SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY PANEL ON OVERSEAS SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 3, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 :CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 :CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
o~in ~. cS~iuir_af~
=tE4U 0- AO>~~~iSTRA7~ON
5. [~=Pa!'2T ti'SN~ O~ ST4TE
~SH~~:?TO~. ^ = 20520
1-`12
In July, the Secretary asked a distinguished group of
Americans to form a nonpartisan advisory Panel on Overseas
Security to study and ma}:e recor:;~endations concerning the
security of our diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad.
This Panel will be chaired by P.d,~,iral Bobby Inman, retired, taha
is currently President of MCC Co=poration in Austin, Te~;as.
Other merrbers includ?:
-- Senator Warren Rudman, Republican from I~e:~~ Hampshire;
Congressman Daniel Mica,
Democrat fron Florida;
-- Lawrence r.agleburger, for;.zer Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs and former Ambassador to Yugoslavia;
-- Lt. General D'Wayne Gray, Chief of Staff of the United
States 2~iarine Corps;
-- Ann Armstrong, former Am'~?ssador to the United Kingdom;
-- Robert 2~fcGuire, currently Chairman of the Board of
Pinkerton's, Incorporat?d and former Police Cotmissior.er of
the City of t?ew York; and
--- Victor Dikeos, a retired Foreign Service Officer, who
will be the Panel's Executives Secretary.
The members of the Par.21 will examine a number of
security-related questions, sucr as:
-- What is the nature of the threat that our overseas
personnel and facilitizs fact over the nett ten to fifteen
years, and hoZV can we best protect against it?
-- How can the U.S. fulfill its obligations to protect
foreign missions and their personnel in this country?
-- And, what aro the resourcz implications of theca answers?
The members of the Panel first ti,et on July 27, and they
intend to issue their report on or shortly after January 1,
1935. It is anticipated that t;:e Panel will at that time
present a series of recommendations concerning our overseas
security activities and relat2~? topics.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
Possible Qs and As:
Q. F,'ho is the State Department's ?pint of Contact for the
Panel?
A. Under Secretary for Management Ronald Spiers, who is
responsible for the Department's security and counterrorism
policies and programs, through his Assistant Secretary for
Administration, Robert Lamb.
Q. Where will the staff for the Panel come from?
A. In addition to State Department e~ployees who will be
detailed to the Panel's working stafL, we expect that the
other foreign affairs agencies c-~ill also contribute
personnel.
What o-they agencies will be involved?
A. All of the U.S. Government agencies with a major overseas
presence will be assisting thz Panel in its work.
Q. Will this Panel pr?-empt the existing decision-making
process?
A. No. The Panel will not deal with military aspects of the
question, and =gill not become involved in managing current
security programs or day-to-day operations.
Will the Panel members travel overseas to study the issue?
A. There ray be the need for a trip by 1 or more members, but
at the moment we don't anticipate any.
Q. tidill the Panel members be paiG?
A. They of course will be reirnbu~sed for their travzl and
expenses in the process of carrying out their duties on the
Panel, but that is all that is a::ticir~ated_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
Q. Will the report be made public?
A. There will be parts of this report that will be highly
classified and of course they won't be released, but all
unclassified information will be put in the public domain.
Q. Another Panel to study the iss~:e of security is all well
and good, but what has the Depart~ent actually done
recently about this problem, especially in light of the
'bombings in Beirut and Kuwait?
A. In this f~3sca1 year, the Department will spend over 120
million directly on security-related programs and
activities to protect our personnel, facilities and
national security information overseas. In addition to the
ongoing regular security programs, the Department is also
over o_ne-half way through the Security Enhancement Program,
which will spend more than X130 pillion over a five-year
period to enhance security significan~ly at over 65 of our
most threatened posts. We have also added a great deal of
additional security protection to our posts in Western
Europe, in light of the recent assassination attempts
there, through a special supplerental approved by the
Congress in 1982. In responses to the vehicle bombings in
the Middle East last year, all posts have reveiwed their
physical barriers and host-government protection, and
remedial measur?s have been taken where needed.
