NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 1 MAY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200030003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Ten C---ea
Central
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
1 May 1984
Top Seerel
CPAS NID 84-102JX
1 May 1984
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Top Secret
Contents
China-US: Media Handling of the President's Visit ....................
Spain: Implications of Regional Election ....................................
Egypt-USSR: Limited Movement ................................................. 4
Yugoslavia: Cabinet, Changes .................................................... 5
Denmark: Security Debate .......................................................... 7
Dominican Republic: Economic Pressures Persist .................... 7
North Korea-USSR-China: Summit Visits ................................ 8
Chad-Libya: Rebel Discontent With Tripoli ................................
Special Analysis
International: Suppression of Illegal Narcotics .......................... 12
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1 May 1984
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CHINA-US: Media Handling of the President's Visit
Beijing's public treatment of the President's visit has been
designed to underscore its desire for stronger bilateral ties while
emphasizing that it remains as independent as before.
public handling of differences over Taiwan and international issues
has followed established lines and has been moderate in tone.
Although the Chinese media excised some of the President's remarks
about the USSR, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders implicitly
indicated support for US efforts to check Soviet expansionism by
stressing the importance for regional and global stability of good
relations between the US and China. The news agency Xinhua,
moreover, highlighted the Defense Minister's talks with US military
officials in the President's party.
Soviet media, on the other hand, have been critical of the US but
more restrained in complaining that China has not dissociated itself
completely from the President's "anti-Soviet course." Officials in
Moscow have been more critical of China in private, seeking to
underscore the risks to the US of closer ties with Beijing.
Comment: Beijing appears prepared-at least for now-to manage
its media coverage of bilateral irritants carefully, in order to promote
a more stable relationship with the US, for strategic and economic
reasons. China will continue to emphasize its independence in foreign
affairs, largely to appeal to nationalistic sentiment at home and to
facilitate dealing with the Soviet threat and with suspicious Third
World friends, like North Korea. The Soviets presumably also are
discouraging closer Sino-US ties in any private contacts they may
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1 1- May 1984
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SPAIN: .. Implications of.IRegional Election
A regional party-the center-right Convergence and Union-
decisively won the regional election in Catalonia on Sunday, but
prime Minister Gonzalez's Socialist party also increased its
share of the vote.
Convergence and. Union has raised its representation from 43 to 72
seats and has won an absolute majority in the 135-member regional
assembly. The Socialists also increased their share, from 33 to 41
seats. The chief national opposition party, the conservative Popular
Alliance, won only 11 seats in the assembly. The Communists in
Catalonia dropped from 25 to six seats, and other regionalist parties
declined from 16 to five seats.
Comment: The vote in Catalonia was primarily an endorsement for
the Convergence and Union's management of regional affairs for the
past four years, but it also has national implications. The party's
strong showing will add impetus to the effort of Miguel Roca-the
leader of its parliamentary delegation in Madrid-to forge a new
federation of centrist and regional parties. The Popular Alliance's
distant third-place finish will renew the public's doubts about party
leader Manuel Fraga's ability to attract enough centrist support to run
effectively against the Socialists in the next national election.
The failure of the Communists leaves Prime Minister Gonzalez secure
from any threat from the left and free to continue moderate policies
that appeal to centrist voters. The Communists' decline in
Catalonia-long a stronghold for them-stemmed largely from widely
publicized infighting over personalities and policies as well as from
the emergence of the new pro-Soviet party.
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Cairo is slowly moving toward normalized relations with Moscow
but is not yet ready to exchange ambassadors.
Egyptian Foreign Minister All has been misquoted in the press twice,
most recently last weekend, as announcing that Cairo and Moscow
have agreed to exchange ambassadors. In a published interview, Ali
merely said that Egypt's good relations with the US do not prevent it
from restoring full relations with the USSR.
Normalized relations were not the principal topic during the visit to
Cairo last month of Vladimir Polyakov, chief of the Near East
Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the last Soviet
Ambassador to Egypt.
Comment: President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials have said
repeatedly that Egypt has to have good relations with both
superpowers and that the USSR has to be involved in the Middle East
peace process. Cairo also believes that Moscow shares its concern
about ending the Iran-Iraq war.
Mubarak probably also believes that public comment about future
Egyptian-Soviet relations will help the government party in the coming
parliamentary elections. Egypt's opposition parties advocate more
balanced relations with the East and the West.
