MILITARY NEWS: TANK FIRE FROM CONCEALED FIRING POSITIONS, BY MAJOR-GENERAL OF TANK TROOPS A. LAPTEV AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL D. NALIVAYKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400580001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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FIRE AND WEAPONS
Tank Fire from Concealed Firing Positions
(Pressing problems of preparation and
utilization of tank subunits)
by
Major-General of Tank Troops A. Laptev and
Lieutenant Colonel D. Nalivayko
In spite of the mass utilization of nuclear/missile weapons
in a modern battle or operation, a large proportion of the tasks
of the neutralization and destruction of enemy personnel and fire
weapons, and the disruption of his control system and denial of
maneuver, is still the duty of artillery using conventional
ammunition.
One of the decisive conditions for successfully overcoming
enemy defense lines during the course of?an offensive is the
creation of the necessary fire.density for carrying out the tasks
of neutralizing the enemy defense during the period of'fire
preparation and of fire support of an offensive.
It is not always possible to create the required fire density
for neutralization using organic artillery and reinforcement weapons,
even when bringing in second echelon artillery. For this reason,
our service regulations envisage the possibility of calling upon
tank subunits for firing from concealed firing positions.
Test exercises carried out during the last 5 to 6 years in a
number of military districts (groups of forces), have confirmed
the expediency of such utilization of tank subunits, as they successfully
carry out part of the tasks of neutralizing enemy defense and actively
reinforce-the artillery.
.Tank subunits being utilized for firing from concealed firing
positions for the period of fire preparation of an offensive will,
as a rule, conduct fire at unobserved targets, because in view of
the intensive fire during that period, practically all targets become
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unobserved, with.the exception of some located immediately at the
enemy's forward defended edge. If one also takes into consideration
that the fire preparation of an offensive in a number of cases is
carried out at night or in conditions of restricted visibility,
it becomes clear that tank fire from concealed firing positions
at observed targets can only be a rare exception.
One should also bear in mind (article 169 of "Regulations
for Firing from Tanks and Assault Guns", 1958 edition) that tank
fire from concealed firing positions, as a rule, is conducted
against targets integrated into sectors, or against independent
targets of relatively large area. In view of the inadequate
maximum rate of fire of tanks, firing against a single sector (a
single target) is, as a rule, conducted simultaneously by several
tank companies (usually at battalion strength) and inrsome cases
overlapping (vnakladku) artillery subunits.
It follows from the above that the training of tank subunits
in firing from concealed firing positions should at present be
directed first of all at their preparation for delivering fire at
unobserved targets at battalion strength.
However, the Course of Tank Firing (KST-59?) contains a firing
exercise from concealed firing positions which provides for the
resolving,of problems of neutralization (destruction) of observed
targets only and only at. company strength. Such a situation cannot
be considered normal. The training of tank subunits in firing from
concealed firing positions` should be reconstructed in such a way
as to conform to the principle: "Train troops for what is required
in war".
Parallel with the solution of this question we also consider
it advisable to reexamine the accepted principles of organizing the
control of fire of tank subunits. These principles, as is well known,
are set forth in "Instructions on the Method of Utilizing Tanks and
Assault Guns for Firing From Concealed Firing Positions" and in
"Instructions on the Organization and the Technology of Work of
Crews When Firing From Tanks and Concealed Firing Positions". A
number of important points in these documents are out of date and
do not meet the requirements of modern combat organization.
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For instance,. these documents specify that tank company
commanders control tank fire from observation points (Nablyudatelnyy
Punkt - NP). Communications between the NP and the company firing
positions are maintained through the radio sets of the command
tanks, which are moved up directly to the NP. In cases where,.in
view of conditions of the-terrain, it is not possible to move up
the tanks directly to the NP, the company commander is issued with
a portable tank radio set. Wire communications, in case of
necessity, is organized by the forces and means of the artillery
groups in the composition of which the tank subunits are brought
in to carry out the t9sks.
It is easy to see that these requirements are unacceptable.
First of all, it is practically impossible, in conditions of
modern combat, to select an NP which would allow the company commander
to carry out his work directly from a tank. It is still less possible
to occupy such an NP secretly, together with the commander of an
artillery or combined arms subunit.
Neither is it possible to supply tank subunits (down to companies
inclusive) with portable radio sets or wire means for organizing
communications between the tank subunits NP, and firing positions
(Ognevaya Pozitsiya - OP) and for coordination communications,
because neither the combined arms large units nor, still less, the
artillery groups have any such reserves of communication.forces and
means at their disposal. Besides, in modern combat, in order to
ensure fire control in such a vital period of the battle as the
fire preparation of an.offensive, radio communications should be
duplicated by other means. For this reason, the organization of
fire control of tank subunits from concealed positions, by following
the principle detailed above, is fraught with great difficulties
and in some cases is simply unrealistic.
At the same time one should bear in mind that tank subunits
are located in concealed firing positions for several hours, but
.the duration.of their delivery of fire during the period of fire
preparation or counterpreparation is frequently limited to several
minutes only.
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As we have already pointed out, in the great majority of cases
tank subunits will be given unobserved targets, and,as'a rule, one
or a maximum of two per battalion. Consequently, the NP's of the
tank battalion commanders, and even more so the NP's of company
commanders, as a rule, are not able to ensure observation of the
results of their fire and cannot correct it during fire delivery.