Drafted: A/EX/MST: ?-iASafford; mas
8/1/8, 632-5376, Doc. 1680M
Cleared: A: JPShumate
PA/PRESS: BCarlson
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
has been to protect our facilities and people against specific,
identifiable threats. As a cor.seguQnce taken a neW type of
threat arises, our eBployees are sub}act to ris'~ until ue have,-
had time to institute proper measures. bTe often appear
reactive.
5.'e cannot protect every post against every threat. The.
costs--human as well as material--are too great. Our policy
I, ~ THE PANEL SHOULD EVALUATE THE DEpART?tENT'S
RESPO;~SIBILITIES TO PROTECT U.S. F?~CILITIES AFD PERSOJiNEL
A$P,OAD AND DETERriINE HObJ BEST THcY CAN $E FULFILLED.
The number and size of our diplomatic and consular posts
and foreign affairs agencies abroad have grown dramatically
since the Second IJorld `ear. The Departaent has sought to
accommodate the full range of U.S. Government activities that
seek to locate under the uzabrella of our embassies.
control
determine
operational effectiveness and our obli4atzons to protect our
people.
In acIcno=pledging oux responsibilities to protect
emplogees, tae nave differentiated bet:aeen terrorist acts
dixected against our buildings and personnel and criminal
activities s~hich affect an entire populace. To the pzrson
whose life or family is thzeatenzd at a remote 2nd dangerous
post, this distinction is li:tely to be academic.
-Criainal activity and common crime are, to some extent, a
pant of the landscape in Lhe Uaitzd Sta gs; terrorist activity
is not. Our present policy takes into account the fact that
many actions necessary to protect personnel froze co:vmon cta~e
Given the intensified security threat the panel should
examine the rixe, composition, location and
degree
of
we can exercise o>>er the 257 Foreign
Service
posts
Lo
the prooer balance between re2so*_:ed
security
~aeasur2s,
protect er~~loyees zgainst common creme.
overseas would be the zesponsibility of the employee an the ZT.S.
The Panel .should re`-exacin2 our' responsibilities to
Our security zneasur2s a~ve been concentrated on
chanceries because they ar,~ generall;~ su'oject to t;~e greatest
threat. ~Te have dons I?as for residznces. Government-owned
housing is often treated di~fferentlq from privately-leased
housing. Schools and com;~unity centers represent sn even more
razzed pattern.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5 _
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
- ~' ?` Iy,r THE ADEQUr1CY OF PRESENT PROGRAY.5 TO PROTECT FOY.EIC?~
t;ISSIONS AND T:{EIR PERSO2iNEL SITUATED IFS THIS COUNTRY NEED
COY.PREHE?:SIVE RETHINKING. THE ti;;ITED STATES 't',A.KES HEAVY
Dc?;ANDS Oti FOREIGN GOV.r.RP~?lENTS TO PROTECT ITS p;ISSI.ONS. 5+I{EN
THEY?SEEK RECIPROCITY, OUR QESPONSE HaS NOT ALIvAYS BE`cN
SATISFACTORY TO THEN.
Protection of foreigners in the United Ststea is a quilt
wor~C of responsibilities. The Secret Service protects visiting
Chiefs of State ar.d Heads of GovernWent. State's Office of
Security generally protects their s+ives, husbands and other
accotipanying adult family mewbere. Statz Security has
responsibility for protecting all other foreign visitors ._
including cabinet members.
In ~rashington, the Uniformed Division of the Secret
Service protects foreign missions. Elsewhere, responsibility
falls on local jurisdictions.
For Ness York, the Department is acquiring fron Treasury
the authority to reimburse local jurisdictions for
extraordinary expenses in connection with protection of foreign
missions to hz U.N. ~Ie have legislative authority to establish
a similar program for consular facilities and people but as yet
no money to fund the progran.
Our efxectiveness in meeting these zesponsibilities has r~
direct besrir.g on the willingness oz' foreign governaents to
protect our personnel. These are a number of Federal agencies
involved in providing this protection. Stale alone cannot
rationalize this situation. The Panel should nz'~ce
recor~nendations t_o the _Secretarv for xatzonalizing this
situ a_tion,._reco?nizirn that s~on~ may xeguire follow-up~h
other a~Q~enci_es. - -
V. b]HAT ARE THE P.ESOURCE I'riPLIC~1'lTONS Or OUrZ SECUkITY
2ESP0?+SIBILITIES?
