DDI NEWSLETTER IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801140004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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DDI NEWSLETTER
11 December 1985
Improving the Quality of Intelligence
I realized with some amazement a few days ago that nearly
half the analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence joined CIA
subsequent to my speech four years ago outlining a program to
improve the quality of the finished intelligence product.
Accordingly, I would like to use this Newsletter for, among other
things, a review of that program for improving quality and to
give you a report on its implementation.
The program rests essentially on three pillars: (1)
improving the relevance of the product through a coherent
research planning process and a dramatic increase in contacts
with the users of our analysis; (2) stimulating creative and
imaginative analysis by opening to an unprecedented extent a
dialogue with experts in business, academe, and think tanks; and
(3) improving quality control within the Directorate by
intensifying the review of draft papers and increasing
accountability up and down the line for the quality of the
work. Let me address each of these in turn.
Improving the Dialogue With Policymakers
To improve DI managers' understanding of the policy process
and how intelligence is used in that process, I announced four
years ago that "a minimum of a one-year rotational tour in a
policy agency or nonintelligence consumer of CIA analysis will be
required of prospective and present DI divison chiefs." Over the
past four years, nearly 100 officers of the DI have served
rotational tours in policy agencies, as advisers to negotiating
teams and as representatives to military
comma ine managers need to understand how policy
is made in Washington as well as how policymakers use and regard
intelligence.
Beyond this, each office director is supposed to meet with
his or her Departmental assistant secretary counterpart at least
once every two weeks--in addition to their everyday contacts--to
discuss the overall quality and relevance of support being
provided, as well as to discuss both current and longer range
requirements. This dialogue with the policy community should
extend from the office director to the analyst, with people at
each level getting to know their counterparts and engaging in
continuing discussions over quality, relevance, and
requirements. I firmly believe that only through such a dialogue
can our work be genuinely useful--and used.
CL BY SIGNER
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As part of the effort to improve relevance, in 1982 I
directed a reevaluation of DI longer range production programs to
assess their relevance to the needs of policy officials.
Henceforth, we would use the dialogue described above to ensure
that our longer term work would be conceived jointly with, or at
least reflect the input of, the policy community, while also
incorporating our own analysts' insights into future problems.
We have now published five of these research programs; we are
producing about 80 percent of the number of papers we project
each year, indicating that we are doing a good job of protecting
resources for research, despite crises and ad hoc demands.
I worry, however, that the planning process is becoming both
routine and stale. The research program needs a longer
perspective. It also needs to be more flexible; by the last six
months of the year, it fails to reflect the numerous
substitutions, cancellations, and reallocations of resources to
projects that have higher priority or greater relevance.
Moreover, perhaps because of the perceived fixed nature of the
program, some managers are not sufficiently flexible in
considering changes. Then the plan becomes a straitjacket--an
obstacle rather than a help. An important objective of the
research program, after all, is to force us to allocate
substantial resources for research to ensure that we not only do
the basic and longer range work that underpins current support
but also alert the policy community to future problems.
To achieve these ends better, I am making two changes in the
program. First, beginning with the 1987 program, each office
will initiate the research planning process by preparing--in
close consultation with its policymaker consumers--an essay on
the key substantive issues and problems that are likely to
dominate the scene in its area of responsibility for the coming
five years. Both resources allocation and research planning will
then be guided by this substantive, longer range view. While
specific projects will be developed for only the coming year, the
broader perspective will help managers better plan the longer
range allocation of analytical and supporting resources--as SOVA
has done in building the defense industries and domestic issues
divisions, or ALA in expanding the Central America/Caribbean
effort, or OGI in the counterterrorism effort, and so on. This
approach should also allow us to consider research planning, at
least in general terms, on a multiyear basis.
While we are doing well in overall research production (836
papers in 1984) there. are a number of substitutions and additions
to the formal program during the year (about 60 new papers a
quarter were added in 1984). The preparation of a longer term
strategic overview should help us improve our ability to project
and complete specific papers. But the reality of a constantly
changing world and new requirements suggest the need to reflect
changes in the research program itself.
