MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME QUESTIONS IN THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF INITIAL OFFENSICE OPERATIONS, BY COLONEL-GENERAL A. BABADZHANYAN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400750001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Some Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial
Offensive Operations
by
Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan
The constant quantitative and qualitative growth of missile
weapons and the increase in the quantity of nuclear warheads allotted
for the execution of an operation are causing continuous changes in
the methods of combat operations of ground troops. These changes are
now occurring so rapidly that, at times, that which only several
months ago was new and progressive becomes obsolescent and ceases
to correspond to the requirements of the day. Specifically, the methods
of execution of the offensive operations of the initial period of a
nuclear/missile war have undergone such a rapid development. The
purpose of this article, which is.on the.order of a response to a
number of articles published in previous-issues of the Special
Collection, is to examine some of the questions in'the preparation
and conduct of initial, offensive operations.
As is well known, a nuclear/missile war will be of an
exceptionally decisive nature. The availability of modern, powerful
combat weapons permits even an enemy wbo is being defeated and is close
to destruction to deliver telling'thermonucleir strikes against the
deep rear area and groupings of the armed forces holding the upper
hand. In order to fully. deprive the enemy of any opportunity to use
nuclear weapons, it is not enough to deliver strategic massed nuclear
strikes against his territory. No nuclear strikes can guarantee the
complete destruction of all the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack or
eliminate his capability to deliver strikes.
The fulfilment of this mission can be guaranteed only by the
swiftest capture and occupation of enemy territory. By this very
means can our country be made completely secure from strikes by the
enemy's ground nuclear weapons and the enemy deprived of bases for his
submarine and-surface missile-carrying fleet which can still operate
on the ocean for a certain period of time after the land forces are
destroyed.
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For the quickest capture of enemy territory (of course, that
territory the seizure of which will not require the organization of
landing operations across the ocean), it is necessary to carry out a
decisive strategic offensive throughout the entire depth of the
theaters. In this regard., under no conditions of a situation can
one front be slow in shifting to the offensive, or alternate the
latter with defense in all or the-greater part of its zone of operations.
We emphasize that, immediately at the beginning of combat operations,
all fronts., without exception., must shift to the offensive on the
.axes where the seizure of enemy. territory is possible and necessary.
A shift to the. defensive on such axes is not permissible. The troops
of the front must shift to the offensive regardless of their condition,
even after undergoing enemy nuclear strikes.
In connection with this, in our opinion there must be a change
in the point of view regarding the nature of the combat operations
of ground troops in the case when the enemy pre-empts us in operations.
Previously, we considered that., under these conditions, a front must
shift to the defensive in order to repulse an enemy attack. Now., it is-
necessary to consider that, even in this situation, a front with all
available forces will immediately shift to the. offensive, which, most
probably., will assume the nature of a meeting engagement.
The next question_is of great practical interest. What will be,
the-duration and the depth of the first strategic offensive operation
directed at attaining the immediate strategic goals of ,a war?
By looking at a maps it can be seen that the goals of a strategic
offensive on the European continent can be defined as the destruction
of the armed forces of the aggressor countries located there and
reaching the seacoasts of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.
In terms of depth, this .consists on various strategic axes of from
boo to Boo km (Southwester" Theater. of Military Operations--TVD) and
from 1200 to 2000 km (Western TVD).
According to modern views., the average speed of an offensive
can reach 100 km per day. It is also considered that, in a system
of strategic offensive, the offensive operations of formations must
follow one after the other without operational pauses. Consequently.,,
the tasks of a strategic offensive in the theaters being examined
can be fulfilled within 10 to 20 21t?hou? periods. If adjustments
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are made in their time periods to account for mountainous conditions,
for delays in forcing wide water barriers (for example, straits), and
for obstacle zones of radioactive contamination, then it will take more
than 20 24-hour periods. It is possible that these time periods will
even comprise the duration of the initial period of war.
How many subsequent front offensive operations will it be necessary
to carry out on the two above-indicated basic theaters in the initial
period of a war?
According to existing opinions, the depth of an offensive operation
of a front can be from 500 to 6001 up to 800 to 1000 km2. We consider
that the second opinion corresponds to a greater degree to the
conditions of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war.
The depth of a front offensive operation is determined by the
range of operations of the weapons of destruction, by the maneuver
capabilities of the troops, by the capability for uninterrupted supply
of material, and by the depth of the enemy's operational formation.
