AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001300510001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
c
Afghanistan Situation Report
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7 February 1984
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7 February 1984
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SOVIETS' TOUGH STAND ON PAKISTAN
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The Soviets have adopted a more active policy toward Pakistan
that may include increased military pressure along the border.
Soviet efforts to indoctrinate the Afghan populace through the
media have had little success but may help to define Soviet
political goals, limit antiregime sentiment, and influence Afghan
youth.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
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SOVIETS' TOUGH STAND ON PAKISTAN
The US Embassy in Islamabad believes that the Soviets have
adopted a more active policy toward Pakistan that may include
increased military pressure along the border. The Embassy
observes that the recent signing of a joint economic agreement
and public statements about the desirability of improved
bilateral ties have been accompanied by more belligerent rhetoric
by Ambassador Smirnov. Last December, Smirnov warned in a press
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interview that the Soviets and Afghans would take joint action if
needed to end Pakistan's support for the resistance. In a speech
on 1 February the Soviet Ambassador accused Pakistan of
establishing 80 "military bases" on its territory for arming and
training the insurgents. The US Embassy posits that the 27
January air attack against a Pakistan border village that caused
more than 100 casualties may presage more such attacks.
The Soviets hope that the economic and political benefits of
improved bilateral relations will cause Pakistan to moderate its
policy towards Afghanistan, but they also seem prepared to
increase military pressure--including more cross-border attacks.
The Soviets are increasingly frustrated by the lack of military
progress in Afghanistan and may have concluded that tougher
measures are needed to stem insurgent infiltration from Pakistan.
Soviet press coverage along with Ambassador Smirnov's recent
statements lay the basis for stepped up military pressure on
Pakistan. Soviet analysts believe that Moscow recognizes past
cross-border incidents may have served to strengthen
international support for Zia and discredited Zia's domestic
opponents. Soviet analysts anticipate no major near-term changes
in the Soviet policy approach.
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owl W&WIN&I
increased Soviet and Afghan
security measures, similar to those in Kabul, are in effect in
Mazar-e Sharif, but the road from the city to Jeyretan port
remains insecure.
Nur Ahmad Nur, who holds the
number two post in the Afghan Communist Party, was for reasons
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unknown placed aboard a flight to Moscow on 8 January, apparently
against his will. 25X1
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Soviet efforts to indoctrinate the Afghan populace through the media
have had little success but may help to define Soviet political goals,
limit antiregime sentiment, and ultimately influence Afghan youth. The
ignorance and cynicism of Afghans, with minor assistance from Western
and antiregime media, generally serve to counter the Soviet and regime
media campaign. The media also define what Afghans can say openly
without incurring risks and provide the party line for those who wish to
advance in the regime.
Communist Control, Goals
In the four years they have been in Afghanistan, the Soviets have
created a smaller version of their own propaganda apparatus for the
Afghans. 15 Soviet advisers
control all Kabul radio and television broadcasts and write scripts
promoting socialism and criticizing US policy. The Soviets exert
similar controls over Afghan publications, many of which did not exist
prior to the Soviet intervention.
Soviet and regime media efforts are directed at anyone who will
listen, though youth are the primary target, according to US Embassy
reports. In 1980, Soviet advisers set
propaganda goals that apparently are still being followed. The primary
tasks assigned Afghan media personnel were to discredit Western
reportage and to publicize Soviet-Afghan friendship, Afghan party unity,
and the heroism of the Afghan Army. Soviet aid, the protective role of
the Soviet military's "limited contingent," and Moscow's benevolence
toward Islam also were to be stressed.
reach large numbers of urban residents,
yet have little effect on popular opinion
broadcasts are aimed particularly at youth, according to US Embassy
reports. A popular daily television show features Kabul schoolchildren
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reciting poems and stories with revolutionary themes, after which
nonpolitical animated cartoons are shown. Most of the radio and
television programs, however, purvey political, social, and economic
themes that even the Kabul audience considers irrelevant. US Embassy
sources indicate that Afghans find most international news meaningless.
One marcher in the 25 December 1983 demonstration protesting US
intervention in Grenada confessed to having no idea where or what
Grenada was. On issues of public interest, such as military service and
the the rye, most listeners reject the regime line out of hand.
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In the countryside, regime broadcasts are wide) received but
ineffective. most villagers
in Faryab and Jowzjan Provinces listen to transistor radios
nightly--mostly to Kabul radio for music and entertainment.
Kabul radio is the most popular among
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rural Afghans only because it provides Afghan music and continual
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service. Regime broadcasts of propaganda elicit amusement or derision,
The Afghan press has a very small audience and a very limited
influence in Afghan society. Because the literacy rate is below 10
percent, the press probably reaches only a small portion of the urban
populace. US Embassy reports indicate the vast majority of literate
Afghans ignore the press. In seven months of walking about the capital,
an Embassy officer has not seen a single Afghan buying, reading, or even
carrying a newspaper. Kabul apparently has only two newspaper kiosks,
both with old newspapers for sale, and the newspaper display stands that
are so prevalent in the USSR apparently are nonexistent in Kabul.
Embassy sources believe Kabul newspapers are used predominantly for
wrapping, toilet paper being widely available.
