the investigation following the arrest of Red Army Faction (RAF) member
Gisela Dutzi, West German police found a map, showing 21 US military
installations in the Mannheim area. The map-believed stolen by Dutzi when she
worked at the US military base at Mannheim in 1979-80-was in the possession of
Peter Winter, with whom Dutzi resided prior to her arrest. Winter claimed he was
given the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with instructions to
check out the installations to determine.if the map was still accurate. West.
.German authorities presume the RAF has some operational interest in US
25X1
12 May 1983 United States: Flight 236 Now Boarding for Havana
A Capitol Airlines flight en route from San Juan to Miami with 248 persons
aboard was hijacked to Cuba by an unidentified black woman brandishing a flare
..pistol. The hijacker was taken into custody by Cuban officials, and the passengers,
after stocking up on cigars and rum, continued on to Miami. The same Capitol
flight was hijacked on 1 May.F----] 25X1
8-13 May 1983 Italy: Formation of New Red Brigades Column
In Florence, manifestos appeared announcing the formation of a new Tuscany Red
Brigades (BR) column, named for former Tuscany column leader Umberto
Catabiani who was killed on 24. May 1982.in a shootout with police. The BR mani-
fests mention the planned militarization of Italy as the southern "flank" of
NATO..We note the previous Tuscany column had planned to attack Camp Darby
in 1982, and we suspect the resuscitated Tuscany column may also target the
installation, especially during the time frame of the anniversary of Catabiani's
death. 25X1
13, May 1983
Afghanistan: Split in Al Zulfigar?
A Pakistani newspaper. reported an armed clash between two factions of Al
Zulfiqar in Kabul. This is the first indication we. have had of a split in the group.
25X1
woman. A search conducted by Marines and local guards had negative results
Philippines: Bomb Threat to US Embassy
A bomb threat was phoned in to. the US Embassy in. Manila by an unidentified
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15 May 1983 Spain: Arrest of Spanish Rightwing Terrorists
In Valladolid, seven members of the rightwing October 28 Armed Group were
arrested by police for two murders in January 1983. The group is named after the
date of the 1982 Socialist general election victory in Spain.
16 May 1983 Italy: Arrest of Italian Terrorists
In Turin, four members of the Red Brigades (BR) were arrested during an
antiterrorism operation. Italian police indicated that the arrested men were
attempting to reorganize the Turin BR column, which was broken up by Italian
authorities in 1982.
responsibility for the latest device, and investigation is continuing.
and US installations in London earlier this year. No group has yet claimed
17 May 1983 United Kingdom: Discovery of Incendiary Device
In London, an incendiary device was mailed to a private business firm but was
opened without ignition. The device was similar to seven devices claimed by the
Scottish National Liberation Army, the Makhnos Anarchist Army, the Second of
April Group, and the Wat Tyler People's Liberation Army sent to Soviet, British,
carrier in as many weeks
19 May 1983 United States: Eastern Airlines Flight Hijacked
An Eastern Airlines flight en route from Miami to New York with 132 persons
aboard was hijacked to Cuba by a Spanish-speaking male claiming to have a
bomb. Upon arrival in Havana, the hijacker was taken into custody, and the plane
and passengers returned to Miami. The incident was the third hijacking of a US
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20 May 1983 South Africa: Explosion at South African Air Force Headquarters
A car bomb exploded adjacent to the headquarters of the South African Air Force
in central Pretoria, killing 18 and injuring 217. The African National Congress
has claimed credit.
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