AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301630002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 5, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Toy Seeret-
InteHigence
Afghanistan Situation Report (u)
Top Secret
NESA M 84-10199CX
87CX
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
SOVIET DRUG USE IN AFGHANISTAN
Soviet troops' use of drugs is unlikely to have caused major
combat problems but saps performance enough to cause growing
concern.
COMMODITY SHORTAGES IN KABUL
Kabul is suffering serious shortages of fuel, sugar, and meat
because of insurgent activity. F--1
AIRFIELD ATTACK
Insurgents may have used the 107-mm rocket in a recent attack on
Bagram Airfield.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
THE SOVIETS AND MASOOD
The Soviets have failed to find Panjsher Valle commander Masood
despite his having become a primary concern.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions comment
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed
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TOP SECRET
SOVIET INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES (S)
SOVIET DRUG USE IN AFGHANISTAN
Soviet officials probably regard the drug problem as one
aspect of generally low morale, and they have been unwilling to
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provide the amenities necessary to keep troops from turning to
drugs as a way of coping with difficult living conditions. The
use of drugs is unlikely to have caused major combat problems but
saps performance enough to cause growing concern. The Soviets
have investigated military inefficiency and accidents that might
have been caused by drugs.
COMMODITY SHORTAGES IN KABUL
Kabul is suffering serious shortages of fuel, sugar, and meat,
according to US Embassy reports. Regime media have blamed the
shortages on insur ents' "highway robbery" and interference
ith
transportation.
The
meoia appea e to Kabul citizens to report hoarding and
speculation and indicated that regime commissions to monitor
prices have fined 66 shop owners for overcharging.
Comment:
Kabul media's concern is an unusual acknowledgment of the
regime's lack of control over the countryside and is likely to
elicit pro-resistance sentiment rather than censure. Because
Soviet sweeps through the Panjsher Valley and nearby areas have
failed to make the Termez-to-Kabul highway secure, and because
bridges destroyed-this spring by the insurgents have been
replaced with military bridges of lower load capacity, the
serious shortages are likely to continue.
AIRFIELD ATTACK (C)
According to press reports, Afghan insurgents claimed on 12
May that they destroyed a number of planes and helicopters at
Bagram airbase with 16 ground-to-ground missiles, 15 mortar
rounds, and 25 cannon shells. They said they fired their weapons
from a distance of about 2.5 kilometers. According to satellite
imagery, four MIG-21s and one fuel truck at Bagram were
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our O&UHLI
The insurgents' "ground-to-ground missile" is likely to have
been the 107 mm tube-launched rocket first made by the Chinese
and widely used throughout the Third World since the 1960s. It
has a range of about 8.5 kilometers and a warhead of some 8.4
kilograms of high explosive. Although the insurgents have used
the RPG-7 rocket launcher frequently, its maximum effective range
is only 300 meters and its warhead is much smaller than the 107
rocket. While not as light as the RPG, the 107 rocket is
portable and would provide the insurgents with a significant
capability to attack area targets such as airfields and garrisons
F -1
at long, relatively safe ranges.
-- Knowledgeable sources in Kabul are predicting that the
extremely light winter snowfall will reduce hydroelectric power
in the canal and hamper agriculture, according to US Embassy
reports. 7
-- Multiple sources of the US Embassy report that security in
Mazar-e Sharif has deteriorated markedly in recent weeks and that
travel west of the city is especially hazardous. F-1
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poi
PERSPECTIVE
THE SOVIETS AND MASOOD
The Soviets have failed to find Ahmad Shah Masood, the Afghan
resistance's best known field commander, despite intensive efforts in
the current Soviet offensive in the Panjsher Valley. Masood's
successful attacks against Soviet forces and supply lines--even during a
truce in the Panjsher--have made him a prime Soviet target.
Nevertheless, his death or capture probably would be only a temporary
reverse for the resistance. If Masood survives, his influence and
prestige will be enhanced, and he will be in a better position to
ad nce ooperation among insurgent groups in northeastern Afghanistan.
The Offensive
to lack the timely, accurate intelligence and appropriate tactics
necessary for them to achieve decisive results. So far, the Soviets
The Soviets began their seventh offensive into the Panjsher Valley on
20 April 1984, ending a cease-fire that had lasted since January 1983.*
We believe the Soviets decided to resume hostilities in response to more
frequent attacks by Masood's guerrillas against Soviet and Afghan
facilities and convoys outside the valley. Six previous Soviet
campaigns failed to destroy the resistance in the Panjsher, and their
current attempt--by far the most aggressive and ambitious--still appears
have had little success locating and engaging insurgent groups.
