PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND PERSONALOGY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000600690003-8
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOL. 21 No. 4
'"" WINTER 1977
-TR-SINT 77-004
Ns `.. 1365
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NOFORN
An untapped collection possibility
PARAPSYCHOLOGY IN INTELLIGENCE:
A PERSONAL REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
The Central Intelligence Agency has investigated the controversial phenomenon
called parapsychology as it relates to intelligence collection. The author was involved
with many aspects of the last such investigations. This paper summarizes selected
highlights of the experiences of the author and others. The intent is not historical
completeness. Files are available for those interested in details. Instead the intent is to
record some certainly interesting and possibly useful data and opinions. This record is
likely to be of future benefit to those who will be required to evaluate intelligence-
related aspects of parapsychology.
The Agency took the initiative by sponsoring serious parapsychological research,
but circumstances, biases, and fear of ridicule prevented CIA from completing a
scientific investigation of parapsychology and its relevance to national security.
During this research period, CIA was buffeted with investigations concerning
illegalities and improprieties of all sorts. This situation, perhaps properly so, raised the
sensitivity of CIA's involvement in unusual activities. The " Proxmire Effect," where
the fear that certain Government research contracts would be claimed to be ill-
founded and held up for scorn, was another factor precluding CIA from sensitive areas
of research. Also, there tend to be two types of reactions to parapsychology: positive or
negative, with little in between. Parapsychological data, almost by definition, are
elusive and unexplained. Add a history replete with proven frauds and many people
instantly reject the subject saying, in effect, "I would not believe this stuff even if it
were true." Others, who mostly have had personal "conversion" experiences, tend to
be equally convinced that one unexplained success establishes a phenomenon. These
prejudices make it difficult to evaluate parapsychology carefully and scientifically.
Tantalizing but incomplete data have been generated by CIA-sponsored research.
These data show, among other things, that on occasion unexplained results of genuine
intelligence significance occur. This is not to say that parapsychology is a proven
intelligence tool; it is to say that the evaluation is not yet complete and more research
is needed.
Attention is confined to psvchokinetics and cemote vie.~ine. Psvchokinetics is the
purported ability of a person to interact with a machine or other object by
unexplained means. Remote viewing is akin to clairvoyance in that a person claims to
sense information about a site or person removed from a known sensory link.
Anecdotal reports of extrasensory perception (ESP) capabilities have reached
U.S. national security agencies at least since World War II, when Hitler was said to
rely on astrologers and seers. Suggestions for military applications of ESP continued to
be received after World War II. For example, in 1952 the Department of Defense was
lectured on the possible usefulness of extrasensory perception in psychological
warfare.' Over the years, reports continued to accumulate. In 1961, the reports
' A. Puharich, "On the Possible Usefulness of Extrasensory Perception in Psychological Warfare"
delivered to a 1952 Pentagon conference, The Washington Post, August 7, 1977.
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induced one of the earliest U. S. Government parapsychology investigations when the
chief of CIA's Office of Technical Service (then the Technical Services Division)
became interested in the claims of ESP. Technical project officers soon contacted
Stephen I. Abrams, the Director of the Parapsychological Laboratory, Oxford
University, England. Under the auspices of Project ULTRA, Abrams prepared a
review article which claimed ESP was demonstrated but not understood or controlla-
ble.' The report was read with interest but produced no further action for another
decade.
Two lasgr physicists, Dr. Russell Targ and Dr. Harold E. Puthoff, re-awakened
CIA research in parapsychology. Targ had been avocationally interested in parapsy-
chology for most of his adult life. As an experimentalist, he was interested in scientific
observations of parapsychology. Puthof f became interested in the field in the early
1970s. He was a theoretician who was exploring new fields of research after extensive
work in quantum electronics.
In April of 1972, Targ met with CIA personnel from the Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI) and discussed the subject of paranormal abilities. Targ revealed that
he had contacts with people who purported to have seen and documented some Soviet
investigations of psychokinesis. Films of Soviets moving inanimate objects by "mental
powers " were made available to analysts from OSI. They, in turn, contacted personnel
from the Office of Research and Development (ORD) and OTS. An ORD Project
Officer then visited Targ who had recently joined the Stanford Research Institute
(SRI). Targ proposed that some psychokinetic verification investigations could be done
at SRI in conjunction with Puthoff.