This Panel is being asked to cone for=.~ard with a program
which could lay the foundationp of the Department's security
philosophy and practices for t5e next generation. 7cor a
progran of this scope resources cannot be t'e deciding factor.
But the DepsrtTaent's.m2ans are nodzst sad funding must be taken
into account. The Panel show?_d id?nt _ `v in Pnersl Lerms, the
~~ - -- -==y=~= - - - - - ,mss ~ -
costs of their recomner_dations to the S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5 ~
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
.. ?~..
The Penei ohould ngse6s the actions necessary to.er.sure e
securewenvironc+ant for our employees once potential threats are
identified or oro~ected.
In today's world our foreign national employees in aoae
countries risk their lives and yell being by working for uy.
ble need outside thinking on U.S. Government responsibility for
these loyal .pen and women.
The Penel~uld examine our obligations to national
employes snd our ability to sstisiy reasonably these
expections.
lI, IN ADDITION TO CONSIDERING TEE RESPOivSIBILITY OF THE U.
S. GOVER2iMENT TO ITS EF~PLO'tEES, THE pA?:EL SHOULD ALSO AEVIELJ
THE CONDITIONS OF A?] EMPLOYEE' 5 SERVICE AT A DA?1GE1tOUS OR
THREATENED POST.
Traditionally the Foreign Service and other foreign
affairs agencies have taken pride in their discipline snd
willingness to serve at difficult and hazardous posts. fever
before havo the dangers been so grave and direct.
The Panel should examine whether ['mesa meta and more
hazardous conditions have neaninofully altered our
psycholocicsl contxact t~xih our ea~loyees2 stud their
implications for our xecruzt~en' assignment policy, and the
total psychic and financial coWper.sation packas~e? 'vThat sew
training may be needed?
III. THE PANEL SHOULD 3tEVILW OC? OBLIGATIOIi TO P~2OTECT
A2:ERICA2v' $USINESSES AND PRI9aTE IriSTITUTIONS OPr.RATING A5RCt'D
AGAINST THREATS TO THEM AS A~i?RZCA.I:S OR SY"ri30LS 0. TiiE.U?iITED
STATES .
Today the Office of Security offers inforrsal advice to
private industry in the t3nited States and responds to inquiries
on threats. This service is pxovided unevenly. SY is
developing a pronran to strengthen and institutionalize these
arrangements. Our security support of American business sill
continue to be limited to unclassified, advisory activities
unless we change present policy.
Abroad this sort df assistance is provided to those firms
knos~.ledgeable enough to soak us out or when coadi2?_ons in a
particular country lead the post to reach out to ziambers of the
private American casmunity. The Panel could help us achieves a
clear concensue on our xeanonsibilities for American citizens
businesses and other institu[ions abroyd.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
SCHEDULE FOP, THE JULY 27, 1984 MEETING
OF THE SECRETARY'S CO:;N:ISSIO:~ Oh OVERSEAS SECURITY
8:45-9:00 a.m. Commission mer::bers asserble in the
9:00-9:30 a.m.
1:10 p.m.
9:40-9:50 a.m.
9:55-10:15 a.m.
10:20-10:40 a.m.
10:45-11:00 a.m.
11:05-11:20 a.m.
11:25-11:~O.a.m.
11:5 a.m.- .
12:00 p.m.
12:05-12:15 p.m.
12:20-12:30 p.m.
12:35-12:50 p.m.
12:55-1:10 p.m.
1:15-2:20 p.m.
2:30-:30 p.r^.