Kabul newspapers are essentially compilations of regime slogans,
according to the US Embassy. Articles critical of economic
mismanagement or the faults of lower-ranking officials, common in the
Soviet press, are rare in Afghanistan. Nearly all problems are
attributed to imperialists and counterrevolutionary elements.
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The book trade has little effect in Afghan society, apart from its
role in supplying schools. US Embassy sources indicate that the trade
in Kabul is almost entirely a Soviet undertaking. The city has only one
bookmobile and two sales outlets for new books. The outlets specialize
in children's books, with well printed, colorful volumes such as Tales
About Lenin selling at give-away prices. Soviet-published books
dominate the juvenile market and are also prevalent in Kabul's used book
outlets. The high proportion of new Soviet books appearing in the used-
book markets suggests the regime may be supplying them directly to
dealers in an attempt to increase distribution.
In our view, the cynicism and illiteracy of the Afghans render Soviet
media as ineffective as Afghan media in shaping public opinion. Moscow
radiobroadcasts in Dari, Tajik, and Pashtu, along with Soviet
television, are clearly monitorable in Kabul. Soviet media regularly
stress that the Afghan revolution is irreversible and portray the Afghan
people as busily engaged--with Soviet assistance--in consolidating the
gains of the April 1978 revolution under the leadership of the Afghan
party. We believe listeners ignore Soviet propaganda as they do the
regime's.
a steady flow of
Soviet propaganda comes from translating 'centers i e Tashkent to remind
Afghans of their ethnic and cultural ties to the USSR.
quotes the Tashkent press as stressing the need "to tell our Uzbek
brothers in Afghanistan about the great progress we have made under
Communism in Central Asia." Another theme centers on the need "to
extend help to our backward brothers in Afghanistan to enrich and
develop their primitive literature and culture." Most of the
propaganda, is aimed at Afghan youth.
Antiregime and Western Media
Antiregime broadcasts, in our view, may occasionally boost insurgent
morale. Three clandestine radios have recently begun to broadcast
criticism of Soviet and Afghan regime policy. Two of the stations, The
Voice of Afghanistan and The Voice of the Afghan Mujahedin, reportedly
broadcast from insurgent strongholds within Afghanistan. The third, The
Revolutionary Islamic Voice of Afghanistan, apparently broadcasts from
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Mashhad, Iran. Its programs stridently attack the Afghan regime as well
as "Zionism" and the US presence in Lebanon. Cassette recordings,
however. are probably more effective than the clandestine broadcasts.
tapes distributed by Panjsher insurgents
are popular, though scarce. The tapes present music, Afghan poetry, and
commentaries on fighting, and they are designed to encourage other
insurgents. Cassettes from personally identified sources are akin to
Afghans' traditionally accepted medium for news: rumors passed orally.
Resistance publications, like the Communist press, are limited by
widespread illiteracy and do little more than provide cheerleading.
Insurgent organizations in Peshawar maintain several publications,
some of which may be smuggled into
Afghanistan; In our view, most of them exaggerate claims of insurgent
successes.
Insurgent printed media in Afghanistan are probably almost
nonexistent. one group of insurgents
claims that it publishes a newspaper in Baghlan Province featuring
general news, insurgent operations, and criticism of regime policies.
The monthly run reportedly consists of 700 to 1,000 copies, using
newsprint stolen by government employees collaborating with the
insurgents. Given the low rate of literacy, however, along with the
danger to anyone observed by the regime in possession of such a
newspaper, we doubt that such publications are very extensive or very
effective.
Western broadcasts to Af hanistan may occasionally boost insurgent
morale in some areas. insurgents in
Faryab Province are eager to get Western military aid but seem
unimpressed by expressions of support for the resistance on Western
broadcasts. The insurgents view the radio more as a source of
entertainment than of information.
statements of support for the resistance by U o icials
appreciably boost morale among insurgents in Peshawar and among the
Kabul populace.
The effect of Western broadcasts is limited by reception problems,
lack of interest, and ignorance. US Embassy reports indicate that VOA
and Radio Liberty are often jammed, fully or partially. Although Radio
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Pakistan, VOA, and BBC have local audiences, listeners generally find
the programs too short and tune to the continual service of Kabul radio,
Moreover, Afghans have no interest in
Western radios' extensive reporting on international sports. Although
they enjoy news on anti-Communist groups and personalities, such news is
poorly understood. The East-West conflict is seen in the context of a
struggle between Soviet atheism and religious faith. Polish opposition
leader Lech Walesa and Solidarity are seen as "Catholic mujahedin." The
Faryab insurgents--probably typical--are poorly informed on the war in
other parts of the country. By late 1983, none had heard of the truce
concluded between Panjsher insurgent commander Masood and the Soviets
early in the year.
Armed with the sword of cynicism and the shield of ignorance and
illiteracy, most Afghans are amply protected against Communist
propaganda. Afghans in the near term probably will continue to consider
Communist propaganda ridiculous or irrelevant. Youth may absorb the
persistent message but may well turn skeptical as they grow older. The
success of the Communist media campaign will lie in its capacity to
intimidate the populace by heightening the impression of regime
pervasiveness and control. The media will also define what Afghans can
say openly without incurring risks and provide the party line for those
who wish to advance in the regime.
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