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Accordingly, the second change I plan to make is to issue an
update of the program at midyear. This will not involve any
narrative, but simply would list projects planned for the third
and fourth quarters, reflecting substitutions, cancellations, and
other changes. I expect this listing of projects to involve
minimum effort by the offices. I hope that this update, formally
recognizing the need to adjust a program developed eight to 10
months earlier and to reflect new requirements and priorities,
will encourage managers to be somewhat more flexible about
changes to the program--a flexibility I repeatedly have
encouraged.
Finally, some 60 percent of our papers are scheduled as a
result of direct requests from consumers or through our dialogue
with them. While we must reserve the resources to work on issues
we identify as important--and self-initiated research is the
source of some of our most creative work--I believe an even
greater proportion of our research should respond to the
expressed needs of our policy users.
Letting in Fresh Air: Open Minds and Candor
In 1982, I stated "Each office will be required to develop
an aggressive program of contacts, conferences, and seminars on
important subjects" with the purpose of allowing analysts to
learn the views of experts outside CIA and the Intelligence
Community on the issues they cover and with a view to enhancing
the research program. In fiscal years 1982-1985, the Directorate
sponsored over 300 substantive conferences. Analysts attended
some 1500 externally sponsored conferences. A growing percentage
of our papers are reviewed by outside experts--as high as 30
percent in some offices. Various panels have been formed at
Directorate initiative to review our substantive work in draft
and offer ideas or different approaches. We have cooperated with
a variety of outside-sponsored evaluations, including both our
Congressional oversight committees and PFIAB, in the hope of
identifying areas for possible improvement.
Beyond sponsorship of and participation in conferences, DI
analysts were required, beginning in 1982, "to refresh their
substantive knowledge and broaden their perspective through
regular outside training" at least every two years. This could
include university-sponsored training courses, participation in
outside-sponsored seminars and conferences, or special training
opportunities offered by institutes, think tanks, corporate
contractors, or the military. Nearly all analysts have
participated in this program and have met the minimum
requirement. (Analysts in their probationary period were
exempted from the requirement on the grounds that, having just
come to the Agency, they needed to use available training time
for settling into their new jobs.)
Another area receiving new emphasis in order to let the
diversity of views emerge more clearly was the encouragement of
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analysts to be more aggressive in considering alternative
scenarios for given situations. That is, while we would always
try to give a best estimate, when our uncertainties were
significant or when an alternative outcome could have extremely
serious consequences, we would lay out for the policymaker other
ways in which a situation could unfold and how we might detect
that. In addition, analysts were encouraged to be more direct in
expressing the level of confidence in their conclusions and of
the quality of the evidence or data available. Disagreements
among analysts were not to be submerged but were to be surfaced
and presented openly.
Finally, high priori
ty was placed on integrating economic,
political, military, and
S&T analysis--the dire need for which
prompted the far-reaching
reorganization of the Directorate in
1981. Concomitantly, I stressed the need for papers prepared
jointly by several analysts and across office lines. We have
come a long way in this area (Product Evaluation Staff--see
below--found in 1984 that nearly 50 percent of our research
papers were multidisciplinary), but there is much more room for
improvement, especially in the area of joint work.
These measures, collectively, were intended not only to make
the analytical climate far more lively but to create an
atmosphere in which differences of view and unorthodox approaches
were encouraged and welcomed. I consider this "opening to the
outside," greater candor about uncertainty and differences, and
truly integrated assessments to be the heart of our effort to
improve the quality of analysis.
Quality Control and Accountability
It was clear in 1982 that, in addition to the measures
described above, a more intensive effort to improve the quality
of our written analysis as well as our thinking was required. I
announced three steps to improve quality control and
accountability.
