DRAFT - PORTLAND WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903820037-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: MISC

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DRAFT - Portland World Affairs Council
Mr. Chairman, officers and members of the World Affairs
Council, guests:
When I first heard that I might be honored by an invitation
to speak to you I sent a draft of what I thought what was a pretty
good talk on Central America--and all that--to one of your board
members--not for approval but to see if it might be suitable. It
was not, this severe judge told me: "...much too general--she said"--
anyone could have written that." I bring this up not only to show
the severe standards of your board--may I come up to them:--but to
apologize for what may be an excessively personal or confessional
note in all this. I was told to speak of my experiences on the
National Intelligence Council over the past year and I shall do
so: Cardinal Newman said: "Egotism is true modesty. In religious
enquiry each of us can speak only for himself." So in international
politics.
It has been said that the Department of State lacks
a constituency in the country: compared with the Department of
Agriculture with its farmers, Commerce, Treasury, (hand) and that's
another way of saying there is only a small number of citizens
engaged in sustained and serious examination of foreign affairs.
This is a definably different element from the single-issue factions
who clamor for the interests of a single-minded group, clustering
about the fashionable banner of the moment. If there is a
constituency that can bring rationality and open-mindedness to questions
all too much marked--and naturally so--by prejudice and emotion--it
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is your World Affairs Council, and other gatherings like yours
around the country.
In passing let me throw out two questions-two ways of
expressing our weakness in the conduct of foreign affairs. First:
can we afford to let our course in foreign affairs veer like a
weathervane as, with each new administration, a new set of
inexperienced hands comes on board?
Second: that old, familiar, but pessimistic question: is it
possible to carry out effective foreign policy in a representative
democracy like yours?
An intelligence officer--which I was and I suppose I
shall always be must work with Francis Bacon's advice: "If we
begin with doubts, and are patient in them, we shall end in
certainties." We can't be sure of ending with certainties but
the passage itself is worth taking: getting there may not be
half but all the fun.
If you are--metaphorically speaking--the constituency
of the Department of State, I am going to borrow you to talk about
another part of the foreign affairs apparatus with a constituency even
smaller than that of State's: the so-called intelligence community,
that nexus of intelligence agencies--military and civilian--in
Washington and their extensions abroad. There are a couple of reasons
for this constituency being so tiny. One is the difficulty the
outsider has in knowing what is going on in the intelligence community
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and thus how or even whether any questions of interest to the
informed citizen is being considered: another reason is the
superficial, romantic, slanted, and sensational, treatment
intelligence work gets in the public press.
Intelligence work consists of four parts, roughly,
arbitrarily--forgive me if I tell you things you know as well as
I do but I want to be sure we are all together when we get to
the point of all this.
? Four functions, let's say:
? The gathering and reporting of information the
government needs to make plans and reach decisions--
it can come from anywhere or anyone--it includes the
information we can get only through espionage:
? The analysis of this information to be sure its
meaning is clear, that it is plausible, probable,
that it is given its proper weight;
? the preparation of estimates--the national intel-
ligence estimates--looking into the future--we'll come
back to that;
? Secret political operations, paramilitary operations,
perhaps the least important of all aspects of intel-
ligence work but the side that gets the most attention.
Now I am going to talk to you about my experience with
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overseeing the writing of a national intelligence estimate, not
because the experience was typical of the preparation of all such
estimates but because the experience illustrates the conflict
between intelligence and ideology. I shall go on to make some
observations about the quality of the discussion of strategies
in Central America, within the administration, that is.
Let me make it clear that I am not speaking for the
National Intelligence Council, the CIA, or the government in
any way but that I do speak with the bias of an intelligence
officer.
The National Intelligence Council is made up of National
Intelligence Officers, each of whom deals with a geographic area--
Latin America in my case--or with a subject, Soviet strategic
weapons, or ground forces, nuclear proliferation, terrorism. (hand)
Incidentally, I'm not going to take your time going over how we go
about our work although I can later if you're interested.
Estimating deals with the future. Hans Morgenthau
The first lesson which the student of international
politics must learn and never forget is that the
complexities of international affairs make simple
solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible.
It is here that the scholar and the charlatan part
company.
