SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1955

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002900030001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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464#010011W
SEetkITY-INFORMATION
031170
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID -1955
NIE-90
(Supersedes NIE-64 Part I)
Approved 11 August 1953
Published 18 August 1953
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. t.
E DECLASSiFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C 5
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: tarsal_ REVIEWER:
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 11 August 1953. The FBI abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-
5-
TataffeftET
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161,1101111 ? ?? ?Eao
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1955
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet Bloc capabilities through mid-1955.
ASSUMPTION
No general war within the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
1. There is no evidence that the_basic
economic and military strength of the
-Soviet Bloc, or'the?autliroxity_of_the_Soviet
mime., have been weakened by _develop-
inents since the death of Stalin. We be-
lieve -it Unlikely that appreciable weak-
ening in these respects will occur during
the period of this estimate. Despite the
recent disorders in East Germany we
believe that the USSR will be able to
maintain effective control there and in
the other Satellites. However, preoccu-
pation with the succession to Stalin and
bureaucratic confusion following the fall
of Beria may lead to occasional uncer-
tainty in Bloc tactics and hesitance in
deciding on policy, both foreign and
_
domestic.
2. Soviet economic growth will probably
continue during the _period of this esti-
mate at a rate higher thari that main-
tained in any major Western state, al-
, ? _
though the very great superiority of the
West's total volume of production over
that of the Bloc will in fact be slightly
tsrm ,??
increased. There are various indications
that the Bloc may in the near future de-
?
vote a somewhat greater proportion of
resources to the production of consumers'
goods, and a smaller proportion to the
production of capital goods, than in the
recent past. However, We believe. it un-
likely that the generaltrends of Bloc
. , ,
eco-
nomicdevelopment._whichhave been ob-
served since 1945_ _will_be_significaritly
altered.
3. The most significant increase in Bloc
military capabilities during the period of
this estimate will arise from enlargement
"Er.. NON?4.0,
of the Bloc stockpile of _atomic_w_eapons_,
and from an increase in the number_of its
jet aircraft and its submarines. The
Bloc may by mid-1955 have available a
sufficient number of heavy bombers to
increase greatly its air offensive capabili-
ties. A limited number of all-weather jet
interceptors may also be in operation, in-
creasing Bloc air defense capabilities.
We do not believe that marked changes
in Bloc military strength and capabili-
ties are likely to occur in other respects;
however, there will be a general improve-
ment in training and equipment of Bloc
armed forces.
1
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4. On 8 August 1953, Malenkov an-
nbunced to the Supreme Soviet that the
United States no longer had a monopoly
in the production of the hydrogen bomb.
However, no\ Soviet explosion of a ther-
monuclear device, ,hasiret been detected.
The Malenkov stenient may have been
pure propasanda, or it may have been
inspired/b the attainment of a specific
staF,df development short of an actual
test. We believe that the latter interpre-
tation is the more probable.
5. Bloc political warfare capabilities will
remain great, especially in Iran and Indo-
china, but will vary in accordance with
changes in world conditions and in each
2
country or region. Soviet Bloc capabili-
ties for the more violent forms of political
warfare, such as armed rebellion and
guerrilla warfare, are greatest in the un-
derdeveloped and colonial areas of South-
east Asia'; far less so in South Asia, the
Arab states, and Africa. In Western Eu-
rope, particularly France and Italy, and
in certain Latin American countries,
Communist political warfare capabilities
are considerable for sabotage, strikes, and
the exploitation of economic difficulties.
Nearly all areas are susceptible to some
form of propaganda and diplomatic pres-
sure, although such pressures would be
more effective in Southeast Asia than in
Western Europe.
DISCUSSION
FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES
Political Factors
6. The relationships_ among top Soviet lead-
ers -
since the death of Stalin are not yet clear.
The arrest of Beria established the fact that
there was sharp dissension within the highest
Soviet leadership. It is not yet clear whether
this dissension arose principally from a strug-
gle for personal power or from differences
over basic policy, nor whether Beria's fall has
ended the dissension. There is no evidence
that the authority of the regime has been
weakened by_ events since_Stalin's_death,and
we believe it unlikely that_this,authority will
break down within the period of this estimate,
or even _be appreciably_ _weakened. We are
estimating Bloc capabilities on this basis.
