CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: ON A TIGHTROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500160001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 December 1983
Central African Republic: On a Tightrope
/b
President Andre Kolingba is confronted with an array of
economic and political problems so severe they could bring down
his moderate, pro-Western government early next year, a
development that could enable Libya to gain a new foothold in
the Central African Republic. France, the former colonial
power and the country's chief patron, faces the unwelcome
alternative of either stepping up support for Kolingba's inept
regime, engineering its replacement, or letting the government
fall at the risk of a less friendly regime taking over.
Kolingba's prospects depend largely on his ability to retain
crucial financial and military backing from France, which in
turn is tied to his willingness to name a more competent
cabinet and to come to terms with the IMF for a new standby.
agreement.
Thus far, Paris sees no leadership alternative to Kolingba
and is seeking a greater US role in bailing out the country.
This memorandum was prepared byl (West Africa Branch, Africa
Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It has been
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Information as of
25 November 1983 has been used in preparation of this paper. Questions
and comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa
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The French see the CAR --which borders Chad and Sudan, both
active targets of Libyan adverturism-- as a buffer against
further Libyan meddling in the region. France uses the CAR as
a staging base for military operations in Chad. Some 1,300
French troops stationed in the CAR help reassure other moderate
states in the region --particularly Cameroon and mineral-rich
Gabon and Zaire where Paris has significant commercial
interests-- that Paris will honor its security obligations.
in our view, Kolingba will probably muddle through the
current financial and political crisis but we believe his
longer term prospects are guarded. Kolingba probably will be
forced to undertake sufficient economic and political reforms
to ensure crucial French and IMF backing, lest Paris become
convinced that the cost of proping up the regime is too high
and finally decide to engineer its replacement. But Kolingba's
actions will serve only to stave off rather than to resolve
underlying problems. Kolingba's politically risky reforms will
compel the regime to rely increasingly on Paris to guarantee
its security. In our view, Libya will try to exploit the
fragility of the government by continuing --and perhaps
stepping up-- support for coup plotting among disgruntled
members of the regime. We believe that France would intervene
on Kolingba's behalf, however, if Tripoli moved directly to
oust the regime.
Introduction
Kolingba, who assumed power two years ago in a bloodless military
coup, is under mounting pressure to stem the CAR's deepening financial
crisis and to clean up his corrupt and increasingly factionalized
government. Kolingba's reliance on tribal nepotism and favoritism to
ensure political support has spurred growing dissension within his regime
and resentment among the country's approximately 80 ethnic groups.
Besides domestic economic and internal political problems, Kolingba has to
contend with Libyan attempts to undermine the government and growing
French displeasure with his administration.
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Legacy of Neglect
Kolingba inherited a bitter legacy of economic and political
deterioration left in the wake of Emperor Bokassa's bloody 13-year rule,
during which political division, massive corruption, and economic
mismanagement took firm root. Steadily declining diamond and cotton
production, rising unemployment, and falling government revenues left the
country in financial straits. Bokassa relied on French aid --about
$30 million a year-- to cover a massive budget deficit which had reached
$20 million by the end of his reign in 1979.
President David Dacko's feckless attempt at reconstruction followed
the French-engineered fall of Bokassa's repressive regime. In September
1979, some 300 French troops installed Dacko --himself ousted in a coup in
1966 led by Bokassa-- after Paris failed to convince Bokassa to resign.
Dacko's weak civilian regime soon found itself in a divisive political
standoff with newly-formed opposition political parties that began to
demand a greater role in government. Presidential elections in 1981, in
which Dacko was accused of fraud after narrowly defeating the major
opposition party leader, led to rioting by the latter's followers in the
capital and calls for the President's resignation.- Dacko's poor health
and gradual loss of popular support left him unable to cope with the
country's mounting economic problems, and he soon lost the backing of the
Mitterrand government.
Army Chief of Staff Kolingba assumed power in September 1981 --with
the apparent approval of the French and Dacko himself-- declaring his
intention to restore order. He quickly suspended the constitution, banned
political party activity, and named an all military Cabinet. Kolingba
also announced an austerity and anti-corruption program, while searching
for new sources of foreign economic assistance to supplement French aid in
an effort to revitalize the economy.