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As politically-sophisticated as a president and his
policymakers may be they are probably quite unmindful of Morgenthau's
advice and they do ask questions about the future. And they expect
answers: that's what the Council is for. And if they don't ask
the questions, the intelligence community should be asking the
questions and trying to come up with answers. The national estimate
does not furnish simple solutions--it is not a policy paper--and
it does not do any flat prophesying although many papers do talk
about the various ways the game may play out. The President should
feel confident that he gets these opinions just as he gets other
intelligence information--not free of bias but with the proper bias
in favor of the interests of the United States--not the particular
administration but the government of the United States--not the
bias of any particular group or fashion--but of the government of
the United States. The estimate may not prophesy but the president
should learn whether the subject is one he should worry about and
whether there is anything he can do about it.
Now I came into the Council as the National Intelligence
Officer--the NIO-for Latin America. The position put me in close
touch with the director, William Casey. He wears two hats: one is
that of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other
is that of Director of Central Intelligence--the president's
intelligence officer, as it were, and the Council comes under Casey
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in this function--a function that finds him also chairman of the
National Foreign Intelligence Board, the board on which the heads
of the various government intelligence agencies sit and where
national estimates are submitted, accepted, rejected, or modified.
Iwas, figuratively, Casey's "man" on Latin America, not for
operations but for estimates, assessments, briefings, interagency
meetings--all that.
Now the reason I was brought in was that the previous
NIO has strong views about Latin America, about what our policy
should be, what our intelligence should say, how our intelligence
reports should read, how intelligence analysts should think--in
short, he was ideologue, a grue believer. He left the job--in a
formal sense--and is now the senior Latin American person on the
National Security Council. It was the healthy resistance of the
intelligence community to ideological dominance that led to his
leaving the job. He was not a professional intelligence officer,
but a writer, whom Casey had brought in from a think tank, and it
was not Casey's disagreement with his views or Casey's disapproval
of his approach to the job that led to his leaving. That was the
reason for my coming and, to get ahead of myself, that was the reason
for my leaving: the intelligence community and I soon fell into step
but I was out of step with Casey.
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Mexico. Even before I was brought on board I was warned
that I would have to do something about Mexico. It turned out that
a draft estimate had been written by a quite competent analyst in /
one of the agencies but that the previous NIO had found it seriously !l
wanting. So there it say and the intelligence community had no
chance to comment on it.
Like a number of other countries in Latin America, Mexico
is passing through a serious, perhaps dreadful time, of shrinking
opportunity, unemployment, continued underemployment, hardship, becuase
of the enormous debt she has incurred with foreign banks and the need
to repay the debt and to regain investors' confidence. Under the
leadership of President Miguel de la Madrid Mexico has been the
International Monetary Dund's prize pupil, exceeding the IMF's
stipulations for cutting public spending, with the consequent
severe political costs of austerity.
The main difference, for us, between Mexico and the other
Latin American nations struggling with debts--Argentina, Brazil,
Peru--is that Mexico is on our border. There are uncountable
connections between us and Mexico--commercial, social, cultural,
personal--and despite differences in outlook we are a remarkably
friendly pair of neighbors.
Now in preparing a national intelligence estimate on
Mexico, we knew we had to cover a number of important questions in
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a comparatively short document taht would tell the president and
other policymakers what Mexico looks like--from Washington--what the
problems are, what the prospects are for their growing worse,
how the Mexican government seems to be dealing with the problems,
and what effect all this has on the United States and what effect
the United States and foreign banks have on the prospects for Mexico.
In short, we met--representatives of the intelligence
community--to define what we were after, to agree on the questions
we wanted to cover, and set the drafter to work, all promising
cooperation in getting the data he would need--by the way generally
the embassy, in this case, Mexico City, is brought in to the process
so that everyone who can contribute is able to do so although an
embassy--an ambassador--is-not allowed to dictate the conclusions
of an estimate.
The process, which should have taken us three or four
months at most took us about nine--a familiar gestation period
to all of us--but much too long for even this important estimate.
The reason was that we were trying to write an intelligence estimate
when what was wanted from us was domething to fit the pattern of a
stereotype.
The previous NIO, before he had come to the Council,
had published an article: "Mexico: the Iran to our South."
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This furnished the architecture of the stereotype. The implication
of the title alone is that the experts were wrong about Mexico
just as they are wrong about Iran. The Intelligence community was
complacent about Mexico. Those with a tendency to distrust the
bureaucracy and intelligence analysts in particular took to that idea.