These proposals were quickly followed by a laboratory demonstration. A man was
found by Targ and Puthoff who apparently had psychokinetic abilities. He was taken
on a surprise visit to a superconducting shielded magnetometer being used in quark
(high energy particle) experiments by Dr. A. Hebbard of Stanford University Physics
Department. The quark experiment required that the magnetometer be as well
shielded as technology would allow. Nevertheless, when the subject placed his
attention on the interior of the magnetometer, the output signal was visibly disturbed,
indicating a change in the internal magnetic field. Several other correlations of his
mental efforts with signal variations were observed. These variations were never seen
before or after the visit. The event was summarized and transmitted to the Agency in
the form of a letter to an OSI analysts and as discussions with OTS and ORD officers.
The Office of Technical Services took the first action. With the approval of the
same manager who supported the ESP studies a decade previously, an OTS project
officer contracted for a demonstration with the previously described subject at SRI.
For a cost of $874, one OTS and one ORD representative worked with Targ and
Puthoff and the previously mentioned man for a few days in August, 1972. During
this demonstration, the subject was asked to describe objects hidden out of sight by the
CIA personnel. The subject did well. The descriptions were so startlingly accurate that
the OTS and ORD representatives suggested that the work be continued and
expanded. The same Director of OTS reviewed the data, approved another $2,500
work order, and encouraged the development of a more complete research plan.
By October, 1972, I was the Project Officer. I was chosen because of my physics
background to work with the physicists from SRI. The Office of Technical Service
funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology.' The expanded investigation
' S. I. Abrams, "Extrasensory Perception", Draft report, 14 December 1965.
' H. E. Puthoff; Stanford Research Institute; Letter to K. Green/OSI, June 27, 1972.
'Office of Technical Service Contract 9473, 1 October 1972 (CONFIDENTIAL).
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included tests of several abilities of both the original subject and a new one. Curious
data began to appear; the paranormal abilities seemed individualistic. For example,
one subject, by mental effort, apparently caused an increase in the temperature
measured by a thermistor; the action could not be duplicated by the second subject.
The second subject was able to reproduce, with impressive accuracy, information
sealed inside envelopes. Under identical conditions, the first subject could reproduce
nothing. Perhaps even more disturbing, repeating the same experiment with the same
subject did not yield consistent results. I began to have serious feelings of being
involved with a fraud.
Approximately halfway through this project, the SRI contractors were invited to
review their results. After careful consideration of the security and sensitivity factors,
the results were shared and discussed with selected Agency personnel during that and
subsequent meetings. In February, 1973, the most recent data were reviewed;
thereafter, several ORD officers showed definite interest in contributing their own
expertise and office funding.
The possibility of a joint OTS/ORD program continued to develop. The Office of
Research and Development sent new Project Officers to SRI during February, 1973,
and the reports which were brought back convinced ORD to become involved.
Interest was translated into action when ORD requested an increase in the scope of the
effort and transferred funds to OTS.' About this time, a third sensitive subject. Pat
Price, became available at SRI, and the remote viewing experiments in which a
subject describes his impressions of remote objects or locations began in earnest. The
possibility that such useful abilities were real motivated all concerned to move ahead
quickly.
The contract required additional management review before it could be
continued or its scope increased. The initial review went from OTS and ORD to Mr.
William Colby, then the DDO. On 24 April, Mr. Colby decided that the Executive
Management Committee should pass judgment on this potentially sensitive project. By
the middle of May, 1973, the approval request went through the Management
Committee. An approval memorandum was written for the signature of the DCI, then
Dr. James Schlesinger.' Mr. Colby took the memorandum to the DCI a few days later.
I was soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any
follow-on in this area. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It
should be tabled. It is interesting to note that OTS was then being investigated for
involvement in the Watergate affair, and that in May, 1973, the DCI issued a
memorandum to all CIA employees requesting the reporting of any activities that may
have been illegal and improper. As Project Officer, clearly my sense of timing had not
been guided by useful paranormal abilities!
During the summer of 1973, SRI continued working informally with an OSI
officer on a remote viewing experiment which eventually stimulated more CIA-
sponsored investigations of parapsychology. The target was a vacation property in the
eastern United States. The experiment began with the passing of nothing more than
the geographic coordinates of the vacation property to the SRI physicists who, in turn,
passed them to the two subject, one of whom was Pat Price. No maps were permitted,
and the subjects were asked to give an immediate response of what they remotely
viewed at these coordinates. The subject came back with descriptions which were
apparent misses. They both talked about a military-like facility. Nevertheless, a
' C/TSD; Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director for Operations; Subject: Request for Approval
of Contract; 20 April 1973 (SECRET).