In the past war, as a practical matter, the range of the front
bomber aircraft was about 300 km; the rear services could,
uninterruptedly, support the advancing troops to a distance of not
more than 250 to 300 km from the area where they were initially based;
the depth of the operational formation of the enemy's group of armies
was 200 to 250 km. All this determined the depth of a front offensive
operation as 250 to 300 113n-
. The offensive operations of the concluding stage of World War II
occupied a special place in their scope, when,a significant quantity
of tank and mechanized large units and formation which sharply
increased the mobility of troops, appeared in the composition of our
ground troops. For example, the depth of the Vistula-Oder offensive
operation was more than 500 km, and the depth of the Manchurian
offensive operation was 600 to 800 km. The scope of these operations,
achieved in 1945 when the troops did not have those weapons of
11. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought",
First Issue, 1961.
2. "Modern War", published by the Military Academy of the General
staff , l9 OS , page 194.
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destruction or those maneuvering capabilities which modern ground
troops have, shows that the proposed depth of a modern front offensive
operation of 1000 km is not fantastic.
Even now the weapons of a front and the means of reinforcing a
front can ensure the destruction of the enemy to a depth of up to
500 km. The question of supplying the front with missiles possessing
a great range of fire is in the stage of practical resolution. In
addition, missile troops of strategic designation will undoubtedly
be used in the front zone during the initial period of a war.
In comparison with the past war, the depth of the enemy
operational formation has, at present, also increased. Certain
elements of the enemy's operational missile rear services are
located at a distance of up to 1000 km from the front line.
The only thing that still causes one to doubt the reality of
assigning a mission of such depth to a front is the limited
capabilities of the operational rear services. The fact is that the
capabilities of the rear services have not undergone any substantial
changes during the past several years and, to some degree, have even
decreased, if one considers the probable destruction of railroads and
the mass destruction of motor vehicle', roads. Decisive measures are
necessary to increase the capabilities of the rear services for
delivering material, in the first place, providing the rear services
with units and large units of aircraft, helicopters, and motor
vehicles with large load capacities, and the extensive introduction
of pipeline transport. Only in this case can the rear services ensure
the execution of deep and swift offensive operations.
Thus, it will be necessary to carry out 1 or 2 successive front
offensive operations in order to attain the immediate strategic goals
in Europe: one operation on the Southwestern TVD and two on the
Western TVD.
At the present time, various opinions exist as to how the
strategic offensive will be executed organizationally.
The authors of. the book; Modern War,_ believe that in the system
of operations in ground theaters the first position will be given to
front operations, not to the operations of groups of fronts as it was
in the past war.
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In the article "The Question of the. Theory of the operation
of a Group of Fronts",1 Colonel S. Kozlov considers'it necessary to
create high commands in,all TVD's and to subordinate to them not only
.front formations but'also the other types of armed forces operating
in a given TVD (missile troops, the Navy, long-range aviation, and
troops of the PVO of the Country):
A compromise is expressed in the point of view presented by
Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy2 that offensive operations in the
initial period of a war can be executed by fronts and groups of fronts.
Let us examine this question. During the years of World.War II,
beginning with the Soviet Army counteroffensive near Moscow
(December 1941 to. April 191+2), all the main offensive operations
were carried out, as a rule, not by?separate.fronts but by the
united efforts of several fronts. Usually, the goals of an offensive
operation on a strategic axis were achieved by the efforts of 2 or 3
fronts. The conditions of the past war required this, when an
enormous density of weapons and a superiority of no less than 2 or 3
times over the enemy were needed for a breakthrough of defenses.
The efforts of several fronts were usually concentrated on such a
strategic or operational axis, the geographic conditions of which
provided the capability for close operational coordination among
the fronts.
In the. conduct of a nuclear/missile war' a concentration of
enormous masses of'personnel and equipment is: not required to carry
out an offensive. Even now the density of troops has sharply decreased,
while the. zones of offensive of formations have increased 1.5 to 2. times..
All of this indicates that under modern conditions the efforts of,
one front are sufficient for those axes where in ttae past war it, was
necessary to concentrate the efforts of several fronts.
Consequently, the troops of one front will now operate, as a
rule, on each of the strategic or important operational axes. It is
our. view that under these conditions the combining of several fronts
into a group is not advisable, if only because operational coordination
1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 2/52/,
1960.
2. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military _Thought"
First Issue, 1961.
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between fronts operating on independent strategic or important
operational axes is not always possible, or is almost impossible.
The General Headquarters (Stavka) will organize strategic
coordination between the fronts, or rather, implement strategic
coordination of the efforts of strategic nuclear/missile weapons
with the operations of the fronts.
