CHILE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
Director of Central Intelligence
-Seer.-
National Intelligence Estimate
Chile: Prospects for
Democratic Transition
Key Judgments
iIIIASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
CA MARK ON
~ety=et~
NIE 94-851W
December 1985
Copy 3 9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
NIE 94-85/W
CHILE: PROSPECTS FOR
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
ssith regular distribution.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
SCOPE NOTE
Chile's 1980 Constitution calls for a presidential plebiscite in 1989
and congressional elections in 1990. The democratic opposition wants to
modify the Constitution, however, believing that President Pinochet
plans to use it to perpetuate his rule well into the next decade.
Opposition leaders are calling for a more rapid and complete transition
to civilian rule and a return of the military to the barracks. Meanwhile,
the radical left has rejected any peaceful transition and continues to
advocate the violent overthrow of Pinochet.
This Estimate assesses the prospects for a peaceful transition to
democratic civilian rule in Chile over the next four years. It begins by
examining the major political forces at work, including the military, the
democratic opposition, and the radical left. It also examines the
economy and various external factors that are likely to affect the
transition. Finally, it discusses alternative scenarios and the influence
the United States may have on the process.
t
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that Chile's President Augusto Pinochet is likely to
remain in power through 1989, and that he will seek to manipulate the
military, the democratic opposition, and the radical left to perpetuate
his rule. The military wants to restore a stable non-Communist political
system, and there are recent signs that senior officers want Pinochet to
demonstrate more flexibility with the democratic opposition, perhaps
by agreeing to open presidential elections by 1989 rather than a
plebiscite with only Pinochet as candidate. Only the military have the
requisite force to remove him, and, if they believe he is becoming an
obstacle to a stable transition process, they may decide to oust him. 1
The major factor likely to influence military support for Pinochet,
other than the President's own willingness to make necessary conces-
sions, is whether the democratic opposition can continue to demonstrate
a large degree of cohesion, responsibility, and popular support. The
August 1985 National Accord, which implicitly accepted Pinochet's rule
until 1989 but called for a direct presidential election and an end to po-
litical restrictions, was viewed by some key officers as a positive
development. It was signed by 11 political parties representing both the
center-left and the democratic right. It is ambiguous about relations
with the Communist Party, but it excludes radical left groups advocat-
ing violence. Although Pinochet has rejected the Accord, it continues to
gain popular support, and we believe the military will pressure him to
agree to a dialogue with the moderate opposition if present trends
continue.
The Communist Party has indicated it will not sign the Accord, but
views it as a positive step in support of widening opposition to the
government. The Communists probably will seek to cooperate with the
moderate opposition and exploit organized antiregime demonstrations,
but they are not likely to renounce violence as the ultimate means of
overthrowing Pinochet. They have considerable influence in one of the
two main labor confederations in Chile, and can use it to support
popular protests. Organized labor is unable to play a decisive political
role, however, because only 20 percent of the work force is unionized
and labor laws are relatively restrictive.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
The Catholic Church has become a major factor in support of the
moderate opposition in its efforts to open up the political system and
speed up the transition process. Church leader Cardinal Fresno, an
opponent of Pinochet's policies, brokered the National Accord. He is
likely to continue to play a key role in maintaining political pressure on
the government, including attempting to use as leverage the Pope's
projected visit to Chile. Fresno probably will be circumspect in his
dealings with the government, however, because he badly wants the
National Accord to succeed and does not want to appear too partisan.
The economy is likely to continue to be a key factor in influencing
public attitudes toward the Pinochet regime. In 1982 a sharp economic
downturn fueled mass'popular protests, but moderate growth in the last
two years has reduced dissatisfaction with government economic poli-
cies. Nevertheless, we project continued economic austerity and only
modest growth in the next few years as Chile attempts to keep its
massive foreign debt commitments and meet International Monetary
Fund requirements. By 1987 or 1988, Pinochet may decide to ease
austerity measures and stimulate economic growth to improve his
political prospects. This probably would cause him serious problems
with Chile's international creditors, but he may be willing to risk that in
order to promote growth.
Because of its heavy $22 billion debt load, foreign financial support
is a major factor in Chile's economic performance and ultimately in
Pinochet's political prospects. The United States played a crucial role in
negotiating a key debt rescheduling agreement this year and undoubt-
edly will be a significant factor in any new agreements that Chile may
seek by 1987. Thus Washington can have some political influence in
Chile depending on the support it lends to future requests for loans, par-
ticularly loans from multilateral sources such as the Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank. Major South American
democracies, although desirous of a peaceful democratic transition in
Chile, lack significant influence over domestic politics there. In the case
of Argentina and Peru, they have their own reasons to improve bilateral
relations with Chile.
The Soviets have played a major role in supporting the Communist
Party of Chile and its strategy of attempting to overthrow Pinochet
through violence. Soviet financial support has been crucial to the party's
survival, and Moscow has expanded its aid to include support for
guerrilla training of Chilean subversives in allied countries and the
supplying of weapons to returning militants, some of whom belong to
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). Cuba appears to be
coordinating closely with Soviet efforts, and it reportedly is concentrat-
ing its support on the radical Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR), which also receives Libyan support.
We believe that the best chance for a relatively stable democratic
transition to occur by 1989 would be through modification of the 1980
Constitution to permit free and open elections. We believe that there is
a better than even chance that this will occur, particularly if the
democratic opposition is able to hold together. Pinochet would risk
losing a plebiscite in 1989 unless his popularity improves dramatically,
but he may calculate that his prospects for continuing in power are best
served by an open election with several candidates. We believe that the
role of the senior armed forces officers is the most critical variable
affecting the course of developments in Chile. Should Pinochet's
support erode further in coming years, senior military officers probably
would pressure Pinochet not to run in order to avoid an embarrassing
defeat. The possibility remains that he can maintain military support,
but we think it will become increasingly difficult as 1989 approaches.
We believe a transition that followed the current constitutional
timetable and resulted in a plebiscite, with Pinochet as the candidate,
would probably lead to a deterioration in Chile's political stability.
Pinochet would need the united support of the armed forces, major
economic groups, and a significant portion of the middle class to win,
and this currently appears to be lacking. Even should he manage to gain
sufficient support to achieve a victory, his relations with the democratic
opposition are likely to be poor, and prospects for longer term stability
would be uncertain at best.
The radical left is likely to step up its violence in an effort to pre-
vent a successful transition, but there is little likelihood that it can
seriously threaten to overthrow the government. The military and
security forces have good capabilities to counter an insurgency, and
most Chileans favor peaceful change rather than violence. Should
Pinochet remain inflexible on altering the transition process, he would
greatly strengthen the radical left. Under such circumstances, the
radical left might obtain sufficient popular support to mount a viable
insurgency, particularly after 1989.
US interest in promoting a stable democracy in Chile and main-
taining a cooperative relationship could be jeopardized if Pinochet
persists in trying to perpetuate himself in power. This would increase
the risk of instability and raise the possibility of a radical leftist
takeover. The United States can have some influence on Pinochet
through its position in future Chilean debt rescheduling and new loan
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
requests. He has shown that he can be responsive to subtle economic
pressure, but there is some possibility that extreme economic pressure
may influence Pinochet to adopt a radical posture on debt repayment.
US influence may help hold the democratic opposition together and
encourage its pragmatic approach toward the Pinochet government.
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP87T00495R001301410003-8