TESTIMONY ON PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION S. 1282

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R001000120011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 15, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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TESTIMONY ON PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION
S. 1282
PRESENTED TO
THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS, AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
BY
L. PAUL BREMER, III
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCTOBER 15, 1987
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Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify
before this committee. It is a pleasure to discuss with
this committee a topic which a recent Roper poll showed more
American citizens-- some 69 percent- desired government
action on than any other foreign policy issue.
I am happy to report to you that the administration's
counterterrorism policy is showing results. The fact is
that, although terrorism continues around the world, one is
much more likely these days to read news stories about
terrorist arrests than about sensational hijackings. And
gripping news accounts of terrorist atrocities have quietly
given way to brief reports from western capitals on the
successful apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of
terrorists.
Pr251ress against Terrorism
Over the last 18 months, there has been a measurable drop in
international terrorism.
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o From 1981 through 1985 international terrorism grew from
some 500 incidents per year to about 800 incidents.
o But in 1986 terrorism dropped six percent. So far in
198.7 it is down another 10 percent. The decline would
be greater but for Afohan-sponsored terrorism in
Pakistan.
o Contrary to the impression many Americans have,
terrorism in Europe dropped dramatically last year--
over 33 percent.
o And in 1986 there were only two airline hijackings, the
lowest number since we began keeping track over 20 years
ago.
While these numbers are encouraging, they do not convey the
full sense of what is happening. Terrorism can strain and
has strained relations among even the friendliest states,
but there is, I believe, a growing consensus about the
response to terrorism. This is the key change In our
counterterrorism fight.
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Ten years ago the terrorists seemed to have the initiative.
They attacked or hijacked seemingly at will. Their
grievances were, if not respected, often heard
sympathetically. The West was on the defensive. A number
of countries reached de facto agreements with foreign
terrorists, saying, in effect: "Do not attack our
interests, do not conduct operations on our soil and in
return, we will grant you free transit and domicile within
our borders."
In the mid-1980'x, there has been an important shift in
emphasis in the West's fight against terrorism. Now our
fellow democracies are banding together and cooperating.
The dynamics of the situation have shifted, with much of
initiative now on our side. And, over time, it has become
clear that the terrorists never keep their end of the.
bargain. Sooner or later accommodation leads to blood on
your own doorstep.
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The United States has worked with like-minded nations to
develop multilateral agreements and declarations about
terrorist attacks on civil aviation, internationally
protected persons, passenger liners and hostage-taking.
These documents reflect an important degree of agreement in
principle where there was-none a decade ago. In my many
contacts at the policy and working levels around the world,
I find a new sense of resolve about terrorism: a sense of
resolve which is saying, "let's let the professionals-- the
police, immigration and customs and intelligence services--
do their jobs."
Networking is a popular word these days. But networking is
not just something for yuppie stockbrokers. Among the
Interior ministers in Europe, within Interpol, within
military organisations and intelligence agencies, the
professionals are meeting each other and sharing tactics,
intelligence and ideas. There is today a counterterrorism
network and we are all benefiting from it.
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The United States has been in the forefront of the
counterterrorism battle.
o On the eve of the Venice summit, Attorney General Meese
traveled to Paris for an unprecedented ministerial-level
meeting on terrorism with representatives of the
European Community and the Summit Seven.
o Bilaterally, we are working to tighten extradition
treaties. We provide Anti-terrorism Assistance to some
40 nations who have the will, but not the means to
resist terrorism. Our government has made made firm
diplomatic representations to a number of countries
about their relations with terrorist organizations and
we have seen results.
o We also act unilaterally when we cannot secure
cooperation or circumstances make it infeasible to
coordinate our actions. A Lebanese terrorist named
Fawaz Younis, accused of directing the hijacking of a
Jordanian airliner with U.S. nationals aboard, was
recently arrested in international water by the FBI.