' W. E. Colby; DDO; Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Request for
Approval of Contract; 4 May 1973 (SECRET).
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striking correlation of the two independent descriptions was noted. The correlation
caused the OSI officer to drive to the site and investigate in more detail.
To the surprise of the OSI officer, he soon discovered a sensitive government
installation a few miles from the vacation property. This discovery led to a request to
have Price provide information concerning the interior workings of this particular site.
All the data produced by the two subjects were reviewed in CIA and the Agency
concerned.
The evaluation was, as usual, mixed.' Pat Price, who had no military or
intelligence background, provided a list of project titles associated with current and
past activities including one of extreme sensitivity. Also, the codename of the site was
provided. Other information concerning the physical layout of the site was accurate.
Some information, such as the names of the people at the site, proved incorrect.
These experiments took several months to be analyzed and reviewed within the
Agency. Now Mr. Colby was DCI, and the new directors of OTS and ORD were
favorably impressed by the data. In the fall of 1973, a Statement of Work was
outlined, and SRI was asked to propose another program. A jointly funded ORD and
OTS program was begun in February, 1974.' The author again was the Project
Officer. The project proceeded on the premise that the phenomena existed; the
objective was to develop and utilize them.
The ORD funds were devoted to basic studies such as the identification of
measurable physiological or psychological characteristics of psychic individuals, and
the establishment of experimental protocols for validating paranormal abilities. The
OTS funds were to evaluate the operational utility of psychic subjects without regard
to the detailed understanding of paranormal functioning. If the paranormal function-
ing was sufficiently reproducible, we were confident applications would be found.
Before many months had passed, difficulties developed in the project. Our
tasking in the basic research area proved to be more extensive than time and funds
would allow. The contractors wanted to compromise by doing all of the tasks with less
completeness. The ORD scientists insisted that with such a controversial topic, fewer
but more rigorous results would be of more value. The rigor of the research became a
serious issue between the ORD project officers and SRI, with myself generally taking a
position between the righteousness of the contractor and indignation of the research-
ers. Several meetings occurred over that issue.
As an example of the kinds of disputes which developed over the basic research,
consider the evaluation of the significance of data from the "ESP teaching machine"
experiments. This machine was a four-state electronic random number generator used
to test for paranormal abilities. SRI claimed the machine randomly cycled through
four states, and the subject indicates the current machine state by pressing a button.
The state of the machine and the subject's choice were recorded for later analysis. A
subject "guessing" should, on the average, be correct 25 percent of the time. SRI had a
subject who averaged a statistically very significant 29 percent for more than 2,00
trials.
I requested a review of the experiment and analysis, and two ORD officers
quickly and skeptically responded. They first argued that the ESP machine was
' K. Green; LSD/OSI; Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Verification of Remote Viewing
Experiments at Stanford Research Institute; 9 November 1973.
(SECRET)
'Office of Technical Service Contract, FAN 4125-4099 Office of Research and Development
Contract, FAN 4162-8103; 1 February 1974 (CONFIDENTIAL;.
10 SECRET
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possibly not random. They further argued the subjects probably learned the nonran-
dom machine patterns and thereby produced high scores.' During this review, it was
noted that whether the machine was random or not, the data taken during the
experiment could be analyzed to determine actual machine statistics. The machine
randomness was then unimportant, because the subject's performance could then be
compared with actual machine performance.'* The ORD Project Officers, however,
did not believe it would be worth the effort to do the extra analysis of the actual data.
I disagreed. I had the Office of Joint Computer Services redo the data analysis.
The conclusion was that during the experiment "no evidence of nonrandomness was
discovered" and there was "no solid reason how he was able to be so successful."" I
further ordered the subject retested. He averaged more than 28 percent during
anothe>t 2,500 trials. This information was given in written and oral form to the ORD
Project Officers, who maintained there must be yet another flaw in the experiment or
analysis, but it was not worth finding. Because of more pressing demands, the issue
could not be pursued to a more definite conclusion.
