SOVIET SPOKESMEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 5, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
Nigh t1ine
Adc Network
:larch 5, 1937 11:30 p.m.
Soviet Spokesmen
TED KOPPEL: Once upon a time, you could recognize them
instantly by their ill-fitting clothes and their surly
disposition, but these days there's a new breed of
Soviet spokesmen.
Good evening, I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nightline.
You've seen them here, you've seen them there, these
days you see them everywhere. How effective are these
new charm merchants from Moscow? That's our focus
tonight.
I received a telex yesterday from our bureau in iNloscow
passing on in full the text of a letter to me from
Georgi Arbatov, one of the Soviet Union's leading
experts on the United States and an advisor to Mikhail
Gorbachev. I rather expect the same letter went out to
a number of other people in the U.S. media.
It takes note of the fact that Americans have often
criticized human rights violations in the Soviet Union,
expressing their concern about the fate of s ecific
individuals. The rest of the letter deals with the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
case of Doctor Charles Hyder, an American scientist who
is on a hunger strike here in Washington to saved the
world from nuclear war. It is wrong, Mr. Arbatov
concludes in his letter, to sit back and wait for this
noble man to die.
No argument. Doctor Hyder is obviously a committed and
courageous man, but Georgi Arhatov has neatly equated
Doctor Hyder's case, which is hardly an example of a
human rights violation, with thousands of genuine human
rights violations in the Soviet Union and he's done it
in a personal telex to an American anchorman.
That's what's new, not the message, but the packaging.
And it's the new brand of Soviet packaging we're going
to examine tonight.
Here's Nightline correspondent, James Walker.
JAMES WALKER: Okay, you say, it's another one of those
Soviet spokesmen. Never could remember their names,
but they're generally overweight, a little grouchy, and
speak English with a thick accent that goes on, and on,
and on.
,!fell, America, look again. Meet the latest model
Soviet spokesman.
FRANK GREER (Political consultant) : He literally
looks like an American candidate for office, almost.
WALKER: Frank Greer ought to know. He, John
Deardourff, and David Sawyer are three of the leading
consultants to American politicians. They know what
sells on TV, so we asked them to review the
performances of seven Russians whom the Soviet
government had made available to appear on American
television during the past eight years.
Like Radio Moscow commentator Joe Adamov. In this 1983
appearance, Adamov displayed the old Soviet delivery
style, called the "-ear hug." You seize the subject
and hold it.
Page 2 Transmedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
JOE AOAMOV: And that is why the Cuban troops were
invited into that country. Any regime that is not to
the United States liking, either it tries to send in
troops from outside like in Angola or Afghanistan, or
direct aggression as we see in Grenada today. The same
thing happened in Chile.
GREER: He's articulate. I mean he speaks very much as
an American would, but he's so combative that I think
it would turn off the American public.
JOHN DEAROOURFF (Political consultant): Uell, from a
stylistic standpoint, both he and Arbatov look like
what I think the American stereotype of the mean, ugly
Russian might be.
WALKER: Of course, not all Russians are long-winded.
Listen to Gennadi Gerasimov, Chief Spokesman for the
Soviet Foreign Ministry.
KOPPEL: The Sakharov/Daniloff affair, just a minor
bump in the road or does it have any importance of it's
own now that it's over?
GENNADI GERASIMO'J: Now that it's over, I think it will
be forgotten pretty soon.
DAVID SAWYER (Political consultant): He certainly
learned the short answer technique.
GREER: He has a slightly, I think, defensive attitude.
I don't think he's very persuasive in making his point.
I mean, I think he's clearly a public spokesman. He
doesn't look like he's enjoying being on television.
WALKER: But this man does. He's Vladimir Pozner.
He's one of a kind, comfortable speaking our language
and very disarming, like when he tried to justify the
Soviet downing of South Korean Airline Flight 007 in
1983.
VLADI 1IR POZNER: Why didn't the pilot of the South
Korean plane contact or answer the Soviet signals and
tell them point blank what they were?
Page 3 TransMedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
WALKER: And Pozner can really turn on the charm,
making the most of his first-hand knowledge of America.
PHIL DONAHUE: You grew up in this city?
POZNER: I did.
DONAHUE: You went to Stuyvesant High School?
POZNER: I did.
GREER: He is really warm and engaging.
DONAHUE: You did not sing America the Beautiful in the
school choir, I assume?
POZNER: Had a lousy voice.
DONAHUE: How do we look to you?
POZNER: Let me tell you this, when I walked out in the
streets it was a very emotional thing for me. I've
dreamed about it many times, because regardless of
being a Soviet citizen, I love New York.