7. Nevertheless, internal political ,develop-
ments since the death of Stalin, and espe-
cially the arrest of Beria, have almost cer-
tainly produced anxiety and perhaps_some
confusion in the Soviet bureaucracy. It is
possible that, Soviet and Satellite 'readers will
be preoccupied for a considerable time with
the problems posed by the transfer of power.
These factors may produce occasional uncer-
tainty in tactics and hesitancy in deciding on
policy, both foreign and domestic. However,
we do not believe that these factors will act
to impair the basic economic and military
strength of the Bloc. Nor do we believe that
the Soviet rulers will cease to base their policy
on their conviction of an irreconcilable hos-
tility between the Bloc and the non-Commu-
nist world.
8. We believe that Soviet ability to maintain
effective control in the European Satellites
has not been impaired by anything that has
happened since the death of Stalin. Soviet
suppression of the riots in East Germany
demonstrated the thoroughness of that con-
trol, while at the_same time indicating that
the Satellite governments themselves may be
unable, without _Soviet armed force in_re--
serve, to maintain their populations in sub-
jection to the will of the Kremlin. The possi-
bility that the Satellite populations will be
The current critical situation in Indonesia will
be examined in an estimate now in preparation.
For a more detailed account of this subject, see
the Appendices to this estimate.
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encouraged to follow the example of popular
resistance in East Germany may require the
Soviet leaders to devote more attention and
resources to the problem of control in the
Satellites and thus somewhat reduce over-all
Bloc capabilities.
9. The Chinese Communist regime has firm
control over the territory which it adminis-
ters. There is little likelihood of this control
being threatened or shaken by domestic
forces within the period of this estimate. The
relations of Communist China to the USSR
are more those of an ally than a Satellite.
The alliance is based on a common ideology
and at least a temporary community of in-
terests which is not likely to be affected by
changes in Kremlin leadership. We believe,
however, that Mao Tse -,ung may take the
opportunity increasingly to pursue Commu-
nist China's own interests, possibly to the
detriment of Soviet authority over Commu-
nism in that area. Termination of hostili-
ties in Korea will make Communist China's
economic and military dependence on the
USSR less urgent, though this dependence
will continue to limit Communist China's
capacity for independent action.
Economic Factors
10. The Soviet Bloc is self-sufficient in food,
has a strong modern heavy industry, and
possesses adequate supplies of nearly all the
natural resources required further to develop
its industrial economy. The economies of the
Satellites are being progressively integrated
with that of the USSR in the interests of pro-
moting Bloc self-sufficiency and the growth
of Bloc military production capacity. Dur-
ing the period of this estimate, the Soviet Bloc
economy will be capable of supporting a
major war effort.
11. The gross national product (GNP) of the
Bloc will probably increase during the period
of this estimate at an average annual rate of
between 5 and 6.5 percent. The increase in
the USSR alone will probably be at an annual
rate of between 6.5 and 8 percent. This
Soviet rate of growth will almost certainly be
higher than the rate which the US or any
major Western state will maintain. Never-
3
theless, the total output of the Soviet economy
will remain much lower than that of the US,
and the output of? the entire Bloc will remain
much lower than that of the NATO states.
We estimate that Soviet GNP was about one-
quarter to one-third that of the US in 1952,
and that the GNP of the entire Bloc was
about one-third that of the NATO states.
These disparities in ratio terms may be re-
duced slightly during the period of this esti-
mate, although the disparities in absolute
terms will probably be widened somewhat.
12. The Bloc, and especially, the USSR, will
probably continue to concentrate upon ex-
panding the industrial base. Growth of agri-
cultural production will probably Jag behind
? -
groWth of_ industrial __production. We esti-
mate that about one-sixth of Soviet GNP is
now devoted to military outlays, and that the
proportion will probably remain at about this
level through the period of this estimate.
13. There are various indications, however,
that the Bloc may in the near future devote a
somewhat greater proportion of resources to
the production of consumers' goods, and a
smaller proportion to the production of capital
goods, than in the recent past. These indica-
tions are clearest with respect to East Ger-
many and Hungary, but they are not lacking
for the USSR itself: As_yet they _are-insuffi-
cient to form _a_basis _for_an_ estimate _that
significant changes_in over=all Bloc economic
policy have occurred or are_ likely_ to occur.