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He is jailed near here awaiting trial. This is a direct
result of a vigorous, imaginative, unilateral U.S.
action.
U.S. Gov rnment Countort e
. sm Polic
The United States follows a three-part strategy for dealing
with terrorism.
1. The first element is a policy of-firmness towards
terrorists. Giving in to terrorist demands will only
breed future demands, demands which are likely to be
greater than those of today. As a father, I learned
long ago that behavior rewarded is behavior repeated.
While the Iran-Contra affair may have caused some'-to
doubt our steadfastness in resisting terrorist demands,
I can assure you that there is no sense in the
counterterrorism community that we should change our
policy. No country, no terrorist should believe that
? there is anything to be gained by threateningithe United
States with terrorist action. We will not make
concessions. We will not deal.
800 TOO *ON
J--& S 1931 HX31UI PT -T
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2. The second element of our strategy consists of practical
measures to bring terrorists to justice. By practical
measures, I mean the identification, tracking,
apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists.
In the past 18 months more and more terrorists have been
tried and jailed around the world, usually after
receiving the kind of stiff sentences which were unheard
of only a few years ago.
3. The third element of our policy, pressure on
terror-supporting states, relates directly to the
Committee's current interest, so I would like to address
it in more detail.
State support for terrorism
In the administration's view, state supported terrorists are
substantially more dangerous than those operating
independently. State sponsorship gives clear advantages to
the terrorist. For example:
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o When a terrorist obtains legitimate travel and
identification documents from a patron state, it becomes
harder to identify and track him. When Nezar Hindawi
went to London to blow up an El Al flight last year, he
carried an authentic Syrian Service passport.
o A state-supported terrorist has a ready source of
weapons and a ready means to transport them. Embassies
are exempt from search by international convention and
the baggage handlers at state-owned airlines don't
interfere when directed not to examine a particular
parcel. Once again, the Hindawi case is instructive.
His bomb came into the United Kingdom on Syria's
official airline.
o Countries like Libya, Syria and Iran make a terrorist's
work easier by providing a place to train. A terrorist
operating alone, especially if a fugitive, has a hard
time finding an isolated location to fire automatic
weapons or assemble and detonate explosives.
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o Similarly, simple refuge supplied by patron states
constitutes important support. Being able to live
without fear of immediate arrest and punishment is of
enormous psychological value to a terrorist.
o Finally, financial support from state sponsors allows
terrorists to spend more time on operations because they
need not rob banks or traffic in drugs to raise money.
Benefit to the State SponjQr
The sponsoring state receives benefits as well:
o Terrorism can be an inexpensive form of warfare. A
small group of terrorists costs less per year than a
company of regular soldiers and can cause far more havoc
in an enemy state than could that company of soldiers.
o Using terrorist surrogates makes it easier for the
sponsoring state to deny responsibility for actions
which, if taken overtly, could lead to war. Shortly
?.
after the Abu Nidal Organization moved to Syria in 1983,
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it stage a series of attacks on Jordanian interests. I
think it no coincidence that these attacks ceased
following a Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement.
o A state can also use terrorists to murder dissidents
abroad. Qadhafi, for'example, has hired terrorists to
kill Libyan opponents in many countries, including the
United States. In May, two Libyans tried to kill the
former Libyan Ambassador in Vienna. After their attempt
failed, they fled into the Libyan People's bureau
there. We believe this incident shows why European
governments should take particular care to monitor the.
size and activities of Libyan embassies in their
countries.
U.S. Re nses to State-Supported Terrorism '?
So our policy recognizes the need to deal with
state-supported terrorism. Our response should be carefully
tailored to each individual case in order to use the
leverage that works best with that particular country.
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Libya
Libya was on the U.S. Government's list of terror-supporting
states when it was first published in 1979 and remains on
the list today. Over the years the U.S. has responded to
Libyan actions with a mixt.%re of policy tools: we closed
our embassy there and later ordered the Libyan embassy here
closed; we imposed economic sanctions, and exhorted our
friends to do the same. And eventually, we used military
force. After that, the Europeans, too, imposed political,
diplomatic and economic measures on Libya.