SAWYER: Now, what can you say, it's perfect. He's
very engaging, emotionally you identify with him. e's
a very real person and he comes across that way,
without any of the official --
DEARDOURFF: No, it's a very human environment talking
to Donahue --
GREER: And I also think that part of it is he's so
familiar with the language that you almost forget
you're listening to a Russian spokesman.
SAWYER: In one sense, he's certainly the most
dangerous, because you feel as if you're talking to
your next door neighbor and you forget for a moment
that he's a Soviet propagandist.
Page 4 Transliedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
WALKER: And, this is the new breed of Soviet
spokesmen. Dimitri Titov could almost change his name
to Clark Kent and Vitaly Churkin is equally
presentable.
VITALY CHURKIN: It is the sincere hope of the
government of Afghanistan, and our hope too, that
nobody is going to be killed from now on in
Afghanistan.
DEARDOURFF: He has the perfect anchorman's haircut.
SAWYER: Exactly, both those last two really represent
a new generation. They're calm, they're relaxed,
they're credible, they're open, they're completely
comfortable. They have accents, but it in no way
interferes with being able to listen to what they're
saying, you know, with a fairly open mind.
DEARDOURFF: We're getting away from these older,
balding, white haired men wearing suits that look like
they were made out of, you know, blankets left over
from the Crimean War. I mean, they are now
understanding that if they are going to use American
television, they have to use it the way successful
Americans use television.
WALKL- R: So, gone are the blankets, replaced by a
Brooks Brothers appearance combined with a low key,
friendlier style. And just where might the Soviets
have gotten the idea to modernize their TV image?
Ironically, say our media experts, maybe from the great
communicator himself, from Ronald Reagan.
KOPPEL: For the most part, the changes are still
principally in style rather than substance, but as
James Walker will tell us in a moment, there's been
some change in substance too.
(Commercials)
Page 5 Transmedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
Correspondent James Walker now continues his analysis
of Soviet spokesmen, style and substance.
WALKER: April 26th, 1986, one of the world's worst
nuclear accidents takes place in Chernobyl, but the
Soviets say nothing. Several days later, with worried
European officials talking about spreading radiation,
Soviet spokesmen are made available for TV appearances.
Their message reflects the traditional Soviet defensive
attitude toward such crisis, namely stonewall.
EUGENE POZDNYAKOV: We were accused of not, you know,
informing the governments of the proper countries. It
happened on Saturday, and the governments of proper
countries are usually on holidays on weekends.
KOPPEL: Oh, come on. Come on.
POZDNYAKOV: On 1d1onday they received --
KOPPEL: No, no, no, no, no. Now, i'ir. Pozknyakov -
JALKER: Two weeks later, the Chief Soviet Spokesman,
Gennadi Gerasimov, seemed to regret the lack of candor
about Chernobyl.
GERASINOV: You can criticize us for a little hit of a
delay, we wanted to come out with this possible news.
WALKER: In fact, many Soviet watchers think the
Russians these days are practicing Western style damage
control.
KOPPEL : What has been charged for quite some time,
that you have been using public relations stunts in a
sense here, to distract attention --
CERASIIdOV: It's your art, it's not our art, PR.
KOPPEL: I beg your pardon?
GERASIROV: It is your art, PR, public relations.
Page 6 TransMedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
KOPPEL: Well, you seem to be learning very quickly.
GERASIMOV: 1adison Avenue is in New York, not in
Moscow.
WALKER: A Madison Avenue product?
DAVID PO'.dELL (Soviet media specialist): Well, I
wouldn't he surprised.
WALKER: David Powell is a Soviet media specialist, who
thinks the Russians have embraced Madison Avenue in
style, but not in substance.
POWELL: The messages, I think, are really very similar
to those that they have been for decades, but the
packaging, the approach that they employ, the physical
appearance of the commentators, is now much more nearly
like what Americans are accustomed to, and what
Americans can more readily identify with.
WALKER: And many Soviet spokesmen are becoming much
cagier at answering thorny questions. Consider
Alexander Podakin's tactic, when asked in 1984 about
Soviet dissident Andre Sakharov's whereabouts.
ALEXANDER PODAKIN: The West knows perfectly well where
is 11r. Sakharov, and again, if we are going to discuss
something, there are major problems -- well, let us
discuss some of the problems that exist right in the
United States. There could be discussions of the
people who are, on mass scale, deprived of their rights
to work.
p0WELL: In the very recent past, it has been a very
gentle effort to move the subject matter of the
discussion from an awkward one, from the Soviet point
of view, to one much more congenial to Soviet needs,
that is this issue of bag ladies or unemployment or
drug abuse or whatever in the United States.
WALKER: The Soviets have a growing stable of spokesmen
available for TV interviews for American audiences.
Although they use different men with different titles,
Page 7 TransMedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
journalist, diplomate, scientist, academician, American
analysts say they all spout the Party line.