The Kolingba Regime's Growing Weaknesses
Although the military government succeeded initially in restoring
surface calm to the country, tribal rivalries, demands for a return to
civilian rule, and resistance to economic belt-tightening measures soon
flared. The initial wait-and-see attitude of Central Africans gave way to
accusations of tribal favoritism and autocratic rule by banned opposition
parties and government counter-charges of disloyalty. An atmosphere of
mutual distrust aggravated political tensions and heightened unhappiness
over the regime's austerity and anti-corruption campaigns.
Tribalism. Kolingba initially sought to form a tribally balanced
government, but quickly gave in to pressure from his fellow southern
tribesmen to expand their role in the regime. Although southerners form
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only about 25 percent of the population, they have dominated the country's
politics since independence in 1960. Out of some 24 ministers and high
commissioners now in the government, 17 are southerners and more than half
are from Kolingba's own minority tribe, the Yakoma. According to the
US Embassy, Kolingba has regularly selected his closest advisers from and
awarded the majority of military promotions to his fellow Yakomas.
Southern political dominance has inspired opposition among tribes of
the northern savannah region, which make up about 75 percent of the
Aooulation
Tribal opposition to the Kolingba regime has also come from members
of the southern M'Baka tribe, to which former leaders Bokassa and Dacko
belong. The US Embassy reports that Kolingba fears that Bokassa, now in
exile in Ivory Coast, is recruiting M'Bakas to restore him to power.
Kolingba is even being faced with squabbling between two subgroups of
his Yakoma tribe. He has been accused of favoring members of his own
subtribe, man of whom he has retained despite their incompetence and
corruption.
Economic Deterioration. The Kolingba regime's political problems are
compounded by a serious financial crisis. The government is technically
bankrupt due to falling export earnings, a growing budget deficit, and
rising debt service payments. A five-month drought plagued the
agricultural sector this year, which employs almost 85 percent of the
2.5 million population and represents 37 percent of domestic output. The
drought damaged key export crops of coffee, tobacco, timber, and cotton,
reduced food production, cut off river transportation to key coastal
trading centers, and crippled the small industrial sector by shortages of
hydroelectrical power.
Meanwhile, the country's access to crucial international assistance,
which in 1982 totalled over $110 million, is in jeopardy. Last month the
IMF suspended the CAR's $20 million standby program for failure to meet
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Fund guidelines to curb government spending, and the regime could find
itself unable to pay government salaries by the end of the year. The Fund
plans to send a team to Bangui in mid-January to negotiate a new standby
agreement if it is satisfied that Kolingba will undertake tough austerity
measures. The Fund insists that the regime write off arrearages in civil
service salaries as forced contributions to the government, implement
fiscal reforms in 1984 that were dropped this year in the face of
opposition, and levy a 15 percent tax on civil service salaries.
US Embassy officials believe these harsh measures could provoke
serious domestic unrest that Kolingba might be hard pressed to contain.
They point out that government salaries have not increased since 1980,
while the annual rise in the cost of living has been on the order of
15 percent. Civil service salaries no longer cover the cost of food for
the typical family and workers have had to resort to second jobs and
corruption to make ends meet. A salary reduction announced last February
prompted calls for a general strike that was narrowly averted by a
government crackdown and the arrest of several labor leaders.
Weak Leadership. Despite the need for prompt, decisive government
action on economic and political problems, Kolingba remains cautious and
deliberate, even when making minor decisions. US Embassy officials
describe his leadership style as strictly month-to-month crisis
management. They report that Kolingba has failed to rally behind him the
majority of Central Africans, who generally view his rule as a transition
to a more dynamic government. Moreover, Embassy reports point out that
Kolingba suffers from recurrent bouts of depression and frequently
into seclusion to avoid facing important and difficult decisions.
Kolingba's hesitation to act has aggravated his regime's troubles.
His tolerance of incompetence and corruption among fellow military
officers has eroded the government's ability to tackle the country's
serious economic problems. US Embassy reporting indicates that he is
dissatisfied with the performance of several Cabinet ministers, but has
been reluctant to remove them for fear of inspiring wider disloyalty
Libyan Meddling
According to Us Embassy reporting, Tripoli persists in its attempts
to destabilize the CAR. In our view, Libyan leader Qadhafi hopes to
pressure the Kolingba regime or a successor government into allowing Libya
to use the CAR as a base to encourage serious insurgency in southern
Chad. The US Embassy reports that politically aware Central Africans are
concerned that opposition groups made up predominantly of northern
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tribesmen (see annex) are developing stronger links to Libya through their
contact with Chadian dissidents supported by Tripoli. The border area of
northern CAR and southern Chad is inhabited by closely related tribes who
hold little allegiance to either national government and have been long-
standin4 sources of opposition to b_o
Kolingba has tried to prevent the more than 1,000 Chadian exiles in
the CAR from working against Chadian President Habre and has supported the
legitimacy of the N'Djamena government in African forums over the Libyan-
backed dissidents led by former President Goukouni. Moreover, Kolingba
continues to make his country's facilities available for France's
extensive military operation in support of Habre, and has even offered
symbolic nonmilitary assistance to N'Djamena in the form of as yet
undelivered food aid.
