ISRAEL: PERCEPTIONS OF SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000100030003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Seefft--
Israel:
Perceptions of Syria
Seer-et
NESA 85-10003
January 1985
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Copy 373
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~?tE\ Directorate of
Intelligence
Israel:
Perceptions of Syria
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10003
January 1985
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Israel:
Perceptions of Syria 25X1
Key Judgments Israelis, both in and out of government, view Syria as Israel's most
Information available determined enemy and doubt that Syria is interested in an eventual peace
as of 24 December 1984 settlement. They believe Syria's intense hostility stems largely from the
was used in this report.
regime's minority Alawite character, which, in the Israeli view, forces the
regime to focus on an external enemy to legitimize its control. Israelis also
consider Syria's aspiration to Arab leadership as a cause of Syrian
hostility.
Israeli leaders believe Syria will adhere to limited agreements and tacit
understandings as long as Israel retains strategic superiority. Israelis are
seeking to reach a tacit understanding with Syria on Lebanon to facilitate
the withdrawal of Israeli forces. They are increasingly concerned, however,
that Syria may calculate that Israeli domestic pressures will compel Tel
Aviv to withdraw without any Syrian concessions.
Israeli leaders are concerned that tensions arising from Syria's continuing
arms buildup, Assad's outspoken defense of the Palestinians, and the close
proximity of Israeli and Syrian forces in eastern Lebanon could lead to
renewed local clashes or even a wider conflict. If Assad initiated an attack
against Israel, the Israelis believe that it probably would be for limited
political gains.
Most Israelis foresee an extended period of internal unrest in Syria after
Assad leaves the scene. Although internal discord would make Syria a
more unpredictable neighbor, the Israelis believe it would weaken Syria's
position in the region and force the successor regime to turn inward.
Israelis expect President Assad-and whoever succeeds him-to continue
his efforts to prevent King Hussein from entering negotiations with Israel
and thereby foreclose the possibilities of isolation from the peace process,
loss of leverage over the Palestinian and Golan Heights issues, and a
reduced Arab leadership role. In the event that the peace process revives,
Israel will look to the United States to counter Syrian efforts to keep
Hussein on the sidelines.
Secret
NESA 85-10003
January 1985
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Figure. 1
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Israel:
Perceptions of Syria
In our judgment, Israeli leaders across the political
spectrum-like the overwhelming majority of the
Israeli public-believe that the prospects for genuine
peace with Syria are dim. Israelis remember vividly
the pre-1967 Syrian shelling from the Golan Heights
of Israeli settlements in the northern Galilee. They
believe it would be folly to return the strategically
vital Golan to Damascus. Public opinion polls have
consistently revealed that a large majority of Israe-
lis-on the order of 70 percent-support Israel's
annexation of the Golan in 1981.
Israeli thinking about the Arab-Israeli dispute has
focused largely on Syria since the signing of the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. Events of the
last two years in Lebanon and within the Palestinian
movement have reinforced the tendency among Israeli
officials to view Syria as the dominant Arab player in
the Middle East, according to the US Embassy in Tel
Israel's Implacable Foe
The US Embassy reports that most Israelis regard
Syria as violent, "bloodthirsty," with little or no
interest in a peace settlement-unlike, for example,
their more benign view of Jordan and its intentions.
Israelis are divided in their assessments of the reasons
for Syrian hostility. Most
argue that the regime focuses attention on an external
enemy to legitimize its control, and it will remain
opposed to peace with Israel as long as the Alawis are
specialists cite the minority character of President
Assad's Alawite regime. Those holding this view
Other Israeli experts ascribe Syria's hostility to aspi-
rations to preeminence in the Arab world and to
leadership of the Arab struggle against Zionism. One
leading specialist maintains that Syria's hostility is
not likely to diminish soon because the Syrian Bath
Party has indoctrinated an entire generation of Syri-
ans with its Pan-Arab and anti-Israeli views. F 25X1
A minority of Israeli specialists contend that Syria's
hostility stems from its rivalry with Israel for regional
dominance. According to this view, Damascus sees 25X1
the Arab-Israeli conflict as a decades-long struggle.
These Israelis believe Syria intends first to create a
"satellite" regime in Lebanon, then dominate Jordan
and the Palestinian movement, and finally impose its
non prior to Israel's invasion in June 1982.