NICHOLAS DANILOFF: The thing you have to keep in mind
is that there is one employer, and that is the Soviet
government basically, so when they speak, they speak
against the background of the fact that there is one
employer. So they're not going to be wildly critical
of their employer.
WALKER: And they get their marching orders from the
man standing to the left of Soviet Party boss, Mikhail
Gorbachev. His name is Alexander Yakovlev, Chief of
Propaganda, member of the Politburo, and a former
ambassador to Canada. Incidentally, he studied at
Columbia University for one year.
And, when it comes to U.S. directed propaganda, Anatoly
Dobrynin weighs in. Dobrynin was Soviet Ambassador to
the United States for 25 years.
POWELL: Both of these men, Yakovlev and Dobrynin,
understand that Americans don't want to see friction,
they don't want to see conflict. They'd like to see at
least the appearance of compromise, they'd like to see
the "arms control process" or a "peace Process."
WALKER: And it's a lesson not lost on the spokesmen
who want to sound reasonable, magnanimous.
CHURKIN: You are right that the Vienna talks were not
very successful. i'flaybe it is because the framework was
not broad enough for them. So now we are offering to
broaden that framework, including the entire territory
of Europe up to the Urals in the East of Europe.
WALKED: Talking about our differences, it's a new
style, a new openness, but the changes in style are far
more dramatic than the changes in substance. The
Soviets have realiz-d that in the U.S. the court of
public opinion is supreme.
I'm James Walker for Nightline, in Washington.
Page 8 Transmedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
KOPPEL: When we come back, we'll talk with a man whose
own education and background in the Soviet Union allow
him to focus clearly on those differences in style and
substance, Soviet emigre, Dimitri Simes.
(Commercials)
KOPPEL: Joining us live in our Washington Bureau is
Dimitri Simes, who immigrated to the United States in
1973. Educated in the Soviet Union, Dlr. Simes is now a
Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and Director of their program on
LI.S./Soviet relations.
I was just thinking, it was back in 1973, Dimitri, that
I used to go to lunch with a Soviet diplomat here. It
was at the time of the Watergate crisis, and he
genuinely did not believe it was possible that Richard
Nixon might be forced out of office, because he didn't
understand how much influence the American Congress
had, and he certainly didn't realize how much influence
the American public and the American media had.
They've smartened up a lot in the last 14 years a lot,
haven't they? How and why?
DIWITRI SIf1ES: Ted, they have smartened up, but let's
also not overstate it. There was recently an article
in Izvestia, where they suggested that the military/
industrial complex in the United States was unhappy
with Ronald Reagan who made too many concessions in
Reykjavik, so they organized this little scandal over
the Iran/contra affair. They are learning, but they
have a long way to go.
Cut, most importantly, there is a new generation of
scholars, journalists, and officials in the Soviet
Union who are comfortable with the Jest and more
importantly, who are comfortable with themselves, who
were not raised during the Stalin period, who do not
believe that saying something wrong on Aierican TV
would bring them to Siberia.
It is a combination of change in Soviet style and in
Page 9 TransMedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
real change inside the Soviet Union that makes the
difference.
KOPPEL: What about all these people that we bring on
our programs here in the United States, is there a
central place where they are trained? In other words,
is there a conscious effort made by the Soviet
government when it dispatches people to this country to
make sure that they are comfortable on American
television?
SIDES: Initially, Ted, that was not a criteria at all.
What the Soviets really cared about was somebody who
would deliver the Party line. A person of the embassy
who would dispatch a staff member to appear on American
TV would not think about this person's effectiveness
with the American audience. He would worry much more
about the Central Committee Secretary who would say,
"How did you allow this guy to appear on the Nightline,
and to say something different from the Party line?".
You could notice, Ted, that Dobrynin for instance, to
the best of my knowledge, never appeared on American
TV, because he cared too much about his reputation,
about his dignity, and he simply would not be
embarrassed like some of the guests on your show in the
past.
KOPPEL: But indeed, it was under Ambassador Dobrynin's
-- or during his tenure, that this group of people, and
I understand that he and Vladimir Pozner, for example,
he's a great admirer of Vladimir Pozner, he believes
that Pozner did very, very well. And I have been told
that Dobrynin used to cable back to Moscow and say,
"Keep this guy coming", because he's very effective on
American television.
SIRES: Well, that is something they began doing in the
late 70's and the early 80's, but frankly, at that time
Pozner was almost a sacrificial lamb. He was a very
junior official of the Soviet radio, and his only job
was to broadcast to the United States.
Page 10 TransMedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
There were obviously exceptions, but I still would
argue that the main criteria was to put somebody on TV
who would not put his superiors in trouble, who would
sound right, not to people in the United States, but to
his political bosses in Moscow.