On the basis of the above, we conclude that in a nuclear/missile
war the main role in attaining the goals of armed combat in theaters
will belong not to the operations of a group of fronts, but to the
system of simultaneous and successive front operations. This does
not preclude, of course, the conduct of operations by a group of
fronts at individual stages of a strategic offensive operation on
axes where operational coordination of several fronts is feasible.
In our view, the limited number of fronts in a nuclear/missile
war also makes the formation of TVD commands inadvisable. It is
known that, at the beginning of World War II, the number of fronts
was limited (five fronts) and corresponded exactly to the number of
strategic axes which existed at the time (Northern, Northwestern,
Western, Southwestern, and Southern). Under these conditions the
fronts fulfilled not only operational, but also strategic missions.
The commands of three axes were created in July 1941, the
Northwestern, the Western, and the Southwestern; they were called
upon to carry out the operational-strategic direction of the fronts
(which generally numbered from 5 to 11 at various periods). The
complexity and the intensity of the situation at the fronts of war
frequently forced the General Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command to directly control the fronts, bypassing the commands of
the axes, thereby making them useless. As is known, after existing -
for about one year altogether, these commands were abolished.
In conducting a nuclear/missile war the number of fronts on the
indicated axes will be less than in the past war. The conditions for
military operations will become still more complex. The maneuverability
of troops and the mobility of the front line will, increase by several
times. All this provides a basis for considering the creation of
commands of axes or of TVD's in a future war inadvisable.
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In our opinion , the formation of TVD commands is possible only
in remote theaters where the control of the armed forces will be
difficult for the General Headquarters, for example, in the Far East
(as it was in the past war) or on other continents when our troops
arrive there.
However, granting the possibility of creating strategic commands
in remote TVD, it is not possible: to agree with the proposal that
the naval forces operating in the waters adjoining the theater should
be subordinated to these commands. The mission of supporting ground
forces is secondary for the naval forces, in comparison with the
missions of blockading enemy countries and of disrupting enemy ocean
and sea intercontinental transport, which missions are frequently
carried out in remote ocean areas or even on other oceans. For the
fulfilment of these missions, a broad strategic maneuver by submarine
forces is required. The subordination of all naval forces to the
TVD command could thus fetter and,limit the Navy's capability of
fulfilling its main missions. Of course, the part of the naval
forces which will be operating in support of the troops of a TVD
(the destruction of enemy strike missile-carrying and aircraft
carrier naval forces, the disruption of enemy amphibious landing
operations, the participation in amphibious landing operations of TVD
troops, etc.) must be subordinated to the TVD command.
The thought expressed by some authors of articles concerning
the creation of operational-strategic commands in our theaters of
military operations was undoubtedly influenced to some degree by the
presence of such control elements on the territories of the countries
of the imperialist coalition. However, such an analogy is not
justified here. The fact of the matter is that the American Joint
Staff in essence controls the armies of the countries which comprise
the imperialist coalition. But the Americans are not in a position
to effect centralized control of all the armed forces that make up
the coalition and which are dispersed on almost all the continents of
the world. Therefore, they formed intermediate control elements,
commands of the TVD.
Under our conditions, when theaters of military operations are
located on two continents.(Europe and Asia) and are connected by land
borders with well-established means of communications and supply, it
will hardly be necessary to form such an intermediate command as a TVD
command.
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50X1-HUM
Several words on the initial offensive- operations of fronts.
These operations- can begin-under various conditions of a situation.
The shifting-of fronts to an offensive can be preceded by a threatening
period. It will take place if a war starts after a significant
intensification of tension in the relations between the principal
countries of-the imperialist coalition and those of the Socialist Camp.,
and when-it becomes clear that the political relations of the two
camps will inevitably bring on a military conflict. The threatening
.period can also take place when a world war starts through involvement
of the principal countries in the course of a local war in one of the
areas of the world.
War can also be started by a surprise enemy strike, when there
will be no threatening period. The most characteristic version of
a surprise attack can be the delivery by the probable aggressor of a
mass thermonuclear strike against the socialist countries under the
guise of carrying out large training exercises.
A surprise attack is the most advantageous method of starting a
war. It'may be assumed that war will be unleashed by a surprise
attack, if the imperialists decide on this. Therefore, in the
practical activity of our armed forces and in their operational and
combat training, it is necessary to embark decisively on a course for
the preparation of troops for the entry into a war which is not
preceded,by a threatening period. If.the armed forces are ready
to begin military operations when there is no threatening period,
then they will always be able.to do so when there is a threatening
period.
