COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000100180004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 24, 1973
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Thirty-Fifth Report
mu
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
17 October through 23 October 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
26
24 October 1973
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Thirty-Fifth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
17 October through 23 October 1973)
The Key Points
Another Communist combat regiment has moved from
Cambodia into South Vietnam's MR-3.
Particularly severe rains and flooding have cur-
tailed North Vietnamese logistic activity in the
North Vietnamese Panhandle, northern South Viet-
nam, and south Laos.
Communist rice shortages appear to be one reason
for North Vietnamese plans for military action
in GVN MR-3. Strictly in the economic sphere,
they are increasing their efforts to obtain rice
and other supplies.
Combat activity remained at low levels in both
South Vietnam and Laos last week.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the thirty-fifth in a series of memo-
randa summarizing evidence received during the report-
ing period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military materiel toward and into South
Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in
violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agree-
ments, and (III) other developments affecting Commu-
nist military capabilities in Indochina.
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Viet-
namese Personnel and Military Supplies
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3. Recent reports have confirmed earlier in-
dications that the NVA 367th Sapper Regiment was
leaving Cambodia.
the NVA 203rd Regiment and three artillery battalions-
Vietnam. The remaining combat strength consists of
e regiment, as
we as other units, may have vacated former posi-
tions in Cambodia because of continued poor relations
between KC-VC/NVA units. The deployment of the reg-
iment also may be related to Communist plans to in-
crease tactical activity in Tay Ninh Province.
4. The relocation of the unit--estimated at
some 1,000 men--lowers VC/NVA combat strength in Cam-
bodia to about 2,000, compared with an estimated
strength of more than 7,000 at the time of the Vietnam
ceasefire in January. In addition to the above, there
may be as many as 2,000 VC/NVA operating as cadre,
advisors and liaison with the KC. Similarly, VC/NVA
administrative services strength has declined from
around 30,000 in January to a present strength of
about 18,000, as these units have also moved into South
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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
Indochina
7. For the second week in a row, heavy rains
from an unusually high number of seasonal typhoons
sharply restricted the Communist logistic effort 25X1
throughout most areas of the North Vietnamese Pan-
handle, South Vietnam, and south Laos.
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 25`1 Hon' Nieu
a el Her-nan Tao
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W aria
C hani rap
:Phunt Sdoc
Ach Romeas
Ban Me
ThunI
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
Province boundary
Military region
- -' International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
'V 922 1
A
Ben Bac
165
havane
Atlo 515
116
Railroad
POL pipeline
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8m The particularly heavy rains and wide-
spread flooding this month clearly have disrupted
North Vietnamese dry season preparations and prob-
ably will interfere with the resumption of large
scale supply shipments from southern North Vietnam
to Laos. The length of the delay will be a direct
:function of future weather patterns and the intensity
of Communist recovery efforts.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South
Vietnam and Laos
9m In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January,
15 June, and for the last week (17-23 Oct) are
shown below:
Military
Region
Total Since 27
January Ceasefire
(17-23 Oct)
MR 1
Major
1,402
Minor
4,905
Major
377
Minor
1,546
Major
24
Minor
ill
MR 2
571
3,820
307
1,966
22
100
MR 3
570
4,139
168
1,563
8
94
MR 4
1,132
10,221
454
4,055
25
318
Totals
3,675
23,085
1,306
9,130
79(87)
623(557)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
10. Some of these violations may have been in-
itiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the charts on
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the following pages, however, do show fairly accu-
rately the trend in the amount of combat that has oc-
curred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who
started it may not always be treated in objective
fashion.
11. There was no significant military activity
in Laos last week.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Ca a-
bi t es in Indochina
A. Communist Rice Shortages in GVN MR-3
12. The worsening Communist rice supply situa-
tion in southern South Vietnam
apparently is
a prime cause o reported Communist intentions to in-
crease significantly the level of military activity
in western GVN MR-3 in the near future.
the purpose
--To force ARVN into a defensive
posture so that the Communists can
obtain rice crops.
--To protect rice crops in Commu-
nist controlled areas to insure an
uninterrupted rice harvest.