Concurrent with this deteriorating state of affairs, new Directors of ORD and
OTS were named again. Since neither Director had any background or experience in
paranormal research, the new Director of ORD reviewed the parapsychology project
and had reservations. I requested a meeting in which-he said he could not accept this
reality of paranormal functioning, but he understood his bias. He said that inasmuch
as he could not make an objective decision in this field, he could simply follow the
advice of his staff. The ORD Project Officers were feeling their own frustrations and
uncertainties concerning the work and now had to face this unusual kind of skepticism
of their new Director. The skepticism about the believability of the phenomenon and
quality of the basic research adversely affected the opinions of many people in OTS.
Support for the project was vanishing rapidly.
As these pressures mounted, the first intelligence collection operation using
parapsychology was attempted. The taget was the Semipalatinsk Unidentified Re-
search and Development Facility-3 (URDF-3, formerly known as PNUTS). The
experimental collection would use our best subject, Pat Price. From experience it was
obvious that Price produced bad data as well as good. Borrowing from classical
communication theory concepts, this "noisy channel" of information could neverthe-
less be useful if it were characterized. An elaborate protocol was designed which
would accomplish two characterization measurements. First, we needed assurance the
channel was collecting useful data. I reviewed the photos of URDF-3 and chose two
features which, if Price described them, would show the channel at least partially
working. Referring to Figure la, these features were the tall crane and the four
structures resembling oil well derricks. It was agreed that if Price described these
structures, I would be prepared to have him sign a secrecy agreement, making him
witting, and collect more relevant intelligence details. Secondly, after a working
channel was thus established, a signal-to-noise or quality characterization was
required. This would be done by periodic tests of the channel-that is, periodically
Price would be asked to describe features of URDF-3 which were known. The
accuracy of these descriptions would be used to estimate the quality of the data we
had no obvious way of verifying. .
'L- W. Rook; LSR/ORD; Memorandum for OTS/CB; Subject: Evidence for Non-Randomness of
Four-State Electronic Random Stimulus Generator; 12 June 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
"S. L. Cianci; LSR/ORD; Memorandum for OTS/CB; Subject: Response to Requested Critique, SRI
Random Stimulus Generator Results; 12 June 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
" G. Burow; OJCS/AD/BD; Memorandum for Dr. Kress; Subject: Analysis of the Subject-Machine
Relationship; 8 October 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
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and briefing Targ and Puthoff
The experiment began with my branch chief and
and
in a motel. Later, at SRI. Price was briefed by g Puthoff. Since
Targ against
Puthoff presumably knew nothing about URDF-3, this protocol guarded
coordinates, a
cueing and/or telepathy. Initially Price was given only the geographic world atlas map marked with the approximate location of URDF-3, and told it was a
Soviet RD&E test site. Overnight, he produced the drawing on the bottom right of
Figure lb. Price further mentioned this was a "damned big crane" because he saw a
person walk by and he only came up to the axles on the wheels (note sketch on left,
Figure lb). This performance caught my attention; but with two more days of work,
we never heard about the derricks. Eventually, a decision was needed. Because the
crane was so impressive, my branch chief and I decided the derricks description
requirement should be relaxed and we should continue.
When the decision was made to make Price witting, I decided to test him. My
Pat
the sat wnas conference
immediately asked
branch Price chief and
introduced as the sponsor. and I Puthoff
into
Pat
Price if he knew me.
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Yes.
Name?
Ken Kress.
Occupation?
Works for CIA.
Since I was then a covert employee, the response was meaningful. After having Price
sign a secrecy agreement, and some discussions, I confronted him again. I rolled out a
large version of Figure la and asked if he had viewed this site.
Yes, of course!
Why didn't you see the four derricks?
Wait, I'll check.
Price closed his eyes, put on his glasses (he "sees" better that way) and in a few
seconds answered. "I didn't see them because they are not there any more." Since my
and implied data
data were three or four months old, e no rejoinr to
that my data were not good. we proceeded
package.