We believe it unlikely that any changes which
may be made in Bloc economic policy will
significantly alter either the basic emphasis
placed upon development of heavy industry
and military potential or the general_trends of
Bloc economic development which have been
observed since 1945, and on which our present
estimate of probable future Bloc economic
developments is largely based.
Military Factors
14. We estimate that the size of Bloc forces-in-
being will not increase substantially by mid-
1955. The program for increasing Bloc mili-
tary strength will continue to emphasize
modernization of the armed forces and en-
largement of the atomic stockpile.
TIONOPIWir
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15. We estimate that by mid-1955 the USSR
will have a stockpile of approximately 300
atomic weapons (30-100 kiloton yield) .3 In
view of our uncertainty concerning the pro-
duction of fissionable materials, particularly
uranium-235, the number of atomic weapons
may be as low as 200 or as high as 600.
16. On 8 August 1953, Malenkov announced
to the Supreme Soviet that the United States
no longer had a monopoly in the production
of the hydrogen bomb. However, no Soviet
explosion of a thermonuclear device has yet
-1 been detected and we cannot be confident
that a militarily significant weapon will have
been achieved until such a test explosion has
been conducted. We do know that basic re-
search which may be related to the thermo-
nuclear program is being carried on, and the
USSR has a growing capacity for quantity
production of materials which could be used
in the development of thermonuclear weap-
ons. Field testing of thermonuclear reac-
tions based on disclosures or independent
research may take place at any time. How-
ever, there is insufficient evidence to indi-
cate the degree of priority assigned by the
USSR to its thermonuclear program. The
Malenkov statement may have been pure
propaganda, or it may have been inspired by
the attainment of a specific stage of develop-
ment short of an actual test. We believe
that the latter interpretation is the more
probable.
17. The over-all capabilities of Bloc ground,
naval, and air forces will almost certainly con-
tinue to increase during the period of this esti-
mate as a result of the following factors: in-
creases in the numbers of modern aircraft and
naval vessels including submarines; increase
in the number of atomic weapons; progressive
We believe that weapons yielding 200-500 kilo-
tons are probably within Soviet capability and
that the USSR could make smaller weapons (as
low as 5 kilotons). In the event that the USSR
should choose to stockpile weapons of smaller
or larger yield, the estimated number of weap-
ons in the stockpile would be altered accordingly.
modernization and standardization of weap-
ons and equipment, particularly/those incor-
porating electronic guidance and control; in-
creased combat efficiency of Communist
Chinese and of at least some Satellite forces;
and improvement of the Bloc logistical posi-
tion including facilities and stocks of war
material.
18. However, the Bloc armed forces will con-
tinue to be hampered by certain weaknesses:
deficiencies in experience, training, and equip-
ment for strategic air operations and air de-
fense; lack of ability to conduct long-range
amphibious and naval operations; and the
logistic problems arising from the size of Bloc
territory and the relatively inadequate road
and rail network and merchant fleet.
19. The relative unreliability of Satellite
armed forces is a factor detrimental to Bloc
military capabilities. If political tension and
popular resistance in the Satellites increase,
the USSR may find the military usefulness of
Satellite forces and Satellite territories greatly
reduced.
BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES
20. We estimate that the Bloc now has the ca-
pability to undertake concurrent large-scale
operations in continental Europe, the Middle
East, and mainland Asia. The Bloc could re-
inforce with Chinese Communist and Sbviet
forces the Communist forces now in Korea,
and at the same time undertake4 an invasion
of Japan by Soviet forces.
21. Bloc naval forces (except for the ocean-
going submarines, and new cruisers and de-
stroyers) as now constituted are designed to
protect Bloc coastal areas and the seaward
flank of a ground campaign. However, the
characteristics of the new construction now
appearing, and the increasing coordination
between Naval Aviation and the Fleet indicate
a growing emphasis on offensive operations.
No estimate of the success of these operations
can be made without considering the effects of
the actions of opposing forces.
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With respect to mine warfare, the USSR now
has the capability of seriously interfering with
Allied sea communications. In the European
area, this effort could include all the ports and
approaches of the UK and Western Europe.