An important situational condition, under which fronts can begin
their initial offensive operations, is the location of the troops of
a front ..in relation to the enemy before the start of military
operations. A front (group of forces) which, prior to the start of
military operations, is located directly on the border beyond which
the countries of the imperialist coalition are located, will come
.into contact with the ground enemy immediately. However, a front
located at a.distance from this border at the start of military
operations can shift to the offensive only after reaching the line
.of contact between the aggressor troops and the armies of countries
friendly to us.
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mall cases, the, *troops of a front will shift to a decisive
offensive immediately after a counterstrike or after a strike,-to
frustrate a surprise enemy attack. A counterstrike, or a strike to
frustrate an enemy attack, will be carried out'on the basis of the
decision,'of the higher party and government leaders of the. country;
the . main role'in carrying it out will be played by the missile
troops of-strategic-designation. It is understood that government
leaders will also make the decision for the front troops to shift
to a decisive offensive.
There is a wide-spread point of view that front nuclear/missile
weapons:must,also participate in a counterstrike to frustrate a
surprise enemy attack, which are measures of the Supreme High
Command. In our opinion, the front weapons will not be in a
..position to participate in.a counterstrike or in the first nuclear
strike for the following reasons:
--the nuclear/missile weapons of a considerable number of the
fronts, which are located at a.distance from the borders adjacent to
the enemy prior to the start of military. operations, cannot be used
because of the comparatively short range of the operations;
--the nuclear/missile weapons of these fronts, even those directly
in the border zone, will not be able to participate in immediate
operations, because considerable time (up to several hours, and, under
certain conditions, up to several days) will be required to bring them
up to combat condition (basically, for the assembly and checking of
missiles and warheads).
In addition to the above, it is necessary to take into account
the following consideration. In an offensive operation, the planned
transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel-will be
.greatly hampered because of the mass destruction of communication
lines and the destruction of certain depots which had become known to
the enemy. Therefore, it is not advisable to expend a significant
amount of the nuclear/missile weapons of a front 'at the very beginning
of an operation. They should be saved for subsequent use in the course
of an operation.and in completing it.
The extensive use. of nuclear/missile weapons compels a new,
approach.to solving the problem of the combat composition of a front.
In the. past war, the combat composition of a front was determined by
the necessity of creating a twofold or threefold (and sometimes even.
more) superiority of forces and weapons over the enemy on the axes
of strikes.-
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Under modern conditions, the-criterion for determining the
composition of a front is its-capability to inflict destruction on an
opposing enemy grouping with nuclear weapons and to complete its rout
with motorized rifle, tank, and airborne large units. Figuratively
speaking, one can say that combined-arms and tank large units will
now play'-the role of a "broom" by means of which the front's offensive
zone will be.,cleared of the remaining enemy troops after they are
routed by nuclear weapons. Under conditions. when, as the result of
nuclear..:strikes, the correlation of forces can rapidly and sharply
change in favor of the side that has executed them, an offensive
operation of a front can.be carried out successfully even when the
,'initial correlation. of forces and weapons was equal.
The combat composition of a front in-an initial operation will
depend on the.method of unleashing the war.
If a war starts by a surprise enemy attack, the front will then
be forced to start combat operations with a limited number of large
units in constant readiness'. During the course of an operation, the
front will be reinforced by fully mobilized large units and by large
units inconstant readiness, arriving from the zone of interior (in
accordance with the plan for 'the' strategic deployment of the ground
troops).
If, however, military operations develop after a threatening period,
then the first front operation can start with a larger number of troops:
large units in constant readiness and those fully mobilized.. In all
cases, it is necessary to consider that the approach of troops from
the zone of interior can be frustrated or delayed by the enemy by means
of direct strikes against these large units and also by the destruction
of communication routes.
Missile large units and units are the skeleton of the operational
formation of a front, without which the conduct of combat operations
under modern conditions is impossible. Therefore, in a border district
(group of forces), the composition Qf the missile troops must be such
as.is necessary for achievement of the objectives of the first
operation. , In addition, the composition of the missile troops and
their supply of. ammunition must compensate for the shortage of
combined-arms and tank large units when these are put out of action
on the field of battle or when their arrival from the zone of interior
is disrupted or delayed.
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Let us dwell briefly on the methods of operations of the troops
of a front in initial offensive operations.
