MEETING WITH SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 9 MAY 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000200430001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Meeting with retry Wei rger
9. May '1986,
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8 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
9 May 1986
1. You are scheduled for a breakfast meeting with Secretary Weinberger and
Deputy Secretary Taft tomorrow at 0715 at the Pentaton.
2. The following items were coordinated with the Secretary's staff:
NO TAB Secretary Weinberger wishes to hear from you about the front page piece in
Wednesday's Post on the potential for prosecuting the press under the 1950
COMINT statute, as well as the Post piece yesterday on reported reactions
in the Justice Department.
TOVSECRET
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NO TAB Ability of Abu Abbas to Launch Attacks in the United States. Abbas
believes the United States is responsible for the pressure on him which
has limited his mobility and restricted his access to press interviews.
He has made several threats against US and Israeli personnel and
facilities since the Achille Lauro operation last October and Abbas'
subsequent exile in Iraq. In mid-March Abbas first threatened that his
group would launch terrorist attacks within the United States--using US
citizens--if US pressure against him continued. We doubt that he has an
immediate capability to make good on his threats, however, since the PLF's
operational capabilities are even more limited now than before the Achille
Lauro hijacking.
The FBI does not believe the PLF has built a network or placed
operatives in the US.
-- At the moment, the Iraqi government seems to be keeping Abbas on a
short leash and there are few other Arab governments willing to
receive him.
Over the longer term, we must take seriously his threats to target
the US directly. At least prior to Achille Lauro, the PLF had support
networks throughout West Europe. We know about a high-level meeting of
the PLF held last month in Baghdad in which the creation of a covert
apparatus to operate in an unspecified hostile environment was discussed.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
TAB B West European Reactions to US Decisions on SALT II Compliance. You may
wish to pass to Secretary Weinberger a copy of George Kolt's paper on West
European reaction to a future US decision on whether or not to continue
SALT II compliance.
The next US decision point on SALT II will come this fall when the US
will be in a position to take a militarily significant action beyond
SALT II constraints--namely the continued conversion of B-52s to ALCM
carriers without corresponding reductions of MIRVed ICBMs or SSBMs.
George argues that such a step would be an unmistakable message to the
Soviets that they must either forget about using arms control to create a
more predictable military environment or move into a new arms control
regime that entails genuine reductions and compliance.
Unfortunately, European governments are signaling us that they would
prefer indefinite compliance with SALT II--a preference that runs counter
to the President's implied warning in NSDD-222. A US decision to move
beyond SALT II limits could pose difficult political problems for the
French, Italian and British governments.
In France, cohabitation rivalry is already making French foreign
policy less predictable and prey to the Mitterrand-Chirac power
struggle.
In the UK, prominent Labor leaders are trying to capitalize on the
negative public reaction to Thatcher's decision on the US strikes
against Libya and to make the "special relationship" with the US a
partisan issue.
In Italy, differences among the parties which form Prime Minister
Craxi's coalition government run deep and have become increasingly
strained over foreign policy, where Foreign Minister Andreotti's
compromising approach to Libya, as well as the Soviet Union, have
irritated not only his coalition partners but also members of his own
party.
NO TAB Status of the NRO. You may wish to raise with Secretary Weinberger your
concerns about the situation at the NRO.
TOP SECRET
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC No. 002146-86
National Intelligence Council 30 April 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Proposed Discussion Item for DCI Meeting with
Admiral Poindexter, National Security Council
1. European governments have reacted approvingly to the President's
decision to continue abiding by the mutual restraints of SALT II but, as
Paul Nitze's conversations in Bonn and Rome show, they are also
signalling us they would prefer indefinite compliance with SALT II. This
European preference runs counter to the President's implied warning in
NSDD 222 that this was the last time the US would countenance Soviet arms
control violations without taking action itself.
2. The next US decision point on SALT II will come this fall when,
for the first time, the US will be in a position to take a militarily
significant action that will involve acquisition of new weapons systems
beyond the SALT II constraints--namely the continued conversion of B-52's
to ALCM carriers without corresponding reductions of MIRVed ICBMs or
SSBMs.
3. This decision will be a strategic one and, thus, even more
significant than the Carter Administration's tactical decision in 1979
not to seek ratification of SALT II. The upcoming decision could in
effect be the coup de grace for the arms control regime of the 70's. It
could be an unmistakable message to the Soviets that they must either
forget about using arms control to create a more predictable military
environment or move into a new arms control regime--one that entails
genuine reductions, genuine verification and genuine compliance.
4. The intrinsic difficulty of taking such a step is clear:
-- Arms control may not have the sentimental support it had in
the 70s but it still has many powerful devotees.
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The Europeans are generally among those devotees and will
undoubtedly maintain their preference for deploring hostile
actions--in this case Soviet arms control
violations--rather than doing anything about them. Given
the importance to the West as a whole of the North Atlantic
Alliance, this is a factor that must be taken into
account. But it should not be the primary determining
factor as some may urge.
-- Finally, and probably most importantly, there is the
question of which side is better prepared for a break-out
should arms control as epitomized by SALT II be abandoned.
The answer to that question hinges not so much on
production capabilities as on the development of a
long-range strategy and programs to support it.
5. Besides these intrinsic problems, timing will be difficult:
-- As things now stand, fall will be the time when the US and
the Soviets are preparing for the next Summit. The
administration thus will be under pressure not to
jeopardize the Summit by abandoning SALT II constraints. A
better way to look at the situation might be to foresee
that the US will have this SALT II action as potential
leverage over Soviet decisions during this period . . .
whereas the Soviets could conceivably goad the US into
abandonment of the SALT II treaty if they wanted either an
excuse to cancel the Summit or a propaganda advantage.
-- From the perspective of Europe we will need to think very
specifically about the effect of our decision on the FRG
where the campaign for the January 1987 federal elections
will be going into full gear.
6. We will also need to consider the effect of our decision on
France, Italy, and the UK where internal political strains have
complicated foreign policy debates and formulation. In France,
cohabitation rivalry is already making French foreign policy less
predictable and prey to the Mitterrand-Chirac power struggle. In the UK,
prominent Labor leaders are trying to capitalize on the negative public
reaction to Thatcher's decision on the US strikes against Libya and to
make the "special relationship" with the US a partisan issue. In Italy,
differences among the parties which form Prime Minister Craxi's coalition
government run deep and have become increasingly strained over foreign
policy where Foreign Minister Andreotti's compromising approach to Libya
as well as the Soviet Union have irritated not only his coalition
partners but also members of his own party. The upshot of these domestic
policy debates is that the governments concerned probably will prefer a
US policy of "no change" in order to avoid having to make controversial
decisions themselves.
25X1
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7. in sum, it seems rather predictable that if we come to the next
decision point without having formulated and having discussed with our
allies a long-term strategy, the politics of the moment will again
dictate a decision to continue abiding by SALT II restraints. This may
or may not be the best course for us, but it certainly should not be
decided principally on ephemeral reasons. It, thus, seems imperative
that we begin developing a game plan that will see us at least through
the next year.
George Kolt
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