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Roman
osovo
(Autonomous pro mce)
if, ece
1 May 1984
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YUGOSLAVIA: Cabinet Changes
Major changes in the Cabinet-including changes among the top
economic advisers-reflect complex political and ethnically
based maneuvering, not policy changes.
The elevation of Foreign Minister Mojsov and Interior Minister Dolanc
to the collective federal presidency, effective on 15 May, is the
occasion for two changes. Raif Dizdarevic, a leading Bosnian Muslim
with limited diplomatic background, will be the new foreign minister.
The US Embassy reports that he believes that two of his predecessors
at the Ministry who are now entering the federal presidency may
interfere in his portfolio.
the new Interior Minister, Dobrislav . 25X1
Culafic, got his job with the support of his predecessor. Culafic will
preside over the Ministry that is enforcing a major crackdown on
dissidents and intellectuals. Serb leaders vetoed another candidate,
a Serb from Vojvodina Province, because his constituency stresses
its autonomy from the Republic of Serbia. 25X1
Vice Premier Dragan and member-without-portfolio Janko Smole, the
architects of Yugoslavia's stabilization strategy and the principal
negotiators with the IMF, are leaving for personal reasons. The US
Embassy reports that Dragan is exhausted following major surgery.
Another economist, Croat No Margan, is leaving, the Cabinet, in order
to assume an important position with UNESCO.
Comment: No major policy shifts are likely. The large number of
former foreign ministers in top executive posts probably ensures
continuity in Yugoslav foreign policy. Belgrade's dealings with
Western creditors may temporarily suffer from the loss of its most
experienced financial negotiators. but the IMF package for 1984 has
been completed.
Culafic probably will have trouble asserting control over Interior in the
shadow of Dolanc. The latter reportedly wants to head the powerful
Federal Council for the Defense of the Constitutional Order, which
oversees internal security policy.
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DENMARK: Security Debate
In a major security debate in Parliament tomorrow, the opposition
Social Democrats probably will present a resolution banning
deployment of nuclear weapons in Denmark under any
circumstances. It also will call for no-first-use, curtailment of INF
deployment, and a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone.
Comment: There is a good chance the Social Democrats can gain a
majority for such a resolution. Excluding nuclear weapons even in
wartime would raise serious questions about the Danish role in NATO
and could also have repercussions on the security debate in Norway
and the Netherlands. The Social Democrats reportedly are not
seeking the government's ouster at this time, and they presumably
will push for wording that will not require the government to adopt the
resolution as policy or resign.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Economic Pressures Persist
The government has promised to back a wage bill now before
congress, enact legislation on job security for union organizers, and
expand the social security system. The country's five labor
confederations have been demand in as well
as on price controls. Meanwhile, police
occupied several labor headquar ers as wee , and, accor ing to the
US Embassy, authorities are taking extra security precautions for
Labor Day demonstrations planned today.
Comment: Tensions continue high as price increases on basic
commodities and planned hikes on petroleum products threaten to
push inflation to more than 40 percent this year-four times higher
than last year. Strict budgetary controls demanded by the IMF will
limit wage increases and probably will require new taxes.
Nevertheless, President Jorge Blanco appears determined to carry
out the austerity program while maintaining public order by granting
limited concessions and by continuing tight security. The violence
associated with suppressing the riots last week has restored order
but probably has inflicted lasting damage on Jorge Blanco's political
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NORTH KOREA-USSR-CHINA: Summit Visits
North Korean President Kim II-song hopes to use separate summit
meetings with Chinese and Soviet leaders this month to increase his
support from them and to discourage the growing level of contacts
between Seoul and the Communist superpowers, especially China.
Chinese party leader Hu Yaobang will visit P' on an this week. and
Kim will travel to Moscow later this month
Comment: Hu Yaobang will use his visit to reassure Kim that Beijing
did not compromise North Korean interests in talks with President
Reagan. In Moscow, where Kim has not visited in an official capacity
since 1961, he will probably seek greater material support, including
project aid and advanced weapons systems, and Soviet backing for
his plans to have his son. succeed him. Moscow views Kim's visit as an
opportunity to signal that Soviet interests cannot be ignored in any.