Despite Bangui's support for Habre, Kolingba has been careful not to
take an openly anti-Qadhafi stance for fear of provoking even more Libyan
subversion against his vulnerable regime. Indeed, Kolingba renewed
diplomatic relations with Tripoli in September 1982 in hopes of jolting
the French into providing additional budgetary assistance or extracting
.some much-needed funds from Libya. He allowed the Libyans to establish a
military training camp outside Bangui to train a new CAR armored unit and
to deliver a shipment of small arms for use by CAR troops. Relations with
Tripoli soured last May, however, after Kolingba expelled some 80 Libyan
military instructors following Qadhafi's failure to provide financial
aid. The US Embassy reports that Bangui now closely monitors the some
20 Libyan diplomats still in the country. According to the US Embassy,
rmer Foreign Minister last May after he,
had allegedly secured Libyan funding to oust
Kolingba in favor of a pro-Libyan regime.
Mounting French Frustration
French confidence in Kolingba's leadership has waned in the last two
years, but the US Embassy in Bangui reports that Paris still sees no
alternative pro-French leader on the horizon with sufficient domestic
backing to pursue the politically-risky austerity program needed to get
the country's external finances in order. France appreciates the regime's
moderate foreign policy and acceptance of French military bases and some
1,300 French troops under joint defense and military assistance
agreements. The CAR serves as an important military staging base should
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French support operations be required for moderate states in central
Africa where Paris has significant commercial interests, particularly
Cameroon and mineral-rich Zaire and Gabon. Moreover, Kolingba --with the
considerable aid of his French security advisers-- has been able to defuse
his opposition without resorting to heavy-handed tactics.
Nevertheless, US Embassy reporting indicates that France is
increasingly frustrated with Kolingba's indecisive leadership and favors a
return to civilian rule--although Paris does not see this as feasible
anytime soon. French unhappiness is underscored by the CAR's status as
one of the few francophone African countries that President Mitterrand has
not yet visited. French dissatisfaction stems largely from the regime's
mounting financial dependence on Paris, coupled with Kolingba's reluctance
to improve the quality of his ministers. Paris, according to the French
ambassador in Bangui, has conditioned continued French budgetary aid to
the CAR on Kolingba's reaching a new agreement with the IMF and has hinted
that emergency aid might be forthcoming to tide the CAR over from the
signing of an IMF agreement until it becomes operative.
We believe Kolingba will find it difficult to ignore French demands
for long. France is the CAR's largest aid donor and trading partner; in
1981 it accounted for more than 90 percent of bilateral aid receipts and
40 percent of foreign trade. Bilateral French assistance in 1982 totalled
about $63 million. This year, French budgetary support alone will
probably exceed $15 million, or two-thirds of the CAR's projected budget
deficit of almost $22 million. Alarmed by the regime's poor fiscal
management, the US Embassy reports that France required Bangui officials
to come to Paris almost on a monthly basis in 1982 to collect budget
subsidies to meet civil service salaries.
French officials continued to work,hard behind the scenes this year
to secure favorable debt rescheduling terms from Bangui's official
creditors as well as IMF flexibility on key requirements of the standby
program. The US Embassy also reports that Paris has asked for US help to
keep the Kolingba regime afloat. France wants the US to increase aid--now
about $1.6 million annually, including the Peace Corps--and to exert
pressure on the IMF to reach an accommodation with Bangui.