Reporting from the embassy or from other sources--particularly other
sources--that indicated instability was eagerly waved about by the
doomsday faction and information that showed de la Madrid and his
government to beware of their own problems or attempting to deal
with them was scoffed at as another delusion of the old hands.
That is to say, those who said that Mexico had weathered many storms,
that the government had brought on stability and growth as had no
other government south of the Rio Bravo, and that they would probably
get through this were dismissed as complacent. Remember Iran!
Then there were those usually faceless sources I came to
think of as "Casey's rich friends," showing the development of a
bad attitude on my part. The information from these people - came
not in the form of dry and careful intelligence reports but in the
attractive and impressive anecdote. The anecdotes came with flat
statements "the PRI is dead--" that's the Institutional Revolutionary
Party that has so sucessfully dominated Mexican political life--
run Mexico, realy--for almost sixty years. Or "de la Madrid is a
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technocrat," meaning that he lacks the political aptitude to
control the unrest and grumbling that will flow from austerity.
To anecdotes were added the allegations: the Cubans were
organizing secret groups to overthrow the Mexican government;
guerrillas are gathering in Oaxaca; the Mexican government is
turning a blind dye to the Guatemalan guerrillas' safehaven in
Chaipas. Arms are flowing throug the Yucatan to El Salvador.
Have you ever tried to disprove an unfounded allegation? You
are complacent: you are talking to the wrong people: you're
looking in the wrong place: your intelligence is no good. It's
quite a game and the "allegator" if he is a position of authority
is never wrong: the burden of proof is on the intelligence
officers. Many an expensive wheel has been spun in searching for
evidence to back up allegations. There can be smoke without fire.
There are reasons for portraying Mexico as weak and
political stability as.fragile. One is used to bolster the
arguments for our policy in Central America. Thus, if Mexico is
weak, tottering, how much more important that we stop the
Communists in Central America. Mexico--the Iran to our south--is
next. One can't dismiss the threat from those who are sowing
violence in Central America. One must object to skewing intelligence
to fit the propagandist's breathless message. Must we paint Mexico
in frightening colors to justify a policy that makes sense in itself?
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In the hearts, and leaking into the heads, of key
members of the administration is a strong resentment of Mexico's
role in Central America. One benefit of our backing the insurgents
in Nicaragua was to frighten Mexico into taking the initiative
to join three other countries in the so-called Contadora process.
Before this Mexico had been apathetic--at best apathetic--more
accurately favoring the Saninistasregime in Nicaragua and if not
hoping for the success of the guerrillas in El Salvador certainly
doing nothing to help the legal government in El Salvador. This
cannot but be annoying to the United States that is working
exactly in the opposite direction. This resentment colored the
views of those who wanted the estimate to come out with a
highly negative view of the Mexican government. With some it
seemed almost an obsession, as though Mexico were the cause of the
problems in Central America rather than being an obstacle to the
solutions we favor.
The task of draling and redrafting the estimate was
complicated by real gaps in information and honest and respectable
doubts about the meaning of much of the information we had.
Information, if incomplete or contradictory, as it may often be
leads to the need to qualify opinions and for some care in the
expression of judgements. But we had to do that while batting off
the constant barrage of allegations from above: unrest in the slums,
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sullen campesinos, leftist unions growing, restless youth. On
two occasions I had detailed critiques under Casey's signature,
challenging our information and our judgements. It became evident
not only to me but to the representatives from other agencies
gathered around the table that our elbows were being jiggled.
When we came up with a final draft of the estimate and
sent it out to the various agencies for their principals to read
before the meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board,
an unusual step was taken. The Vice Chairman of the Council
was a magazine editor who had come into the agency with the new
administration and who, after a period as personal assistant to
Casey, had been assigned to the Council. He called around to the
heads of the various agencies to express Casey's dissatisfaction
with the draft, saying that each one of them would be expected to
estimate the odds for complete collapse in Mexico. I don't know
whether this was the eagerness of the subordinate to please or
whether this lobbying was done at Casey's direction but, added to
the previous pressure on the intelligence community, it did not
make a good impression. The judgements of the estimate were not
rejected at the meeting, the estimate having given due weight to
the possibilities for things going wrong in Mexico. Nevertheless
Casey declared that this is my estimate and ordered that the key
sections be rewritten to reflect the sense of the meeting. At
this point the estimate was taken from my hands and rewritten in
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part by the magazine editor to give an even more dire view in
the key passages. Casey is right in saying that in his estimate.