KOPPEL: All right. Where, when, and why did it
change, Dimitri?
SIMES: Ted, this began changing during the late
Brezhnev period, because of Dobrynin, because of some
other officials in Moscow, and frankly, because they
began learning that American TV could be very useful.
And they also learned something that they never
expected, namely that people like you could be fair to
them, that they could have an impact, that being
honest, that being effective, that being charming,
would make a difference.
Then came likhail Gorbachev and a group of people
around him, much more experienced in American and
Western affairs in general, and people essentially who
emphasize effectiveness and people who are very
self-confident, people who believe that they can
compete with American officials and equals, that they
have a good case and that they can deliver it very
effectively.
KOPPEL: Now, you phrased it very generously when you
said they look at people like me and say, "Aha, they
can be fair." Is that a kind way of saying, you know,
go on American television because they're all a bunch
of patsies anyway, they'll let you say whatever you
want.
S I M E S : Uell, I think that they started with an
assumption, Ted, that whatever they would say, nobody
would believe them, that lying through their teeth or
trying to be truthful as much as they could would not
make any difference whatsoever.
They learned that it would make a difference, that
there was a premium on trying to be truthful. And
there's no question that they are government employees
Page 11 Trans('ledia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
and as all diplomats, you know diplomats are honorable
people who have to lie on behalf of their government,
and Mr. Pozner lies on behalf of his government all the
time. But they are not trying to lie just for the sake
of it as they were doing very often in the past.
KOPPEL: All right. I'll tell you what, I want to take
a break, but before we take a break let me pose a
question to you and then you'll give me the answer
after we come back.
There are clear, stylistic changes, but in reality has
anything of substance changed? I want you to respond
to that when we return.
We will continue our conversation with Dimitri Simes in
just a moment.
(Commercials)
KOPPEL: Continuing our conversation now with Dimitri
Simes here in Washington.
Dimitri, the package has clearly changed, how about the
message inside? Any changes at all?
SIM ES: 11!ell, Ted, the message has changed also. The
message has changed because there is a new leader in
the Soviet Union who said the status quo was no longer
acceptable. His slogan is reform rather than
continuity, and consequently Soviet spokesmen are
perfectly prepared, sometimes they are even delighted,
to discuss and to criticize Soviet mistakes of the
past.
Put, what did not change is what was said before on
this program, these people are Soviet government
employees. They reflect the position of their
government and you certainly wouldn't expect them to
criticize policies of their new leader, :iikhail
Gorbachev.
Glasnost, Soviet style today, is glasnost to support
Gorbachev, not to undermine his initiatives.
Page 12 TranslMedia
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
KOPPEL: Glasnost is the new Soviet policy of openness,
right?
SIflES: It is openness to indulge the General
Secretary, effectively. As Gorbachev said at the last
Party plenum, "We've talked enough about the reform,
now we have to implement it." And he made very clear
that those who oppose reform would be crushed. That is
his version of glasnost.
KOPPEL: You have -- in a sense, you straddle two
cultures, the Soviet culture and the American culture.
Do you feel uncomfortable seeing these men -- and we've
deliberately been calling them spokesmen because there
are no women among them -- do you feel uncomfortable
seeing these men on American television?
SINES: Ted, I have a mixed response. First of all, I
am glad that the Soviet Union is becoming a more
civilized and sophisticated society, and it is entirely
constructive if they can address American audiences
using American language, symbols and terminology which
we can identify with.
But, very often, I think, we forget that we are dealing
with Soviet government employees promoting Soviet
foreign policy objectives and only to the extent that
you can identify with these objectives, you can
identify with these people. They still work for the
adversary, and they still say exactly what they are
instructed to say even if they do it with great charm.
KOPPEL: Is there any usefulness though, is what I'm
asking, to having them on and letting them say it as
long as we identify them for what they are, which is
spokesmen of that government?
SIM ES: Ted, there is no question in my mind that the
American people are better off and richer by knowing
what the Soviet position is as long as they can
understand it correctly. But they are entitled to know
that Vladimir Pozner, for instance, is a former
American citizen who defected to the Soviet Union and
Page 13 TransMedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7
he is a man, as you said today, who over the years
supported the Party line.
Let's remember that those charming spokesmen today,
very often are exactly the same people who claimed that
Andre Sakharov was a criminal, that the Soviets were
invited to liberate Afghanistan and et cetera, and at
cetera, and at cetera.
KOPPEL: Dimitri, I'm sorry I have to cut you off. We
are really out of time, but I thank you very much. It
was generous of you to come in tonight.
SKIES: It was a pleasure.
KOPPEL: Thank you.
That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel, in
Washington. For all of us here at ABC news, good
night.
Page 14
Transl'Iedia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170005-7