Operations Center Conrerence Room
r;eeting with Secretary St:ultz
Briefing for Commission N,embers
Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary for
Administration: 'Introduction'
David Fields, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Security: 'The Nature of the Threat'
Harvey Buffalo, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Foreign Buildings: 'Physical Security
and our Overseas Facilities'
Ambassador Donald pett~rson, Acting Director
ofr;anagemer,t Operations: 'The Nature of
Our Overseas Presence'
Ambassador Robert Sayre, Director of the
Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency
Planning: 'International Terrorism'
Robert Ribera, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Communications: 'Co~~.:~unications
Security and the Paperless Embassy'
James P~olan, Director of the Office of
Foreign Missions: 'P.?ciprocity and the
Security Context'
Alarcia Curran, Director of the Family
Liaison Office: 'Family Liaison Office
Persp?ctive on Security'
Dennis Hays, President of the American
Foreign Service Association: `AFSA
Perspective on Security'
Roger Feldman, Comptrollzr: 'Budgetary
Implications of Security'
Y~lr. Lamb: 'i7on-23onetary Costs of Security'
Lunch, Eienry Clay P.oom, eigh~h floor
Commission r~.e,:ibers convent for discussion,
Room 6316
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
? ., ; .
In testi^ony before the Congress, Y said we mould
convene a high-level advisory panel to loob at the
ramifications of embassy security ~:orld~:ide. I briefly
described to the Cor~~nittee---just as X did in the letter
you received from ne--the nature of the problem we face in
conducting our nation's business around the world. I told
them that I would be seeking your judqnent on the
appropriate balance bet~azen th? risks and benefits of our
presence abroad. What I hope to see is a map that will
guide us into t:he future.
You are all vQry busy and I an pleased that you have
agreed to participate in this wor;;. I can think of no
Wore distingui:>hed and appropriate panel than this one,
and I want to express my thanks that you have carved out a
day to devote to this topic.
In my opinion, there are few issues which impack fnore
seriously on how tae ray carry out our foreign policies.
Business is best conducted ir, a stable work environment.
And yet, we cannot give up and come Nome every time
stability is threatened.
I?do not have to tell you that our Foreign Ser~~ice is
not a timid or frightened group. For two hundred fears,
they have served in every corner of the world under the
Host adverse conditions. In recent ki es, ho~:eveT~e
conditions have chanced to a re~arkabl2 extent.
number o? games on the olaqucs in the Di plo,~~atic Lobby of
those I~i112d t.~hiie serving this country .ys graphic
testimony.~ko z:hak change. ,fie havz seen our abilaty to
conduct business tested too of tzn and in :.oo sang daces.
:T2 have taken slops to cope with the increasing and
shifting threats. ry'2 have prone?red new security systeris, .
products, dev~:ces, and tactacs. Ere l:av2 been successful
with our security programs. But perhaps in some instances
we have not acted qu? ckly enough. ~Te think our record can
be improved.
3~e have 'gone to Congress again and again ~.it.n requests
for monies fort n2%~ progTars. The ?resources available to
fund and ,~ar_a~ye our ovzr~das -security progra;~ have -~een P
inadequate to m?e~c the :noupti~~g threat znd the growing f`'
requests for additional security measures. ale have been
sbreadi.:!g our resources too thinly--which is but one of
two a.nterrelated problems. The second is t~aak ~a2 ba~,?e
lac~;ed a r?cognized conceptual frame;~or~ for dQfwning,
consistently and realistica33y, what ~e mean by security
overseas.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
2
Unfortunately, there is no ua}? to provide 'security'
for a?ll or even most of the staf f and dep=nder.ts at
embassies and consulates every~:h?re in the world. ~e
recognize that :~e start from a discou=acing prer:ise:
__ 8ny er~Y?assy can be overrun, especially wh?n we do
not ha`~~e the support of the host govern~~,ent;
__ any A,;~~erican official or family ,:?er~b2r can be
Dcidnap;ped or a~illed if the opposition is willing
to take the necessary risks and invest the
necessary resources in the operation;
-- no residence can be mad ? entirely secure, here or
overseas; and
-- no total security guarantee can b2 given by the
U.S. government to its erployees, career or
noncare2r, overseas.