--To take counter action against
the GVN economic blockade which
has had some effect.
In addition to their planned military efforts to
alleviate the worsening rice availability situation,
the North Vietnamese are also planning to expand
their economic efforts (see B below.)
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(See Reverse Side of Page)
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ULn%)L-I inL 1IULII I IUI1J IIr JUU I h
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)
JAN-FEB 200
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
0
200
. igNr
y
NS
__ )Q
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Lh.] ,
11 _m
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
NEW"
'.?!;` CEASE-FIRE
JUL
woos
`'~-''-I?I IJ I f ha i 11
iI I
111- 11-
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AUG 100
SEP 100
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13,14 '15.16.17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27128129130 31
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10, 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 271281291301
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1;a20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 128129130 31
OCT 100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 3
200
NOV 100
DEC 100
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425262728293031
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1211129110131
]AN 100
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13. The rice shortage reportedly is the result
of a poor rice crop in Communist held areas as well
as the cessation of rice deliveries from the Khmer
Communists in Cambodia to South Vietnam. In the past,
Cambodian rice deliveries have met a significant
portion of the rice requirement of VC/NVA forces in
GVN MR-3.
the Communists must ensure that internal sup-
ply problems in MR-3 are solved if they hope to achieve
any substantial success. Nonetheless, the North
Vietnamese do have the option--although it would be
unprecedented--of shipping rice from North Vietnam to
GVN MR-3 if a severe shortage persists.
B. Communists Press Economic Activities Deeper
into Southern South V etnam
15. Communist political and rear services cadres
are apparently undertaking a wide range of economic
projects designed to strengthen their hold on the
Ben Suc area of Binh Duong Province lust 30 miles
north of Saigon (see map).
the Viet Cong have formulated plans to buii-a---
several mills and plants during the coming year and
have already established a system of cooperative
stores for Communist cadre and military personnel in
the Ben Suc area. The Viet Cong also have been re-
cruiting laborers to work on the nearby Michelin rub-
ber plantation and are providing tractors, plows, and
farm tools to rear service units and civilians along
with instructions to increase food production. To
facilitate economic trading and the flow of supplies
into the area, the Communists have secured and im-
proved roads linking Ben Suc with rear bases along
the Cambodian border, and in early September report-
edly initiated a regular ferry service across the
Saigon River just north of the town.
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17. The purposes of the Communists' economic
program are to increase the quantity of supplies they
are able to produce and collect locally and to gen-
erate political support among the South Vietnamese
population by making them economically dependent
upon the Viet Cong. Similar efforts to stimulate
economic development in Communist controlled ter-
ritory have been reported, particularly along the
Cambodian border in northern MR-3. But aside from
the purchasing of goods in GVN controlled territory
and the distribution of small loans to Viet Cong
sympathizers, the Communist economic activities
around Ben Suc are the closest to South Vietnamese
controlled territory and population centers in MR-3
reported thus far.
C. Communists Increase Coastal Infiltration of
Supplies into South Vietnam's Lower Delta
18.I Communist coastal resupply
deliveries to base areas a ong the western coast of
South Vietnam's southern MR-4 indicate an increase
in activity over the past several months. South
Vietnamese officials claim that the Communists have
shifted to sea transportation because ARVN units have
interdicted the major overland corridor used to re-
supply the lower delta from stocks in southern Cam-
bodia. Reports of coastal offloading usually surge
at this time of year, however, as seasonal flooding
restricts the Communists' mobility along the land
routes.
19. The available reporting suggests that the
coastal shipments originate in Cambodia, where the
Communists control a substantial part of the south-
ern coast. Deliveries are most frequently made by
5 to 15-ton fishing vessels which offload onto
sampans about a mile offshore. The sampans report-
edly carry the supplies to nearby inland waterways
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for further transport to inland rear services areas.
A large part of the cargo is apparently ammunition,
but in some cases troops are also infiltrated by
sea.
Because
the high volume of fishing traffic-in this area makes
detections of vessels carrying illegal cargoes ex-
tremely difficult, such activities are likely to con-
tinue.
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