Also, during the period of fire preparation or counterpreparation,
tank subunits are naturally carrying out only the planned tasks
provided for beforehand in the fire table, so the control of fire
of these subunits during the entire firing period will in fact only
consist of transmitting several signals or commands in accordance
with which tank companies conduct fire on-:prearranged settings in
a definite order.
Thus, observation points of tank subunit commanders (especially
company commanders' NP's) will in fact become points of reception
of signals or commands from higher commanders for conducting fire
and. their: transmission to.the firing positions of their own subunits.
They will not play any other role in support of fire control, neither
will they be able to do so.
The only positive role can be played by NP's of tank battalion
commanders when by personal contact with artillery battalion (diviton)
commanders or groups they may :coordinate the carrying out of such
tasks as the organization of the topographical fixing of the OP's
and the determining of settings for firing for effect. As for the
observation points of commanders of tank companies, they will not
play any part in the carrying out of these tasks. At the same
time, the difficulties in organizing company observation points
and controlling fire from them are most substantial.
It may be seen from what has been said that, for tank subunits,
it is advisable to restrict ourselves to the organization of NP's
only for battalion (batalon) commanders and to carry out all problems
of fire control from these points. It is time to do away with the
organizing of tank company commanders' NP's as such.
A battalion commander's NP should.include the commander of one
of the artillery battalions (divizion) or one of the batteries of
the artillery group to which the battalion is attached to fulfill
the task. In order to ensure camouflage and the ease of company
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control, it is best to locate the battalion headquarters-in the
area of their firing positions, deployed in the firing position
area of one of the batteries of the artillery battalion (division),
with the commander of which the tank battalion commander shares
the NP. The tank of the battalion commander is also located in
the headquarters area.
With such an organization, the commander controls the fire
of the battalion (batalon) from the observation point through the
radio set of the armored carrier or through another radio set
of the battalion radio section and the tanks of(company commanders
located at the firing position. For duplicate communications,
the wire communications of the artillery battalion (division) may
be used. It is precisely in this way that the battalion commander
keeps in touch with his headquarters and company commanders
during the period of preparation, when radio communications are
usually not allowed.
The co-location.of battalion commanders', and artillery
subunit commanders' NP's,as well as the location of the battalion
headquarters and the firing positions in the OP area of one of
the artillery batteries, ensure reliable communications and the
successful solution of such.important problems as the determination
of company firing position coordinates, the orientation of tanks
in the principal direction, and the determination of initial settings
for fire for effect. All these tasks in cases of necessity may
be successfully carried out by the tank battalion headquarters
with the help of the senior officer at the firing position, the
computing officer(vychislitel), and two or three enlisted men trained
in the tying in of firing positions, from one of the artillery
batteries of the artillery battalion with which the tank battalion
is coordinating. This is especially:'.important when combat is
to be organized quickly and it.is not possible to detail topographic
subunits for tying in firing positions.
Eliminating the creation of observation posts for company
commanders makes it considerably easier to organize control.
Moreover, there is no necessity to move up a considerable number
of personnel and combat equipment, including tanks,to the area
of observation posts and to detail additional forces and means
for organizing communications between the observation posts and
the firing positions.
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Such a principle of organizing control does away with the
unnatural separation of tank company commanders from their subunits,
which considerably increases the constant readiness of the companies
for carrying out tasks within their battalions and regiments.
At present, the solution of practically all the problems connected
with the preparation of tank subunits for firing from concealed
firing positions is carried out by the tank company commanders and
the commanders and the staffs of artillery groups in whose composition
the tanks are. The organization of control proposed by us makes
it possible to determine clearly the duties of the commanders and
staffs of tank units.
For instance, because the company commanders will always be
with their companies, they will have to carry out the duties of
senior officers at the firing positions and be responsible for the
engineer preparation and camquflage of firing positions, the careful
preparation of weapons and :ammunition for firing, the observance
of safety measures, the correct comprehension of the settings by
the crews, the order of conducting fire and the expenditure of
ammunition, for the timely readiness of the companies to conduct
fire, and the precise carrying out of fire tables. Without waiting
for special instructions or help, the company commander"s duty is,
by using his own forces and means and equipment, to determine the
firing position's coordinates and to give the battalion commander
ballistic corrections for the company's directing tank.
The commander and the staff of a tank battalion must establish
control over the timely readiness of the companies for carrying
out their tasks, organize the topographic preparation, establish
the settings for firing for effect, give these settings to the
companies, and determine the order of the conduct of fire and the
ammunition expenditure, and control the fire of the companies during
the execution of the firing table.
The duties of the commander and the staff of a tank or motorized
rifle regiment whose tanks are called upon to fire from concealed
positions are:
-to organize the reconnoitering o 'the area of the firing positions,
the routes for bringing tanks to these positions and for their
return to the columns of their units (large units) after completing
their tasks;
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-to ensure the timely occupation of the firing positions and
the NP's by the subunits, and their engineer preparation and
camouflage;
-to provide the subunits with the necessary amount of ammunition,
and detail in good time ammunition carriers to help out the Brews;
-to check the preparation of weapons and ammunition for firing and
the observance of safety measures at the positions;
-to provide for timely withdrawal from the positions after completing
the tasks, and the timely return and readiness of the companies
and battalions to carry out their basic tasks in their own units.
These proposed ways of reshaping the training and the organization
of control over tank subunits when firing from concealed firing
positions, are certainly not comprehensive; they require additions
and amplification. However, it is an undoubted fact that the time
has come when the solution of these problems has become a necessity.
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