Working Relationships Are Possible
Press and Embassy reporting indicates that, despite
Syria's perceived hostility, most Labor Party leaders
believe they can reach limited understandings with
Damascus. The Laborites cite their experience with
the Syrians on the disengagement of forces on the
Golan Heights in 1974 and on the tacitly understood
"red lines" in Lebanon that guided Syrian military
activities there in the mid-1970s.' They note that the
Syrians have lived up to their basic obligations under
the disengagement agreement and that the Golan has
remained fairly quiet. Similarly, they believe the
Syrians generally abided by the "red lines" in Leba-
In our judgment, the Israeli Government would like to
reach an understanding with Syria on Lebanon to
facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli troops. It wants to
reach an agreement defining Syria's southernmost
military presence in Lebanon and minimizing infiltra-
tion into southern Lebanon by radical Shias and
' "Red lines" are meant to alert friends and enemies to alterations
in the status quo unacceptable to Israel and which could trigger a
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Palestinians, including those based in the Bekaa
Valley. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Israeli
leaders-including Prime Minister Peres and Defense
Minister Rabin-acknowledge that Syria now holds
most of the cards in Lebanon. They also concede that
Assad thus far has not adopted a more flexible
position because of concern over the potential strate-
gic threat posed by the presence of Israeli forces in
Lebanon only 40 kilometers from the Syrian capital.
We believe Peres and Rabin are increasingly con-
cerned that Syria may calculate it does not have to
offer concessions because Israeli internal political
pressures will eventually force Tel Aviv to withdraw
from Lebanon without an understanding on security
arrangements in the south. If this is Syria's assess-
ment, they fear that Damascus will bide its time.
In our view, Peres and Rabin believe that Syrian
preeminence in central and northern Lebanon serves
Israeli interests by promoting stability on Israel's
northern border. They also believe Syria's continuing
involvement in Lebanon will tie down significant
numbers of Syrian troops and, consequently, diminish
the Syrian military threat to Israel. They also con-
clude that Syria's involvement in Lebanon will be-
come a major irritant to Damascus after Assad
departs the scene and the successor regime struggles
to preserve the precarious internal balance in Syria.
As a result, they believe Israel's strong strategic
position in the region probably will be enhanced.
conflict with Israel.
Likud leaders, on the other hand, take a gloomier
view that is colored by recent events. They see Syria's
presence in Lebanon as a constant reminder of the
previous Likud government's failure-at great cost in
Israeli lives-to achieve some of the military and
political goals that guided the 1982 invasion. Vice
Prime Minister Shamir, former Defense Minister
Sharon, and other Likud leaders do not believe the
division of Syrian military forces between Syria and
Lebanon significantly reduces the military threat to
Israel. They are apprehensive that Syria eventually
may develop a second front in Lebanon for a future
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Prospects for Hostilities
Israeli leaders know that Syria is Israel's most formi-
dable military opponent and believe Damascus will
continue its attempt to build military capabilities
comparable to those of Israel. In the view of many
Israeli officials, Syria is Israel's only Arab neighbor
that still believes the Arab-Israeli conflict can be
resolved by war, but they do not expect a general
conflict with Syria to occur in the near term. They
believe Syria is too preoccupied with unresolved suc-
cession problems at home and with the Lebanon
imbroglio to undertake major military action against
Israeli leaders nonetheless are concerned that tensions
arising from Syria's continuing arms buildup, Presi-
dent Assad's support for the dissident Palestinians,
and the close proximity of Israeli and Syrian forces in
eastern Lebanon could lead to renewed local clashes
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Figure 4. Israeli SIGINT in-
stallations in Golan Heights.
Israeli leaders are concerned that Syria might start
limited hostilities for political gains. Some foresee the
possibility of Syrian-Israeli air clashes or a "war of
attrition" in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley or on the Golan
Heights. Israeli concern is heightened by Assad's
determination to frustrate any diplomatic resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict that does not take into
The Post-Assad Era
Assad's uncertain health has generated intense Israeli
speculation about the security and foreign policy
implications of the post-Assad Syrian leadership.
In their view, Syria after Assad probably will go
through a prolonged period of instability with rival
personalities and sectarian and'security groups com-
peting for control.
Assad's brother, Rif at, is seen by almost all Israeli
specialists as lacking the President's sophisticated
political skills, according to Embassy reporting. The
Israelis see only slim chances for Rif at to succeed his
brother, but they believe Assad's loyalty to him may
give Rifat an early edge in the struggle for power.
Even if he does become president, they doubt he will
be clever enough to survive against his wide array of
enemies in key Army and intelligence positions.
Some Israeli academic observers are less confident
that Assad's departure will result in prolonged insta-
bility. They maintain that the principal Alawi and
Sunni contenders are key figures in the current
regime and will try to preserve outward unity as they
maneuver behind the scenes. They "speculate that this
should minimize violence and unrest, although it
probably will not assure the stability that prevailed
Assad, by his
shrewd leadership and calculated use of force, has
made Syria more powerful and influential in the
region than would have otherwise been the case. They
doubt that any successor will be as effective as Assad.