Korean settlement. The visit also will give Moscow a chance to take
advantage of, and possibly add to, strains in Chinese-North Korean
relations caused by Beijing's contacts as closer
Chinese ties with the US and Japan.
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CHAD-LIBYA: Rebel Discontent With Tripoli
the Libyans may be restricting
the movement of the Vice President of Chad's rebel government-in-
exile after he tried to arrange a meeting with a representative of
President Habre's regime last month. Chadian Government officials
claim that some 50 dissidents fled the Libyan stronghold at Fada last
week and defected to the Habre regime. In addition, a serious dispute
over military strategy arose last month between Chadian rebel troops
and Libyan forces deployed near the 16th parallel
Comment: Rebel disgruntlement almost certainly stems from Tripoli's
heavyhanded control in the north and the dissidents' realization that
they have lost their autonomy. Libya will be able to contain outbreaks
of rebel discontent, but problems are likely to fester as long as the
military stalemate continues. Increasing rebel unhappiness with the
Libyans is likely to enhance Habre's image as a legitimate leader for
Chadians favoring national independence.
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USSR
In Brief
- Soviets last week insisted any agreement to improve US hotline
should be recorded by exchange of notes ... they want to avoid
formal document that suggests breakthrough in relations while
arms control issues remain unresolved.
that authorities will not tolerate violence.
- Egyptian authorities have arrested 53 members of Islamic
extremist group ... some members of another religious group also
arrested for sabotage ... crackdown intended to remind public
__]Zambia will take only political refugees ... most will go
members expelled from Mozambique,
- Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia have offered refuge to ANC
to Tanzania, which permits guerrilla training.
and Ethiopia ... successful talks might lead to high-It-VA
exchange ... no lasting solution likely any time soon.
- Kenyan President Moi trying to mediate dispute between Sudan
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Special Analysis
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INTERNATIONAL: Suppression of Illegal Narcotics
Governments of some of the principal drug-exporting countries
in Asia and Latin America are having at least limited success in
their efforts, backed by the US, to combat narcotics activities.
Results range from good to poor, and the gains are mainly short
term. There has been little disruption of illicit crop production,
which is. expected to rise this year in most areas. Control
programs may gradually gain ground, but limited resources,
domestic pressures, and widespread corruption continue to
prevent more substantial progress toward suppression of the
international drug trade.
The US Drug Enforcement Administration and the National Institute
on Drug Abuse say that more than 40 million people in the US are
expected to spend up to $80 billion this year to consume some 4 tons
of heroin, as much as 61 tons of cocaine, and about 14,000 tons of
marijuana. Nearly all of these drugs come from crops grown in foreign
countries, where illegal drug activities are an important part of the
local economy
Latin America produces most of the marijuana, all of the cocaine, and
about a quarter of the heroin imported to the US, according to DEA
estimates. Control efforts are making little headway, and kev
segments of the drug industry remain largely unrestricted
Colombia's cocaine and marijuana traffickers dominate the US
market. Last year Colombia produced between 13,000 and 16,000
tons of marijuana, and the country's cultivation of coca has increased
considerably-the latter crop is still grown primarily in Bolivia and
The Colombian Government, like others in Latin America, assigns a
low priority to narcotics control. Its recent decision to undertake a
campaign to test herbicide spray against selected coca and marijuana
fields and its recent seizure of a large cocaine processing and
trafficking complex indicate at least some willingness to begin to
crack down on producers and traffickers. At the same time, strong
nationalist sentiment, domestic political concerns, lack of financial
resources, and the economic influence of the powerful illicit drug
industry remain major obstacles to tighter control of narcotics
activities in Colombia.
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Mexico's once exemplary opium eradication program-which made
substantial inroads into production between 1 d 1982-has
been weakened Opium output 25X6,
increased in 1983, and both the opium harvest and heroin shipments
are expected to rise again this year. Although Mexican marijuana
probably still accounts for only a small percentage of US
consumption, exports are likely to increase in 1984. 25X1
The Jamaican Government's recent crackdown on marijuana
smuggling has stalled, because of the traffickers' political influence,
and because the Army is not strong enough to conduct sustained
large-scale interdiction operations. Marijuana shipments from
Jamaica-the second-largest supplier to the US after Colombia,
according to DEA-have nearly doubled since 1981 and are likely
to exceed 2,000 tons this year.