This policy has worked. While other nations have been
slower to respond, today Libya is politically isolated.
During the past year, Libyan-supported terrorist operations
have declined, although Qadhafi still appears ready tb,use
terrorism as a policy tool.
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Syria
Syria too is a "charter member" of the list of
terror-supporting states and, in spite of some encouraging
signs, remains on the list. While Syria has long been
involved in terrorism, she was particularly active from 1983
to 1986. As I mentioned earlier, Syria began using the Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO) as a surrogate in 1983 in a series
of attacks on Jordan. These attacks stopped following a
Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement.
While the Jordanian attacks ceased, other ANO attacks,
generally planned and trained for in Syria or in
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, continued. While based
in Syria, the ANO was responsible for many attacks,
including the Rome and Vienna airport massacres of December
27, 1985, and the September 6, 1986, murder of 22 worshipers
at a Synagogue in Istanbul. And Syria continues to play
host to a number of other terrorist groups.
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Syrian officials have also been directly involved in
terrorist activities. Sworn court testimony in London
implicated a Deputy Chief of Syrian Air Force Intelligence,
Lt. Col. Haithem Said, in the attempt to place a suitcase
bomb aboard an El Al flight. Testimony in Berlin led a
court there to'issue an arrest warrant for Said because of
his role in the bombing of the German-Arab Friendship
Society on March 29, 1986.
Revelation of Syria's direct role in these terrorist
activities led to a series of actions last November by the
United Kingdom, the European Community and the United States
to distance themselves from Syria. The United Kingdom broke
diplomatic relations. We withdrew our Ambassador. Economic
sanctions. were also imposed, though U.S. bilateral trade
with Syria is insignificant, and her other trading partners
have not imposed major economic sanctions.
However, Syria proved sensitive to the political and
diplomatic isolation. In June, Syria expelled most of the
Abu Nidal Organization and we have not seen evidepce
recently of Syrian involvement in terrorism. These are
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encouraging signs. Still we intend to keep our remaining
sanctions in place and to leave Syria on the list of
terror-supporting states until we see evidence of a
fundamental change in Syrian policy towards terrorism.
Virtually since it came to power, the current Iranian regime
has used terrorism. Over the years, it has attacked U.S.
targets, European interests, moderate Arabs and its own
dissidents.
The United States has taken an increasingly tough position
toward Iran in response to its continuing support for
terrorism and its refusal to cease hostilities in the
Iran-Iraq war. Following the bombings of the US embassy
buildings and the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, we placed Iran
on the list of countries supporting international terrorism.
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When a country is placed on that list, export controls are
imposed on selected "dual use" items. We have specifically
banned the export to Iran of a variety of items and
equipment which could support terrorist and/or military
operations, including helicopters, aircraft, outboard
engines, chemical weapon precursors and several other
national-security controlled items.
We currently are expanding the list of national security
controlled items. We 'are also studying other measures which
we can take against Iran, including cutting off the import
of Iranian oil. This is an extremely complex issue, but let
me emphasize here that the administration is completely
supportive of the objectives of the recently proposed
legislation on the subject. We want to craft our policy so
that these objectives are best met.
Iran has been under little concerted international pressure
until recently, but is now increasingly isolated. Other
countries have been reluctant to sever profitable commercial
dealings, particularly in the absence of international
cooperation. However, Iran's continued outrageous behavior
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is beginning to exact a toll with other countries. For
example, relations with France have chilled with the onset
of the so-called "embassies war," which began when a French
magistrate demanded the right to question a non-diplomatic
employee of the Iranian embassy in Paris about terrorist
activities in France. ?'