In the Far East, most of the vital Allied port
areas and sea lanes around the perimeter of
the Bloc could be similarly attacked. The
Soviet Navy will have no long-range amphib-
ious capability within the period of this esti-
mate, but it will remain capable of mounting
short-range amphibious lifts in _considerable
force. The Soviet submarine force will in-
crease its capability to undertake offensive
patrols and mining operations along most of
the world's strategically vital sea lanes, and
possibly, if the specialized craft have been
developed, simultaneously to launch guided
missile attacks against targets on both the
Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US.5
22. The USSR now has the capability to un-
dertake? concurrent air operations against the
US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle
East, Japan, and the offshore island chain of
Asia. However, operations against the US
would be much more difficult than those
against the other areas. The USSR has the
capability to reach all parts of the US and to
attempt the delivery of its full stockpile of
atomic weapons. However, even a stripped-
down TU-4 could reach only the extreme
northwestern corner on two-way missions
without aerial refueling. Even with aerial re-
fueling and other range extension techniques,7
attack upon the northeastern industrial area
and upon most of the principal strategic bases
almost certainly would involve the expendi-
ture of the attacking aircraft and most of the
crews on one-way missions. Until it has a
heavy bomber available for operational use,
the USSR will not have the capability to reach
5 We believe the USSR capable of adapting sub-
marines to this use, but we have no evidence to
indicate that such modifications have been made.
? No estimate of the success of these operations
can be made without considering the effects of
the actions of opposing forces.
7We believe that the USSR has the capability to
utilize range extension techniques, but we have
no evidence that any, of these techniques have
been exploited.
most of the strategically important areas in
the US on two-way missions. A heavy bomber
may already be in production and, if it be
assumed that series production began in mid-
1953, about 200 may be available by mid-1955.8
23. We estimate that the Bloc has the capa-
bility of providing vigorous opposition against
air attacks on critical targets in the interior
of the USSR, under conditions of good visi-
bility. Under clear moonlit night conditions,
Bloc defense capabilities are fair against pis-
ton bombers and negligible against jet bomb-
ers. Under conditions of poor visibility, day
or night, Bloc interception capabilities are
negligible.
24. Currently known trends point to an in-
crease of Bloc air defense capabilities during
the period of this estimate. It is estimated
that improved airborne intercept (Al) equip-
ment will come into operational use during
this period. Although the future develop-
ment and availability of guided missiles is
obscure, surface-to-air missiles based on Ger-
man designs could be available now or in the
immediate future. A limited number of all-
weather jet interceptors may be in operation
by mid-1955. However, we cannot estimate
the significance of these improvements rela-
tive to future air offensive capabilities.
BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES
25. It is probable that Bloc capabilities for
political warfare against the non-Communist
world have been temporarily reduced by the
transfer of power to new leadership in the
Kremlin and by the evidences of top-level dis-
sension which have accompanied the transfer.
However, we believe that the weakness and
confusion which have marked the operations
of Communist political warfare in recent
months will be overcome within a short time
unless the authority of the Soviet rulers
should be impaired to a greater degree than
we have estimated is likely.
8 For more detailed information, see SE-36/1, "So-
viet Capabilities for Attack on the US through
Mid-1955," 3 August 1953.
?For detailed discussion of Bloc political warfare
strengths and weaknesses, see Appendix C of this
estimate.
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26. Bloc political warfare capabilities will de-
pend to a large degree not only upon the
situation within the Bloc but also upon the
success with which the non-Communist world
meets the challenges to its stability which
would exist even if there were no Communist
threat. Thus Bloc political warfare capa-
bilities would increase if the economic situa-
tion in the non-Communist world should
deteriorate; if nationalist antagonism in West-
ern Europe should be intensified; if conflicts
between the US and its allies should under-
mine the program for improved Western de-
fenses; and if nationalist movements in colo-
nial areas should stimulate rebellions against
the Western Powers. Bloc political warfare
capabilities would decrease if the non-Commu-
nist world during the period of this estimate
should avoid the dangers arising from prob-
lems such as these.
27. The relative military strength of the Bloc
and the West is also a factor influencing po-
litical warfare capabilities. Increase or de-
crease of over-all Bloc military strength rela-
tive to that of the West would almost certainly
produce some corresponding increase or de-
crease in Bloc political warfare capabilities.
Fear of war and consequent vulnerability to
Bloc political warfare would probably grow
rapidly in some parts of the non-Communist
world if it became widely believed that the
Bloc's capabilities in atomic warfare had
significantly increased relative to those of the
West. This vulnerability to political warfare
would be accentuated if it were widely be-
lieved that the Bloc had markedly improved
its air defenses relative to Western offensive
capabilities.
