CAPE VERDE: PEREIRA'S PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000402160002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 13, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 September 1983
Cape Verde: Pereira's Problems
President Aristides Pereira visits Washington at a time
when his ministate faces an exceptionally bleak economic
situation and is the object of Soviet and Libyan pressure to
gain military access to its main port and airfield. Moscow and
Tripoli are attracted by Cape Verde's strategic location at the
crossroads of central Atlantic sea and air lanes, 400 miles
off the coast of West Africa. A moderate leftist, Pereira
tries to maintain a strictly nonaligned foreign policy, faces
no serious domestic opposition, and is firmly in control of his
one-party government.
comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
This memorandum was prepared West Africa Branch,
Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It has
been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and
ALA M 83-1014
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We believe Pereira wants to strengthen Cape Verdean-US
relations which were given a boost last year by Vice President
Bush's visit to the islands. Pereira will want to discuss
southern African issues as well as his concern over Libyan
destabilization efforts in Africa. He will offer to continue to
facilitate US efforts to promote a dialogue between South
Africa and Angola over Namibia. In an attempt to persuade
Washington to increase economic assistance above the current
annual level of $2 million, Pereira is likely to point to his
role in arranging two ous rounds of Angolan-South Africa
talks in Cape Verde.
*25X1
Cape Verde's Economic Woes
About one-third of Cape Verde's 300,000 people depend on subsistence
agriculture for a living, but the US Ambassador reports that last year the
country produced only 10 percent of its food needs. With agricultural
production dormant, rural employment is dependent on public works projects
underwritten by foreign aid programs. The country suffers from repeated
and Mlengthy _periods of drought, an absence of significant raw materials,
the socialist-oriented government is the largest employer
It
.
controls banking, commodity imports, transportation, the press
schools
,
,
and most medical services. Most stores and shops, however, remain
We believe that Cape Verde's traditional negative trade balance is
worsening. The US Embassy reports that in 1982 the value of imports
exceeded exports by a ratio of 40 to one. The Embassy reports that
international loans have not been sufficient to implement the government's
fairly realistic economic goals. We believe the country will be forced to
continue to rely on remittances from emigrants abroad--$20 million
annually from the Unite es--and massive international aid to stave
off economic disaster. 25X1
Political Scene
Pereira is an experienced, pragmatic, and realistic politician. He
is a respected nationalist who helped found and then lead the African Paty
for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC)--the
organization under whose banner independence was won from Portugal. He
was reelected to a new five-year term as party leader and President at a
party convention in 1980. Pereira presides over what one US Embassy
officer descri s a Marxist-oriented, benign, consultative
dictatorship.
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US Embassy reporting indicates that Pereira faces no serious
political challenges, despite the country's economic plight and the
existence of a pro-Soviet element in Cape Verde's internal politics. The
steady exodus of the more disgruntled Cape Verdeans to the US is one
important safety valve. The influence of the pro-Soviet faction--which
favors closer ties to the Soviet bloc--has been kept in check by the high
prestige of Pereira. His hand has been strengthened by his close links
with the leadership of the country's 2,000-man Army, which Pereira
during much of the revolutionary struggle against the Portuguese.
Three years ago, Pereira purged the cabinet of most pro-Soviet
radicals and consolidated the control of his moderate leftist faction over
the party and the government. These developments paved the way for
subsequent modest efforts by Pereira to liberalize the country's Marxist
orientation. Pereira continues, however, to closely monitor pro-Soviet
Foreign Minister Silvino da Luz, who seems to have shifted in recent years
to a more pragmatic line on the issue of diversification of the country's
sources of economic and military assistance. Several minor underground
opposition parties exist and students occasionally demonstrate, but these
groups are only occasional annoyances rather than active threats to
Perei ra.
Foreign Policy Concerns
Cape Verde's extreme poverty, strategic location, and complete
dependence on foreign assistance and remittances make it vulnerable to
external pressures and enticements. Pereira has thus far managed to
balance relations with the West and the East. Cape Verde, for example,
allows commercial aircraft from the USSR, Cuba, and South Africa to refuel
at its major airfield. While maintaining friendly ties with Communist
states and engaging in militant posturing against the West in
international forums, Pereira's government is quietly working to foster a
closer relationship with Western nations to ensure continued aid flows. We
believe, Pereira's behind-the-scenes role since the late 1970s in hosting
periodic talks on a Namibian settlement is indicative both of the Cape
Verdean leader's multifaceted foreign policy, and his desire to be seen as
an important African leader. Pereira is proud of his role as the current
Chairman of the Permanent Inter-state Committee on Drought Control in ;the
Sahel (CILSS), an organization that groups together nine Sahelian states.