In a few weeks, the latest URDF-3 reconnaissance was checked. Two derricks
were partially disassembled, but basically all four were visible. In general, most of
Price's data were wrong or could not be evaluated. He did, nevertheless, produce some
amazing descriptions, like buildings then under construction, spherical tank sections,
and the crane in Figure 1b. Two analysts, a photo interpreter at IAS'= and a nuclear
analyst at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories agreed that Price's description of the
crane was accurate; the nuclear analyst wrote that "one: he, the subject, actually saw it
through remote viewing, or two: he was informed what to draw by someone
knowledgeable of URDF-3." 3 But, again, since there was so much bad information
mixed in with the good, ~ athe re at veberas~l i ~nclusiven The ORDrofficers concluded th at
remote viewing,
12W. T. Strand; C/FSO/IAS; Memorandum for Director, Office of Technical Service; Subject:
Evaluation of Data on Semipalatinsk Unidentified R&D Facility No. 3, USSR; 20 August 1974 (SECRET).
" D. Stillman; Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; "An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of
URDF-3"; 4 December 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
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Figure 1 Comparison of Target Site and Drawing by Remote Viewer
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since there were no control experiments to compare with, the data were nothing but
lucky guessing.
I began to doubt my own objectivity in evaluating the significance of paranormal
abilities to intelligence collection. It was clear that the SRI contractors were claiming
success while ORD advisors were saying the experiments were not meaningful because
of poor experimental design. As a check on myself, I asked for a critique of the
investigation from a disinterested consultant, a theoretical physicist with broad
intellectual background. His first task was to evaluate the field of parapsychology
without knowledge of the CIA data. After he had completed this critique, I asked him
to acquaint' himself with the CIA data and then to reassess the field. The first
h
d
l
researc
i
investigation produced genuine interest in paranormal functioning as a va
area. After being acquainted with CIA data, his conclusion was, a large body of
reliable experimental evidence points to the inescapable conclusion that extrasensory
perception does exist as a real phenomenon, albeit characterized by rarity and lack of
reliability."" This judgment by a competent scientist gave impetus to continue serious
inquiry into parapsychology.
Because of the general skepticism and the mixed results of the various operational
experiments, a final challenge was issued by OTS management: OTS is not in the
research business; do something of genuine operational significance. Price was chosen,
and suggestions were solicited from operational personnel in both OTS and the DDO.
An intriguing idea was selected from audio operational applications: the difficult and
dangerous job of targeting and installing audio collection systems. A test to determine
if remote viewing could help was suggested. The interiors of two foreign embassies
were known to the audio teams who had made entries several years previously. Price
was to visit these embassies by his remote viewing capability, locate the coderooms,
and come up with information that might allow a member of the audio team to
determine whether Price was likely to be of operational use in subsequent operations.
Price was given operationally acceptable data such as the exterior photographs and the
geographical coordinates of the embassies.
In both cases, Price correctly located the coderooms. He produced copious data,
such as the location of interior doors and colors of marble stairs and fireplaces that
were accurate and specific. As usual, much was also vague and incorrect. Regardless,
the operations officer involved concluded, "It is my considered opinion that this
technique-whatever it is-offers definite operational possibilities."
This result was reviewed within OTS and the DDO, and various suggestions for
1 f 11 activities were formulated.'' This package of requirements, plus
-on
potentta o ow
the final results of the current contract, were reviewed at several meetings within OTS
and ORD. The results of those meetings are as follows:
1. According to the ORD Project Officers, the research was not productive
or even competent;. therefore, research support to SRI was dropped. The Director
" J. A. Ball; "An Overview of Extrasensory Perception"; Report to CIA, 27 January 1975.
"C/AOB/OTS; Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Parapsychology/? Remote Viewing"; 20 April
1976 (SECRET).
" Chief/Division D/DDO; Memorandum for C/D&E; Subject: Perceptual Augmentation Tech-
niques; 24 January 1975 (SECRET); AC/SE/DDO; Memorandum for C/DBE; Subject. Perceptual
Augmentation Testing; 14 January 1975 (SECRET), C/EA/DDO; Memorandum for Director of Technical
Service; Subject: Exploration of Operational Potential of "Paranormals"; 5 February 1975 (SECREr);
C/Libya/EL/NE/DDO; Memorandum for OTS/CB; Subject: Libyan Desk Requirement for Psychic
Experiments Relating to Libya; 31 January 1975 (SECRET); CI/Staff/DDO; Memorandum for the Record;
Subject: SRI Experiment; 12 December 1974 (SECRET).
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of OTS felt the OTS charter would not support research; therefore, all Agency
funding in paranormal research stopped.
2. Because of the mixed results, the operational utility of the capability was
considered questionable but deserved further testing.