As Director of Central Intelligence he can decide what an
esimate will say. As I was, when the estimate was finally approved,
Casey remarked that he only wanted to be sure that our govenment
was alert to the possibility--no matter how small--that things
might go the wrong way in Mexico. As is the case in struggles
such as this, there is no clear-cut difference in the outcome and
it was the process that was clouded, subtleties were blurred in
the development of "two sides" to the estimate, and as is so often
the case moderation and wisdom were the casualties. The struggle
led to a draft that I was not particularly proud of--save for its
showing that we in the intelligence community had stuck to our
guns--and the version redone by the magazine editor made it somewhat
worse. Truth is not so distorted as to hurt either country--Mexico
or the United States--and if you were to read the estimate you
would probably shrug your shoulders and say it looks all right to me
as I am figuratively shrugging my shoulders now. But what an un-
necessary struggle!
To sharpen the contrast between what in my opinion is
the right and the wrong way of handling intelligence estimates
when political pressure, ideology, or the desire to "go along"'
threaten to influence the integrity of the process, let me turn
to a harsh example.
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Richard Helms, director from 1966 to 1973, said not
long ago that he was accused of being a traitor because CIA estimates
about the war in southeast Asia were not pleasing to the policy-
makers at that time: they didn't say that it was working. This
is the difference I want to illustrate: Helms would rather be called
a traitor than to warp the intelligence to fit the policy--that
may be an extreme way of putting it but it may be also a way of
expressing the ethics of the intelligence officer.
I said earlier that the case of Mexico isn't typical of
the estimative process. Casey is proud of his work at rebuilding
the agency after the neglect of the Carter years. He is proud
of the greatly increased number of estimates the Council has
produced. He has a sentimental attachment to intelligence work going
back to his wartime service. He also is close to the president and
can get things for the agency that another director might not be able
to do.
Let me put this into context. When it is a matter of
policy or of ideology any administration may be tempted to try to
get the intelligence to fit what it is doing or what it thinks of the
world. Someone said that the test of any army is how it fights when
it's tired. For an intelligence officer the test of an administration
might be how it accepts intelligence information when it hurts--when
it goes against the ideological grain.
Central America. It is allowed that an intelligence officer
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have opinions but he should not let them interfere with his work.
I here confess I sinned by intruding on Casey with suggestions
about the course of events in Central America. These were in
my own mind the most pragamatic sorts of observations based
entirely on my appreciation of the direction of events in Central
America. When I discussed my letter of resignation with Casey he
said that it was probably right that I should go because of my
feelings about policy in Central America. I won't quarrel with him
about that: in my own mind it was the process that raised questions
in my mind not the policy itself. Our policy in the broad sense
is one of supporting the government in El Salvador and of opposing
the gradual imposition of totalitarian government in Nicaragua.
Our particular objection--not the only one--is to their supporting
subversion in neighboring countries, not only in El Salvador.
Part of this policy has meant putting a good deal of
pressure on the Sandinistas, the ruling faction, better, factions,
in Ni_- - mia PrvccnrP t1ri iwh'
? public and private statements both criticizing the
Sandinista regime and iterating our objections to their
actions;
? the invasion of Grenada, not carried out for this reason,
frightened both the Sandinistas and the Cubans who let
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it be known that they could not defend Nicaragua
from an invasion (nor would the Soviets).
Pressure, I began to ask myself, for what? Did we expect
the Sandinistas to step down? Become democratic? To voluntarily
stop supporting the guerrillas in El Salvador? Were we merely
playing for time? What did we expect to happen--what would we
do--in time?
I persisted in discussing this with Casey: the theme
was: where do we think we're going? I also put forward a view
that the survival of the government in El Salvador might depend
on the cutting off of the support to the Salvadoran guerrillas
from Nicaragua. Support here means safehaven, training sites,
infiltration routes, passage to and from Cuba for training,
communications and command facilities, and importantly as well arms
and ammunition smuggled into El Salvador for the guerillas.
If this support is important, better--vital--it would
be worth our while to negotiate an end to it with the Sandinistas
while we have the pressure on. What if our pressure--our
bargaining position wears out--what if the congress forces the
administration's hand--what if there is a change in administration?