First, it was necessary to make clear that the accuracy,
relevance, and timeliness of each DI product would henceforth be
the primary responsibility of all managers as well as analysts.
I directed that all draft intelligence assessments, research
papers, and typescript memorandums be reviewed not only by the
division and office chiefs but also by the DDI. The result of
this intensified review process, onerous as it has been for many
analysts, has been a significant improvement in the quality of
papers produced. The ADDI and I have now reviewed more than
2,500 IAs, RPs, and typescripts. I continue to be amazed by the
diversity and the quality of the work, but also by the occasional
turkey that slips through. Despite the extra burden on everyone
involved, I remain as convinced today as I was four years ago
that this process is essential to ensuring consistently high-
quality production by the Directorate.
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I
believed then, as I do
now,
the
opportunity to gauge
the
work
over time--whether it
is
improving, staying the same, or deteriorating--and to judge not
only accuracy but drafting skill and ability to conceptualize
problems and identify issues. It should be an invaluable aid for
evaluating analysts and making promotion decisions.
From the analyst's standpoint, given the rapid turnover of
managers particularly at the branch and division level, the
production file, if properly used, should allow the manager
quickly to assess the quality of people he or she supervises. It
should diminish the need for the analyst to have to prove himself
or herself to every new supervisor. I believe that managers
still do not make adequate use of these files in evaluating,
ranking, and promoting analysts. And, worse yet, I suspect that
there is still too much emphasis given to the thickness of the
file rather than to the quality of what is in it.
production file on each analyst.
that such a file offers managers
overall quality of an analyst's
Second, I announced in 1982 that analysts and supervisors
would be evaluated and promoted on the basis of the quality of
their work and that each office should develop and maintain a
Third, the Senior Review Panel was transferred to the DCI
and given a purely Intelligence Community role, and in its place
a DI Product Evaluation Staff was established. This Staff was
charged with reviewing Directorate production on important
substantive problems from the standpoint of relevance,
timeliness, quality of writing and presentation, innovativeness,
imagination, and accuracy. The Staff was charged with paying
attention to successes as well as problems so that we could learn
from both. The Staff has turned out over the past three and a
half years evaluations of the Directorate's work on the Falklands
crisis, Third World military conflicts, Central America, current
intelligence, crisis management, East-West trade,
interdisciplinary analysis in the DI, Soviet arms deliveries to
the Third World, Libya-Morocco, South Africa's domestic crisis,
and other subjects.
This, then, constitutes the core of our four-year-old
program to improve the quality of intelligence reaching the
policymaker. In some cases, such as the use of alternative
scenarios and more candor about the quality of our sources and
our confidence in our judgments, more remains to be done. In
others, such as the research program, we need to continue making
adjustments and improvements. But it is important for all
analysts, experienced and new, to remember that quality genuinely
is the name of the game, that it drives the policies of the
Directorate, and that the approaches described above--both
intellectual and bureaucratic--are not transitory but form the
foundation of our entire effort. Our success--and, as the last
section of this newsletter points out, there has been a good deal
of it--will continue as long everyone in the Directorate
understands the program and participates in it.
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Paperwork Reduction
In last spring's newsletter, I noted that many had
complained during the "Excellence" exercise about the
proliferation of forms that had to be filled out and the degree
to which this paper bureaucracy was detracting from getting our
work done. We undertook at that time a major effort to identify
all the forms and reports we had to deal with and to eliminate as
many as possible. The first stage of that effort is now complete
and, while I can report progress, it is less dramatic than I
would have hoped.
We identified a total of 273 forms (138 DI and 135 non-
DI). Most of the paperwork, as you might expect, relates to
administrative requirements; after that come CPAS production
requirements, OCR document and publication procurement, and other
individual DI component requirements.