*See "Afghanistan: The Cease-Fire and the Future of the Insurgency in
the Panjsher Valley," NESA 83-10211, September 1983, for a discussion of
the strategic importance of the valley, the cease-fire, and previous
operations. (S)
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Masood's Operations
We estimate that Masood commands some 5,000 to 7,000 full-time and
part-time insurgents in the Panjsher Valley area; other guerrilla groups
provide his forces with occasional assistance. Masood has successfully
used 30-man commando groups and 100- to 200-man autonomous expeditionary
units outside the valley, which he used as a sanctuary during the truce.
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Masood's Strategy
We believe Masood's forces have been avoiding the main bod f iet
troops advancing up the Panjsher Valley.
Insurgent Cooperation During the Campaign
According to US Embassy sources, cooperation among insurgents loyal
to Peshawar groups is significantly better than during previous Soviet
operations into the Panjsher Valley. Groups from as far away as Ghazni,
as well as from the Shomali Plain and nearby areas, have provided
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Resistance Losses
Despite the Afghan regime's public claims of victory in the Panjsher
offensive, we believe the Soviets have made little progress in subduing
the resistance. According to US Embassy reports, except for an incident
in which Soviet helicopters killed some 200 insurgents in an open area
outside the valley, guerrilla casualties have been low. High altitude
bombing has not, in our judgment, been effective against Masood's mobile
groups.
Outlook
Masood's death probably would be only a short-term blow to the
resistance. Although his demise might lead to a succession struggle for
control of insurgent forces in the Panjsher, a new leader likely would
emerge--perhaps one of his own commanders. Alternatively, other eastern
and northern area insurgent leaders, particularly Zabiullah Khan and
others belonging to the Jamiat-i-Islami, could incorporate the Panjsher
Valley group into their own organizations, continuing Masood's
unification efforts.
If Masood survives the current offensive, the resistance probably
will be strengthened. His prestige would be enhanced, improving his
ability to unify area insurgent groups. Masood presumably will again
try to improve his relations with other insurgent leaders in the
northern, eastern; and central regions. Nevertheless, cooperation would
proceed slowly.
Masood's insurgents probably will try to return to the Panjsher
Valley after the operation concludes because of its strategic location
and natural defenses. In our judgment, however, insurgent occupation of
the valley is not essential to the resistance. Guerrillas could
continue attacking convoys and other Soviet and Afghan targets from
other areas, increasing security problems outside the Panjsher Valley.
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The Soviets, aware of this, apparently have decided to leave some of
their forces in the Panjsher Valley and move in Afghan units as well.
Satellite photography taken in early May shows that the Soviets were
improving their defensive positions around Rokhah, some 20 kilometers
inside the valley and the site of a garrison before the 1983 truce. In
order to secure the valley, the Soviets would have to commit a far
larger force than their preparations suggest they apparently intend to
le
i
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n garrisons. Unless they increase their forces substantially,
Snvie~ and Afghan garrisons also will probably come under attack.
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AHMAD SHAH MASOOD: A SYMBOL FOR THE RESISTANCE?
Masood has become one of the most prominent guerrilla leaders in
Afghanistan, largely because of international press coverage of his successes
against the Soviets. Although the Soviets may regard Masood as a symbol of
the resistance, we believe some guerrilla commanders in other regions of
Afghanistan actually co a men and are as effective as the Panjsher
Valley insurgent leader. ~n~ d mo~
In our judgment, Masood's ability to organize the insurgents in the
Panjsher Valley into military units under a single command and use them in
coordinated operations has made,a vital contribution to the expansion of the
Panjsher resistance. He has overcome some of the political infighting between
rival insurgent groups and has coordinated multigroup attacks successfully.
Masood also has earned the support of most civilians in the Panjsher Valley.
Masood, who has studied the works of Che Guevara and Mao Zedong and
apparently has a good understanding of guerrilla tactics, has organized his
forces into three major types of units. Some men serve part-time in
stationary defense units in their own villages. Others are full-time
professional fighters who operate as mobile commando groups in operations
inside the valley, and a third group participates in operations outside the
valley. Compared to many Afghan insurgent groups, Masood's forces are well-
equipped, led by experienced fighters, and well-trained in guerrilla tactics
and the use of heavy weapons and small arms. His military organization also
includes an intelligence network that provides him with valuable information
on impending Soviet activity in the area. Masood oversees guerrilla warfare
schools in the valley and sends his insurgents outside the area on training
missions to other groups not under his direct command.
We believe Masood has a long-term commitment to the resistance.
Moreover, his commanders, the most trusted of which are probably his brothers,
probably will continue to fight should the Soviets succeed in killing him.
The Panjsher Valley insurgency, however, is essentially a Tajik organization
and its expansion into a unified national resistance effort is improbable. 7
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