The Lautenbero Bill
As you can see from the foregoing review, we agree with the
underlying assumption of"Senator Lautenberg's bill:
Economic pressures can be useful against countries
supporting terrorism. However, we oppose the bill in its
current form for four reasons:
1. It is seldom desireable to impose all possible economic
sanctions at one t me.
Seldom is a state which sponsors terrorism solely, or
even heavily, dependent on economic relations with the
United States. That is why we need to consider most
sanctions as having an impact which is as such or more
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psychological and political than economic. And we must
keep in mind that the purpose of sanctions is to bring
about a change in behavior on the part of the target
state'.
'We believe it prudent to avoid the automatic linking of
economic measures to a political determination.
Remembering that it is political effect we seek, we are
more likely to succeed if we have available a range of
sanctions which can be applied over time than if we are
required to impose an an entire package imposed at once.
For example: Had we used all our economic sanctions
against Syria when it was put on the terrorist list In
1979, we would have had nothing left to reinforce the
political steps taken last November. Of course, there
may also be times when we would want to impose all the
available sanctions at once.
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2. The bill can force the President to send a mixed signal.
Senator Lautenberg's bill, it might be argued, gives the
President needed flexibility by permitting him to waive
the imposition of certain sanctions. However, this
amendment would in effect force him to send a mixed
signal by requiring public explanation of why he is
imposing certain sanctions.
By simultaneously declaring a state to be a supporter of
terrorism and explaining publicly why he is not imposing
certain sanctions, the President invites confusion in
the target country. Since he must cite "national
interests" to avoid imposing the sanction, he would
weaken the deterrent effect of the unimposed sanction or
sanctions. Beyond that, the target country is likely to
take the President's refusal to impose a sanction as
U.S. recognition of some "mitigating circumstance."
There are times when we cannot avoid sending mixed
signals. But we should avoid requiring them in U.B. law.
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3. The bill's prov,sion for Congressional overide sets the
stage for a potentially divisive debate at a,time when
we should show unity.
Should Congress choose to exercise its option to attempt
to overide the President's decision to withold a given
sanction, the target state will enjoy the spectacle of
watching the administration and Congress debate just
what we should do to it. Such a display would surely
undermine the effects accomplished by placing the nation
on the list in the first place. Sometimes the executive
and legislative branches see things so differently that
such a debate cannot be avoided. But again, we think it
unwise to build the potential for such a conflict into
our laws.
4. The bill can reduce ojar chances of operating in concert
with other nations.
By tilting the playing field towards early economic
sanctions, our ability to act in concert with.rother
nations is diminished. If the President follows the
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path of least resistance and imposes all sanctions at
once, we could reduce the chances of sanctions by other
nations which might be reluctant to be seen as "bowing
to U.S. pressure." Also, if we have already imposed our
sanctions, we will have nothing left in reserve to use
to complement the actions of other nations, as we did
with Syria.
I do not want to suggest that the administration is
uninterested in economic sanctions, or even in future
legislation in support of sanctions. On the contrary,
within the administration, my office has been instrumental
in leading a discussion about new measures which, after
appropriate executive branch review, we may ask for
legislation to support.
Conclusion
Much of the recent progress in counterterrorism has been
made possible by Congressional action. Our Anti-terrorism
Assistance program depends on authorizations and funding
from the Congress. Younis was arrested under statutes
passed in 1984 by a Congress eager to assist the
administration in combatting terrorism.
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The funds and authorities we have received have been used to
good effect. This will continue to be the case. Around the
world there is a cooperative spirit which we have not seen
before. After nearly 20 years of disarray in the face of
terrorism, the West is beginning to unite to confront
terrorists as criminals. ?:
I do not want to leave the impression that our problems are
solved, that there are not disagreements among friends, or
that we will not suffer reverses in the months ahead. I do
believe that the progress we are making is real, substantive
and permanent. We are not going to eliminate terrorism, but
we are making the world a more dangerous place for
terrorists and safer for the rest of us.
Thank you very much.
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