As part of this campaign, DI offices eliminated 56 forms and
reports through automation, consolidation, or elimination of the
requirement. We have automated the DI Production Management
Information System, the contract project approval process,
applicant tracking, and travel projections. CPAS, CRES, and OCR
eliminated a number of forms that imposed burdens on the DI as a
whole, and I or MPS eliminated several production tracking
reports. In several instances, I have directed the offices to go
back to the drawing board and come up with more ways to
consolidate and automate. Directorate-wide automation efforts
that will significantly reduce the number of hours devoted to
paperwork requirements in the personnel and travel areas include
a travel data base, applicant data, career board actions, and
validation of the DI Human Resources Management Information
Service. We also have asked the Offices of Personnel, Finance,
and Security to combine, automate, or eliminate a variety of
forms. We have received positive responses on some of these.
All in all, the effort was probably worthwhile even though
not dramatically successful. We did succeed in eliminating some
40 percent of the forms generated in this Directorate, including
some very time-consuming ones. We certainly drew the attention
of people in this Directorate and in the DA to the need to he
more aggressive in eliminating forms or thinking twice before
creating new ones. And we will keep pressing.
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Bringing a new analyst on board effectively requires a major
commitment on the part of the branch and division managers.
Numerous tasks must be attended to -- finding available
workspace, getting the analyst on SAFE, tutoring in basic
computer skills, introducing the person around, setting up the
sequence of training, suggesting ways to read into the account,
answering the endless questions of "How do I . . .?" The branch
chief and analyst peers usually share the responsibility for
assisting the new analyst in the logistics of the work.
While new analysts have diverse backgrounds, have a range of
prior employment experience, and range in age from 24 to 50, they
do have many similar feelings and concerns. They are excited by
the challenges that lie ahead and daunted by the multitude of new
things to be learned. The most effective way to assist a new
employee to make the transition to DI analyst is to assign a
mentor.
Interviews of some 50 new analysts one year after EOD show
that we could do a much better job of orienting the new analyst
to the job and that few offices have a formal mentoring
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program. I realize that the current mix of new and experienced
analysts in some branches precludes within-branch mentoring
arrangements. Yet, effective matches can easily be made within,
or even across, divisions. I stand by my recommendation in the
June 1984 Newsletter, "Each office should appoint a 'mentor' for
each new employee to ease adjustment to and integration into the
DI." This is as true for secretaries and analytical support
people as it is for analysts.
Projects of Note
We continue to produce papers that are meeting policymakers'
needs for cogent, timely, well-integrated, and objective analysis
regardless of the subject. Listing good work is always a problem
because so much that deserves commendation is left out. With
that disclaimer, the following offers only a small sample of the
first rate analysis being published throughout the Directorate.
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Papers are our premier products, but I want also to note the
increasingly broad range of activities in which the Directorate
is involved. We are producing new kinds of finished products,
such as the videotapes that were created for the Reagan-Gorbachev
summit. We are extending our intelligence analysis support into
operational areas such as narcotics interdiction and technology
transfer, and increasing our capability to do near real-time
assessments of terrorism and arms shipments.
Another aspect of our intelligence production has been
especially noteworthy in the past several months and deserves
thanks from all of us. In a period of severe secretarial
understaffing, DI secretaries have shown exceptional
professionalism, competence, and dedication while putting in a
lot of extra work to keep the Directorate from grinding to a
halt. Every week should be "Secretaries Week" in this place.
I also want to point out the increasing contribution that
ADP is making to our research and analysis, largely through
efforts at the office level. NESA, for example, is well into its
commitment to equip a large share of the office with personal
computers, and ALA has developed its Support Staff as a model for
officewide ADP support that ranges from sophisticated data base
development to the publication of such eye-catching training aids
as its "ADP Primer."