There are, ho~~ever, four areas where ~e have taken
concerted, syst:e:natic action to i~:prove our security
posture overseas. inese are:
(1) the security enhancement prograr.: to strengthen our
_ embassy bui?dings to avoid infiltration and
~- cap~ur_e,
(2} public access control,
{3) prot?ction of our officials, and
(~l) Counter-terroris;n.
In a fifth area--residential secur'iiy--tee have been
much less systematic, because of the ?~^erasity of the
probl?3.
In mounting th?se programs, ~e havz faced the fact
that the specific security rquirem`nts of each xndividua 1
post nay vary greatl~.~, depending on the size of th?
~.mericzr_ comrunity; the nunbzr, size, ag?, condition, and,
especially, location of our buildings and facilities; the
local social, po?=tlcal, and econo~~.c conditions; the
responszvenys:~ of rile hose go~,?ernm??~t to secuzit~ .
requirements; the status of existing sQcur~ty Thus the
arrangements; and a numb?r of other sac~or.~. ,
specific security improvements at each host must be
measured and :implemented on a case-by-case basis. No two
are the sanz.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
In approaching these pr obI e:~~ , we havz been guide-d by
a nur^ber of assumptions and objectives:
-- U.S. missions must continue to do business abtoad.~
U.S. personnel will continue to live and cork at overseas
locations with normal social, recreational, and .
educational n?eds in nll but the highest temporary threat
situations. Host country nation>ls will continue to meet
with our people and to enter our facilities o:~ business.
Host govern,~,ent protection will continue to bb the
cornerstone of our security overseas as specified by the
Vienna Convention.
-- Our facilities can and ~,aill be made resistant to
mob action, entry of vehicle-borne bombs, attack by small
groups of terrorists, and surreptitious entry. They
cannot be made i?.fiune to sustained siege or military
action conducted or condoned by host governments, to very
powerful explosions outside our premises, to aerial or
artillery bombardment, or to hostile action initiated or
supported by some of our o~rn employees.
--- Piost oi` our systLmatic efrorts to date have been
devoted to poi>ts an the highest threat areas. fl~1r
objective, ho~.ever, is to address the security of all
locations xorl.dtaide.
--- Armoring of ;vehicles can and axll be used to
provide protection to our talking personnel in foreign
locations.
--- ~ntell~i.gence analysis, local and long-3istancz
secure couu-nunication, and prevision of temporary
assistance at overseas locations in response to. specific
threats or incidents are essential ele^2nts in lessening
the incidence and impact of terrorism.
-- The ho?nbs of our overseas personn23 can and till be
provided with measures co make kidnapping less li?~eiy to
succeed and t.o reduce the incidence of cri::e_ Residential
structures, ho~ev2r, can be sec:gyred to a lesser dAgre2
than our official bui?~3ings.
lie also have irportant crL?estior_s of our ob?igations to
our foreign patio, al Qr~ployees and to private ~'lmericans
rho are 2~tposed to threat si~p?y because they are
Americans. A:nd finally, -~e have the question of s~h2ther
we are providing adequate protection to soreign missions
and their people in our country.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
.?
bye cannot acceF?t tragic losses that r;.igr:[ have been
prevented by takir,c defensive steps.
'X recognize that there are no sure solutions to all
these problem . ~Th2re are questions that denand the Host
careful scrutiny and enalysis and the best answers
possible. X can pledge to you that my personal support
and the resources of this Department and our sister
foreign z~ffairs agencies will be made available to you.
h'hile I recognize the magnitude of this undertaking and
the limitations on your time, T hope you can agree to have
your report to me by the first of newt year.
Bor the r2rnainder of the morning, we ~,~ill present to
you a series of short briefings on a t2chn:cal level
designed to cover an array of factual, as opposed to
subjective, considerations that enter into the various
problems I have outlined.