3. To achieve better security, all the operations-oriented testing with the
contractor was stopped, and a personal services contract with Price was started.
4. Since I was judged to be a positively biased advocate of paranormal
functioning, the testing and evaluation of Price would be transferred to a more
pragmatic OTS operations psychologist.
The OTS psychologist picked up his new responsibilities and chose to complete an
unfinished DDO requirement. The origin of the requirement went back to the fall of
1974 when several OTS engineers became aware of the parapsychology project in OTS
and had volunteered to attempt remote viewing. They passed initial remote viewing
tests at SRI with some apparent successes. To test these OTS insiders further, I chose a
suggested requirement to obtain information about a Libyan site described only by its
geographic coordinates. The OTS engineers described new construction which could
be an SA-5 missile training site." The Libyan Desk officer was immediately
impressed. He then revealed to me that an agent had reported essentially the same
story. More coordinates were quickly furnished but were put aside by me.
The second set of Libyan geographic coordinates was passed by the OTS
psychologist to Price. A report describing a guerrilla training site was quickly
returned. It contained a map-like drawing of the complex. Price described a related
underwater sabotage training facility site several hundred kilometers away on the sea
coast. This information was passed to the Libyan Desk. Some data were evaluated
immediately, some were evaluated only after ordering special reconnaissance cover-
age. New information produced by Price was verified by the reconnaissance. The
underwater sabotage training facility description was similar to a collateral agent's
report. The Libyan Desk officer quickly escalated the requirement to what was going
on inside those buildings, the plans and intentions, etc." The second requirements list
was passed to Pat Price. Price died of a heart attack a few days later, and the program
stopped. There have been no further CIA-sponsored intelligence collection tests.
Since July, 1975, there has been only modest CIA and Intelligence Community
Staff interest in parapsychology. The Office of Scientific Intelligence completed a
study about Soviet military and KGB applied parapsychology." During November of
1976, Director George Bush became aware that official Soviets were visiting and
questioning Puthoff and Targ at SRI about their work in parapsychology. Mr. Bush
requested and received a briefing on CIA's investigations into parapsychology. Before
there was any official reaction, he left the Agency. Various intelligence community
groups, such as the Human Resources Subcommittee on R&D, have exhaustively
reviewed parapsychology in CIA, DOD, and the open research, but have failed to
conclude whether parapsychology is or is not a worthwhile area for futher investiga-
tion. Several proposals from SRI and other contractors were received by CIA but none
were accepted. There are no current plans for CIA to fund parapsychology
investigations.
" OTS/SDB; Notes on Interviews with F. P., E. L, C. J., K. G., and V. C. January 1975 (SECRET).
'? DDO/NE; Memorandum for OTS/BAB; Subject: Experimental Collection Activity Relating to
Libya; 8 October 1975 (SECRET).
"T. Hamilton; LSD/OSI; "Soviet and East European Parapsychology Research," SI 77-10012, April
1977 (SECRET/NOFORN).
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Parapsyd 9Y
PostScript At this point, I have traced the action and reaction of various elements of CIA to
what is certainly an unconventional and highly controversial subject. Also of interest other agencies parapsychology. In August, 1973,
are the concurrent reactions OEwith several members of DIA. The DIA people were
parapsychology was discussed considerable
oce during the
basically interested in the SOVraultst1Nnme ous meetings ha e expressed
interest in our own fledgling
? past several years. DIA remains interested on a low priority basis.
The Army Materiel Command learned of CIA interest in the paranormal. We
discovered the Army interest was generated by data which enedlfrm t ettnary' to ostile Apparently certain individuals called point men, who led patrols had far fewer casualties from booby traps and ambushes than the average. These poke
men, needless to say, had a loyal following of men and, in general, greatly helped
morale of their troops under a brutal, stressful situation. The Army gave extensive
psychological tests to a group of unusually successful point men and
cme to no o p conclusion Ogi other than perhaps that paranormal capabilities may be the
closely
came t
explanation! The Army was most interested in CIA results and waneeld~to stay ~and was
informed. After a few more follow-up meetings, the Army
never heard from again.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) reported that they
had not only a showing of interest but a hostile response as well to the subject area. At
one time, we felt we had the strong interest and I went to of some where we had a several-hour
data. The SRI contractors a
who had been convened
lly confrontation with ouresults. After a long, inconclusive, emotional discussion, we
especially to debunk
left. Contacts with DARPA stopped for several years.