ASG, similarly, has made ADP applications handier for
analysts. Some 500 people attended an ASG fair in October at
which new hardware, software, and services were displayed. The
issuance of a new foldout brochure with services and phone
numbers has given everyone a clearer idea of where to go in ASG
to find help. A new piece of software called EZGUIDE, which can
be called up at any DI terminal hooked to the mainframe, provides
a directory to existing data bases and people who can help
analysts use them. The World Factbook is now available online
and can be queried for a wide variety of cross-national
comparisons. Support for economists continues to grow, with more
trade tapes and services from commercial firms available. Use of
EZFILE, a popular "shoebox" for political and other analysts, is
increasing; 215 analysts used it more than 2,400 times in
October. ASG hopes to have the Third World Information System, a
gateway to many different social science data bases, accessible
to analysts around the first of the year.
I want to single out for special commendation the work done
by SOYA, ACTS, and OSWR in preparation of and support for the
President's meeting in Geneva with General Secretary Gorbachev.
This is the seventh US-Soviet summit that I have had a hand in
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helping to prepare, and CIA has never before played such a key--
and acknowledged--role. From the production of three different
videotapes (for which CPAS deserves great credit as well) to
basic briefing papers, a variety of both long-range and last-
minute requests, and direct briefing of the President, the
Directorate's role was unparalleled and outstanding. One non-CIA
participant in the briefing of the President by a SOVA analyst
observed in retrospect that "it was the best thing he got."
The Senior Director for International Economic Affairs at
the National Security Council praised the entire Directorate's
work on the International Economic and Energy Weekly, noting that
it is regularly crisp, insightful, and forward looking, and that
"no finer publication is available in the US Government."
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I want to bring to your attention two expressions of kudos
from the DCI. As you may have already read, the Director has
written to Senator Durenberger that:
Your alleged comments that we do not consider in longer
range evaluations brewing crises such as the Philippines, the
rise of Shiite Muslim fundamentalism or the energy problem
are tragically wrong. These are all areas where the
Intelligence Community has produced an enormous number of
long range studies over the last six years or more and where
we have been far out in front.
Your views on the quality of our work in all of these
areas are directly contradicted by statements you and a
number of other members of the Committee have made privately
about the high quality of our work generally and on these
problems in particular.
Also, responding to a series of questions from Senator Helms
about our work on the Soviet Union, the Director wrote:
I believe that improvements in intelligence collection
combined with dramatic and sometimes drastic measures to
improve analysis have in fact significantly improved the
quality of intelligence now available to the Administration
compared to when the President assumed office. The President
and the National Security Council members have been briefed
regularly on Soviet strategic force developments by
Intelligence Community officers and have found the
assessments tough-minded, realistic and very professional.
Similarly, the Intelligence Community's contribution to the
Administration's deliberations on Soviet non-compliance with
arms control and analysis of the Soviet approach to arms
control have been impressive. In short, the President has
more direct knowledge than many of his predecessors of CIA's
and the Intelligence Community's work on the Soviet Union and
has been deeply impressed by the improvement in the last
several years. He is proud of the role the Administration
and the Congress have played in this improvement.
I also want to share with you examples of the "search for
excellence" which the directorate submitted recently to the DCI:
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A final kudo. At the end of this month Dick Kerr will leave
the DI to become Deputy Director for Administration. Dick has
been my deputy--partner, actually--for three and a half years.
He has been a determined and very successful advocate of the
Directorate's interests in the Agency and the Community. Our
large increase in resources, advances in ADP, success in
recruitment, and improved product bear his stamp. For me, his
advice, common sense, knowledge of and insight into the
Directorate, and his sense of humor have been invaluable. While
the Agency will benefit immensely from his new appointment, he
will be deeply missed in the Directorate, and especially in this
office.
Since the last Newsletter in June, the Directorate has
approved 27 awards worth $36,300, and the offices have
distributed to individuals and components 232 awards worth almost
$90,000.
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-- I will give a speech after the first of the year at
Harvard on CIA's (and especially the DI's) relations with
the academic world--mainly on our need for their help and
why they should not be apprehensive. I believe it is
necessary to address directly concerns about this
relationship which have been surfaced in academic circles
recently.
obert N. G Ees
Deputy Director for telligence
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