He will address th~N General Assembly this month in his capacity as
CILSS Chairman. I 25X1
Cape Verde's ties with Communist countries began in the early 1960s
when the Soviets became the principal source of arms and political support
for the Cape Verde/Guinea-Bissau struggle against the Portuguese. Moscow
still supplies the bulk of Cape Verde's military needs, and there are 10
Soviet military advisers attached to the Army. Relations with Cuba are
friendly, and, under the terms of a 1975 civil air agreement, Cuban troops
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? 25X1
in civil ress are allowed to transit Cape Verde enroute to and from
25X1 Angola.
Nevertheless, relations since independence have not developed wholly
to Moscow's satisfaction. In addition to loosening the ruling party's
ties to the USSR and to Moscow's ideological line, Pereira has, despite
repeated Soviet requests, refused naval base rights to Moscow and air
transit rights to oli for 2sxiraft carrying miltary equipment to
Central America.
Cape Verde's relations with Portugal--based on the ties of culture,
family, language, and history--are still important and have warmed
considerably in recent years. By 1980, Portugal--despite burdensome
economic, social, and political difficulties--had provided Cape Verde with
over $5 million for construction projects, university scholarships, and
transportation improvements, in addition to over 50 technical advisers. A
visit by President Eanes to Praia in 1980 and a return visit by Pereira to
Portugal the following year resulted in additional technical assistance
and a number of fishing agreements. F-7 25X1
Cape Verde has been motivated to develop better relations with
Portugal because of dissatisfaction with Eastern bloc financial and
military assistance. The US Embassy reports Cape Verde is unhappy over
obsolete Communist-supplied equipment provided at exaggerated prices,
racist behavior by the Soviet advisers, and poor technical and military
training. The Embassy reports that Pereira's visit to Portugal in June
1981 resulted in a military agreement ending Cape Verde's policy of
accepting military assistance exclusively from Soviet bloc countries.
US Interests
Cape Verde's cordial relations with the US are rooted in historical
ties between their peoples. Many local residents feel a bond with America
through relatives or friends who are among the some 3UU,000 Cape Verdeans
in the US. Cape Verdeans began migrating for economic reasons to the US--
mainly the northeast--early in the 19th century and emigration continues_
US private investment in Cape Verde is minimal. US assistance in
1982 amounted to about $2 million, a reduction from previous annual levels
of $3 million. The assistance includes a three-year PL-480 title II
program, providing about 15,000 tons of corn annually, and agricultural
research assistance. The US Embassy reports no new aid commitments are
contemplated this year. F I 25X1
US interests and goals in Cape Verde are principally to deny the
Soviets and their allies permanent military installations, while
maintaining US access to airports and harbors on an as needed basis and
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encouraging Cape Verdean movement toward more genuine nonalignment. The
US Embassy reports that two visits to Cape Verde by Vice President Bush in
1982 went far toward improving relations strained by US support for
Portugal during the fight for independence. 25X1
Issues Pereira May Raise
In our view, President Pereira is likely to center his discussions
with US officials on his country's dependence on the West for aid and his
concern over declining US aid levels. We believe he will point to the
important role US aid plays in offsetting Soviet attempts to gain
influence through their military assistance agreements with Cape Verde.
In our judgment, he is likely also to point to continuing Soviet and
Libyan pressure on Praia for military access to Cape Verdean facilities.
We believe Pereira will indicate his concern over the continued lack
of progress on a Namibian settlement between South Africa and Angola. In
addition, he is likely, in our view, to express worry over the potential
for growing South African aggressiveness in southern Africa, particularly
in Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique. The US Embassy in Praia reports
Pereira visited Angola and Mozambique in early September specifically to
prepare hims or discussions with US officials during his visit to
Washington. ~ul 25X1
In our judgment, Pereira is likely to be quite critical in private
discussion of Libya's role in Chad and elsewhere. We doubt, however, that
Cape Verde will take a strong anti-Libyan stance in the UN or other
international forums. In a recent press interview Pereira was only mildly
critical of Libya and moderately supportive of Chadian leader Habre's
legitimacy as head of state. US Embassy reporting indicates Pereira fears
the possibility of Libyan subversion in retaliation for his continued
refusal to allow Libyan arms flights to transit Cape Verde enroute to
Nicaragua.
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SUBJECT: Cape Verde: Pereira's Problems
Distribution:
Original - LTC William Eckert, Officer of Vice President
1 - Frederick L. Wettering, Director African Affairs, NSC
1 - Robert Cabelly, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Jim Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director, INR/AA, Department of State
1 - Thomas Burke, Cape Verde Desk Officer, Department of State
1 - Peter Spicer, DIO/AF, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Noel C. Koch, Department of Defense
1 - Douglas P. Mulholland, Department of Treasury
1 - Intelligence Liaison, Commerce Department
1 - Federick Gilbert, Director, AFR/SWA, AID, Department of State
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DUO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
1 - NIC Action Group
1 - PUB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - U/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
2 - ALA/AF
2 - AF/W
4 -
ALA/AF/W:U (13 SEPTEMBER 1983)
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