Drug traffickers in some Latin American countries, meanwhile, are
diversifying their operations or are beginning to play a major role in
the international market for the first time. Peruvian coca growers are
becoming directly involved in refining and smuggling cocaine. Belize
has greatly increased its marijuana production in recent years, and it
could overtake Jamaica this year as the second-largest supplier to the
us.
Southwest Asia's "Golden Crescent" -Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Iran-has long been the largest opium producing and consuming
region in the world. According to the DEA, it currently accounts for
about half the heroin reaching the US.
Steady reductions until this year in opium production in the region
were largely the result of the drop in Pakistan from about 700 tons in 25X1
1979 to 45 to 60 tons in 1983. The Pakistanis attribute their continued
success in curbing production to crop substitution, although
unfavorable weather and soft market prices apparently have played
a more important role. Pakistan has an organized antinarcotics
program, but it is reluctant to risk a politically costly showdown with
traffickers and refiners in the Pakistani-Afghan border area, where
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Increased opium output during the past two years in Afghanistan has
enabled traffickers to offset Pakistan's reductions and evidently will
result in a net increase this year in regional production. The regime. in
Kabul shows little interest in allocating scarce resources to narcotics
control, even though much of its opium production may be helping to
support farmers who are active in the insurgency.
Iran apparently is a net importer of opium. It is concerned chiefly with
finding ways to cope with its large addict population and discounts
its role as a refining and transshipment point for some heroin
consignments going to Turkish traffickers.
Southwest Asian heroin is expected to remain plentiful and could
become even more abundant if competition among traffickers
increases to take advantage of continued surplus production. The
existing glut of Golden Crescent heroin on the European market
might lead to larger shipments to the US.
Narcotics production activities in the "Golden Triangle," where
Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet, are concentrated primarily along
the Thai-Burmese border. Southeast Asia currently produces about
a quarter of the heroin reaching the US, according to DEA.
Thailand's increased use of military force during the past two years
against the groups that control the region's main opium-growing
areas have had some temporary impact on refining and smuggling
operations in the border area. The smugglers, however, are moving
base camps and refineries deeper inside Burma, and some of the
groups have agreed to work together to protect their access to
opium, shipments of supplies and chemicals, and trafficking routes.
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Thailand's limited crop-substitution program continues to be poorly
enforced, and Bangkok has been slow to promote wider participation
among farmers, who sometimes could make more money by
switching to other crops. The country's limited attempts at opium
crop eradication have not had much impact either, and se and
political concerns curithave 25X6
kept the government from gettingenouah domestic ort to
undertake large-scale eradication. 25X1
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Bangkok resumed some eradication efforts near the border with
Burma in late February. This move, however, came too late in the
growing season to have much effect. It probably was only a short-
term effort at least partly aimed at easing US criticism during Prime
Minister Prem's visit to Washington last month.
Burma is estimated to grow more than 80 percent of the opium
produced in Southeast Asia, and its problem-plagued antinarcotics
programs are part of its broader counterinsurgency effort. Top
eradication projects have had little impact and increasingly have been
hindered by guerrilla threats of reprisals. Plans by Burma to expand
control efforts have been stalled by lack of funds and by high-level
government and military corruption.
The opium harvest in the region this year is expected to be larger than
the 600 tons produced last year, perhaps as much as 700 tons,
according to preliminary DEA projections based on US Embassy
reporting The impending bumper crop
and the likelihood that many traffickers will adapt quickly to recent
disruptions almost certainly will lead to continued increases in heroin
shipments to the US from the Golden Triangle.
Although production estimates for specific countries are often based
on sketchy information and are not precise, intelligence
indicates that wordwide production of illicit drug crops will
expand in 1984. The result-as projected by DEA-will be an
increase in the quantity of drugs available for export to the US this
year. Large, long-term cuts in drug crop harvests are unlikely to be
achieved in most of the key producing countries in the foreseeable
future. Crop size will continue to be determined mainly by weather
Even if major progress were achieved in one region, the net
availability of illicit drugs to the US would be unlikely to decline. There
is no evidence of organized coordination of narcotics activities in the
three key regions, but producers and traffickers worldwide have been
quick to exploit oooortunities afforded by local shortages and
disruptions.
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Narcotics Smuggling: Major Routes and Cultivation Areas
Major Routes
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