The following-factors will exert an influence on the methods of
conducting initial offensive operations: the limited number of front
troops; disorganization of the enemy's SDvernmental control and-the
control of his armed forces, and, consequently, the isolation of the
enemy's troops and the putting out of action of entire elements of his
operational formation; the enemy's lack of prepared and occupied
lines of defense;. and the. existence of large areas of radioactive .
contamination.
The above-listed factors. create favorable conditions for an
offensive by several strike groupings on axes. An offensive on
separate axes ensures the splintering of the enemy front and a
dispersal of his attention and efforts. At the same time, an.
offensive on axes is much more complicated than an offensive which is
carried out with close. lateral contact between units, large units,
and even armies. During an offensive on axes, each grouping will be in
a difficult situation and will have to operate independently with its
flanks, and even its rear area, exposed. In view of this, the
significance of preparing our.command cadres,for such operations
becomes clear.
In the years of World War II, an'offensive was conducted on a
solid front in close combat formations, with a methodical breakthrough
of'enemy positions and defense zones. Actually, combat operations
were .conducted in the. zone of effective fire of the infantry and
artillery weapons, i.e., in a zone 10 to 15 km on both sides from the
line of contact, if one does not consider sporadic aerial strikes
against the depth. Under these conditions, the effect of fire
against the enemy was exploited immediately.., Close coordination in
timing and location was executed between the fire weapons, the
infantry, and tanks.
Under modern conditions, the sharply increased capabilities. of
fire weapons. have led them to a contradiction with the capabilities.
,of the infantry and tanks. The infantry and tanks have become
incapable of immediately exploiting the effect of nuclear/missile
strikes.:against the entire depth of a defending enemy. To ensure
rapid seizure of the entire depth of the enemy defenses by active
50X1 -HUM
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combat operations and to achieve the objectives of the operation in.
the shortest period of time,.it.is necessary to increase sharply the
rate of the offensive which, by the Directive of the Minister of Defense
for Operational Training for 1961, was ordered to be increased:.to
100 km per 24-hour period. This is a very high rate. It is sufficient
to state that thedistance covered in a 24-hour period in the execution-
of a march consists of 180 to 250 km, i.e., only two times greater
than the distance which must be covered by attacking troops in a
24-hour period.
In planning an operation, is it possible to guarantee that a rate
of, say.100 km-.per day, will be sustained every day? Certainly not.
There will be days in an operation when troops will be able to advance
only negligibly, days when they will not move at all, and, possibly,
days when they will even fall back. We are speaking of those days
when front troops will be repulsing enemy counterstrikes, conducting
meeting engagements with the enemy, forcing water barriers, and
overcoming substantial zones of radioactive contamination and mountain
passes. Consequently, on the other days of the operation, the rate
of advance must be such so as to compensate for the days of'slow or
.of no rate of advance,i.e., it'must approach the speed of executing a
march.
. In the offensive operations.of the past war, the most decisive
results were achieved by encircling the enemy operational groupings
and subsequently annihilating and capturing them. However, at the
end.of the war, especially in the Vistula-Oder operation, the
ineffectiveness of encirclement as a form of conducting an operation
bad already become obvious. Those enemy groupings;. around which a
solid ring of encirclement was not closed; turned into so-called
"roaming pockets" and quickly ceased to exist. But those enemy
groupings that were encircled by our troops (for example,.the Poznan
and the Schneidemu~Ya groupings) continued to fight while surrounded
until the end of the war, diverting a substantial number of our troops
to them.
We cannot agree with the statement) that in a modern war
encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings can be?employed
along with the delivery of swift, deep strikes on separate axes.
1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought",
First issue, 1961.
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o" 50X1-HUM
Under the conditions of highly maneuvering combat operations, it.
will be inadvisable to encircle a large enemy grouping which is
dispersed over a large area. The limited number of troops in a
front will not permit the creation of inner and outer fronts of
encirclement..and the conduct of methodical combat for the purpose of
contracting aring of encirclement, breaking up the encircled
grouping, and destroying it piecemeal. Such operations threaten loss
of the rate of the offensive and, possibly, even its frustration.
It is much more advisable to use small forces-to intercept the main
routes of retreat of an enveloped enemy and subsequently destroy
him with nuclear/missile weapons. In this, the main body of the
front troops must move forward without delay and without glancing
back at the encircled enemy grouping.
In the most general terms, this is how we visualize the initial
offensive operations of the initial period of a war. Undoubtedly,
some of the problems we have examined require further consideration
and critical analysis.
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