Outlook
In our view, Kolingba will probably muddle through his financial and
political woes over the next several months, but we believe his longer
term prospects are not good. Kolingba is likely finally to undertake
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enough political and economic reforms to ensure French backing and to get
satisfactory negotiations underway with the IMF next January. Kolingba
has little choice but to develop a serious austerity plan and to reshuffle
his cabinet, replacing the most.inept and corrupt military ministers with
competent civilian technocrats. But Kolingba probably will not replace as
many ministers as Paris has demanded for fear of aggravating tribal
tensions and creating a new source of opposition among discharged
Even if, as we expect, Kolingba embarks on long overdue reform, we
believe his regime will still be hardpressed over the longer run to
resolve persistent political divisions and seemingly intractable economic
troubles. Kolingba's weak leadership style and reliance on fellow
tribesmen for advice is likely to continue to inspire discontent among
rival ethnic groups. In our view, the regime's shallow base of popular
support will make it difficult for Kolingba to follow through with
draconian belt tightening programs, such as deep cuts in the civil service
payroll, that could trigger serious unrest among the financially
hardpressed Central Africans, especially in urban areas.
France appears to be willing to allow Kolingba some more time to face
up to the inevitable while continuing financially to bail out the shaky
regime rather than risk the emergence of a less friendly government. But
we believe that if Kolingba does not soon begin to mend his ways, Paris
could finally become convinced that the cost of proping up the inept
regime is too high and engineer his replacement. Nevertheless, we believe
that France would intervene directly to defend Kolingba against a Libyan
We believe that Libya will try to exploit the fragility of the
Kolingba government by continuing --and perhaps stepping up-- support for
coup plotting among disgruntled members of the regime. Tripoli's
occupation of northern Chad and ambitions to stir trouble for Habre in
southern Chad and President Nimeri in southern Sudan will continue to fuel
the southern-based CAR regime's fears of Libyan support for dissidence in
northern CAR. If reforms in the CAR spur serious unrest, Libya would
probably work to install a government that would be willing to ask Paris
to withdraw French troops.
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Group 1
Central African Opposition Groups
Leader Orientation
Central African People's Ange Patasse (northern
Liberation Movement (MLPC) Kaba tribe), in exile
in Ivory Coast after
being implicated in a
coup attempt in March
1982.
Group 2 Leader
Central African National General Francois Bozize
Liberation Movement (MCLN) (nothern Baya tribe),
living in Congo,
replaced Rudolf Idi
Lala who was ousted
for embezzlement last
month. Bozize was
also implicated
in 1982 coup plot.
Group 3 Leader
Oubangui Patriotic Front- Abel Goumba (tribe
Labor Party (FPO-PT) unknown) released from
prison last August--
arrested in April 1983
for political agitation-
-and allowed to remain
in the country after
agreeing to refrain
from political activity
Largest group. Bases its
influence on northern tribal
resentment of southern rule.
Leader uses socialist jargon,
but is regarded as an
opportunist. Calls for an
early return to civilian rule
and multiparty politics.
Suspected of receiving Libyan
financial support.
Orientation
Small, radical group
Claims responsibility for
a 1981 terrorist bombing in
Bangui.
Orientation
Small party that espouses
Marxist-Leninism.
Suspected by government of
receiving Soviet aid and some
Libyan military training.
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Group 4
Leader
Orientation
Independent Grouping for
Political Reflection and
Action (GIRA)
Group 5
Movement for Democracy
and Independence (MDI)
Group 6
Republican Party for
Progress (PRP)
Francois Pehoua
(southern Yakoma tribe).
Former head of the Union
of Central African
Banks.
Leader
Francois Gueret
(southern Yakoma tribe).
Named High Commissioner
of State in April 1983
and serves as a close
adviser to Kolingba.
Personal vehicle of its
leader who finished third
in March 1981 presidential'
election. A moderate,
with no defined political
a return to civilian rule.
Orientation
Small and most moderate group.
Seeks a return to civilian
rule and draws support mainly
from civil servants and
educated residents of Bangui.
Leader Orientation
Henri Maidou Small, moderate group favoring
(southern Banziri tribe). a return to civilian rule.
Former Vice President
suspected by government
of collaborating in a
Libyan-backed coup
plot last year.
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SUBJECT: Central African Republic: On a Tightrope
Distribution:
Original - Glen Monro, Deputy Director, AF/C, Department of State
1 - Federick L. Wettering, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 - Chester A. Crocker, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Ambassador James Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Robert Cabelly, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, USN, Political Military
Affairs, Department of State
1 - Pierre Shostal, Director, AF/C, Department of State
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director, INR/AF, Department of State
1 - Allen Tousignant, Central African Republic Desk Officer,
Department of State
1 - Peter Spicer, DIO/AF, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Noel C. Koch, Department of Defense
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
2 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
1 - NIC Action Group
1 - POB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
2 - ALA/AF
2 - ALA/AF/W
4 - ALA/AF/W
ALA/AF/W
5 Dec 1983)
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