The Navy reviewed part of the work and became interested. Some groups
developed strong interest, and minor funding was provided to SRI by Navy to
replicate one of SRI's earlier experiments asked SRI to repeat the sam eexpenment
experiment was replicated. Then the Navy a as the
under different conditions.
his same time, the Navy ubecame very concern about
previous observations. About
this research being "mind warfare"-related. Funding was stopped.
The active funding for parapsychology now has shifted to the Air Force's by Foreign
Technology Division with the addition of modest testing being but a second phone it
group at DARPA. These investigations are not yet
attempting to evaluate whether
funded by the Air Force. The Air Force project pting t paranormal functioning. Also
signals and communications can be sent and received by Pa a gathered and
aircraft and missile intelligence which can be verified is being g
evaluated. To date the results are more consistent than those
seem duringmhe CI
research, but still they are mixed. Some simple
are difficult to assess.
and conclusive. The more complex experiments
In the non-government world an explosion of interest in unclassified parapsychol-
ogy research occurred after the first publication of CIA-sponsored projects. Books have
been written, prestigious professional societies have had sessions on parapsychology,
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Paraprychdogy
and several national news reports have been broadcast and printed." Director Turner
revealed publicly that CIA has had operational interest in parapsychology.`, The open
publication of these investigations is generally healthy and helpful. It shows a
reduction of associated emotionalism and bias. These publications will also stimulate
other scientific investigations into parapsychology.
There is a less positive aspect to open interest and publications. Before adequate
assessment was made by CIA and others, we may have allowed some important
national security information out into the public domain. It is my opinion that, as it
relates to intelligence, sufficient understanding and assessment of parapsychology has
not been achieved. There are observations, such as the original magnetic experiments
at Stanford University, the OSI remote viewing, the OTS-coderoom experiments, and
these Coincidence is
others done for the Department of Defense, that defy eeaxtpion explanation.
cannot not
likely, and fraud has not been discovered. The imp
determined until the assessment is done.
If the above is true, how is it that the phenomenon remains controversial and
receives so little official government support? Why is it that the proper assessment was
never made? This state of affairs occurs because of the elementary understanding of
parapsychology and because of the peculiarities of the intelligence and military
organizations which have attempted the sD? nt There no damenial
understanding of the mechanisms of paranormal gfunctioning, and the prn
remains poor. The research and experiments have successfully demonstrated abilities
but have not explained them nor made them reproducible. Past and current support of
parapsychology comes from applications-oriented intelligence and military agencies.
The people managing such agencies demand quick and relevant results. The
intelligence and military agencies, therefore, press for results before there is sufficient
experimental reproducibility or understanding of the physical mechanisms. Unless
there is a major breakthrough in understanding, the situation is not likely to change as
long as applications-oriented agencies are funding parapsychology. Agencies must
commit long-term basic research funds and learn to confine attention to testing only
abilities which at least appear reproducible enough to be used to augment other hard
collection techniques (example: use parapsychology to help target hard intelligence
collection techniques and determine if the take is thereby increased). Parapsychology,
r
not stumble
like other technical issues, can then rise or fall on its merits and
en ver
bureaucratic charters and conjectures proposed by people
side or the other in the controversial area.
~' R. Targ and H. Puthoff; "Information Transfer Under Conditions of Sensory Shielding"; Nature,
Channel for Information
602-607 ber 18, Tr I,II, Over Kilo (meter Distances; 1974 Historical Peenpe~~'e and Recent Research"; Proceedings of the IEEE,
Transfer (March 16, Number H. Puthoff; "Mind-Research Scientists Look at
LXIV ychic (March 1976, Number 3, 3 ; Wilhelm; "The Search for Superman"; Dell (1974}, IEEE
ps
Psychic on ; Man; Delacarte Systems Press (Cybernetics; b7r) on (1976 and 1977); NBC Nightly News; 4 and 5
ference Au Man; and Washington
, "Psychic Spying?"; The Washington Past, Outlook
Auggust ust 197 1976; ; NBC Today; y: 9 9 August t 197 1976; ; J.
Section, August 7, 1977.
., J. O'Leary, "Turner Denies CIA Bugging of South Korea's Park." The Washington Star, 9 August
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