Bob Lamb mill describe the agenda, and I mill Look
forward to meeting with you again when it way be he3pful.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 :CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5 -U
iu~ii?iii iWrc ' .-~~_~ _ , _ _ ~. _. _. _ _ _~_~_?+_ i _ % _ i _ _ _~s_~ uuC. ire i ~ : _~_.w?_.u_~s_ i _6 n
_ r
irC.,~:i'v%~u .l.JF1 i ~: _~s_~?_u_~_i_i
,,._1 l,LF~i`~a: _,U 1..UUC.WUhfU: _, _ _, ~dJUI, t ~Y J : _ IuU? Ut~ h`Hly~~: _,,, _, _ ilI^(luL 1 I ~I"i t ~Y f I~ / : _,
-.'~'~ L.. ~ : _ U _ ~ _ 1 _ _ _ ._ _ ._ _ ._ ._ ._ _ _ _ ._.. _ ._ _ ._ _ _. __ _ ~.J 1=1= .L is t : _ ._ _ _. _ _
l..lti .1.4~ 11VF~ I l.lh(:....5_ I _~_ I _~_.. _ _. _ _ ._ _. _... .._. _ _. ._ _ _ _. __ _. _ ._ _... Uf=i~ 11, C.: _~_.r"i_.V_~-_ I _...
L- - - - - - - - - - ?- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~slJlitiJt.l. 1- _L_t._ 1 _. I _t_h(_ _H_iJ_V_ 1 _...~_ 1 _IV_ls._ __ I _r"I_H+_ 1 .... _.F'i.... ...Il_.U_.lu_.p".._.H_...~_ I _ 1 _~"~--ly`
_F1_U_v_1_~_U_K_Y_ _P'_fi_IV_t_!__ _U_IV_ _U_V_t_Yt._-.... ._
_b_~?_~_5_ _b_~?.....L_V....K_...1_...I _Y_, ,_..p"I_~_~_ __~_t_~?_IV_ __r _.U_I-{_I'I_.t_U_. ._ __ .... .... _
IA t::. Y W U I't1J~ _~ _ h _ U.... L _. 1 _ ~' _. _. _ _. _. _ _ ... _ _ ._ _... _. _ __ _. _ _. .... _ _...U _ V _. C? _.tt __ ~ _... t _.
H-~;_ _,b,_t_l._U_M_1_ I _Y_ _I"'_1'1_IV_iv_U_ _ _
trl.Jl?II'It.ly I ~ _.I-...1_lU_~..._I-_ ....~_.~_h'_U_I"t- I _ _. I _.U_. _li_t?_ .._.J?....b_~_1J_.r?_.U_. _.U_IV_ _.U_.K_ _.~+_.~_...U
_tJ_I_ _.L_ _~J fi_iV_tJ_F~_h4_Y_ _i_'Y_Cf,_~_ ._ _ _ ._ ._ _ _ ~
_~_~_L_i_o_n_ -~-?O- _?_s_ _a_n_q_T.. _~--e_c_o-m_ _-P_e_r_ _e_x_?_i_r_ -?0-~~
._'~_i_c_e_ =o_~_ ._i._i_ _~_~.._~_ _~ ._.J._P
?k?srar~tr?z?~irsr?se?~??~?fr?sr?~?ir?st?~r?stsr?~?sr?~??sr l.Ui?.>?Y % ~t.h(LC.~ Llyt=iJh{I?If'r 1.1lJIW
l.h''?Y::~1t't: _V_V_1_ .... .._ _ _ ... _ _ _ h1i.J1Jl~1w.'~':~t.~: _iJ_L_1_ _ _ _ _ ?-
_. _. _. _ r 11-.r r 1J1...tJ~%tt : _li_-'_c:_U_U_ _ _
Ptt4..F11"' I l~lttl: _ '?~UUt{lUht i'dtl.tlt'' I IuUI'11iL-hC: ,_
hC U l1 1 ~ 11V lr : _~ _.'i' _U _.. CS _. l ._. ! ! _. ~. _... b -- --. _. _. ._ -? _ _. t~ __ ~F _. U.?. ti _ 1 _.! % _ U _.l. _ 1 _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ `{'
I4C.x I~ 1'Iti4l.1: _ _ _ _
l.tJl'll''1_t ~I t.iJ bU~c~U. UUUM _ -- -? -. L?~I 11'It= t.J~i: ~lJ
?
u i % i?it-u~ : 3~s ~ i HTiiS ~?, ~:, i , i
STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 :CIA-RDP86M00886R000200110006-5