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On broader peace issues, Israeli officials expect
Assad-and whoever succeeds him-to continue his
efforts to prevent King Hussein from entering negoti-
ations with Israel. The Syrians wish to foreclose the
possibilities of strategic isolation from the peace proc-
ess, loss of leverage over the Palestinian and Golan 25X1
A small minority of academic specialists believes the
transition to the post-Assad era will be relatively
smooth. They believe Assad has established and con-
solidated a political system founded on a broad Alawi-
Sunni base that would continue after his departure.
Although jockeying for advantage and episodic vio-
lence are possible, according to this view, there would
be more stability than most
analysts expect.
Stranglehold on the Peace Process?
In our judgment, Israeli leaders are deeply pessimistic
about the prospects for peace with Syria. They do not
see much room for compromise on the issue of the
Golan Heights. The Likud bloc opposes the return of
any territory on the Golan to Syria, while the Labor
Party's position is vague. Most Labor leaders publicly
favor limited territorial concessions on the Golan in
return for peace with Syria, but language to this
effect was not included in the party's 1984 election
platform. This is probably because they do not believe
Syria would accept less than a total Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan, which neither Labor nor Likud
contemplates.
Heights issues, and a reduced Arab leadership role.
Many Israeli officials reject the view that Damascus
has complete control over Jordan's options to enter the
peace process, although they recognize Syria's ability
to intimidate King Hussein. In their view, Syria's
leverage has been weakened by the commitment of
significant political and military resources to preserve
its dominant position in Lebanon. They believe King
Hussein can negotiate with Israel if he will accept the
risk of heightened tension with Damascus-which the
Israelis believe would not be too great. They note that
Hussein convened an Arab summit in Amman in
November 1980 despite a Syrian military buildup
along the border, although the summit failed to reach
significant decisions because of a Syrian boycott.
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In our judgment, there will be no significant changes
in Israeli attitudes toward Syria for the near term,
except in the unlikely event that a Syrian leader 25X1
comes forward to negotiate a peace settlement with
Israel. We believe such a Syrian move would cause
considerable political disarray within any Israeli cabi-
net-regardless of its composition. Nonetheless, we
believe domestic pressure in Israel would compel the
Israeli Government to explore-cautiously-any Syri-
an peace overture.
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The outcome of the Israeli-Lebanese talks at Naqurah
will have only a marginal impact on Israeli percep-
tions of Syria, in our view. If the talks produce an
agreement on security arrangements in southern Leb-
anon that is acceptable to Israel, Labor Party leaders
probably will conclude they were correct in their
assessment that Damascus is amenable to limited
working relationships with Israel. Likud leaders, how-
ever, would not change their minds. Failure at
Naqurah, on the other hand, would harden both
Likud and Labor attitudes.
We believe Israeli perceptions of Syria will not be
radically altered by a change of regime in Damascus.
Most Israeli strategic analysts and a few academics
caution that a successor regime may contrive an early
crisis with Israel to shore up its domestic support.
are intrigued by the possibility
that Rirat may succeed his brother to the presidency.
Rif'at's perceived openness to the West leads these
Israelis to believe he might be inclined to reach an
understanding with Israel and reduce the prospects
for hostilities.
Whatever Israeli government is in office will test the
intentions of Assad's successor. Israel will want to
confirm previous understandings with Syria regarding
the prevention of terrorist attacks and limitation of
Syrian military activity in the Bekaa Valley and on
the Golan Heights. These understandings will become
even more critical to the Israeli Government once its
forces withdraw from southern Lebanon. Israel will
closely monitor Syrian responses to Israeli artillery
and airstrikes against Palestinian and radical Shia
positions in the Bekaa Valley and elsewhere in Leba-
non to assess the new regime's attitude toward Israel.
Implications for US Policy
Israeli perceptions of Syrian efforts to strengthen
Syria's armed forces and air defenses will continue to
draw Israel closer militarily to the United States. In
their discussions with the United States, Israeli offi-
cials are likely to underscore the possibility of an
emerging military bloc-composed of Syria, Iraq,
and, possibly, Jordan-arrayed against Israel after
the Iran-Iraq war has ended. To counter this per-
ceived threat, Israel will continue to seek the latest
US technology and weapon systems to preserve its
qualitative edge. It also will seek US assurances that
the United States will counter overt Soviet moves on
Syria's behalf in the event of Syrian-Israeli hostilities.
Given Israel's pessimism about peace with Syria,
Israel will continue to focus on drawing King Hussein
and moderate West Bank Palestinians into direct
talks. Israel expects Syria-with or without Assad-
to continue to use every means to control the Palestin-
ian movement and to prevent Hussein from entering
the peace process. In the event of a new US-led effort
to revive the negotiations, Israel will look to the
United States to neutralize Syrian pressure to keep
Hussein on the sidelines.
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