28. Finally, Bloc political warfare capabilities
will be determined to a great extent by the
impression which the non-Communist world
forms of the general character of Bloc policy.
The new leadership in the Kremlin _might, for
example, resume_the_Stalinist_policy_of_obvious
and aggressive hostility to the West? probably
hoping thereby to insure the unity of the
world Communist movement and to promote
fear and despair among non-Communist peo-
ples. On the other hand, the_Kremlin_may
attempt by acts as well as by propaganda to
persuade the non-Communist world that its
basic policies are conciliatory and non-aggres-
sive --- that a fundamental change has in fact
occurred with the passing of Stalin. The
Kremlin might thus expect to attain some of
its objectives by promoting complacency
rather than fear among Western peoples. It
might hope that such a course of action would,
among other things, tend to weaken the co-
hesion of the NATO alliance and reduce the
level of defense expenditures which Western
peoples will be willing to support.
29. Bloc political warfare capabilities vary
greatly throughout the world. We believe
that during the period of this estimate Com-
munist capabilities to establish Communist
governments by political warfare techniques
will be greatest in Indochina and Iran. In
other areas of the world, Communist capa-
bilities to influence the attitudes of peoples
and the policies of non-Communist govern-
ments will constitute the principal danger
posed by Bloc political warfare.
Western Europe
30. Various issues arising out of the German
problem can be exploited by the USSR to di-
vide the Western Powers and to undermine
Western defense programs. So long as Ger-
many remains divided, agitation of the Ger-
man unity question will remain an effective
weapon of Bloc political warfare, both in Ger-
many and in Western Europe. If Western Ger-
many is brought into the Western coalition,
or if Germany is reunited and is not brought
into the Western coalition, the German prob-
lem would continue to offer the USSR oppor-
tunity for creating dissension and friction.
31. The Communist parties of France and
Italy are the only Communist parties in West-
ern Europe that have significant capabilities
for political warfare. During the period of
this estimate these parties will probably not be
able to gain participation in the governments
or otherwise to acquire direct influence over
national policy. On the other hand, given the
strong social discontent within these coun-
tries, the voting strength and mass followings
of the Communists will probably be main-
tained at approximately the present levels.
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They will therefore retain a capability to
harass governments, to confuse opinion, and
to discredit parliamentary institutions. More-
over, this capability would be magnified if the
centrist parties lose strength to the right and
non-Communist left, thus increasing govern-
mental instability.
32. In Western Europe generally, but. par-
ticularly in France and Italy, Bloc capabilities
for economic warfarel? and for political action
would increase sharply if there should be any
serious decline in the level of economic activ-
ity. Communist-controlled labor unions
which at present are unable to lead the mass
of workers into political strikes would recover
this capability. In these circumstances, Bloc
economic pressure, which is not now an impor-
tant aspect of Bloc political warfare, could
become increasingly effective. However, un-
less the Bloc changes its basic economic policy,
it will not be able within the period of this
estimate to provide markets for large quan-
tities of non-strategic goods. In any case, the
Bloc will be unable to supply a significant pro-
portion of the goods for which Western Eu-
rope is now dependent on overseas sources.
As a practical matter, therefore, the Bloc lacks
the capability to bring about a major shift in
present trade patterns. However, a relatively
small increase in the volume of trade which
certain countries now carry on with the USSR
could have an appreciable economic effect in
those countries and possibly a more significant
psychological effect.
Southeastern Europe
33. Bloc political warfare capabilities will re-
main negligible in Southeastern Europe. The
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO and
the recently concluded Ankara Pact between
Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia have reduced
greatly the political effectiveness of Bloc mili-
tary strength in this area. Moreover, we be-
lieve that the Bloc will be unable, through
conciliatory tactics and a normalization of
relations, to reverse the Western orientation
of these states.
"Studies are currently in progress in preparation
for NIE-100, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities for Eco-
nomic Warfare," scheduled for publication in
November 1953.