Now, implicit in the suggestion of negotiating an end to this
support would be or might be an acceptance of the Sandinista regime.
Another view is that the Sandinistas can never be trusted
to leave their neighbors alone, particularly as long as Fidel Castro
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is running things in Cuba, and that we should not accept a regime
that is so close to the Cubans and to the Soviets. This view would
hold that the Sandinistas might like to be less dependent on those
two but that their affection for them will render them always a
danger in Central America.
This is the hard-line view and it is a mistake to scoff
at it as the evidence against it is not sufficient to support some of
the strong arguments brought against it.
My own uneasiness was not caused so much by differences
with this view as with the entirely inadequate discussion in
government of the courses open to us. In Nicaragua--the discussions
about El Salvador were quite direct and open.
We have a number of strategies open to us--a fairly wide
range. If one of those involves negotiations you not only talk
about it but you explore every avenue open to you with great care:
what you want to achieve and what you know or assume the other side
wants. How far will they go? What matters do we consider negotiable
and what would they consider beyond discussion, and so on. Then you
worry about timing, and who will do the talking, and what will be the
way to start, and so on down the line. If you are in the State
Department, you start working on congressmen and you ask the president
to say something. You can imagine the thought it would take to
prepare to negotiate with someone like the Sandinistas, with the Cubans
sitting in back advising them, and behind them the Soviets, neither
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of whom want to see peace in Central America or to see the United
States get off the hook there.
Negotiations were never discussed except to be mentioned
as a shameful form of surrender to the Sandinistas, the Cubans,
the Soviets. The discussion is forbidden on ideological grounds.
I should say "was:" I left at the end of May.
One alternative to negotiations is invasion by the United
States of Nicaragua. Much bandied about in the press after Grenada
and even expected in Managua and Habana. I never heard any responsible
officer of our government seriously recommend it although it is so
obvious. Conventional wisdom says that we would hold the towns
after taking some serious land dig losses, that the Sandinistas
and many loyal Nicaraguans would take to the hills, and that there
would be protected guerrilla warfare. This has not been examined
either. One can just as easily declare that the Sandinista factions
would fall apart, the people, sick of struggle and hardship, would
welcome the invaders as happily as the Grenadians who were tired of
their burdensome and bullying regime.
Neither alternative--nor others that would occur in the
course of serious and protracted discussion--are being sufficiently
examined.
There is one vexing reason for this beyond the ideological
and that is the fear of leaks. Leaks to the press of intelligence
information, usually to bolster one move or another; leaks of
government intentions to sabotage the action; leaks to the congress.
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It is part of everyone's consideration. Don't let the press people
tell you that is is healthy--the people's right to know--the First
Amendment. It is vicious in intent and it is damaging to your
interests. The tendency is to reduce to the smallest the size of
any group deliberating a sensitive matter: one result is that
The phenomenon of
leaks is a symptom of poor discipline--of a person's being so
sure of the rightness of his own views--or of his being a manipulator
without any views--of his own that he is willing to violate his trust
to have his own way. There are baser motives, as well. (Money,
getting even). You simply don't do that: you work within the system
and if you do not like the rules of the system you get out.
Nevertheless, it is not fear of leaks alone that prevents
the full and intelligent discussion of courses open to us in
Central America, but the influence of serious differences of opinion
and the persistence of the true believers.
Here I have tried to deal with the ability of intelligence
to inform our policymakers or, badly done, to let them down. I
bring to your attention also the need for fuller discussion among
the foreign affairs departments and agencies of the courses open to
us. This must be a concern of yours and it needs attention in any
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administration, especially if they come to Washington with their
heads full of untested ideas. Hans Morgenthau warned us about easy
solutions: what do you say to someone who says: it is immoral
to negotiate, to sit down with, much worse to compromise, with a
Sandinista, a Marxist-Leninist, or with the Soviets?
What do you say to these Christians who insist that our
government help the Sandinistas, no questions asked, and help the
guerrillas come to power in El Salvador?
I have a suggestion. Allen Dulles saw to it that engraved
on the wall as you enter the CIA building are the words:
"and the truth shall make you free."
I think that on the other side of that hall there should be
engraved those words of Oliver Cromwell, addressed to an unruly
parliament:
'?4y brethern, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink
that you may be mistaken."
FINIS
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