Middle East and Africa
34. During the period of this estimate Bloc
political warfare in the Middle East and North
Africa will be favored by the continuation of
strong nationalism, political and social tur-
moil, and economic dislocation. The situa-
tion will be most favorable to Communism in
Iran. In Egypt and Syria, the military gov-
ernments in power will probably limit Com-
munist capabilities. In the Middle East gen-
erally the Bloc will find it difficult to develop
effective instruments of political warfare out
of the local Communist parties. The Bloc
could intensify Middle East tensions by anti-
Western propaganda, by providing some sup-
port to either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict
with Israel, or by releasing large numbers of
Jews for emigration to Israel. It might in-
crease neutralist sentiment and create some
good will by offers of trade and military assist-
ance. Communist capabilities in North Africa
are relatively significant already because of
the influences which can be exerted in that
area by the French Communist Party, and
may increase if nationalist antagonism to
France grows. Other parts of Africa appear
to offer some of the same opportunities to
Communism as the Middle East and North
Africa, though they are comparatively untried
territory.
35. The Communists will continue to have
substantial capabilities for political warfare
in Iran during the period of this estimate.
Under conditions of continuing political in-
stability, the Tudeh Party may develop the
capability to gain control of the government
either through violent or non-violent means.
Soviet moves toward an improvement of
diplomatic and economic relations could
weaken traditional Iranian distrust of Russia
and facilitate Communist infiltration.
South Asia
36. Bloc political warfare is unlikely to alter
Pakistan's Western orientation or the neu-
tralist position of other countries of the area
in the East?West conflict. The Indian Com-
munist Party may increase its strength,
though not sufficiently to endanger the Con-
gress Party's control of the central govern-
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ment. In the other states of South Asia, the
Communist parties will probably not be a
serious factor. Afghanistan will remain sen-
sitive to Bloc military and economic pressure,
and Ceylon may become subject to economic
pressure if it continues to readjust its trade
pattern to attractive offers made by Commu-
nist China.
Southeast and the Far East
37. The Communists will continue to have
substantial capabilities for political warfare
in the countries of Southeast Asia, with the
probable exception of the Philippines. The
political fate of most of this region may be
decided in Indochina. Communist capabili-
ties for supporting the armed rebellion in In-
dochina will probably continue to increase.
In Burma, Communist capabilities for con-
ducting guerrilla raids and for assisting other
dissident groups are small at present. How-
ever, if the Chinese Communists furnish ex-
tensive military support, these capabilities
would increase, becoming a serious threat to
the government's position. Thailand is prob-
ably not vulnerable to Communist subversion
in the absence of strong external Communist
pressure. If, however, the Communists
should establish a position of strength in In-
dochina along Thailand's borders, Commu-
nist capabilities for subversion would consid-
erably increase, particularly among the Viet-
namese in northeastern Thailand. In Indo-
nesia, the Communist Party is represented in
Parliament, controls the dominant labor fed-
eration, and has infiltrated the armed serv-
ices, the police, and the bureaucracy. It will
be capable of harassing the government
through political action, sabotage, and strike
activity." Communist capabilities for eco-
nomic warfare may increase in Southeast
Asia as a result of the Korean truce.
" The current critical situation in Indonesia will
be examined in an estimate now in preparation.
38. Bloc trade offers to Japan will almost cer-
tainly become more powerful weapons of
political warfare following the truce in Korea,
particularly if markets in the non-Communist
world should become less accessible to Jap-
anese exports. Bloc diplomatic moves toward
resolving outstanding issues, such as repatri-
ation of Japanese POW's and Soviet occupa-
tion of former Japanese islands, and toward
restoring normal diplomatic relations could
be employed in attempts to undermine
Japan's present pro-Western orientation.
The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) will
continue to be able to exploit anti-US feeling
and Japanese nationalism, but not to the
extent of undermining the US-Japanese alli-
ance. The JCP will retain some capability
for espionage, sabotage, and subversion, but
will not be capable of threatening internal
security.
39. Communists will retain capabilities for
espionage, subversion, and sabotage in South
Korea and for stimulating anti-US sentiment.
These capabilities will probably be propor-
tional to the degree of Communist military
strength remaining in North Korea and Man-
churia.
Latin America
40. The Communists in all major Latin
American countries will retain a capability
for sabotage, for strikes, for spreading Bloc
propaganda, and for stimulating anti-Ameri-
can sentiment in nationalist, intellectual, and
organized labor groups. These capabilities
would increase if there should be economic
stagnation or a decline in the level of eco-
nomic activity in Latin America. In Guate-
mala, the only country in Latin America
where the Communists have power within the
government, they are almost certain to main-
tain and may increase their influence. All
the major countries of Latin America will re-
main susceptible to Bloc trade offers.
on1cincNiTIA1
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